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“Misreading Skepticism in the Long Eighteenth Century: Studies in the Rhetoric of Assent” 
revisits the intellectual historical conditions that contributed to the widespread internalization of 
skepticism as an error-reduction strategy during the Enlightenment. To do so, it abandons a 
longstanding emphasis the special philosophical tradition of epistemological skepticism 
associated with the Scottish philosopher David Hume and pursues an alternative intellectual 
history of Enlightenment skepticism centered on the Anglophone tradition of “constructive 
skepticism” that informed not only Hume’s skeptical habits but those of other influential 
Anglophone Enlightenment thinkers more often set in opposition to Hume. “Misreading 
Skepticism” draws on this tradition of constructive skepticism to generate a much different 
picture of the character of Enlightenment skepticism than the one extrapolated from radical 
Humean skepticism: one that is not anxious but assured, not theoretical but pragmatic, not 
preoccupied with the threat of “radical uncertainty” but resolved to attaining “moral certainty” 
sufficient to justify belief and action despite irreducible uncertainty. Readings of the philosophy 
of John Locke, Thomas Reid, David Hume, Samuel Johnson, and Dugald Stewart recover the 
broader Enlightenment project of practical rationality that encouraged the widespread 
internalization and instrumentalization of constructive skepticism. Readings of eighteenth-
century rhetorical and legal treatises trace how this constructive skeptical ethos was disseminated 
beyond epistemology and embraced within a generalized theory of assent. “Misreading 
Skepticism” approaches this broader “misreading” in the modern intellectual history of 
skepticism through the special lens of Romantic literary studies, where scholars have 
traditionally framed the rise of British Romanticism as a response to a supposed epistemological 
“crisis” posed by Humean skepticism. “Misreading Skepticism” argues that, to understand the 
Romantic literary reaction to Enlightenment skepticism, we need to approach the intellectual 
history of British Romanticism not through Humean skepticism but through constructive 
skepticism. Readings of Romantic works by William Godwin, William Wordsworth, Mary 
Shelley, and other authors demonstrate how these Romantic writers use literary form to 
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interrogate the confident embrace of constructive skepticism within the Enlightenment as a 
means for managing uncertainty, often by dramatizing or thematizing elements of subjectivity 
and error that skepticism fails to detect or discipline. Drawing insight from the constructive 
skeptical tradition as well as Romantic literary critiques of that tradition, “Misreading 
Skepticism” develops a revisionary account of skepticism that attends to the rhetorical and social 








 Misreading Skepticism in the Long Eighteenth Century 
 
Johnson’s Kick 
After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of 
Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the nonexistence of matter, and 
that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are 
satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget 
the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force 
against a large stone, till he rebounded from it — "I refute it thus.”  
 
       -John Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson (1791)1 
Let me begin with a question about this famous anecdote from Boswell: Is Johnson’s 
argument skeptical? The answer depends on a more general, perennial question about how to 
define skepticism, and the anecdote itself recommends the two most common approaches to 
defining skepticism, though these approaches have conflicting implications for interpreting the 
kick. From one perspective, if we focus on Berkeley’s idealism, we might define skepticism 
more narrowly as a special kind of content: either a special set of arguments organized around 
specific problematics or a special philosophical system or tradition that preserves, comments on, 
and elaborates these special problematics. We might think of this as a strong, exclusive, or 
special definition of skepticism. From another perspective, if we focus on Johnson’s kick itself, 
we may define skepticism more loosely as a special form or mode of argument: skepticism as a 
loosely formal, highly mobile method of critique, or simply a kind of critical spirit, attitude, or 
disposition. We might think of this as a weak, inclusive, and more general definition of 
skepticism, better captured at the grammatical level by the adjective skeptical than the 
nominative skepticism.2 At its limit, this weak definition registers the merest shade of negative 
                                                            
1 Boswell, Life of Samuel Johnson, I:334. 
2The inclusive bent of the adjectival form relative to the nominal form skepticism becomes evident if we rephrase 
the opening question. The question “Is Johnson’s argument skepticism?” feels either slightly less viable or, 
alternatively, more like a provocation. The nominative suggests taking up a stronger, more exclusive definition for 
consideration, i.e. a Skepticism. Upon sensing this exclusivity in the question, one might be more inclined to request 
a proper definition or clarification first before giving an answer. By contrast, “Is Johnson’s argument skeptical?” 
seems to license a more liberal consideration. Thinking along this inclusive line might recommend a new exclusive 
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resistance: a shadow of a doubt, so to speak.3 It accommodates “hot” (more denunciatory and 
polemic) affects of doubt as well as “cold” (that is, more procedural, rational, disinterested) ones. 
This weak definition likewise accommodates unspecified forms of resistance as well as specified 
ones: one need not know why someone is skeptical to perceive they are so, much less trust any 
reason someone provides for his or her skepticism.4 
 These two views of skepticism, while distinct, are typically understood to be aligned, if 
not to overlap. Indeed, it is possible to think of the philosophical tradition of skepticism as a set 
of codified or ritualized skeptical performances, aimed at special problematics such as 
knowledge about the external world. As such, this rough distinction between content and form, 
or strong and weak definitions of skepticism, must finally be more heuristic than definitive. But 
Johnson’s kick demonstrates how these two interpretations can be placed at odds — especially 
within the modern history of skepticism, which tends to privilege a narrower or more specialized 
definition of skepticism at the expense of a weaker or more accommodating definition of 
skepticism. Many, for instance, would be inclined to interpret Johnson’s argument as anti-
skeptical because they identify skepticism with the special modern tradition of epistemological 
skepticism initiated by Descartes, carried forward by Berkeley and Locke, and epitomized by 
Hume. Reversing this line of thought, we might say that if Johnson’s argument appears anti-
skeptical at all, then this would imply the currency of a strong, exclusive, special definition of 
skepticism that emerges out of this modern epistemological tradition. For ease, I will call this 
special, exclusive, epistemological definition Skepticism. And I will call a strong sense of the 
currency of Skepticism or a firm commitment to this definition of Skepticism above others a 
Skeptical perspective.  
 Johnson himself would have likely interpreted his argument to be anti-Skeptical, though 
he would have understood his grounds for rejecting Berkeley’s skepticism to be more theological 
                                                            
definition, in the same way an extensive definition might recommend an intensive one, but an exclusive definition 
does not initially restrict or determine it. 
3Consider Lorraine Daston’s remark that “[t]his state of withheld or suspended belief…known as skepticism, and it 
comes in varying strengths, from mild demur to radical doubt” (“Scientific Error” 22). 
4I adopt this binary following Richard H. Popkin’s claim that, in the eighteenth-century, skepticism would have been 
viewed as “a set of arguments and/or as an attitude” (283). Literary critics often pursue a much more capacious, 
mobile account of skepticism. Interrogating the nature of Percy Shelley’s skepticism, for instance, Spencer Hall 
generates this catalogue of possible interpretations: “Is skepticism in fact a ‘theme,’ an actual subject or topic, or is it 
rather a turn or thought and feeling, a way of seeing, interpreting, and expressing reality?” (71). While accepting this 
wider range of possible significations, here I follow Popkin (and others) by adopting a heuristic binary.  
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and moral than epistemological (we might note that Boswell and Johnson are leaving church).5 
More precisely, Johnson would have not have perceived the distance distinction between 
“moral” and “epistemological” that the tradition of Skepticism has long since ingrained. From a 
pre-Skeptical perspective, “moral” has a more technical, neutral, and epistemological sense of 
“moral knowledge” or opinion. As Johnson notes in The Elements of Philosophy, moral 
knowledge designates “physical truths which related to created Natures,” “all political and 
historical Truths,” and all propositions which are “contingent” in that “their Non-existence 
implies no Absurdity” (Johnson Elements 75). In any case, Johnson clearly has little reverence 
for Skepticism. In kicking the stone, Johnson understands himself to be attacking the very 
seriousness and legitimacy of the Skeptical tradition.  
Yet it seems evident that, even as Johnson’s argument is anti-Skeptical in content, 
Johnson’s argument is also skeptical in the weaker, more inclusive, formal sense I have outlined 
above. In other words, Johnson seems to achieve his anti-Skeptical content with a skeptical 
performance. What is Johnson’s kick if not a skeptical experiment meant to take up and test — 
so as to critique and “refute” — Berkeley’s claim regarding the immateriality of matter? 
Therefore, if Johnson’s refutation of Berkeley illustrates his disdain for Skepticism, it also 
reveals Johnson’s investment in a form of methodological skepticism, not to mention his distinct 
appreciation for how this methodological skepticism might be mobilized to attack and even 
ridicule a narrower tradition of Skepticism. Indeed, this methodological skepticism is specifically 
recommended by Johnson’s theory of moral knowledge and the principle of sufficient reason that 
undergirds it. One can be “said to have a moral Certainty” about moral knowledge when there 
“remains no sufficient Reason to doubt of the Truth of it” (75). 
 From a certain Skeptical perspective, however, Johnson’s hostility towards Skepticism 
tends to eclipse his more basic commitment to a formal, methodological, or procedural 
skepticism. From a certain Skeptical perspective, to be a skeptic is to witness, preserve, and 
clarify the special significance of Skepticism. This is evidently not Johnson’s intent. Therefore, 
from a certain Skeptical perspective, Johnson’s skeptical responses to Skepticism have routinely 
been interpreted as reactionary and dogmatic, as illegitimate rather than legitimate forms of 
skepticism. Johnson’s kick is more often interpreted as an anti-Skeptical joke rather than a 
                                                            
5 In the entry for 31 October 1784, Johnson lists eleven “causes” of skepticism, including “study not for truth but 
vanity” and “indifference about opinions” (Johnson Annals 414). Two notably have to do with false evidentiary 
procedures.  
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skeptical argument, even by his many anti-Skeptical sympathizers.6 And Johnson’s moral 
skepticism has been routinely placed outside rather than inside the history of modern skepticism 
– or even modern intellectual history altogether – as defined by Skepticism. This history – by 
excluding Johnson — distorts the broader internalization of skepticism that defines the modern 
critical ethos; by pursuing a history that includes Johnson, we can illuminate and correct for that 
distortion. 
 
Carlyle Reading Johnson 
 For an early, representative example of the anti-Skeptical reading of Johnson, consider 
the following passage from Thomas Carlyle’s 1832 review of Boswell’s biography: 
[Johnson’s] culture is wholly English; that not of a Thinker but of a ‘Scholar:’ he 
sees and knows nothing but England; he is the John Bull of Spiritual Europe: let him 
live, love him, as he was and could not but be! Pitiable it is, no doubt, that a Samuel 
Johnson must confute Hume’s irreligious Philosophy by some ‘story from a Clergy-
man of the Bishoprick of Durham;’ should see nothing in the great Frederick but 
‘Voltaire’s lackey;’ in Voltaire himself but a man acerrimi ingenii, paucarum 
literarum; in Rousseau but one worthy to be hanged; and in the universal, long-
prepared, inevitable Tendency of European thought but a green-sick milkmaid’s 
crotchet of, for variety’s sake, ‘milking the bull.’ Our good, dear John!” (Carlyle 
155)  
 
To unpack Carlyle’s reading of Johnson’s reaction to Hume, we might first observe that Carlyle 
understands Hume’s “irreligious Philosophy” to represent something more than a special 
philosophical system. Carlyle takes Hume’s Skeptical arguments to have epitomized or even 
effected a more general and even universal Skeptical disposition, what Carlyle calls the 
“universal, long-prepared, inevitable Tendency of European thought” (155). To use my terms 
from above, we might say that Carlyle sees Hume’s Skepticism as a form as well as content. It 
goes without saying that Carlyle has a Skeptical perspective, not to mention a distinctively 
progressive one, and that Carlyle sees himself as partaking in the spirit of Skepticism; unlike 
                                                            
6 Of course, a number of scholars have treated Johnson’s skepticism. Here I will be concerned primarily with 
historical, neo-Kantian interpretations of Johnson’s anti-skeptical reaction to Hume. And, on this front, as Martin 
Maner has recently argued, some “might object to the use of the term ‘skepticism’ in characterizing Johnson’s 
thought because they associate the term with an inverted dogmatism that denies the possibility of genuine 
knowledge” (35). But, Maner asserts, Johnson’s “manner of sifting historical and biographical testimony shows 
everywhere the influence of constructive skepticism” (35). Nicholas Hudson treats Johnson’s Whiggish 
conservatism as largely skeptical in Samuel Johnson and the Making of Modern England. Jack Lynch has made a 
case for Johnson as a “skeptic of a sort” (Lynch 2). For an earlier treatment of Johnson’s relation to skepticism, see 
Robert G. Walker, “Johnson in the ‘Age of Evidences’ Huntington Library Quarterly 44.1 (1980): 27-41.  
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Johnson, he has absorbed Hume’s Skeptical insights. The surest sign of Carlyle’s Skeptical 
perspective is Carlyle’s tendency to naturalize or idealize this “Tendency of thought” — in other 
words, Carlyle’s overwhelming sense that Skepticism is universal, long-prepared, and inevitable 
in this manner. 
 From Carlyle’s perspective, the surest way to tell if someone has a Skeptical perspective 
is to observe his or her reaction to Hume. To qualify as a Skeptic, one must finally be able to see 
something significant and representative in Hume’s Skepticism. Johnson’s response to Hume 
therefore may be skeptical in some sense, but it is also obviously not Skeptical because Johnson 
“see[s] nothing” in Hume’s Skepticism where hindsight has clarified that Johnson should have 
seen something universal, long-prepared, and inevitable. Instead of embracing Hume’s 
Skepticism as significant and representative, Johnson dismisses it as idiosyncratic and idle. This 
is the force of Johnson’s colorful charge that Hume “milk[s] the bull” for variety’s sake. From 
Johnson’s perspective, the idiosyncratic and idle aspect of Hume’s philosophy is what makes 
Hume’s skepticism illegitimate rather than legitimate, excessive rather than essential.  
 Carlyle clearly appreciates Johnson’s reasoning even as he rejects its application to Hume 
because Carlyle effectively turns the same charge of idiosyncrasy against Johnson to clarify the 
illegitimacy of Johnson’s response. Carlyle’s Skeptical perspective is so strong that Johnson 
almost seems, quite improbably, to be protesting Hume out of sheer envy and spite. In some 
respect, Johnson’s resistance looks like little more than bald jealousy to Carlyle. He 
delegitimizes Johnson’s charge by tracing his idiom back to its literal and undignified origin. 
Carlyle describes “milking the bull” as a “green-sick milkmaid’s crotchet” — in other words, the 
homespun conceit of a jealous farm girl. Carlyle thus doubles down on Johnson’s logic: 
Johnson’s accusation against Hume is itself idiosyncratic and illegitimate, not to mention 
unseemly. This is one reason why Johnson’s inability to grasp Hume is more “pitiable” than 
anything, especially given Johnson’s otherwise formidable stature. For Carlyle, it is pitiable that 
“a Samuel Johnson” would have been so unmanned by Hume (to risk putting too fine a point on 
the distinctly gendered character of Carlyle’s critique). Johnson’s “green-sick” response suggests 
that even Johnson secretly knows as much.7 
                                                            
7Incidentally, Carlyle gives Johnson a much more sympathetic, even laudatory, treatment in “The Hero as Man of 
Letters” (1840) so this depiction is more stylized than serious, but it also masterfully executes the trope I want to 
observe. 
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 Carlyle does not take Johnson’s hostility to be solely personal in nature. Much in the 
same way that Carlyle sees Hume’s Skepticism as representative of an enlightened Skeptical 
disposition, Carlyle sees Johnson’s resistance as characteristic of an earlier, unenlightened 
disposition. Johnson’s error is cultural and intellectual as well as personal. Johnson comes off as 
hopelessly ill-equipped to answer or even comprehend Hume; it is as if Johnson had not been 
sufficiently trained to see anything significant in Hume’s Skepticism. Johnson’s arguments 
against Hume are not simply compromised by envy; they are feeble enough in their own right to 
be pitiable. His appeal to the authority of a county clergyman, for instance, reads as a painfully 
provincial and dogmatic reply to Hume’s sophisticated intellectual machinery. It reflects the 
impoverished evidentiary and argumentative procedures of a more credulous and dogmatic age. 
This is why Johnson is a “Scholar” rather than a “Thinker:” Johnson’s neo-classical erudition 
comes off as fundamentally slavish and unoriginal when measured against Carlyle’s Romantic 
appreciation for creativity and originality. All in all, Carlyle takes Johnson’s vision to be 
constricted by a narrow Englishness, woefully impoverished when measured against the more 
cosmopolitan, Continental, Skeptical perspective ushered in by Hume and his enlightened allies. 
Johnson sees nothing significant or representative in Hume’s Skepticism because finally he “sees 
and knows nothing but England” (155). Johnson, as well as his English sensibility, appears 
almost cartoonish from within Carlyle’s Skeptical perspective: Johnson is the “John Bull of 
Spiritual Europe,” a metonymic relation reinforced in Carlyle’s final exasperated cry, “our good, 
dear John!” 
 
Carlyle’s Reading of Johnson is Neo-Kantian 
 Carlyle’s reading of Johnson against Hume, so to speak, amounts to an early articulation 
of what would eventually become a potent and influential intellectual history of modernity 
constructed around the rise of epistemological Skepticism. Despite Hume’s special prominence, 
this intellectual history is best understood as “neo-Kantian” because its characteristic features 
can be traced more or less directly to Kant. Kant, by his own account, is the first philosopher to 
see anything significant in Hume’s Skepticism. But Kant is also the first philosopher to propose 
using the reception of Hume’s Skepticism to divide up history in the manner Carlyle does. 
Therefore, I will use “neo-Kantian intellectual history” as a shorthand to refer to this influential 
intellectual-historical tradition that emerges out of Kant’s negotiation with Hume according to 
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which Kant’s “discovery” of epistemology is taken to be the foundational moment of modern 
thought.  That Copernican turn, so called, shifted attention from metaphysics on the one hand 
and empiricist philosophy on the other (both considered instances of first philosophy, or 
practices of knowledge-making) to epistemology, to the study of the conditions that make 
experience and knowledge possible. 
Neo-Kantian intellectual history is, among other things, unapologetically progressive in 
character. After Kant, there are those who, like Carlyle, see something significant in Hume’s 
Skeptical philosophy and those who once saw nothing in Hume. Neo-Kantian intellectual history 
is invested in observing and explaining the significant distance between these two intellectual 
dispositions. Consider Kant’s picture of Hume’s reception in the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics (1783, hereafter Prolegomena), which is notably not a diptych but a triptych: not 
simply Kant and Hume but Kant, Hume, and Hume’s Scottish commonsense contemporaries — 
Thomas Reid and James Beattie, among others — whom Kant introduces only to ridicule for 
being too blinkered by an older unphilosophical way of thinking to take Hume’s Skepticism 
seriously, to recognize the seriousness of its threat. Carlyle is in some sense reproducing this 
Kantian trope with Johnson: Carlyle not only triangulates himself against Hume and Johnson; he 
also naturalizes his particular orientation towards Hume by effectively presenting Johnson’s as 
unfortunate and, as we will see, even potentially unintelligible. 
Johnson, Johnson’s Scottish commonsense allies Reid and Beattie, and even the entire 
eighteenth-century Anglophone intellectual tradition out of which these thinkers emerge have all 
tended to suffer a similar fate within a neo-Kantian intellectual history of modernity. Their 
hostility to Hume relegates them to a prior, premodern era. Their brand of anti-Skeptical 
skepticism reads as reactionary instead of reasonable, rhetorical instead of philosophical. But, we 
might ask, if one were interested in telling a story about this “universal, long-prepared, inevitable 
Tendency of European thought,” as Carlyle apparently was, wouldn’t Johnson’s investment in a 
methodological skepticism despite or even because of his anti-Skepticism be a site of potential 
interest? Wouldn’t that investment constitute compelling evidence of the extensive 
internalization of skepticism that Carlyle takes to define modern thought? Wouldn’t Johnson’s 
investment in methodological skepticism suggest that this skeptical disposition is lodged even 
deeper than Carlyle imagines: deep enough, as it were, to still be compatible with an explicit 
anti-Skeptical position at the level of propositional content? From this perspective, it is difficult 
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to see how Johnson’s commonsense skepticism would not fall within this broader tendency of 
thought or what one gains by defining skepticism in a way that does not acknowledge Johnson’s 
skepticism as either legitimate or interesting. This perspective recommends pushing back against 
this neo-Kantian picture of things and reimagining the modern intellectual history of skepticism 
in a way that places Johnson’s commonsense skepticism squarely within it.  
Indeed, these questions about Carlyle’s Skeptical perspective might be asked of the 
Skeptical perspective of modern philosophy more broadly. The appreciation for the special status 
of epistemology has long encouraged privileging Hume’s “radical epistemological skepticism” 
not only as a singularly modern version of skepticism but as the definitive articulation of 
“philosophical” skepticism.8 With few exceptions, modern approaches to skepticism have 
amounted to one long commentary on the special significance of Hume’s Skepticism. This 
preoccupation with Skepticism has encouraged a general indifference towards other forms of 
“ordinary incredulity,” which are taken to be more procedural than properly philosophical and 
more preoccupied than clear-eyed and radically “uncommitted,” as epistemological skepticism 
claims to be.9 But, more interestingly, this neo-Kantian preoccupation with Skepticism has 
encouraged a distinct hostility and dismissiveness towards “commonsense skepticism,” which 
we might characterize by an explicit rejection of radical epistemological Skepticism and its very 
seriousness as a philosophical tradition. As the philosophers Joseph Agassi and John Wettersten 
have observed, modern philosophy has consistently struggled to theorize commonsense 
skepticism, largely because it has struggled to appreciate that “it is the insatiable version of 
skepticism and only this version, which common sense (correctly) expunges” as “objectionable” 
because this insatiability is “devoid of all sense of proportion” (429). As such, modern 
philosophers of skepticism have struggled to understand “in what sense…skepticism is contrary 
to common sense, and in what sense not at all” (428).  
                                                            
8 In his influential anti-Skeptical study, Unnatural Doubts (1996) Michael Williams observes that epistemological 
skepticism has become the “paradigm of a sceptical problem” (1) and speculates that “the materials for constructing 
the problem were always at hand, buried in the most basic and universal epistemological ideas, but unnoticed until a 
philosopher came along with sufficient clarity of mind to see their true significance” (1). Williams traces the major 
case for the historical novelty of Descartes’ epistemological skepticism to M.F. Burnyeat’s “Idealism and Greek 
Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” The Philosophical Review, 41.1 (1982). 
9 In his entry for “Skepticism” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Peter Klein insists that in order to grasp 
what makes philosophical skepticism “so intriguing,” we must distinguish between “ordinary incredulity” in which 
“the grounds for the doubt can, in principle, be removed” (np) and “philosophical skepticism,” which “attempts to 
render doubtful every member of some class of propositions” (np). 
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This preoccupation with Skepticism is arguably why one would be inclined to see 
Johnson’s kick as anti-Skeptical rather than skeptical in some fundamental sense. A neo-Kantian, 
Skeptical perspective recommends reading Johnson’s kick as more rhetorical than philosophical, 
more witty joke than argument. One aim of this dissertation is to encourage a view of Johnson’s 
kick that is more skeptical than anti-Skeptical, if not “Skeptical” in some archetypal sense: to 
reimagine Johnson’s kick at the center of a modern rhetoric of skepticism.10 In short, I want to 
encourage a firm “yes” to my initial question, “Is Johnson’s argument skeptical?” My claim is 
that neo-Kantian intellectual history crucially misrepresents the character of modern skepticism. 
In short, neo-Kantian intellectual history has pursued its philosophical picture of Skepticism at 
the expense of a more illuminating account of what skepticism is or how it functions. Johnson’s 
kick not only attunes us to the internalized character of modern skepticism — which, as Lorraine 
Daston notes, is “so reflexive an intellectual stance for moderns that some effort is required to 
appreciate its strangeness” (22) — or its distinctly rhetorical character. Johnson’s kick captures 
skepticism’s instrumental and conservative character: how skepticism appeals to a norm of 
reasonableness to drive out a perceived deviation from that norm as excess and idiosyncrasy. 
Indeed, this conservative appeal to idiosyncrasy is the only thing that can be said to unite Carlyle 
and Johnson’s skeptical orientations. It is this conservative character of skepticism in general and 
its own brand of Skepticism that neo-Kantian intellectual history has never adequately 
appreciated.11 
 
Introducing Neo-Kantian Romanticism 
                                                            
10I develop this reading of Johnson’s kick at length in Chapter 2. For other notable readings of Johnson’s kick, see 
Ian Hacking, “Rocks,” in The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999: 186-
206 and Helen Deutsch and Mary Terrall, “Introduction,” Vital Matters: Eighteenth-Century Views of Conception, 
Life, and Death. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012: 3-12. 
11 George Santayana captures this conservative character of skepticism in his introduction to Scepticism and Animal 
Faith (1923):  
Here is one more system of philosophy. If the reader is tempted to smile, I can assure him that I smile with 
him, and that my system…differs widely in spirit and pretensions from what usually goes by that name. In 
the first place, my system is not mine, nor new. I am merely attempting to express for the reader the 
principles to which he appeals when he smiles” (v).  
Here Santayana focuses on the commonsense skeptical “smile” which targets the Skeptic’s idiosyncrasy (“not mine, 
nor new”) with its reflective and conservative appeal to animal faith. We might think of Johnson’s kick itself as a 
clarification of the “principles to which [the skeptic] appeals when he smiles” (v). This conservative character is the 
reason that Johnson’s kick must read as a joke before an argument: why it must read as more dismissive of 
Skepticism than engaged with it. 
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In this dissertation, I explore the outsized influence that neo-Kantian intellectual history 
has had within twentieth-century approaches to British Romanticism, tracking and correcting the 
distortions I believe this influence has introduced into critical accounts of the British Romantic 
literature: not least, a compromising preoccupation with Humean skepticism. From at least the 
mid-twentieth century on, specialists in the field have been inclined to read Romanticism through 
neo-Kantian intellectual history — indeed, for many of the same reasons that we observed 
Carlyle was inclined to read his intellectual-historical moment through a more strictly Kantian 
Universal History.12 Just as Carlyle embraced a neo-Kantian Universal History for the way the 
rise of Humean skepticism outlined a clear “break” into modern thought from an earlier 
premodern era, so too Romantic literary critics have been inclined to embrace neo-Kantian 
intellectual history for the way it clarifies the rise of Romanticism as a specific and specifically 
modern intellectual formation. 
From a neo-Kantian perspective, Humean epistemological skepticism is generally taken 
to set the basic intellectual and philosophical contours of Romanticism. As Taylor Schey has 
recently observed, in contemporary Romantic criticism Hume’s skepticism is “customarily 
figured as a dark shadow or ‘threat’ that most Romantic writers avoid, repress, or attempt to 
overcome” (Schey 180). Moreover, a special appreciation for the significance of Humean 
epistemological skepticism recommends “constru[ing] the consequences of Enlightenment 
skepticisms” narrowly and exclusively in terms of “crisis and privation” (180). This sense of 
crisis is read either directly from the most radically skeptical passages of Hume’s philosophy or 
from Kant’s later amplification of this radical register. As Schey notes, scholars of Romanticism 
tend to adopt this neo-Kantian framework “[r]egardless of critical persuasion” (180): that is, 
critics tend to accept the claim that Romantics were responding either directly or indirectly to the 
“crisis” of Humean skepticism, even as they disagree widely about the nature or significance of 
that Romantic response.13 This philosophical-historical interpretation of Hume — the tendency to 
see his philosophy as a primary coordinate in modern intellectual history — plays an important 
                                                            
12I discuss Carlyle’s embrace of Kantian Universal History earlier in the introduction. Carlyle refers to Humean 
skepticism as “universal, long-prepared, inevitable Tendency of European thought” (155) and, in an essay on 
Samuel Johnson, laments Johnson’s inability to “see” anything of value in Hume’s skepticism, an inability that for 
Carlyle puts Johnson on the wrong side of history and relegates him to earlier, dogmatic intellectual epoch.  
13Indeed, Schey’s catalogue of responses — “avoid, repress, or attempt to overcome” — is deceptively compact. The 
last several decades of Anglophone Romantic criticism have been devoted to characterizing the nature of this 
Romantic response, and each of these answers has been pursued by a generation of scholars. 
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role in literary critical narratives of the rise of Romanticism, especially as they clarify the rise 
and significance of literature as an autonomous field. Hume-as-radical-skeptic fits into a shared 
account in modern literary criticism, a foundational narrative that sits well below even the 
obvious rifts of the late twentieth century between mid-century neo-Kantian Romanticism and 
the post-structuralist movements formulated, in large part, in reaction to it. My aim here will be 
to draw out and contest this foundational narrative.  
Despite my narrow disciplinary focus on literary studies, I ultimately intend to comment 
on the nature and significance of neo-Kantian intellectual history more broadly, not only as it 
informs and illuminates this foundational narrative but as it has shaped the broader landscape of 
modern Western thought. My reasons for limiting the scope of this inquiry to Romantic literary 
criticism are practical and personal — related to my field of expertise — and therefore to some 
extent arbitrary. But there are at least two strong considerations that recommend using Romantic 
literary criticism as a special lens for viewing this broader neo-Kantian formation. The first is the 
enthusiasm and rigor with which mid-twentieth century Romantic literary critics first embraced 
neo-Kantian intellectual history as an interpretative lens. As we will see, a loosely neo-Kantian 
interpretation of Romanticism effectively unified Romantic literary criticism at the mid-twentieth 
century around a stable definition of Romanticism as a “neo-Kantian” response to Hume. The 
concerted mid-twentieth century effort at articulating a neo-Kantian interpretation of 
Romanticism resulted in a number of powerful literary histories of Romanticism that continue to 
have currency within the field and beyond, and that arguably amount to the most sophisticated, 
creative articulations of neo-Kantian intellectual history altogether. Notable among these mid-
century efforts — and most central to my study — are Earl Wasserman’s influential neo-Kantian 
literary history (outlined, most thoroughly, in The Subtler Language, 1959) and M.H. Abrams’s 
later Natural Supernaturalism (1971). 
 The second consideration that recommends this focus on neo-Kantian Romanticism is the 
curious way that the drift of neo-Kantian interpretations of Romanticism from their beginnings in 
the mid-twentieth century to the present moment mirrors a broader drift of neo-Kantian 
intellectual history from its firm beginnings in Kant to its current Humean elaborations. It is as if 
contemporary Romantic literary critics were so attuned to a neo-Kantian mode of interpretation 
— so trained up in its interpretative and hermeneutic style by long, frequent, and enthusiastic 
encounters with this mode at the mid-twentieth century and, later, by the masterly execution of 
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this mode in the major neo-Kantian literary histories of Romanticism — that it discovered and 
distilled neo-Kantian intellectual history’s essential logic of break. Here the relevant site of 
interest is the post-structuralist effort to initiate a break with neo-Kantian Romanticism that, I 
hope to show, is deeply analogous to the break into “modernity” neo-Kantian intellectual history 
pursues on a larger historical scale.14 In this way, neo-Kantian Romanticism offers not only a 
special articulation of neo-Kantian intellectual history. Its critical trajectory enacts a strange 
microcosm of the progression of broader neo-Kantian intellectual history.15 
 Against this long line of neo-Kantian Romanticism, I want to contest the idea that 
Romantics themselves were ever invested in any neo-Kantian project and, thus, contest the 
influential, persistent literary histories of the “rise of Romanticism” falsely premised on this 
Humean crisis.  In order to do so, I will need to consider why this neo-Kantian framework has 
remained so appealing in Romantic literary criticism: how and why this neo-Kantian framework 
managed to survive what post-structuralism billed (quite successfully) as a full-scale attack on its 
legitimacy. I want to argue that mid-century and post-structuralist neo-Kantian Romanticism are 
                                                            
14To put it schematically, we might say that a post-structuralist like Paul de Man would read a mid-twentieth century 
neo-Kantian like M.H. Abrams in a similar way that a neo-Kantian such as Carlyle would read Johnson. That is, 
both would be inclined to accuse their opponent of a kind of naiveté or perhaps even metaphysical bad faith. And 
this is true even as a neo-Kantian like Abrams would likely read Johnson’s reaction to Skepticism in a way similar to 
Carlyle. De Man repeats the same neo-Kantian pattern of break that Abrams and Carlyle do, except de Man’s target 
is not Johnson’s metaphysical morality but Abrams’ neo-Kantian humanism. And this is true even as Abrams clearly 
understood his humanism to arrive at an anti-metaphysical and even natural morality by departing from Johnson 
and understood Romantics like Carlyle to have contributed to this new anti-metaphysical, or “natural supernatural,” 
humanism. Most curiously of all, this second break makes de Man ultimately want to embrace Johnson’s blinkered 
metaphysics over Abrams’ anti-metaphysical metaphysics of humanism because Johnson’s is at least visibly and 
rationally constructed and therefore already sufficiently diminished. This is true even as de Man is finally more 
doctrinal and tyrannical in register than Abrams ever purported to be. In the end, this makes de Man’s neo-Kantian 
interpretation of Romanticism, while professedly anti-neo-Kantian, finally more spiritually akin to a neo-Kantian 
zealot like Wasserman. De Man claims, more forcefully than Wasserman or Abrams ever would or could, to have a 
view from nowhere, to have thoroughly abandoned any lingering humanism, the final navel-gazing metaphysics. 
And de Man’s radical position, in the final analysis, causes Abrams to question his own stance and to sympathize, 
for different reasons than de Man, with Johnson’s anti-Skepticism. 
15The break post-structuralist Romanticism attempts, in many ways, amounts not to a departure but an exacerbation 
of a neo-Kantian logic. The relevant fact here is that while post-structuralists programmatically attacked the mid-
century critic’s sympathetic and enthusiastic embrace of Romanticism’s distinctly neo-Kantian investments, post-
structuralists still curiously retained a basic neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism. Post-structuralists certainly 
rejected the philosophical legitimacy of this neo-Kantian project, but they still accepted the assumption that the 
Romantics themselves were in fact invested in such a neo-Kantian project. The cumulative effect of post-
structuralism was not to dispense with this neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism, but simply to shift its dramatic 
emphasis: to redescribe the nature and significance of Humean Skepticism for Romanticism so as to exacerbate its 
threat and to clarify its irresolvable status. To return to Schey’s terms, post-structuralism kept Hume as the “threat” 
but pursued a radically different description of Romanticism’s “response:” if the mid-century focused on how 
Romanticism “attempt[ed] to overcome” — or even did overcome — Hume’s threat, post-structuralists argued that 
the Romantic response to Hume simply “avoid[ed]” or “repress[ed]” that threat.  
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united not only by a shared picture of epistemological skepticism but by a shared investment in 
what I will call the neo-Kantian topos of crisis. By topos of crisis, I mean something more 
abstract in character than the looming Hume that Schey observes, though a looming Hume is 
almost always enlisted in its service. Rather, I mean a narrative or dramatic structure that is first 
read loosely, at best, from Kant’s negotiation of Hume and then progressively exacerbated and 
applied to construct and observe a break into modernity. 
I say this topos was read “loosely” from Kant’s negotiation because, while Kant may 
have first elevated Hume to world-historical proportions and licensed reading Hume as a kind of 
looming threat or crisis, Kant always understood Hume to play a supporting and largely negative 
role in his negotiation of epistemology. Hume is the dark anti-hero to Kant’s hero. Kant writes, 
“Since the Essays of Locke and Leibniz, or rather since the origin of metaphysics so far as we 
know its history, nothing has ever happened which could have been more decisive to its fate than 
the attack made upon it by David Hume” (2). But Kant also writes, “[Hume] threw no light on 
this kind of knowledge; but he certainly struck a spark from which light might have been 
obtained, had it caught some inflammable substance and had its smouldering fire been carefully 
nursed and developed” (2). For Kant, Humean skepticism is merely suggestive and preliminary. 
Hume’s threat is finally only apparent, more an effect of Hume’s blindness than his insight. Kant 
clarifies that “I was far from following [Hume] in the conclusions to which he arrived by 
considering, not the whole of his problem, but a part, which by itself can give us no information” 
(5). Hume’s philosophy only looks threatening because it is incomplete, immature.  
Yet, as Kant’s reading of Hume is reified and abstracted through nineteenth-century neo-
Kantian intellectual history — and elaborated according to a different cultural logic and with 
distinct aims — Hume’s threat comes to be seen as more serious and philosophical than it seems 
to have been for Kant, where — I hope to show — it is largely rhetorical. Over the nineteenth 
century, the structure of this Humean crisis changes in character, emotional complexity, and 
scope. Its tone shifts from taunting and dismissive to more ironic and melancholic: less focused 
on the evident advantages of the break into modernity and more on the hard costs of this break 
into disenchantment. And Kant’s looming Hume grows to world-historical proportions so that, 
by the mid-twentieth century, neo-Kantian intellectual history distills Kant’s negotiation with 
Hume into a vague and stylized, but also therefore flexible and potent, topos which could be 
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applied to shape any number of modernity narratives and to speak to any number of modern 
intellectual formations and decode them through epistemology. 
This topos of crisis seems present at any stage in neo-Kantian intellectual history. 
Carlyle, for instance, applies an early version to dispense with Johnson on personal and 
intellectual grounds: Johnson is distinctly threatened by Hume. But it arguably achieves its 
greatest potency at the mid-twentieth century. The essentially empty character of the topos the 
mid-twentieth century critics inherited from neo-Kantian intellectual history gave mid-century 
critics a profound creative license with the neo-Kantian manner of interpretation. And their long 
conditioning in neo-Kantian intellectual history gave them an incredible proficiency and 
ingenuity with its interpretive lens. In short, one can tell that Romantic critics dropped their boats 
late into the long stream of neo-Kantian intellectual history (which arguably begins as early as 
Carlyle) by the sublimated character of the central crisis they observe, which is quite different 
than Carlyle’s. Consider this programmatic statement from Christos Pulos’ short but influential 
study, The Deep Truth: A Study of Shelley's Scepticism (1954):  
This scepticism — the result of the development of thought over a period of 
nearly two centuries — could hardly constitute anything less than the most 
important intellectual problem of the next age — the age of romanticism.  The 
central tendency of the romantic movement, viewed as an event in the intellectual 
history of modern man, was that of reorientation in a world of uncertainty and 
doubt. (5-6)  
 
Measuring the distance between Pulos’ “central tendency” of Romanticism and Carlyle’s 
“Tendency of Thought,” clarifies these major structural transformations in the neo-Kantian 
topos. A shared sense of the significance of Humean Skepticism links both Pulos and Carlyle 
here. Both appear to absorb Humean Skepticism and regard it as historically momentous. From 
my perspective, this is what makes these interpretations of Hume both Skeptical and “neo-
Kantian” in the senses I have discussed and finally more continuous than discontinuous. Yet, 
there are evident differences. Where Carlyle sees Humean skepticism as a solution, Pulos is more 
inclined to see Humean skepticism as a problem (though a happy one) still in need of a solution 
(the Romantic “reorientation). Put another way, Carlyle’s Kantian Universal history is 
unapologetically progressive, while Pulos’ neo-Kantian intellectual history is ostensibly more 
therapeutic.  
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 Pulos’ neo-Kantian interpretation of Romanticism is obviously organized more centrally 
around Humean skepticism, and in this way it nicely demonstrates that the Humean crisis has 
always been (or at least quickly became) the most important detail of Kant’s triptych. Ironically, 
Kant has never been all that central to a neo-Kantian intellectual history. To be sure, Kant’s 
inestimable influence in Anglophone nineteenth-century intellectual culture — his utter 
dominance of the nineteenth-century intellectual landscape from at least Carlyle on — is perhaps 
the only way to explain how this threatening picture of Hume attained its hegemonic status. But 
by the mid-twentieth century (if not long before), Kant’s specific therapeutic response to 
Humean skepticism more or less lost its special currency.16 In any case, Kant’s role is more 
paradigmatic and spiritual in neo-Kantian intellectual history. Kant’s negotiation with Hume 
functions more as a hermeneutic lens than a foundational text. His initial negotiation of Hume 
simply sets the conditions or terms of any and all future negotiations of Hume. Kant literally 
describes his project as the “prolegomena to any future metaphysics.” And, in Anglophone 
intellectual history, Kant proves to be more or less dispensable, where even Carlyle demonstrates 
how Kant’s Hume was wielded to negotiate a break within eighteenth-century Anglophone 
philosophy. 
So, a looming Hume is indeed essential in some manner to the neo-Kantian topos of 
crisis. But the extreme elasticity this topos achieved by the mid-twentieth century means that 
neither Kant nor Hume need necessarily be at the center of any neo-Kantian literary history of 
Romanticism. As we will see in Chapter One, Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism offers a much 
looser and more liberal neo-Kantian picture, whereas Wasserman’s literary history is so dutifully 
neo-Kantian that it is essentially dogmatic. But regardless of how central Kant or Hume are in 
neo-Kantian literary histories, all mid-twentieth century critics work liberally and loosely with 
the neo-Kantian topos of crisis available to them, and use it to observe and construct extensive 
links between epistemology and other major cultural developments. In this dissertation, I will be 
particularly interested in the way that Abrams and Wasserman draw on the neo-Kantian topos to 
connect the distinct shift of literary sensibility between neo-Classical and Romantic poetics with 
                                                            
16The philosopher Michael Williams, for instance, observes the ascendance of general “epistemological pessimism” 
— best embodied by twentieth-century “New Humeans” such as Stanley Cavell — which has encouraged re-
centering Kant’s picture exclusively on Hume (Williams 10-11). 
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the so-called ontological collapse of “analogy” observed most famously by A.O. Lovejoy in The 
Great Chain of Being (1936) and Michel Foucault in The Order of Things (1966). 
While neo-Kantian Romanticism arguably elevates the hermeneutic practice of reading 
various cultural phenomena through epistemology to a new level of sophistication, this practice 
is not specific to neo-Kantian Romanticism but is in some sense characteristic of all neo-Kantian 
intellectual history. Beginning in the nineteenth century, a widespread appreciation for the neo-
Kantian project of epistemology (again, taken to be the paradigmatic insight of modern 
philosophy) encouraged intellectual historians to abstract freely from the disciplinary history of 
modern philosophy in order to situate, explain, and shape a variety of cultural, political, and 
literary historical developments within a broader narrative of modernity. This appreciation for 
Kant’s profound achievement recommended not only memorializing Kant and Hume’s discovery 
of modern epistemology; it encouraged employing that discovery as a hermeneutic lens for 
deciphering all other major cultural developments in order to observe, clarify, or construct their 
modern character. Put another way, a shared sense of the profound significance of Kant’s 
negotiation of Hume seems to have first recommended the genre of intellectual history as a 
legitimate and important lens for viewing and interpreting different kinds of modern intellectual 
formations. Moreover, a shared sense of the singularity of Kant’s negotiation seems to have 
recommended the integrity of a very concept of “modern intellectual history” itself: it 
encouraged the belief, for instance, that there might be a specific “intellectual history” of 
“modernity,” and that “intellectual history” was not only a possible and legitimate way to 
observe “modernity” but was somehow the best way to observe modernity.  
I take “best” here to work in at least three senses: best in a basic empirical sense of “most 
legible,” best in a kind of intensive sense of “most essential,” and best in a moral sense of “most 
elevating and inspiring.” Best in the sense of “most legible” because the appeal of this neo-
Kantian intellectual history was essentially imagistic or pictorial: it imposed a clear narrative 
shape and unity on an otherwise messy and disordered picture of modern history. The story of 
Kant’s response to Hume’s radical skepticism served as the most visible index of broader 
cultural and political shifts which, more properly, comprised modernity but which were much 
more diffuse and difficult, perhaps impossible, to observe. In other words, the neo-Kantian 
narrative distilled modernity’s ineffable but palpable Zeitgeist into an observable and even 
purified form. Epistemology reached laboratory conditions for the observation of modern 
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knowledge and even knowledge altogether: it turned the lens back on the knower, examined the 
very structure of knowledge, and the conditions that define its perception. Best in the sense of 
“most essential” because Kant’s clarification of the significance of Hume’s skepticism through 
epistemology — Kant’s ability to make visible this previously invisible or darkly understood set 
of concerns as well as their special significance — amounted to the most demonstrable evidence 
of a break with a previous moral and metaphysical order and the birth of a modern, scientific 
one. Kant’s “Copernican” turn away from objectivity to subjectivity, from knowledge-making to 
the conditions which make knowledge possible, established the terms for modern inquiry. And 
finally best in the sense of “most elevating” primarily because this break into modernity was read 
favorably, in distinctly progressive and even developmental terms. Hume’s radical skepticism 
and Kant’s clarification of its significance had dispelled with an inferior and inauthentic 
metaphysics and ushered in a more mature and clear-eyed picture of things, one that was 
epistemological rather than moral and therefore philosophical rather than rhetorical. The rise of 
epistemology inaugurated by Kant’s response to Hume could easily be construed as a major 
therapeutic break in the philosophical tradition: Kant’s negotiation of Hume initiated modern 
philosophy and, in some way, broke from the tradition: this is again the Copernican character of 
the enterprise; it echoes many of the same theme of disenchantment that was also empowerment: 
it was a felix culpa, painful and disorienting but ultimately for the best. 
Epistemology clarified for the first time what truly “philosophical” terms looked like, and 
in the process it pointed out the woeful inadequacy of earlier approaches. From Kant’s 
perspective, Reid and Beattie’s inability to object to Hume on properly epistemological grounds 
is precisely what reveals their responses to be inauthentic rather than authentic; dogmatic and 
reactionary rather than critical and engaged; moral and rhetorical instead of intellectual and 
philosophical. This is as much a self-indictment for Kant as anything. Hume famously stirs Kant 
from his “dogmatic slumber” and “gave [his] investigations in the field of speculative philosophy 
a quite new direction” (5). Not just new, but new and improved. And, according to the 
progressive, metonymic logic of neo-Kantian intellectual history, Kant’s epistemology also 
clarified what “modern” terms look like. And from one perspective, he raison d’etre of neo-
Kantian intellectual history seems to have been to enable a kind of reading that allowed the 
“modern” character of different intellectual enterprises to be read through the rise of 
epistemology. It allowed different disciplines to link up with philosophy-cum-epistemology as 
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the master discipline, so to speak, and assert their claim to be sufficiently modern, concerned 
with facts and not values, clear-eyed and not preoccupied.  
The special advantages of linking up literary Romanticism with the broader neo-Kantian 
enterprise should be readily apparent, even as the grounds for doing so are, from my perspective, 
finally specious and a neo-Kantian lens finally distorts as much as it clarifies about literary 
Romanticism. As we have seen in Pulos’ version, Humean skepticism appears to pose the central 
“intellectual problem” that gives the “age of romanticism” (5) its historical and philosophical 
coherence, not to mention the grounds for its claim as a special modern intellectual formation. 
Romanticism unites around a shared sense of Hume’s threat. But this shared sense of threat also 
aligns Romantic literature with a broader constellation of “modern” responses to Hume. Indeed, 
for Pulos, the Romantic response to Hume is explicitly legion: it does not “follow a single 
pattern” (5) but rather manifests in a variety of interrelated modern developments. These include 
the “extension of the scientific method to new areas of investigation” as “men turned, as Hume 
had done, from metaphysics to history and the social sciences” (5) and, most notably for the 
literary critic, the rise of “what is loosely referred to as the transcendental movement” of 
“philosophy and literature” (6). In short, Hume’s skepticism effectively initiates the neo-Kantian 
intellectual formation that Pulos characterizes as the “age of romanticism.” And Pulos’ own 
appreciation of the problem, primed by neo-Kantian intellectual history, encourages him to 
imagine the “age of romanticism” reaching well into the present. Pulos envisions Romanticism 
as an “event” within a continuous “intellectual history of modern man” (my emphasis, 6) — at 
an inflection point, no less. From one angle, Romanticism arrives at the culmination of a 
devastating line of epistemological skepticism “nearly two centuries” in the making. From 
another, Romanticism arrives at the beginning of the new “world of uncertainty and doubt” that 
Humean epistemological skepticism opens up. Humean skepticism thus not only radically 
upends the cultural and intellectual order so that the Romantics can pursue a new, distinctively 
modern project of reorientation and reconciliation; Humean skepticism also clarifies the new, 
distinctively modern – that is, to say epistemological – terms on which such a project of 
reconciliation must be grounded to avoid the metaphysical or theological preoccupations that 
ultimately constricted earlier literary and intellectual movements. 
 This is certainly a simplification of the rationale for the mid-century turn toward neo-
Kantian Romanticism, one that does not adequately capture its tone of moral seriousness and 
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genuine pathos. But framing things this way should show that Pulos’ version of neo-Kantian 
intellectual history is not as far from Carlyle’s Kantian Universal History as one might expect. 
Not too far beneath its therapeutic surface lies a harder core of secular progressivism.  The 
therapeutic character of neo-Kantian Romanticism is distinctly ironic. However consequential or 
disruptive Pulos finds Hume’s skepticism, he is no more threatened by Hume than Carlyle was. 
He knows how to take Hume’s Skepticism seriously, and neo-Kantian intellectual history would 
have offered any number of ways in which to do so. The confidence with which Pulos issues his 
programmatic statement nicely captures what seems to be a prevailing sense that the modern 
order has stabilized despite the crisis which neo-Kantian intellectual history observes at its center 
or the anomie that the constant observation of this crisis seems to generate in the discourse. 
As Colin Jager has observed, the secular progressivism at the heart of neo-Kantian 
Romanticism provides a “substantial continuity in scholarly thinking about the [Romantic] 
period” despite “the various revisions of romanticism accomplished over the past decades” (xi). 
Indeed, from this perspective, we might say that the ultimate effect of post-structuralist 
Romanticism was to discard the therapeutic veneer of mid-century neo-Kantian Romanticism 
and rediscover the core of secular progressivism under neo-Kantian Romanticism and neo-
Kantian intellectual history more broadly. The break with mid-century neo-Kantianism that post-
structuralist Romanticism attempts, in this way, amounts not to a departure but an exacerbation 
of a neo-Kantian logic. The relevant fact here – as Zoe Beenstock, Sarah Zimmerman, and David 
Punter have also recently observed — is that while post-structuralists may have 
programmatically attacked the mid-century critics’ sympathetic and enthusiastic embrace of 
Romanticism’s distinctly neo-Kantian investments, post-structuralists still curiously retained a 
basic neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism.17 Put another way, they may have rejected the 
philosophical legitimacy of this neo-Kantian project, but they still accepted the assumption that 
the Romantics themselves were in fact invested in such a neo-Kantian project.18 The cumulative 
effect of post-structuralism, then, was not to dispense with this neo-Kantian picture of 
Romanticism, but simply to shift its dramatic emphasis: to redescribe the nature and significance 
                                                            
17See Beenstock’s dissertation, “The Social Contract and the Romantic Canon” (2010): 1-10; Zimmerman, 
Romanticism, Lyricism, and History. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999: 1-38; Punter, 
“Romanticism” in Encyclopedia of Literature and Criticism: 106-118. 
18McGann offers what has since become the programmatic statement of this critique: “[T]he scholarship and 
criticism of Romanticism and its works are dominated by a Romantic Ideology, by an uncritical absorption in 
Romanticism’s own self-representations” (Ideology 1). 
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of Humean skepticism for Romanticism so as to exacerbate its threat and to clarify its 
irresolvable status. To return to Schey’s schema above, post-structuralism kept Hume as a 
“threat” but pursued a radically different description of Romanticism’s “response”: if the mid-
century focused on how Romanticism “attempt[ed] to overcome” — or even did overcome — 
Hume’s threat, post-structuralists argued that the Romantic response to Hume simply “avoid[ed]” 
or “repress[ed]” that threat. This is what I mean when I say that post-structuralism exacerbates 
neo-Kantian logic. The neo-Kantian topos of crisis proves so generative that it enables post-
structuralists to imagine an entirely new and coherent type of break, from the epistemological to 
the onto-linguistic, from the humanistic model of subjective agency to a post-structuralist model 
of ideological subjectification. Neo-Kantian critique loves a crisis.19 
 
Neo-Kantian Intellectual History as a Hermeneutic Circle 
However generative this topos of crisis has proven to be, I want to suggest that there is 
something suspiciously convenient about applying it to any period. And I want to think of 
contesting the application of this topos of crisis in neo-Kantian Romanticism as a shorthand way 
of contesting the basic critical and historical integrity of applying this neo-Kantian topos of crisis 
altogether in any period. I want to demonstrate the need to dispense with it entirely, both in the 
literary history of Romanticism and in Western intellectual history, and to construct a new 
intellectual history that does not rely on it.  
Indeed, as Richard Rorty observed long ago in The Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
there is something suspicious about embracing the enterprise of neo-Kantian intellectual history. 
                                                            
19Of course, it is possible that most post-structuralists simply found this historical picture compelling and basically 
correct if woefully incomplete. But, viewed in retrospect, accepting the accuracy of this historical picture can be 
seen as strategic as well as sincere. Simply put, given their antagonistic charge, it is more convenient, and perhaps 
even necessary or constitutive, for both the deconstructionist and the New Historicist to accept this basic historical 
picture and work within it, rather than to correct or challenge it. Deborah Elise White suggests along these lines that 
“[R]eaders on the track of ideology often seem more insistent on the referential status of Romantic argument than 
the Romantics themselves. They hypostasize the very mystifications ostensibly being demystified” (White 2). 
In her analysis of McGann’s engagement with Abrams, Beenstock suggests that “instead of subverting” 
Abrams’ neo-Kantian model or successfully replacing it with a non-ideological neo-Kantian aesthetics, McGann 
“actually perpetuates” Abrams’ neo-Kantian model in a way that “fails to separate [McGann’s] own position” from 
Abrams or to sufficiently “distinguish between the later insights of criticism and the original material contexts of the 
text themselves” (11). This seems to overstate the case against McGann, and I tend to prefer Colin Jager’s 
observation that de Man “cagily” follows the mid-century literary history as a general description of the nature of 
these post-structuralist exchanges. In any case, both perspectives support my central point that post-structuralist 
approaches prefer to retain the neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism — so as toy with it, and read it parasitically and 
hermeneutically — rather than discard it. 
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In Rorty’s account, the problem with neo-Kantian intellectual history is that it generates a 
hermeneutic circle in which philosophy-cum-epistemology achieves a privileged status with 
respect to other modern sciences by successfully representing itself as articulating a “‘theory of 
knowledge” distinct from and superior to these sciences “because it was their foundation” (132). 
In this way, Kant’s Copernican revolution generates a rigidly Ptolemaic disciplinary formation in 
which the modern sciences form so many concentric circles around Kantian epistemology. This 
is a hermeneutic circle because Neo-Kantian intellectual history ostensibly draws its authority 
from the intellectual capital independently afforded to philosophy after Kant’s discovery of 
epistemology. And yet it is neo-Kantian intellectual history that invents, inflates, and reinscribes 
the cultural capital of philosophy in the first place by pursuing and constructing (often quite 
creatively) new ways to observe epistemology’s obvious yet somehow materially unobservable 
influence beyond the narrow disciplinary confines of philosophy. Of course, other modern 
disciplines, standing to benefit from this cultural capital and intellectual cachet, were also 
inclined to accept this picture and work within it, and to offer up their own intellectual historical 
narratives to confirm it.20 Not every discipline had to see itself within a neo-Kantian intellectual 
history. But any discipline that did easily could and dutifully become its satellite, read its own 
practices through the refracted lens of epistemology, and thus offer its own claims to 
epistemological (read: philosophical, modern) significance. Neo-Kantian intellectual history, 
then, has a way of generating a self-fulfilling prophecy: it prints its own intellectual currency. 
This Ptolemaic character of neo-Kantian intellectual history goes deeper. For, as Rorty 
notes, intellectual historians worked to sustain this picture of modernity united around 
epistemology even as it amounted to a demonstrably false representation of the way knowledge 
was produced in any modern scientific discipline. In reality, each discipline would develop 
localized practices that were not reflected in or dictated by epistemology. What sustained this 
false picture? From Rorty’s perspective, there was simply an imperative to see Reason as 
universal, shared and progressively developing across the world in history: something like what 
Carlyle imagines. For Rorty, neo-Kantian intellectual history met that imperative, but it also 
inhibited any accurate description of “the way things really are.” In a more recent analysis of this 
                                                            
20 Marco de Waard nicely describes the effect of intellectual historical discourse as “vertiginously self-referential: 
history of ideas center on the emergence of the idea of history of ideas, narratives of progress historicizing the very 
notion of progress” (de Waard 459) 
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Ptolemaic picture, Bruno Latour has suggested this demonstrably false picture emerges as the 
logical outgrowth of the economy of neo-Kantian epistemology. The sense of inadequacy that 
epistemology’s special claim lends “all forms of veridiction” which seem “by 
contrast…irrational and arbitrary” (Modes 94) encourages pursuing this unified description, and 
the constant smooth alignments of “habit” that emerge to organize each independent institution 
obscures its demonstrable inaccuracy. Latour sees this act of willful misdescription as so 
prevalent and characteristic of modern intellectual history that he gives it a name, “double click” 
or [DC], meant to evoke the disparity between the smooth, integrated user interface of any 
computer program with the sprawling lines of code that generate it. In any case, with this 
misdescription in view, we might even say that the hermeneutic circle constructed by the 
discourse of neo-Kantian intellectual history provides a way of maintaining and naturalizing this 
Ptolemaic picture of the special importance of epistemology against widespread material 
evidence to the contrary. In truly Ptolemaic fashion, neo-Kantian intellectual history saves the 
phenomena. 
Rorty and Latour’s respective analyses predict that there will be a good deal of distortion 
within neo-Kantian Romanticism. And my claim that neo-Kantian Romanticism functions as a 
microcosm of neo-Kantian intellectual history further hypothesizes that these distortions will 
mirror the most salient distortions of neo-Kantian intellectual history. There are obviously limits 
to the insights this microcosm can provide, and those limits also set the limits of this dissertation 
itself. Indeed, my arguments here about neo-Kantian intellectual history can only be partial and 
suggestive, not conclusive.21 There is likewise one caveat worth developing here in order to 
clarify how neo-Kantian Romanticism departs from the appropriations of neo-Kantian 
                                                            
21Any claims about the impact of neo-Kantian intellectual history beyond the field of Romanticism would finally 
need to be confirmed from other disciplinary perspectives. And my claims about neo-Kantian Romanticism are still 
very much under construction: in need of a more comprehensive examination of literary critical approaches to 
Romanticism across the twentieth century. The same can be said for the corrective picture of the intellectual 
historical context of British Romanticism I attempt to sketch here. This is no small part because neo-Kantian 
Romanticism has been so influential in American literary criticism. I believe it informs not only the most thoroughly 
developed lines of thought (e.g. Coleridgean organicism) but also the slightest critical prejudices and habits (e.g. a 
widespread indifference to Hume’s commonsense rivals).  
Still, while my archive is necessarily selective, I believe my selected texts are foundational and thus more 
representative than not. Likewise, I believe my major claims can be borne out through a more comprehensive study. 
Simply put, I do not believe neo-Kantian Romanticism would have achieved the state of development it has had neo-
Kantian intellectual history not achieved the inestimable influence it did. As I hope to show, it was in part the sheer 
cultural authority that neo-Kantian intellectual history had at the mid-century that recommended its adoption within 
Romantic literary criticism. 
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epistemology within, for instance, the disciplinary history of philosophy or natural sciences. 
While neo-Kantian Romanticism is obviously preoccupied with Kantian epistemology in the 
same way that modern scientific disciplines once were, it does not attempt to describe its own 
disciplinary practices in terms of Kantian epistemology, but rather to interpret Romantic 
literature on the basis of what it perceives as its common investment in Kantian epistemology. I 
will claim that the Romantics’ had no such programmatic investment in Kantian epistemology. 
But the major difficulty is how close the neo-Kantian Romantic account actually comes to 
describing Romantic authors’ actual epistemological investments. Indeed, I believe British 
Romantic authors are indeed demonstrably invested in the project of epistemology. But British 
Romanticism perceives this project in distinctly pre-Kantian terms. British Romantic authors — 
especially the “first” generation authors like Wordsworth and Coleridge — are working within 
an Anglophone epistemology which, after Kant, is marked as more moral than philosophical. 
The difficult task will be to recover the terms of this investment as they have been overwritten in 
neo-Kantian terms on what might be best conceived as the palimpsest of epistemological 
thinking that has emerged since the seventeenth-century. Even using the term epistemology to 
refer to this palimpsest is risky, because this technical term itself does not emerge until the mid-
nineteenth century, largely to describe a specifically post-Kantian enterprise.22 Often, the 
problem is not that neo-Kantian Romanticism is wildly off-the-mark: almost seven decades of 
criticism show that the neo-Kantian picture has been accurate enough to tolerate and build upon. 
In many places, correcting its inaccuracies will only require minimal work at the peripheries of 
its approximation. Yet, some inaccuracies and critical bias have been so thoroughly established, 
that they required a more polemic force: neither this lighter work nor the more passive drift out 
of the neo-Kantian orbit over the last decade in Romantic studies will suffice. 
With its improbably tight feedback loop in view, Neo-Kantian intellectual history looks a 
lot like one of William E. Connolly’s “abstract machines,” and indeed seems to be precisely of 
the order of ineffable magnitude Connolly constructs that concept to capture. Connolly defines 
an abstract machine as a “cluster of energized elements of multiple types that enter into loose, re-
enforcing conjugations as the whole complex both consolidates and continues to morph” (135). 
Neo-Kantian intellectual history is “energized” by a shared enthusiasm for the project of 
                                                            
22For a discussion of the mid-nineteenth century origins of the term epistemology see Taylor Schey, “Skeptical 
Ignorance: Hume, Shelley, and the Mystery of ‘Mont Blanc,’” 57-58.  
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observing modernity through epistemology; loose because the lens it uses to do so is finally 
topical and hermeneutic more than historical or analytic, more a theme to be taken up and 
expounded on than a concept to be applied; “re-enforcing” because these topical and 
hermeneutic aspects both afford a great deal of flexibility and range in their application while 
also turning every novel articulation and elaboration of neo-Kantian intellectual history into a 
variation of and contribution to one unified neo-Kantian Intellectual History; and the new, 
creative contributions inflect neo-Kantian intellectual history so as consolidate and morph the 
understanding of what is “shared” at its center: again, it distills the narrative of a potent and 
seductive topos of crisis-and-reconciliation, and finally of crisis alone, which it seizes as an 
opportunity for narrating the same successful break that neo-Kantian intellectual history observes 
in modern philosophy into a wide variety of fields.23  
The improbably tight feedback loop at the center of this abstract machine — which looks 
in hindsight almost explicitly and suspiciously designed to maximize the cultural capital of 
philosophy and to unify nothing short of the entire modern history of Western thought around a 
shared appreciation of philosophy-cum-epistemology — amplified neo-Kantian intellectual 
history into an almost unprecedented cultural force whose impact is as difficult to overestimate 
as it is to describe. Neo-Kantian intellectual history effectively generates the modern order it 
projects, almost entirely by the sheer dramatic potency of its projection, and despite the distorted 
nature of its many projections or their conspicuous lack of correspondence to any actual 
practices. Neo-Kantian epistemology is invoked systematically across the nineteenth-century 
intellectual culture to restrict the scope of religious and moral reasoning — branded as “value” 
rather than “fact” — in a strategic and wide-ranging displacement of religious authority which 
Jose Casanova has described as a process of “differentiation” and which Colin Jager helpfully 
glosses as “the emancipation of a variety of forms of cultural authority from religious control” 
(28). The anti-metaphysical dictates of neo-Kantian epistemology promote an extensive 
fictionalization and formalization of modern disciplinary concepts, which is used to police 
metaphysical impositions and distortions more broadly. In the end, the steady cultivation and 
exacerbation of its empty discourse of crisis — read loosely at best off Kant’s triptych — finally 
                                                            
23 I want to claim that this topos of crisis is, in some sense, endemic to neo-Kantian intellectual history and, more 
specifically, to neo-Kantian critique. As Simon During observes in “The Eighteenth-Century Origins of Critique,” 
“critique requires division” (During 74). 
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achieves the strong sense of “break” which manages, in a profound way, to displace, or diminish, 
the previous moral and intellectual order figured by Johnson. We can measure this achievement 
simply by noting the semantic drift of the word moral itself. The neo-Kantian spirit of critique 
almost singlehandedly changes the meaning of moral, displacing and estranging the older, 
uncontroversial, humanistic, “orienting” sense that someone like Johnson or even Hume would 
have given the term to the more current sense of moral as committed, potentially in a 
preoccupied or disorienting and therefore controversial manner. Neo-Kantian spirit of critique 
turns moral into an accusation. It also turns it into a profession of faith — that is, a matter of faith 
or value instead of fact — and, in some contexts, a confession of sin. 
Neo-Kantian intellectual history also generates a new way of looking at Skepticism 
centered on Hume, and disseminates it so thoroughly and successfully as to naturalize it. Neo-
Kantian intellectual history’s elevating of Skepticism (especially as epitomized by young Hume) 
makes the Skeptic look increasingly more Heroic than Idiotic, more serious than unserious, 
worthier of engagement than dismissal. In the eighteenth century, Skepticism would have looked 
like a kind of Idiocy. And here I do not mean idiocy in the scientistic sense developed in the late-
nineteenth century, but Idiocy in the (neo)classical and developmental sense of idios recovered 
most recently by Walter Parker. As Parker helpfully observes, an idiot is “one whose self-
centeredness undermines his or her citizen identity, causing it to wither or never to take root in 
the first place” (Parker 344). Idiocy is “private, separate, self-centered” because “concerned 
myopically with private things and unmindful of common things;” idiotic behavior is 
fundamentally disoriented, “a rudderless ship, without consequence save for the danger it poses 
to others;” and idiocy is “definitively self-defeating, for the idiot does not know that privacy and 
individual autonomy are entirely dependent on the community” (344). However, from the neo-
Kantian perspective, the Skeptic enjoys a special moral prestige. A neo-Kantian perspective 
perceives a basic Heroism in this critical act of intellectual self-sacrifice and radical detachment. 
Skepticism takes will and effort. For a Skeptic like Carlyle, it is what distinguishes the Thinker 
from the Scholar.  
At a higher level of generality, this debate about Skepticism’s significance amounts to a 
debate about the “evidential context” of Skepticism, to use a concept developed by the 
philosopher of science Simon Schaffer. For Schaffer, debates about evidential context center on 
the “proper implications of some trial” (Schaffer 59) — that is, whether one should interpret the 
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results of an independent trial as signs of general or particular, objective or subjective, 
phenomena. Discussing the evidential context of eighteenth-century natural philosophic self-
experimentation, Schaffer writes: “Experimenters who used their own bodies tried to shift the 
evidential context from the body itself to some wider natural philosophical concern” while 
“critics who denied these implications tried to shift the evidential context back to the 
experimenter’s body. Trials which some reckoned revealed truths about the universe were judged 
by others to reveal much about the movements of Gray’s hands, Italian servingmen’s bellies, or 
Charles Deslon’s eyes” (59). In such a contentious rhetorical context, Schaffer argues, 
“[s]tabilizing an evidential context relied on the power and authority of the collective body of 
experimental philosophy” and “[w]inning that body’s assent was a condition of making 
evidence” (59). In other words, self-evidence could not finally be self-evidence to be perceived 
as universally significant; it must finally be judged so by a larger social body.  
Following Schaffer, we might say that a Skeptical perspective works to frame the 
evidential context of Skepticism as revealing an essential, universal truth about the nature of 
knowledge-making. The Skeptic claims to access a deeper account of knowledge that is 
impossible to achieve without radically suspending the natural, committed, distorted conditions 
of everyday belief. The Skeptic’s study is a lab for observing the conditions of knowledge at a 
practically unattainable but nonetheless foundational state: in a vacuum, or at absolute zero, or 
the speed of light, so to speak — in the kind of revealing state of distortion these extreme natural 
conditions create. On the other hand, an anti-Skeptical or commonsense perspective works to 
shift the evidential context back to the Skeptic himself, to some trace of Idiocy. From a 
Common-Sense perspective, Skepticism obviously distorts more than it clarifies. Skepticism is a 
delusion endemic to the Study. Thomas Reid, for instance, diagnoses Hume’s skeptical 
conclusions comically, almost sympathetically, as a “metaphysical lunacy” (482): a kind of 
occupational hazard of philosophy, one “apt to seize the patient in solitary and speculative 
moments” (482). For Reid (and Hume), such lunacy may prevail in isolation, but it is cured by a 
return “into society” where “Common Sense recovers her authority” (482-83). Pursuing a total 
detachment from everyday commitments is not only practically impossible or undesirable. 
Claiming to have achieved such a total detachment is absurd enough to compromise one’s basic 
credibility or claim to reasonableness: Skeptical doubts are more unnatural than natural.  
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Neo-Kantian intellectual history obviously accepts some version of the Skeptic’s view of 
the evidential context of Skepticism. And we might describe the central achievement of neo-
Kantian intellectual history to have been to stabilize the evidential context of Hume’s Skepticism 
— to affirm it through the “collective body” organized around it — so thoroughly as to 
naturalize it. Neo-Kantian intellectual history is what makes Hume look more Heroic than 
Idiotic. Hume could not do this alone. Neo-Kantian intellectual history treats the universal 
significance of Skepticism to be so self-evident as to be uncontroversial, even passé. It turns an 
open question about the evidential context of Skepticism into a new way to divide up History. 
And it views its interpretation so favorably as to moralize it. Neo-Kantian intellectual history 
presents a new developmental narrative, centered on a new kind of idiocy. To call the Skeptic 
Idiotic becomes idiotic in a different sense of unenlightened, illiberal.  
 
Neo-Kantian Intellectual History Misreads Enlightenment Skepticism  
In many ways, the new perspective on Skepticism generated by neo-Kantian intellectual 
history has been of inestimable value. It has taken considerable intellectual energy and effort to 
carve out its entirely novel account of the world. The fact that we can now celebrate Hume as a 
kind of Hero rather than roundly dismiss him as an Idiot is significant, worthy of analysis in its 
own right. And the remarkable trajectory of Hume’s reception supports many postmodern 
insights about the indeterminacy of meaning, the free-floating nature of the cultural signifier. 
Yet, as influential and generative as neo-Kantian intellectual history has been, it is severely one-
sided and selective picture of things. Its narrow emphasis on Humean skepticism amounts to 
what I will call a misreading of Enlightenment skepticism. I use this term in the more neutral, 
theoretical sense of a “strong reading” offered by Harold Bloom’s concept of misprision, though 
I want to abstract Bloom’s psychoanalytic account into something less contentious and more 
heuristic.24 Indeed, I do intend to retain some of the accusatory or polemic charge of the term 
                                                            
24 In Bloom’s literary criticism, misprision describes the interpretive mechanism by which young poets open up 
space for their own poetic enterprise in an already established, crowded poetic tradition. From Bloom’s perspective, 
the poet responds to the anxiety of influence with a willful misreading of the poetic tradition. Bloom describes this 
act of misprision as introducing a Lucretian clinamen or swerve in the tradition. The young poet “swerves away 
from his precursor, by so reading his precursor’s poem as to execute a clinamen in relation to it” (Anxiety of 
Influence 14). 
Loosely following Bloom, I want to use misreading as an analytic concept to designate a kind of 
interpretation that is guided and in some sense distorted by a specific, identifiable preoccupation. Analyzing a 
misreading along these theoretical lines would mean a) identifying the specific preoccupation organizing the 
interpretation, b) providing a detailed description of how that preoccupation plays out at different scales of 
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misreading evokes, I take this neo-Kantian picture of break to be not simply distorted and 
misguided but in some sense willfully deceptive. But while I want to sound this polemic note, in 
the main I’d still like misreading to carry a more sympathetic and less accusatory sense: more a 
way of capturing the neo-Kantian hermeneutic logic, its commitment to selective rather than 
representative reading. So I’d want to calibrate the term for the appropriate balance of suspicion 
and sympathy.25  
Whatever the productive gains of this misreading, the neo-Kantian preoccupation with 
constructing and observing modernity produces two significant distortions. Neo-Kantian 
intellectual history imagines a specter of crisis around Humean skepticism at the expense of 
caricaturing Hume’s commonsense critics and at the cost of misrepresenting the general 
character of Enlightenment skepticism, including Humean skepticism.26  I have said that general 
character is not radical but constructive: not anxious, metastatic, or reactive but pragmatic, 
                                                            
interpretation and the distortion it introduces. In claiming that neo-Kantian intellectual history misreads 
Enlightenment skepticism, I want to argue that because neo-Kantian intellectual history is preoccupied with 
constructing and observing a picture of modernity — which is to say, constructing and observing a distinctly 
progressive break from an earlier order of things into a modern intellectual order, much like the one Carlyle takes to 
divide Johnson from Hume — it prefers to read Enlightenment skepticism through the narrow lens of Humean 
epistemological skepticism in order to generate a “crisis” sufficient enough to establish this break. Following 
Bloom, we can think of the Humean crisis as the clinamen or swerve that neo-Kantian intellectual history reads into 
the philosophical tradition. And we can think of the misprision to center around Kant’s claim that the project of 
epistemology amounts to something fundamentally new and modern. 
25 Bloom’s account offers a more sympathetic counterpoint to the suspicious note above since Bloom has a 
suggestively Heroic picture of the idiocy at the heart of misprision. Bloom suggests that, from the poet’s 
perspective, this clinamen or swerve amounts to a “corrective moment” which “implies that the precursor poem 
went accurately up to a certain point, but then should have swerved, precisely in the direction that the new poem 
moves” (14). Bloom suggests that while the poet regards this misprision as corrective, the poet’s description is in 
some sense erroneous because deliberately askew. The poet is inclined to invent a problem in need of correction 
rather than observe a real one. In this way, the act of misprision is intentionally idiosyncratic and defiant. However, 
from Bloom’s perspective, this idiosyncrasy is not problematic; it is what makes the act of misprision essentially 
original and poetic. Thus Bloom views misprision in distinctly positive, even celebratory terms. It is how the Poet 
transcends the measured but weak and subservient posture of the mere Critic. Poets misread in the end because they 
“can only read themselves.” For Bloom, to read critically and faithfully “is to be weak:” “to compare, exactly and 
fairly, is to be not elect” (19). Bloom obviously has something of the neo-Kantian spirit. Bloom’s Poets and Critics 
are not that far from Carlyle’s Thinkers and Scholars. Bloom’s final picture of the elect seems to commit the same 
sort of error that the neo-Kantian intellectual history does: it tends to misdescribe the Poet’s achievement by 
exaggerating and ultimately naturalizing it. But, registering Bloom’s more basic sympathetic thrust, I believe it is 
possible to say that the neo-Kantian preoccupation with Humean skepticism does ultimately achieve something new 
and revelatory. So I imagine misreading in this sense as something like imposing a deliberate abstraction or 
reduction in the name of revealing a meaningful pattern. 
26 As Richard H. Popkin observes revising his own account of Enlightenment skepticism: “In assessing the role of 
skepticism in the Enlightenment, I think we have to detach, at least partially, the question of influence in later times 
and try to see what skepticism represented during the eighteenth century, how it affected the major thinkers of the 
time, and how it developed during the period” (282). And he frames this detachment explicitly as bracketing a neo-
Kantian picture of things: He writes, “Decades before anyone thought of writing the history of British empiricism or 
Continental rationalism, there were historical sketches of classical and contemporary skepticism” (283). 
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instrumental, and proactive; not preoccupied with “radical epistemological uncertainty” but 
committed to attaining “moral certainty” sufficient to justify action in the face of irreducible 
uncertainty. But neo-Kantian intellectual history does not only generate this distortion in our 
historical picture of skepticism. Second and more polemically, I want to suggest that the narrow 
neo-Kantian emphasis on Skepticism misidentifies the central problematic of skepticism, which 
is finally more rhetorical than epistemological, more about persuasion than perception. As we 
might expect, in this abstract machine, each distortion reinforces the other. Neo-Kantian 
intellectual history’s constant observation of epistemological Skepticism effectively displaces the 
more rhetorical, probabilistic, and social account of skepticism that prevailed in eighteenth-
century Anglophone philosophy. As such, it struggles to respect or even acknowledge the 
continued relevance of this early rhetorical picture. To pursue its special account of Skepticism, 
neo-Kantian intellectual history must draw a confident line between “properly philosophical” 
and “merely rhetorical” forms of skepticism. But I say we should be interrogating the work this 
kind of controversial distinction performs in a modern rhetoric of assent. And I would suggest 
that assuming any firm distinction exists often risks evading and exacerbating the evident 
problems of skepticism it purports to resolve. The line between rhetoric and philosophy is never 
fixed but dynamic, never decided but always under debate. And, as Paul Ricoeur observed long 
ago, it is the instability at this line that gives energy and urgency to the theory of persuasion or 
argumentation. 
Let me say more about the sum effect of these distortions. As Rorty and Latour observe, 
though Skepticism may have had a profound effect on shaping a theory of modern scientific 
knowledge and in patrolling the boundaries of modern disciplinary inquiry, Skepticism never 
quite captured the kind of skeptical practices taken up in practice within these disciplines, much 
less in everyday life. As Michael Polanyi notes, the “ethos of radical doubt” has always been 
more aspirational, emphatically “avowed” than “always, or indeed ever, rigorously practised 
[sic]” (Polanyi 269) and, in any case, frequently relaxed in ways that are “marginal and 
acknowledged only in passing” (270). In practice, these domains have always been organized by 
a “constructive skeptical” tradition, which Lorraine Daston has described as a “new philosophy 
of rational belief” that emerged in the late seventeenth-century and promoted a “more modest 
reasonableness that solved everyday dilemmas on the basis of incomplete knowledge, in contrast 
to the traditional rationality of demonstrative certainty” (xi). As Henry van Leeuwen and M. 
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Jamie Ferreira have observed, the program of “constructive skepticism” has its origins in the 
probabilistic epistemologies of the late-seventeenth century philosophers John Tillotson, John 
Wilkins, and, to some extent, John Locke. The program is “skeptical” in the sense that it 
acknowledges the fact of epistemological uncertainty and “constructive” in the sense that it 
rejects that this basic fact should have any radical implications regarding our ability to arrive at 
degrees of “moral certainty” sufficient to justify practical action and judgment (Ferreira 2–4).  
Neo-Kantian Romanticism’s emphasis on the radical, anxious, metastatic character of 
doubt does a poor job of capturing the fundamentally conservative, confident character of this 
Enlightenment tradition of constructive skepticism. Constructive skepticism may accept the 
radically skeptical premise that we are unable to attain certain knowledge about matters of fact, 
but it also accepts that the careful application of skeptical and rational procedures constitutes a 
sufficient response to the problem of uncertainty and, further, a viable method for “constructing” 
actionable, if still uncertain, knowledge about the world. Constructive skepticism is not 
paralyzed by the absorption of radical uncertainty but retains a fundamental confidence in the 
ability of a procedural, rational skepticism to address and alleviate, if not resolve entirely, the 
epistemic problem of uncertainty that radical skepticism identifies. It is rather motivated to a 
severe discipline of “error reduction” and an attempt to characterize the nature of legitimate 
belief and prescribe the appropriate and legitimate conditions for assenting to a belief. This 
constructive skeptical confidence in the possibility of uncertain action crystallized, for instance, 
in the evidentiary standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Simply put, unlike Skepticism, 
constructive skepticism does not subordinate the problematic of action under uncertainty or 
relinquish a more basic confidence in the ability to achieve sufficient degrees of certainty. 
In short, we might say that neo-Kantian Romanticism – and neo-Kantian intellectual 
history more broadly – overestimates the significance of neo-Kantian epistemology. And this 
leads it to underestimate the persistence of the older epistemology neo-Kantian epistemology 
claimed to displace. As a result of these two miscalculations, neo-Kantian intellectual history 
tends to overestimate the distance it achieves from that older epistemology. The neo-Kantian 
insistence that Skepticism is self-evidently philosophical — its insistence that it draws the line 
between philosophical and rhetorical skepticism correctly (if only initially) — obscures and, 
indeed, mystifies the fundamentally rhetorical and social character of its achievement. As 
Schaffer’s analysis clarifies, the achievement of Skepticism is finally not philosophical but 
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social: it amounts to stabilization of the evidential context of Skepticism. Describing neo-
Kantian intellectual history’s achievement in these terms supports Rorty’s claims, against 
epistemology, that justification is finally a “social phenomenon rather than a transaction between 
‘the knowing subject’ and ‘reality’” (9) and, likewise, that “rational certainty” is “a matter of 
victory in argument rather than a relation to an object” (156). By rejecting this social account of 
justification for an epistemological one, neo-Kantian intellectual history attempts to place its 
case for Skepticism’s significance beyond the rhetorical, in a manner that can make neo-Kantian 
critique not only appear mystifying than clarifying.  
Of course, however mystifying the neo-Kantian pursuit of Skepticism can seem, it has 
surely been sincere and well-intended. Skepticism has earned its privileged place in the modern 
intellectual milieu because of its unmatched therapeutic and probative powers. But a neo-Kantian 
appreciation for Skepticism’s potency has also arguably led to an uncritical faith in skepticism’s 
efficacy and probity and an evasion of skepticism’s obvious risks. “It remains deeply ingrained 
in the modern mind — as I find even in my own mind,” writes Michael Polanyi in his 
groundbreaking study of neo-Kantian critical philosophy, “that though doubt may become 
nihilistic and imperil thereby all freedom of thought, to refrain from belief is always an act of 
intellectual probity” (271). By the same Skeptical logic, Polanyi argues, “To accept a belief by 
yielding to a voluntary impulse, be it my own or that of others placed in a position of authority, 
is felt to be a surrender of reason” (271). And for this reason, Polanyi laments, “You cannot 
teach the necessity for doing this without incurring — even in your own heart — the suspicion of 
obscurantism” (271). For Polanyi and many other Skeptically minded scholars, there is 
something strangely noble about adopting a skeptical posture despite its risks.  
Several decades since Polanyi’s groundbreaking work, we are beginning to understand 
the nihilistic and perilous consequences that threaten to follow from the enthusiastic embrace of 
skepticism within modern intellectual history. The troubling efficacy of climate skepticism and 
the doubt industry illustrate how an uncritical esteem for skepticism can be hijacked to bad 
effects. In his widely discussed 2004 polemic against post-structuralist critique, Latour lays the 
blame for these “absurd deformations” of “our weapons” at Kant’s door. “The mistake we made 
– the mistake I made was to believe that there was no efficient way to criticize matters of fact 
except by moving away from them and directing one’s attention toward the conditions that made 
them possible” (“Critique” 231). For Latour, “…[T]his meant “remaining too faithful to the 
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unfortunate solution inherited from the philosophy of Immanuel Kant” (231) and “accepting 
much too uncritically what matters of fact were” (231). I take Latour to mean that Kant’s mistake 
is the assumption that any description of matter of facts could be uncontroversial enough to be 
final or definitive. Against this kind of thinking, Latour insists that “[r]eality is not defined by 
matters of fact” (232) and that “matters of fact” are themselves “very partial[,] very polemical, 
very political renderings of matters of concern and only a subset of what could also because 
called states of affairs” (232). Following Mary Poovey, I would add “very recent” renderings to 
this list.  
 Latour suggests that the problem of this confusion of matters of fact with matters of 
concern is that it has shifted the spirit of critique from persuasion to condescension and has 
changed the character of critique: once a “most ambiguous pharmakon,” critique has been 
transformed into a “potent euphoric drug” (239). And the act of critical explanation has resulted 
in descriptions in which “[y]ou [i.e. the critic] are always right!” (239): “[w]hen naive believers 
are clinging forcefully to their objects, claiming that they are made to do things because of their 
gods, their poetry, their cherished objects, you can turn all those attachments into so many 
fetishes and humiliate all the believers by showing that this is nothing but their own projection” 
(239). And this is true even as “not one of us readers would like to see our own most cherished 
objects treated in this way” (240). For Latour, this version of critique obscures any “real 
difference” between “conspiracists and a popularized, teachable version of social critique” (228). 
Instead, writes Latour, there is “something troublingly similar in the structure of [either’s] 
explanation, in the first movement of disbelief and, then, in the wheeling of causal explanations 
coming out of the deep dark below” (229). For Latour, it is time to “bring the sword of criticism 
to criticism itself” (227), to “devise another powerful descriptive tool” designed not to “debunk 
but to protect and to care,” and to “transform the critical urge in the ethos someone who adds 
reality to matters of fact” rather than “subtracts” reality from them, from a deconstructive to a 
constructive urge.  
Glossing Latour, we might say that it is time to call Skeptics Idiots, but we only really 
know how to call them Heroes. We are in need of a way of reactivating the conservative 
character of skepticism while also retaining its radical promise against what I would argue was 
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always skepticism’s more natural conservatism.27 Yet, as Polanyi shows, a Skeptical ethos 
appears reflexively suspicious about such a constructive turn. And Susan Neiman observes in 
Moral Clarity (2009) that, while this allergy may have initially arisen from “humility and moral 
refinement,” it has since resulted in “attitudes that make moral judgments themselves look 
misguided” (13). In this light, it appears a modern enthusiasm for Skepticism has not only 
enabled bad forms of skepticism but also undermined our only means of resisting those 
deformations. 
In this dissertation, I hope to demonstrate how a return to the constructive skeptical 
tradition eclipsed by Humean skepticism can provide sorely needed insight into these 
contemporary problems with skepticism. My study offers a case for recovering the fideist and 
commonsense traditions of skepticism that a neo-Kantian preference for Humean skepticism has 
encouraged critics to ignore or dismiss as dogmatic and incorrigible. I look to these traditions of 
skepticism to recover the Enlightenment investment in common sense as it tethers, orients, and 
mitigates the practice of skepticism. I offer a case for dispensing with the disingenuous topos of 
crisis and pursuing a more substantive and sympathetic picture of Anglophone philosophy and, in 
particular, a more nuanced appreciation of commonsense skepticism.  Likewise, where a critical 
preference for radical skepticism has encouraged viewing the Enlightenment project of attaining 
moral certainty as misguided or problematic, I accept that this project is fundamentally sound 
and serious, if in need of constant attention and refinement. Here I follow Neiman’s observation 
that “[t]he fact that a use [of moral language] is careless doesn’t make it insignificant.” With 
“careless” Neiman is looking in two directions: not only to the glib manner with which most 
academics now handle moral language, but also to the problematic, historical articulations of 
morality that have understandably recommended this pessimism. In “Misreading Skepticism,” I 
pursue a more careful, sympathetic approach to the moral convictions that orient many long 
eighteenth century thinkers but which scholars have long treated with suspicion under the sign of 
neo-Kantian critique.  
                                                            
27 I say more natural conservatism because its dismissive posture appeals to a kind of intellectual and moral probity 
that often aligns with and reinforces the rationality of the institutions that condition it. Polanyi again has the clearest 
theoretical view of both dimensions: “Since the sceptic does not consider it rational to doubt what he himself 
believes, the advocacy of ‘rational doubt’ is merely the sceptic’s way of advocating his own beliefs” (297). And this 
reinforces institutional rationality because ““[w]e owe our mental existence predominantly to works of art, morality, 
religious worship, scientific theory and other articulate systems which we accept as our dwelling place and as the 
soil of our mental development” (286) 
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The most important literary-critical payoff of this more sympathetic engagement with this 
constructive skeptical tradition is the new view it affords of Romantic literature as it responds to 
this tradition. My readings of Romantic literary texts draw on this revised intellectual history to 
challenge the specious assumption that Romantics were deeply invested in radical Humean 
skepticism and to recover the Romantics’ obscured and less understood investment in practical 
rationality. I argue that Romantic literary explorations of uncertainty should not been seen as 
responding to some anxiety or crisis generated by Humean skepticism. Rather, they should be 
seen as interrogating the confident, conservative character of Enlightenment skepticism. I 
demonstrate how Romantic literary works by William Godwin, William Wordsworth, Mary 
Shelley, and other Romantic authors interrogate the intellectual habits that Enlightenment 
philosophers recommend to attain practical certainty, often by thematizing and exposing the 
irreducible elements of subjectivity that these rationalized procedures fail to discipline. 
Collectively, my readings offer an important corrective to several influential neo-Kantian 
Romantic literary histories mistakenly premised on the crisis of Humean skepticism. 
 
Summary of the Chapters 
My study proceeds in six chapters. The first four chapters are dedicated to correcting the 
distortions introduced by neo-Kantian intellectual history and neo-Kantian Romanticism. They 
work at the margins of neo-Kantian intellectual history to develop a revised intellectual history 
of skepticism centered not on the problematic of “radical uncertainty” but on the problematic of 
“moral certainty” and to demonstrate how this larger problematic — elevated by the project of 
“practical rationality” — informs the broader intellectual landscape. The final two chapters then 
consider Romantic literary practices as they respond to this revised intellectual history and, more 
specifically, as they interrogate the conservative imperatives of Enlightenment skepticism. 
Chapter One, “Thinking Through Neo-Kantian Intellectual History,” offers a more 
thorough examination of the character of neo-Kantian intellectual history in its various historical 
phases. Section One, “Neo-Kantian Intellectual History as a Religion,” offers a general 
framework for thinking about the observational practices of neo-Kantian intellectual history: that 
is, how and why it observes the crisis of modernity it does. This overview is followed by three 
historical snapshots of neo-Kantian intellectual history. Section Two, “Neo-Kantian 
Romanticism,” examines how Romantic literary critics adopted neo-Kantian intellectual history 
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at the mid-twentieth century. It considers the cultural factors which arguably compelled mid-
twentieth century literary critics to conscript neo-Kantian intellectual history in this way and why 
we should take neo-Kantian Romanticism to say more about mid-twentieth century investments 
in neo-Kantian intellectual history (and Romanticism's privileged place in it) than it does about 
British Romanticism’s investments in any neo-Kantian project. In short, it argues that literary 
critics were attracted to the cultural authority of neo-Kantian intellectual history, and pursued 
neo-Kantian Romanticism as a kind of justification of Romanticism’s status as a modern 
intellectual formation. Section Three, “Hume is the Special Prophet,” returns to Leslie Stephen’s 
archetypal neo-Kantian intellectual history, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth 
Century (1876), for a closer examination of the how neo-Kantian intellectual history achieved its 
unique shape and prominence at the late nineteenth century. I show how Stephen pursues neo-
Kantian intellectual history to elaborate what he saw as the overly narrow disciplinary history of 
philosophy. And I show how interpreting Stephen’s text as a foundational articulation of neo-
Kantian intellectual history helps answer longstanding critical question regarding the curious 
distance between the kind of sociological intellectual history Stephen envisions and the 
intellectual history he ends up writing.  
One of the most questionable aspects of neo-Kantian intellectual history is how its 
integrity depends, severely, on the accuracy of the Kantian triptych at its origin. The fourth and 
final section of Chapter One, “Collapsing Kant’s Triptych” returns to Kant’s Prolegomena to 
consider how credible Kant’s description of his own or the Common-Sense response to Hume 
really is. Whether or not Kant’s negotiation was ever properly philosophical enough to warrant 
embracing it as uncritically as neo-Kantian intellectual history has, Kant’s triptych is obviously 
rhetorical in some sense. Whatever distance Kant tries to create between either Hume or his 
Common-Sense contemporaries, Kant winds up in more or less the same place as Hume’s critics. 
Kant may take Hume more seriously than Reid or Beattie. Kant may work with Hume more than 
he works against him. But in the end, Kant still dismisses Hume’s threat as only apparent. With 
this rhetorical character in view, this section tries to redescribe the actual distance between Kant 
and Reid’s responses to Hume. It then considers how Kant’s sophisticated rhetorical negotiation 
of Hume lays the groundwork not only for the observational character of neo-Kantian intellectual 
history but, more specifically, for neo-Kantian intellectual history’s successful stabilization of 
Skepticism’s evidential context.  
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Chapter Two, “Neo-Kantian Critique Loves a Crisis,” places the neo-Kantian topos of 
crisis itself under a more thorough scrutiny. Section One, “Whose Crisis is This?,” considers 
how neo-Kantian intellectual history has historically read this crisis into commonsense hostility 
towards Hume as a way of dismissing the legitimacy and intelligibility of the commonsense 
response to Hume. Section Two, “Johnson’s Kick Revisited,” returns to Johnson’s kick to offer a 
sympathetic description of Johnson’s anti-Skeptical skepticism which locates the source of 
Johnson’s hostility towards Skepticism not in his metaphysical or theological preoccupations but 
in his investment in constructive skepticism. Section Three, “Two Senses of Irreligious, 
Revisited,” considers the broader, qualified reception of Hume in the Romantic period. Section 
Four, “The Real Crisis: Practical Rationality, Constructive Skepticism, and the Problem of 
Assent,” builds on this analysis of Johnson’s kick to recover the problematic of “moral certainty” 
that the constructive skeptical project of practical rationality elevates and differentiate it from the 
crisis of “radical uncertainty” that neo-Kantian intellectual history observes. It shows how the 
problematic split between fact and value that neo-Kantian intellectual history sees as the final 
outcome of the Enlightenment project of practical rationality is not the problematic that was at its 
center. Section Five, “Moral Evidence as ‘The Province of Rhetoric,’” aims to recover the deeply 
rhetorical and social character of probable knowledge in the Enlightenment. Section Six, 
“Johnson’s Science,” offers a way of thinking about how Romantic literary authors (specifically 
the first generation) would have encountered and absorbed this broader project of practical 
rationality.  
Chapter Three, “There Was No Radical Hume,” questions the credibility of the radically 
skeptical Hume propagated within neo-Kantian intellectual history, and looks to demonstrate the 
conservative, pragmatic tenor of Anglophone philosophy as a whole by taking Hume’s 
philosophy as representative of the outermost limit of Enlightenment skepticism and drawing out 
this conservatism within Hume. Section One, “Neo-Kantian Romanticism Misreads Hume,” 
considers how neo-Kantian Romanticism has constructed and instrumentalized this radically 
skeptical Hume in the service of narrating the rise of Romanticism. I correct this distortion of 
Hume’s philosophy by reviewing the “naturalistic” picture of Hume’s philosophy that has 
emerged in philosophical treatments of Hume since Martin Kemp Smith’s early, influential 
polemic against the looming Hume of nineteenth-century neo-Kantian philosophy. Section Two, 
“Hume Misreading Locke,” tries to capture the extent of Hume’s investment in “moral certainty” 
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by considering his reaction to what he saw as Locke’s insufficient treatment of that category. 
Section Three, “What Crisis of Analogy?” shows how this radically skeptical Hume has been 
elaborated to construct neo-Kantian literary history’s picture of the eighteenth-century “crisis” or 
“collapse” of the neo-Platonic divine analogy. I challenge the neo-Kantian account of Hume’s 
skeptical rejection of analogy by observing the central role analogy occupies in Humean 
probabilism where it functions as the single psychological mechanism uniting Hume’s 
epistemology and ethics. I argue that Hume’s critique of analogy is motivated less by his anxiety 
about analogy than by his confidence in the possibility of a formal or normative criteria of 
analogy, or what I will call Hume’s “strong” orientation towards analogy. Section Four, 
“Commonsense and Critical Analogy in the Dialogues,” fleshes out Hume’s more complicated 
picture of analogy with a reading of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. In this 
reading, I challenge the tendencies to flatten the dialogue’s literary form into a clear-cut 
argument against analogical arguments from design and to identify Hume’s position with the 
dialogue’s Skeptic, Philo. Instead, I consider the skeptical orientations of all three characters in 
the piece and make the case that Cleanthes, the natural theologian, finally “wins” the dialogue 
largely because his analogical argument from design simply looks more intuitive and intelligible 
than either Philo’s “strong commonsense” or “strong critical” arguments against it. As a whole, 
Chapter Three aims to demonstrate how no picture of Hume’s philosophy is sufficient unless it 
appreciates how Hume’s naturalistic investments limit his skeptical ones — or, alternatively, how 
his commonsense investments orient, tether, and constrict his critical ones28. 
                                                            
28I make a methodological decision here not to pursue strong definitions of either “commonsense” or “critical.” This 
will likely seem evasive. But I believe it is justified for a few reasons. First, it responds to the empty or negative 
character of both terms, which in the eighteenth century seem to operate as what Robert Mitchell has called 
“variable regulative standards:” not measured against a formal standard but rather “read blindly and negatively 
through the actions of others” (keynote, North American Society for the Study of Romanticism, 2017). There is 
simply no way of specifying exactly what either term meant; both were experienced viscerally and implicitly. 
Instead, I believe it is only possible to consider them schematically, as binaries in constant tension. This schematic 
approach seems more advantageous than inhibiting not least because it helpfully aligns with the more or less 
schematic and heuristic ways that someone like Hume would have been trained in the philosophical societies of 
Scotland, where political, historical, and philosophical questions would have been posed in terms of simple binaries 
(e.g. superstition or enthusiasm, wit and genius, self-interest and disinterest) which one could analyze and elaborate 
into viable generalities that could measure the space between the binaries or illuminate each concept in turn or 
perform a synchronic analysis of co-existence in the world. Or in which different prevailing “tendencies” could be 
analyzed diachronically, traced backwards or forwards through the genre of conjectural history in a procedure that 
Devin Griffiths has recently identified as the rhetorical tradition of comparativo that has since evolved into the 
modern comparative method. The most important thing to bear in mind is that these have much different 
connotations than today (see “The Comparative Method and the History of the Humanities”, forthcoming).  
With the terms “commonsense” and “critical” I am aiming to develop analytic tools that recover what I take 
to be the marked nature of the critical in the period, where it potentially lacks the esteem that we have afforded it as 
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Chapter Four, “Making (Common) Sense of Analogy,” situates Hume’s thinking about 
analogy within a broader Enlightenment program devoted to determining the “scope” and 
“force” of analogy and distinguishing privileged from problematic uses of analogical reasoning.29 
The chapter proceeds in eight sections that aim to construct a more variegated and complex 
picture of analogy in the long eighteenth century than the one offered by neo-Kantian 
Romanticism. Section One, “Bad Analogies,” introduces an original analytic schema meant to 
capture the two major orientations towards this critical program: a “strong” orientation, which 
remains optimistic about the discovery of normative criteria that might distinguish good and bad 
analogies, and a “weak” orientation, which remains skeptical and dismissive of this critical 
program. Section Two, “Weak Analogy in Tristram Shandy,” diagnoses the central problem of 
neo-Kantian Romantic approaches to analogy as an underappreciation of the critical force of 
what I will call a “weak” orientation towards analogy in the long eighteenth century. Section 
Three, “Commonsense and Critical Orientations,” develops the original analytic along a second 
axis that distinguishes between “commonsense” and “critical” orientations. A “commonsense” 
orientation anticipates the “rule” of analogy to be more intuitive than counterintuitive — that is, 
more continuous than discontinuous with commonsense — while a “critical orientation” 
anticipates that rule to be more counterintuitive than intuitive, more a matter of expert critical 
judgment. Section Four, “Disciplining Playfair’s Analogy,” pursues a finer definition between 
different “weak” orientations available in the period. Section Five, “Analogy as Presumption: 
The Lawrence-Abernethy Debate,” draws on a case study from Romantic science to consider a 
unique rhetorical strategy of “analogy-as-presumption” that emerges out of the weak orientation 
but which is increasingly disciplined out by the strong critical orientations that emerge in the 
early nineteenth century scientific practice. Section Six, “Rhetoric and Psychology,” tries to 
clarify how a “psychological” account of analogy preferred by the strong orientation gradually 
displaces and reconfigures the “rhetorical” account of analogy preferred by the weak perspective. 
Section Seven, “Common Sense, For and Against Analogy,” examines the Scottish Common-
                                                            
a result of our more general preference for intellectual originality rather than normality. This preference for 
originality is itself statistical, thought to be a matter of a resourceful and ever active empiricism. In short, common 
sense would have had the upper hand due to a deeper investment in what Dror Wharman calls identity-as-
identicality, or a “collective grouping highlighting whatever a person has in common with others” (276). 
29I have chosen here not to pursue or promote any specific definition of analogy here, but rather to focus on 
historical attempts to “formalize” analogy and, more importantly, varying historical estimations of the viability or 
fruitfulness of the project of formalizing analogy.  
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Sense critique of analogy initiated by Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. And Section Eight, 
“Analogy-as-Assent in Associationist Aesthetics,” looks at how this broader context informs 
approaches to analogy within associationist aesthetics, where a psychological account of analogy 
leads critics to pursue analogy as a potential site for observing a universal commonsense 
anticipated and projected by Scottish commonsense philosophy.  
In Chapter Five, “Romantic Analogy Reconsidered,” I turn to consider the uptake of this 
Enlightenment discourse of analogy within Romantic poetic practice. In general, I try to 
demonstrate how Romantic poetics can be seen as developing rather than rejecting the tenets of  
associationist aesthetics, especially as they center around the perception and articulation of 
analogies as sites of communal assent. To establish the grounds for this reading, I revisit a central 
piece of evidence for the Romantic break with associationist aesthetics, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s 1802 letter to William Sotheby, and develop an alternative account of its 
significance. I then turn to consider Wordsworth’s specific engagement with associationist 
aesthetics in both his poetic theory and practice. I argue that, whereas Wordsworth seems to hew 
closely to the tenets of associationist aesthetics in his poetic theory – especially its emphasis on 
general over particular associations – in his poetry practice seems to thematize the kinds of error 
of idiosyncratic perception that aesthetics discourages and elevates them as special sites for 
observing the imagination. And I explore the effects of this interest in visual analogies in two 
poems, “Resolution and Independence” and “The Thorn.”  
The sixth and final chapter, “Disciplines of Doubt,” considers engagements with 
eighteenth-century legal epistemology in three Romantic literary works: Wordsworth’s The 
Borderers, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, and William Godwin’s Things as They Are: Or, The 
Adventures of Caleb Williams. In my reading of The Borderers, “Staging Risk in the Borderers,” 
I propose a new way of thinking about what William Jewett has described as the drama’s “master 
plot of ‘strange repetition’” (Jewett 82) as a kind of procedural and experimental rationalism. In 
“Victor’s Reasonable Doubt,” I focus on the novel’s engagement with the concept of 
circumstantial evidence in the early trial scene and consider the difficult relation between Victor 
Frankenstein’s cold, constructive skepticism and his hotter but suppressed psychological turmoil. 
And in “Caleb’s Unreasonable Doubt,” I focus on the relation of doubt and desire in Caleb 
Williams and argue that the novel’s interest in doubt should be read in dialogue with adoption of 
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard within eighteenth-century legal epistemology. I 
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consider how the novel insists on the ways desire conditions doubt and how that insistence 
subverts the claims to “disinterestedness” and “reasonableness” that recommend “reasonable 
doubt” as a legitimate and adequate response to the risks posed by judgment under uncertainty. 
Chapter Six ends with a brief coda that draws on this reading of Caleb Williams to gesture 
towards a concept of “Romantic doubt.” The dissertation concludes with a more general, if also 













Thinking Through Neo-Kantian Intellectual History 
 
 
1.1 Neo-Kantian Intellectual History as a Religion 
In my introduction, I claim that subscribers to neo-Kantian intellectual history regard it as 
the “best” way to view modernity in three senses: best in the empirical sense of “most legible,” 
best in an intensive sense of “most essential,” and best in a moral sense of “most elevating and 
inspiring.” In this section, I elaborate on this claim, and I want to begin by proposing that neo-
Kantian intellectual history amounts to a quasi-theological practice in the way it vigilantly 
observes the modern break to memorialize and clarify its nature. This quasi-theological view 
captures the doctrinal stability that the first two empirical and intensive senses of best establish. 
More importantly, this quasi-theological view helps visualize how the third (and, from my 
perspective, most interesting) moral sense of best emerges diachronically. As we shall see, for 
Kant, epistemology is importantly not moral or practical, but philosophical (Of course, this is 
because for Kant moral certainty was never in doubt). But, as Lorraine Daston notes, by the early 
nineteenth-century, “epistemological belief” acquired a “moral aura” of its own (“Scientific 
Error” 24) centered on the intellectual probity of Skepticism as a practice. Thus, for someone like 
Carlyle, Skepticism is a matter of manly composure, precisely the kind of composure Johnson — 
almost inexplicably — seems to lose in the face of it. This moral aura grows so that, by the mid-
twentieth century, if not well before, neo-Kantian intellectual history achieves the status of a kind 
of modern religion, especially in its strongest and most compulsory forms. Reciting it is 
perceived as fundamentally orienting, unifying, and fulfilling: it offers a central story which 
clarifies the modern condition as a condition of disenchantment, disillusionment, and dissolution. 
It sets the project of modernity to be coping with and embracing this newly modern condition of 
crisis and, most notably, resisting older metaphysical ways out of it.  
Indeed, many scholars have already noted neo-Kantian intellectual history’s quasi-
theological character and diagnosed some of its major problems, and it will be helpful to review 
 42 
some of these findings since they establish the basis of my revised intellectual history. Polanyi, 
Daston, and others, for instance, have identified one of its central dogmas to be what Polanyi 
describes as the “doctrine of doubt” and Daston as an “ur-belief” that “it is both possible and 
desirable to believe only what one wills to believe, and that the will to believe can be compelled 
by reason” (“Scientific Error” 24). For Polanyi, the problem with this dogma is that its 
rationalism is so naively overconfident that it is finally disingenuous: Polanyi writes, “[N]o 
proclamation of intellectual integrity could be more sincere,” but “its words are devoid of any 
definite meaning, and their ambiguity conceals precisely the kind of personal convictions which 
they so loudly repudiate” (Personal Knowledge 269). Whatever its intent of this ethos of radical 
doubt, the final effect is mystification. Again, Polanyi: “to claim that you strictly refrain from 
believing anything that could be disproved is merely to cloak your own will to believe your 
beliefs behind a false pretense of self-critical severity” (271).  
 For Polanyi, the uncritical adoption of this doctrine of doubt — bound up in the modern 
idea of “objectivism” — has erased what Polanyi calls the “fiduciary stance” – or set of 
unquestioned, background commitments that undergird any modern intellectual practice: as such, 
it has “totally falsified our conception of truth, by exalting what we can know and prove, while 
covering up with ambiguous utterances all that we know and cannot prove, even though the latter 
knowledge underlies, and must ultimately set its seal to, all that we can prove” (286). In his 
analysis of neo-Kantian critique in The Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (1974), 
Wayne Booth provides a complementary account of this falsification. Booth describes a second, 
“modern dogma” that installs the misleading distinction between objective facts and subjective 
values. Under the sway of this dogma, “values” are doomed to appear problematic, irrational 
enough to be incorrigible, beyond argumentation or persuasion, and simply a matter of 
commitment. “Facts,” in contrast, emerge as privileged, self-evident and rational enough to be 
uncontroversial and beyond persuasion because they are more empirical proof or simple 
perception than argumentation.30 For Booth, the problem with this distinction is that it 
mischaracterizes the nature of “rationality,” which is not adequately described as the “surrender 
                                                            
30 See Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974) for Booth’s fullest 
and first articulation of this thesis. Booth’s original study dates itself by being too occasional (written in response to 
a specific controversy at the University of Chicago) but nonetheless offers a prescient treatment of many 
contemporary issues concerning, for instance, reactions to conservative speakers on campus. For a more recent, 
condensed account, see “Blind Skepticism versus a Rhetoric of Assent.” College English 67.4 (2005): 378-88.  
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only to hard empirical proof.” Against this mischaracterization, Booth insists that “[r]easonable 
rhetoric is…what we all depend on — the empirically unprovable but ‘unquestionable 
assumptions’ in every corner of our lives” (“Blind Skepticism” 381). Booth’s objection amounts 
to something like Latour’s distinction between matters of fact and matters of concern.  
Polanyi and Booth offer critiques of these two dogmas of neo-Kantian intellectual history 
at the level of theory: for Polanyi and Booth, the problem with these dogmas is that they 
misdescribe the nature of belief and argumentation. In the next chapter, I will pursue something 
like a critique of these neo-Kantian dogmas at the level of historical description. I will argue that 
they are not the dogmas that would have oriented the long eighteenth-century practice of 
epistemology. The neo-Kantian doctrine of radical doubt may have developed out of the earlier 
Enlightenment program of critical intellectual reform, but eighteenth-century thinkers would 
have been more focused on procedural principle of “reasonable doubt” and would have stressed 
the importance of acquiescing to a belief once all doubts had been resolved. Likewise, though the 
neo-Kantian distinction between fact and value arguably emerges as an effect of epistemology 
over the longue durée, it would not have been the distinction that Enlightenment epistemologists 
observed. Rather, that distinction would have been between “moral” and “demonstrative” 
knowledge and the kinds of certainty they afforded. 
Of course, a theological picture of epistemology has its obvious limits.31 But it is still 
worth pursuing a quasi-theological account of neo-Kantian intellectual history because, as 
Polanyi and Booth’s wry appeals to religious language suggest, there is something distinctly 
ironic about the disparity between the practice of neo-Kantian intellectual history and its self-
descriptions of that practice, between its claim to reject metaphysics and its actual practice, 
which this theological description succinctly captures. These ironies are on clear display in the 
mid-twentieth century, when neo-Kantian intellectual history achieves its fullest theological 
                                                            
31 Daston offers an important account of the differences between an epistemological and religious orientation: “The 
ethos of belief preached by epistemology may occasionally borrow the vocabulary and timbre of religion, but it 
springs from fundamentally different impulses. To grant belief to claims, theories, and propositions does not 
resemble a state of religious conviction, even though both may command the full investment of the self. The one 
seeks at all costs to avoid credulity, the other incredulity, but even this opposition does not fully capture the 
distinction. Epistemological belief — and still more principled disbelief — is willed and cultivated; on this account, 
assent is freely granted by an autonomous cognitive agent who bears responsibility for this decision. In contrast, 
religious faith is a gift, freely endowed but not willed” (“Scientific Error” 23).  
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status and the neo-Kantian topos of crisis essentially unites its professors around a shared vision 
of modern society’s dissolution and fragmentation. 
Despite its claim to have dispelled with metaphysics, neo-Kantian intellectual history 
functions in a way that is hard to distinguish from metaphysics. It offers a strong, committed 
description of the way things really are. Neo-Kantian intellectual history has this metaphysical 
character because metaphysics, like skepticism, is less a matter of content than a matter of form: 
less a worldview itself than an enthusiastic embrace of or strong disposition towards a preferred 
worldview at the exclusion of others. While claiming to be defined by the spirit of Skepticism, 
neo-Kantian intellectual history adopts a fairly uncritical posture towards the authority of its own 
critical descriptions (especially its description of Skepticism). But, as Polanyi notes, its Skeptical 
impulse — its radical ethos of doubt — must assume “a much stronger will to believe than the 
usual beliefs of a person discharging no judicial responsibility” (Personal Knowledge 279). Or, 
as William James puts it, Skepticism is itself volitional, not “avoidance of option” but “option of 
a certain particular kind of risk:” “Better risk loss of truth than chance of error — that is your 
faith-vetoer’s exact position” (James 344).  
Neo-Kantian intellectual history obscures its metaphysical character by framing the 
discovery of neo-Kantian epistemology as a “subtraction story.”32 Neo-Kantian intellectual 
history offers a subtraction story in which the rise of epistemology is viewed not only as a 
modern historical innovation but as a kind of transhistorical discovery. Kant’s response to 
Hume’s epistemological skepticism is understood to initiate a special inquiry into the 
transhistorical conditions which make knowledge possible. Neo-Kantian epistemology provides 
the philosophical terms that allow the dismissal of theological and metaphysical preoccupations 
to seem more uncontroversial than controversial: a matter of intellectual duty and necessity 
                                                            
32Here I am following Charles Taylor’s influential analysis of the logic of secular humanist narratives in A Secular 
Age (2007).  For Taylor, these narratives frame the rise of secular humanism as a process of “subtraction:” a 
progressive abandonment of inauthentic metaphysical commitments and the gradual discovery of an authentic 
account of the human condition. On Taylor’s account, his rhetoric of subtraction encourages viewing secular 
humanism not only as a distinct historical or political formation but also as a transhistorical, natural description of 
the human condition. For Taylor, framing the rise of secular humanism as subtractive in this way allows portraying 
the rise of secular humanism in distinctly progressive and developmental terms. The secular humanist worldview is 
privileged because it is immanent rather than transcendent, uncommitted rather than creedal, natural rather than 
metaphysical, and finally, more mature than naive. These progressive contradistinctions also license a dismissive 
posture towards religious modes since, from within this subtraction story, creedal and metaphysical commitments or 
any sincere investment in transcendence appear naive, if not dishonest or delusional: relics of a more primitive and 
premodern way of thinking. For Taylor’s description of “subtraction stories,” see A Secular Age (Belknap, 2007), 
especially 26-29, 569-79.  
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rather than creedal choice. And this “subtractive logic” itself arguably emerges from what 
Polanyi describes as the neo-Kantian’s “sustained effort to eliminate” all “psychological 
elements” (Personal Knowledge 258) on the conviction that the “uprooting of all voluntary 
components of belief will leave behind unassailed a residue of knowledge that is completely 
determined by the objective evidence” (269). Here again we see the improbable alignment of 
historical and theoretical factors that account for the potency of the neo-Kantian abstract 
machine. 
If neo-Kantian intellectual history is a modern faith, it is a modern faith temperamentally 
inclined to accuse others of bad faith, all while looking conspicuously guilty of bad faith itself 
because of the dogmatic and uncritical way it appears to embrace its own convictions. As Rita 
Felski recently notes, critique “does not tolerate rivals” because it “insists that those who do not 
embrace its tenets must be denying or disavowing them” (“Critique” np) rather than simply 
disagreeing with them. In response, critique deploys a “posture of detachment” (np) — an 
unwillingness to engage its rivals seriously on their terms, because these terms are taken to be 
obviously problematic, untenable, incorrigible, and therefore illegitimate. In his recent analysis 
of Nietzschean critique, Simon During suggests that what distinguishes critique is that it 
“separates itself from rhetoric:” “[Critique] gives up, (ostensibly, at least) on its effort to 
persuade” (During 74). Its “habitual pose is an elevated one in which, as we might put it, 
skepticism, denunciation, and prophecy” (75) co-exist. I would argue that it is less that neo-
Kantian critique has no rhetorical strategy, but that its strategy is to treat its rivals as beyond 
persuasion or even comprehension. We might see this as the difference between Johnson and 
Carlyle’s laughter. Johnson’s kick seems still firmly committed to the persuasive power of wit: 
Johnson hopes that his critics will laugh with him at Berkeley. Carlyle laughs at Johnson’s anti-
Skeptical reaction.  
To examine this difference, we can return for another look at Carlyle’s dismissal of 
Johnson and note that Carlyle has to impose an intellectual threat on Johnson, to read Johnson’s 
hostility as a defensive reaction. But Carlyle goes a step further, and also judges Johnson’s 
defensiveness-cum-hostility towards Hume to be utterly unwarranted, misplaced enough to be 
embarrassing. This is because Carlyle finally seems to believe Humean Skepticism to be 
uncontroversial in nature — momentous or significant because, in retrospect, so incredibly self-
evident. From Carlyle’s perspective, there is no way to comprehend Hume’s Skeptical 
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philosophy and still find it controversial or threatening. For Carlyle, to see Hume’s Skepticism as 
threatening and controversial is to misunderstand it. To see something threatening in Skepticism 
is somehow, paradoxically, to “see nothing” in it. It is as if, for Carlyle, Johnson’s overreaction 
amounts to no reaction at all. 
This strange neo-Kantian logic becomes more clear in Kant’s comical treatment of 
Hume’s commonsense critics in the Prolegomena. Here is Kant commenting on Hume’s 
contemporary reception: 
It is positively painful to see how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, 
and lastly Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were taking 
for granted that which he doubted, and demonstrating with zeal and often with 
impudence that which he never thought of doubting, they so misconstrued his 
valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing 
had happened. (Kant 4) 
 
We will want to focus on Kant’s distinction between what Hume “doubted” and what Hume 
“never thought of doubting” at the center of this comedy of misdirection. Here is how Kant 
glosses this distinction: 
The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even 
indispensable for our knowledge of nature; but whether that concept could be 
thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, 
independent of all experience, implying a more widely extended usefulness, not 
limited merely to objects of experience. This was Hume’s problem. It was a 
question concerning the origin of the concept, not concerning its indispensability 
in use. Were the former decided, the conditions of its use and the sphere of its 
valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. (4) 
 
Kant understands the Common-Sense error to turn on a distinction between a priori and a 
justification of the concept of cause. And he understands this distinction loosely as one between 
what Kant calls “pure” and “practical” justification but what I will eventually want to call 
“epistemological” and “moral” justification. Moral here has the older, now somewhat archaic 
epistemic sense of “right, useful, and even indispensable” knowledge gathered from 
“experience.” It is knowledge gained through intercourse with the world, from being in and 
empirically observing the world: for instance, knowledge of what Hume calls the “course of 
nature,” or of moral duty, of other people’s behavior, of history.  
It’s worth noting, in anticipation of my revised intellectual history, that Kant is observing 
the distinction between demonstrative and moral knowledge, not one between subject or object, 
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or fact or value. And he is observing it in a way that clarifies his thorough conservatism. From 
Kant’s perspective, Hume never doubts the moral certainty of causation: that is, the 
reasonableness and necessity of having a practical or moral faith in the “indispensability” of 
causation. Rather, for Kant, what Hume doubts is whether the necessity of causation may be 
grounded at a deeper epistemological level than this practical, experiential one: that is, whether 
causation has an “inner truth” or a priori claims to a “more widely extended usefulness” than its 
evident everyday usefulness. And, for Kant, while this deeper epistemological question promises 
to completely determine the moral sphere, it is also in some sense entirely disconnected with and 
immaterial to the practical sphere.  
 The mistake Hume’s Anglophone critics make, as Kant sees it, is that they illegitimately 
import what would otherwise be legitimate moral convictions about the practical value of 
causation (as acquired from experience) into the philosophical realm — which is to say, the 
epistemological realm. Put another way, Hume’s critics pursue a moral defense of the practical 
value of causation which, from Kant’s perspective, is entirely inappropriate and unnecessary in 
the given epistemological context. Kant takes Hume to have “demonstrated irrefutably that it was 
entirely impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination as 
involves necessity [in the causal sense]” (3). But again, for Kant, this demonstration only speaks 
to an impossibility of a theoretical concept of necessary causation; it says nothing about the 
legitimacy — not to mention the necessity — of moral certainty in causation. The appeal that 
Hume’s critics make to “common sense,” however valid in the context of moral or practical 
knowledge, has no philosophical currency. For Kant, this appeal comes off as “defiant without 
any insight.” It is dogmatic, confused, and ultimately pointless: dogmatic because common sense 
seems to function as oracular truth rather than rational justification; confused because ultimately 
Kant takes Hume’s critics to be misidentifying their practical, moral conviction in causation as 
grounded in (and thus evidence of) something deeper than warranted; but finally pointless 
because, just as Kant takes a practical faith in causation to be uncontroversial, he also takes 
Hume’s insight to be finally uncontroversial, only an apparent crisis when misunderstood.  
In short, for Kant, Hume’s insight should look intellectually threatening — not least, 
because it threatens to diminish the power of Reason — but not morally threatening. But Hume’s 
critics get these signals crossed. This is why Kant cringes at the “positively painful” sight of 
Hume’s critics. Their confusion — and the hostile, half-baked response their confusion generates 
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— is more embarrassing than anything. The fact that Hume’s critics even take Hume’s insight to 
be morally controversial testifies to their inability to grasp this elementary distinction between 
moral and epistemological considerations. Their overreaction is finally no philosophical reaction: 
as Kant says, “they so misconstrued his valuable suggestion that everything remained in its old 
condition, as if nothing had happened” (4). “As if nothing happened:” their overreaction amounts 
to no reaction at all. 
Kant’s reading of Hume’s contemporaries helps illuminate Carlyle’s remark that 
“[p]itiable it is, no doubt, that a Samuel Johnson must confute Hume’s irreligious Philosophy by 
some ‘story from a Clergy-man of the Bishoprick of Durham’” (155). Carlyle’s dominant 
affective response, like Kant’s, is condescension and pity. And, viewed in light of Kant’s 
negotiation, Carlyle seems to be deftly capitalizing on a double sense of irreligious to make the 
same point Kant does regarding the distinction between epistemological and moral concerns. Of 
course, “irreligious” is generally taken in the sense of being explicitly hostile to religion or 
“without regard” to religion. But it can also be taken as in the more neutral sense of “having no 
reference to religion” at all.  
To be sure, Carlyle would have regarded Hume’s philosophy to be irreligious in the 
hostile sense insofar as Carlyle accepted Hume’s general outlook to be anti-dogmatic, of a piece 
with Voltaire’s.33 However, one of these effects of neo-Kantian history is to cultivate the second, 
neutral sense of irreligious around epistemology. This semantic play between these two senses 
will be important for understanding the neo-Kantian process of “differentiation” that Casanova 
analyzes. Following Kant’s insistence on the philosophical nature of Skepticism, it seems 
warranted to suggest that Carlyle is commenting more subtly on how Johnson’s theological 
preoccupations encourage him to interpret Hume’s philosophy as irreligious in the first hostile 
sense (prompting Johnson to respond in kind with hostility) when, in fact, Johnson should see 
that Hume’s philosophy is finally irreligious in the second sense: or, maybe better, Johnson 
should see that Hume’s philosophy comes by this hostile sense honestly and uncontroversially, so 
to speak, through the second neutral sense. In other words, this neutral sense shows Taylor’s 
                                                            
33This seems to be Hume’s preferred reading as well: “If my philosophy, therefore, makes no addition to the 
arguments of religion, I have at least the satisfaction to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing 
remains precisely as before” (Treatise 164). Of course, many attempt to read this qualification as feigned. But I 
think of it as ground honestly conceded. Of course, this is a contentious claim. For a reading of the hostilely 
irreligious nature of the Treatise, see Russell, The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and 
Irreligion. 
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rhetoric of “subtraction” hard at work. Johnson’s appeal to the authority of a local clergyman 
does not simply reflect Johnson’s intellectual slavishness or his parochial, outmoded evidentiary 
practices. It signifies that Johnson has mistaken what is properly an epistemological problem for 
a moral or theological one. For Carlyle, Johnson’s appeal to a theological or moral authority 
simply has no philosophical sanction. Johnson’s moral preoccupations blind him to the neutral 
philosophical character of Hume’s philosophy; they cause him to react to Hume in an 
inappropriate and even embarrassing manner. For Carlyle, if Johnson had properly understood 
Hume, he would have seen that Hume presents no threat. Johnson’s hostile response thus 
indicates that Johnson simply lacks a legitimate or coherent framework for understanding Hume. 
Again, this is why Johnson’s response is “pitiable” more than anything. Johnson sees controversy 
where there should be none, and it puts him on the wrong side of History.  
The logic of Kant and Carlyle’s readings could be compressed in the following manner. 
Hostile responses to Hume are illegitimate finally because they are simply confused. We know 
that these responses are confused because they are hostile where they should not be or, in Kant’s 
case, alarmed for the wrong reasons. Hostile responses come from within a preoccupied moral or 
theological perspective, where Hume’s philosophy still seems controversial and threatening, and 
not from within an epistemological perspective, where Hume’s insights will seem quite obvious, 
even banal. In this way, hostile reactions to Hume involve a kind of category error.  
Diagnosing this hostility as an intellectual error is ostensibly a sympathetic reading — for 
instance, it is more plausible than Carlyle’s portrait of Johnson’s sheer envy — but it is also 
condescending and ungenerous in its way. It is doubtful that any of Hume’s commonsense critics 
would own that they felt threatened by Hume on intellectual grounds, or that they failed to catch 
the drift of his argument. The neo-Kantian perspective simply struggles to entertain the 
legitimacy of a commonsense rejection of Hume. It cannot read commonsense hostility as 
evidence that Hume’s Skepticism might indeed be less significant than neo-Kantian intellectual 
history assumes: or that there might be a legitimate, coherent commonsense skeptical case to be 
made against Skepticism. Instead, a neo-Kantian perspective is more inclined to invoke the topos 
of crisis to dismiss this anti-Skeptical perspective. Neo-Kantian intellectual history tends to 
interpret this hostility not only as a sign of incomprehension of Skepticism, but also to interpret 
the hostility itself as incomprehensible under the sign of Skepticism. More strikingly and 
incredibly, a neo-Kantian perspective can interpret this mutual incomprehension as even stronger 
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evidence of Hume’s profound historical significance and impact. Hostility towards Hume reads 
like a riddle whose answer is modernity. 
 “The attempted answers [to Hume] are a sufficient proof that even the leaders of opinion 
were impenetrable to his logic” (Stephen 1), writes Leslie Stephen in his influential neo-Kantian 
intellectual history, English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876): 
Johnson thought that Hume’s speculations were a case of ‘milking the bull’ — 
that is to say, of a morbid love of change involving a preference of new error to 
old truth — and imagined that he had been confuted by Beattie…If Hume 
impressed men of mark [e.g. Johnson and Walburton] so slightly, we are tempted 
to doubt whether he can have affected the main current of thought. Yet, as we 
study the remarkable change in the whole tone and substance of our literature 
which synchronized with the appearance of Hume’s writings, it is difficult to 
resist the impression that there is some causal relation. A cold blast of scepticism 
seems to have chilled the very marrow of speculative activity. Men have lost their 
interest in the deepest problems, or write as though paralysed by a half-suppressed 
consciousness of the presence of a great doubter. (1-2)   
 
The trouble with these ambitious claims is that Stephen has almost no direct evidence for them. 
But this absence, quite improbably, becomes more evidence of Hume’s influence, which is “more 
obscure because chiefly negative.” In light of this conspicuous absence of evidence, it is clear 
that Hume must have “produced in many minds a languid scepticism which cared little for 
utterance, and might see, without proclaiming, the futility of Warburton’s insolence or Johnson’s 
dogmatic contempt” (2). For Stephen, it is “as if they felt what Hume saw, or perceived 
implicitly and obscurely what he brought out with the most explicit lucidity” (2). Observing 
Hume’s profound, obscure, negative, and conspicuously unverified influence, Stephen asks:  
What is the real nature of this process? How is it that a tacit intellectual co-
operation is established between minds placed far apart in the scale of culture and 
natural acuteness? How is it that the thought of the intellectual leaders is 
obscurely reflected by so many darkened mirrors, even when we are unable to 
point to any direct and overt means of transmission? How far may we believe in 
the apparent unity of that shifting chaos of speculations of more or less 
independent thinkers, which forms what we vaguely describe as public opinion, or 
the spirit of the age? (2) 
 
Neo-Kantian intellectual history is, in one sense, one long effort to settle these persistent and 
worthwhile questions about cultural and intellectual processes. And, analyzed from without, neo-
Kantian intellectual history offers suggestive answers about them: its success in creating a 
unified picture of modernity and achieving a cultural hegemony centered around epistemology is 
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simply staggering and unprecedented. Its sheer force as a generator of cultural capital, as a self-
organizing and self-reinforcing intellectual cultural system — at least up through the mid-
twentieth century — is stunning. But the trouble is that, from within, neo-Kantian intellectual 
history asks these momentous questions in the narrowest of ways, about the wider cultural 
impact of Humean Skepticism, which it already takes for granted as an intellectualist reflex. It 
must premise Hume’s profound influence before it can interrogate its effects, despite a 
conspicuous absence of warrant for doing so. In some sense, the only thing driving Stephen’s 
account of Hume’s historical and cultural significance is Stephen’s conviction of Hume’s 
historical and cultural significance — which is to say, of the philosophical significance of 
Humean Skepticism. Stephen does not ask whether “the thought of intellectual leaders is 
obscurely reflected by so many darkened mirrors,” or how we could detect this “even when we 
are unable to point to any direct and overt means of transmission” (2), but how it does so: he 
wants to know the “real nature of this process.” He already accepts the reality of the 
phenomenon.34 
 
1.2 The Great Endeavor: Mid-Twentieth Century Neo-Kantian Romanticism 
In his 1963 essay, “Romanticism Re-Examined,” Rene Wellek offers a picture of a broad 
consensus emerging across the field of Romantic literary studies at the mid-twentieth century. 
Wellek observes a “growing area of agreement and even convergence among the definitions or, 
more modestly, descriptions of Romanticism as they have been attempted by responsible 
scholars in recent decades in several countries” (112). Wellek’s picture of a field united around a 
shared, stable definition of Romanticism was intended to rebut critics of the previous generation 
who, following A.O. Lovejoy, had become skeptical about arriving at any definitive account of 
Romanticism and, more basically, pessimistic about the intelligibility of Romanticism as either a 
stable theoretical or historical concept. Lovejoy had argued that “the ‘Romanticism’ of one 
country may have little in common with that of another” and, likewise, “the romantic ideas were 
                                                            
34 Reinhart Koselleck’s insight about the relation of critique and crisis in the eighteenth century remains instructive 
for understanding this strange relation. Koselleck discovers this strange relation itself by observing the curious fact 
that, in all the Utopian critique of Enlightenment, the one truly looming political crisis, the French Revolution, 
remained uncommented on. And it is on the basis of this conspicuous silence, that Koselleck argues that “the critical 
process of enlightenment conjured up” the crisis at the center of the [Utopian] critique it practiced” in the same 
measure that “the political significance” of the true “looming” political crisis of the period, the French Revolution, 
“remained hidden from it” (9). From Koselleck’s perspective, critique may love to observe a crisis, and crisis 
certainly exists, but critical attempts to describe any crisis will also risk misreading or displacing it in some manner. 
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in large part heterogeneous, logically independent, and sometimes essentially antithetic to one 
another in their implications” (Lovejoy 261). From Wellek’s perspective, Lovejoy’s skeptical 
critique had encouraged an increasingly negative and even “despairing, nihilistic” picture of 
Romanticism as fundamentally incoherent, dynamic rather than static, disordered rather than 
ordered. As his charged phrase “responsible scholars” suggests, Wellek found this negative 
picture of Romanticism to be fundamentally irresponsible, both critically and philosophically, 
and in need of correction. 
Wellek had already contested Lovejoy’s thesis more than a decade before, and 
“Romanticism Re-examined” constitutes Wellek’s redoubled effort to gather more conclusive 
evidence in support of the concept of Romanticism he lays out in his earlier essay, “The Concept 
of Romanticism in Literary History” (1949). For Wellek, this concept of Romanticism resided, 
first, in a shared “set of norms” based in “similar or analogous concepts of the imagination, 
nature, symbol, and myth” (109). From Wellek’s perspective, his comprehensive 1963 survey 
revealed that his definition of Romanticism was being independently corroborated and confirmed 
across studies “diverse in method and emphasis” (132). Responding directly to Lovejoy’s doubts 
about the conflicting “implications” of romantic concepts, Wellek writes: 
In all of these studies, however diverse in method and emphasis, a convincing 
agreement has been reached: they all see the implication of imagination, symbol, 
myth, and organic nature, and see it as part of the great endeavor to overcome the 
split between subject and object, the self and the world, the conscious and the 
unconscious. (132) 
  
Wellek closes his essay with a final enthusiastic note, where he offers another iteration of his 
thesis:  
I dislike being called ‘the champion of the concept of a pan-European 
Romanticism.’ I would not be understood as minimizing or ignoring national 
differences or forgetting that great artists have created something unique and 
individual. Still, I hope to have shown that in recent decades a stabilization of 
opinion has been achieved. One could even say (if we did not suspect the word so 
much) that progress has been made not only in defining the common features of 
romanticism but in bringing out what is its peculiarity or even its essence and 
nature: that attempt, apparently doomed to failure and abandoned in our time, to 
identify subject and object, to reconcile man and nature, consciousness and 
unconsciousness by poetry which is ‘the first and last of all knowledge.’ (132) 
 
The picture of Romanticism Wellek presents as uniting mid-century Romantic studies constitutes 
what I have been calling a neo-Kantian interpretation of Romanticism. Again, according to this 
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interpretation, Romanticism is defined by its characteristic turn to “imagination, symbol, myth, 
and organic nature.” Perhaps more importantly, that turn is read primarily as a therapeutic 
response to a series of interrelated crises or breaks that define modernity. This view is “neo-
Kantian” because of the way it situates Romanticism within a constellation of therapeutic 
responses taken to be directly inspired by or simply loosely aligned with Kant’s “Copernican 
revolution” in philosophy. In this sense, as we have already seen with Pulos, Romanticism is 
taken to be one response among many parallel responses to the same basic crisis. As Wellek 
writes, Romanticism is a “part of the great endeavor to overcome the split between subject and 
object, the self and the world, the conscious and the unconscious” (my emphasis, 221). While 
this interpretation situates Romanticism within a field of responses, it also distinguishes 
Romanticism as a distinct and special kind of response: poetic rather than philosophical or, 
perhaps better, a philosophical response that was characteristically poetic. Wellek’s final 
description of Romanticism’s “peculiarity” or essence can thus be read in two directions: from 
one view, Romanticism participates in the peculiarly modern philosophical project of crisis and 
reconciliation: in other words, the essence of Romanticism resides somewhere in the “attempt” at 
reconciliation itself: its participation in the “great endeavor” makes Romanticism an essentially 
modern formation. Yet, from another view, Romanticism also explores a peculiar response to 
this peculiarly modern crisis: taken at this closer angle, Romanticism’s peculiarity lies in its 
attempt to reconcile these crises “by poetry...‘the first and last of all knowledge’” (221-222). 
Taking both senses together, Romanticism is a special (read: poetic) means to a special (read: 
modern) end. 
 Fifty years on, it is evident that Wellek’s confidence in the stability of this neo-Kantian 
interpretation of Romanticism was in some sense wildly misplaced. For practical as much as 
philosophical reasons, the contemporary pictures of Romanticism — much less the field of 
Romantic study — is far from unified, and much more closely resembles that offered by Lovejoy 
and his fellow pessimists. There is not simply a general skepticism regarding the possibility of a 
unified picture of Romanticism or of a unified field of Romantic studies. There is a general 
suspicion about the very enterprise of unification itself and, therefore, a lack of enthusiasm to 
pursue it.35 From the current critical perspective, there can be no Romanticism, only 
                                                            
35 In Local Transcendence (2008), Alan Liu observes that one of the major features of New Historicism was to 
substitute the kind of “methodical narratio or presentation of facts in the history of ideas” pursued by mid-century 
critics like Abrams for a “bricolage” of exordium and digressio” (30). And this stylistic shift is arguably responsible 
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romanticisms.36 To suggest otherwise reflects, at best, an untutored naiveté or, at worst, a kind of 
retrogressive nostalgia.  
 Of course, this is not to say that there is no longer any appreciation for this neo-Kantian 
view or how it shaped the modern landscape of Romantic literary criticism from the mid-century 
on. Indeed, one of the latest and most sophisticated elaborations of this neo-Kantian 
interpretation, M.H. Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism (1973), is arguably still regarded as the 
single most important contribution to modern Romantic literary studies and continues to be 
discussed productively. And Charles Taylor’s recent, surprising resuscitation of Earl 
Wasserman’s The Subtler Language in A Secular Age (2007) also demonstrates a continued 
appreciation for this mid-century neo-Kantian perspective beyond the field of literary studies. It 
would not be a stretch to say that the prestige Romantic literary studies have enjoyed both within 
the broader field of literary studies and beyond since the mid-twentieth century is largely based 
on the perceived achievements of this mid-twentieth century current of neo-Kantianism. 
 Yet, despite this continued and widespread reverence for these achievements, the 
contemporary critical assessment of this mid-century neo-Kantian interpretation of Romanticism 
is decidedly qualified. Any appreciation for it seems contingent upon establishing a comfortable 
critical and historical distance from its narrow, canonical vision of Romanticism, and the 
enthusiasm with which it was constructed. Likewise, any contemporary recovery of its merits 
must occur on updated post-structuralist terms, which would likely be unrecognizable and even 
suspect to its practitioners. To be sure, in the current post-structuralist critical milieu, this mid-
century constellation is more likely to suffer from neglect than mishandling. But when this mid-
century constellation is engaged, it is viewed largely through the trenchant critiques of its 
approach offered by New Historicism and deconstructionism. These two defining post-
structuralist movements, at odds in so many other ways, were essentially united in their mutual 
rejection of the preceding era of criticism. And, in retrospect, they were remarkably successful in 
                                                            
for the persistence of this older mid-century narratio. In any case, I believe the persistence of neo-Kantian 
Romanticism is more about inertia than active preservation. Contemporary attempts at such master narratives — 
those, for instance, offered recently by William Warner and Clifford Siskin — have substituted history of ideas with 
histories of mediations — technologies in the form of intellectual and material networks.  From these Latourian 
perspectives, the emphasis on epistemological questions within the history of ideas constitutes yet another form of 
mystification, namely, the erasure of the material technologies that make these networks possible. 
36Consider Jacques Khalip and Forest Pyle’s claim in Constellations of a Contemporary Romanticism (2016): 
“Indeed, there are as many ‘romanticisms’ as there are ‘Romanticisms,’ and one small but telling index of this 
multiplicity is the variation in lower- and uppercase deployments of the term” (1).   
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painting this mid-century neo-Kantian position as embarrassingly naive, blinded by an uncritical 
optimism and overbearing humanism that, however sincerely, ultimately did more harm than 
good. As such, the decisive turn away from Wellek’s progressive vision towards a darker and 
more fragmented post-structuralist vision of Romanticism is now almost universally viewed as 
welcome progress. 
 Indeed, given the remarkable success of the New Historicist and deconstructionist 
critiques, the most important legacy of this mid-century constellation marked by Wellek, 
Abrams, Wasserman, Wimsatt, and others may turn out to be how these two influential variants 
of post-structuralism came out of an explicit rejection of many of their organizing assumptions. 
Then again, this view of a decisive break — and more specifically, the view of this break as a 
welcome one — comes from deep within post-structuralism. This is a good reason to question its 
accuracy.  
Of course, it would be fruitless to deny what is clearly a major shift in critical sensibility 
and interest between the1960s and the 1980s. But the picture of a total break, especially as it was 
presented in foundational post-structuralist critiques of this mid-century neo-Kantianism — say, 
de Man’s “Rhetoric of Temporality” or McGann’s Romantic Ideology — seems overstated in 
hindsight, at least as much rhetorical as substantive. But because this mid-century neo-Kantian 
constellation is now almost exclusively viewed in relation to the rise of post-structuralism — or 
even more narrowly through the somewhat clownish vision of it sketched by early post-
structuralist critiques — there has been a general tendency to accept this picture of discontinuity 
and therefore to overestimate the distance these post-structuralist critiques achieved from this 
influential mid-century neo-Kantianism. Indeed, even many critical efforts to relitigate these the 
debates, while almost always explicitly framed as attempts to soften these post-structuralist 
critiques and to recover the merits of mid-century criticism or its critical picture of Romanticism, 
tend to work within the strategic and somewhat misleading terms those critiques offer.37 
                                                            
37The many attempts, for instance, to resuscitate the dynamic potential of Coleridgean organicism seem to grant, 
following the post-structuralist critique, that the locus classicus for this mid-century interpretation of Romanticism is 
Coleridgean organicist poetics. But, in hindsight and with a sufficient appreciation for the mid-century’s neo-
Kantian investments, the locus classicus of this neo-Kantian current is arguably more likely Shelley’s radical 
epistemology, as originally and systematically elaborated by Wasserman in his influential account of Shelley’s 
“skeptical idealism” and carried forward by John Wright, Jeannie Hall, Jerrold Hogle, William Keach, and, most 
recently, Mark Bruhn. To be sure, it is not necessarily incorrect or even misguided to identify mid-century criticism 
with Coleridgean organicism. But in light of deconstructionist efforts to claim Shelley for their own — most notably 
in Deconstruction and Criticism (1979) — it also seems possible to regard this emphasis on Coleridgean organicism 
as a kind of strategic diversion or, at least, as an easier target. And it distinctly encourages reading mid-century 
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In short, while it is possible, and even necessary, to regard the post-structuralist turn as 
initiating a significant break with this mid-century way of thinking about Romanticism, it seems 
equally possible to view post-structuralist approaches to Romanticism as still in many ways 
captivated by the neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism introduced in the mid-twentieth century, 
still developing along many of the same intellectual currents set by neo-Kantian Romanticism. In 
other words, we might say that the post-structuralist account of this break is accurate in its way 
but also partial and therefore distorted. With the benefit of hindsight, it even seems possible to 
regard these post-structuralist approaches not simply as elaborating this neo-Kantian picture of 
Romanticism but also in some sense exacerbating it. The fact that post-structuralism has only 
recently been treated as a continuation of the neo-Kantian approach adopted by mid-century 
reflects an underappreciation of the logic of neo-Kantian intellectual history — what actually 
made this neo-Kantian picture appealing to the mid-twentieth century Romantic critics in the 
first place, much less what keeps it around. Put schematically, we might say that we still do not 
sufficiently understand why Wellek takes this neo-Kantian picture to be something “responsible” 
scholars would see. 
 More recent examinations of these post-structuralist critiques have, indeed, begun to 
close the distance between post-structuralism and mid-century criticism, several explicitly along 
neo-Kantian lines. Zoe Beenstock, Sarah Zimmerman, and David Punter, among others, have 
recently observed that post-structuralist critiques did not necessarily, or at least 
programmatically, challenge the historical integrity of the neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism 
embraced at the mid-twentieth century.38 In other words, it might still seem more or less 
unobjectionable to say, as neo-Kantians like Wellek first did, that Romantics themselves were 
deeply invested in a neo-Kantian project of reconciliation and that they pursued this project 
through symbolism, myth, and organicism. Or at least that this would be regarded as a narrow 
                                                            
critics like Wasserman and Abrams backwards rather than forwards so that it may be aligned with New Criticism as 
it has been thoroughly reduced and ridiculed before it can be with post-structuralism. For revisionary treatments of 
organicism, see David Fairer, Organising Poetry; Anne Mellor, English Romantic Irony; Charles Armstrong, 
Romantic Organicism: From Idealist Origins to Ambivalent Afterlife. Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; Krieger, Murray. A 
Reopening of Closure: Organicism Against Itself. The Wellek Library Lectures at the University of California, 
Irvine. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989; Loesberg, Jonathan. A return to aesthetics: autonomy, 
indifference, and postmodernism. Stanford University Press, 2005; Rajan, Tilottama. "Organicism." ESC: English 
Studies in Canada 30.4 (2007): 46-50; Wolfson, Susan J. “Coleridge’s Similes” in Formal Charges: The Shaping of 
Poetry in British Romanticism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997. 
38 See Beenstock’s dissertation, “The Social Contract and the Romantic Canon” (2010): 1-10; Zimmerman, 
Romanticism, Lyricism, and History. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999: 1-38; Punter, 
“Romanticism” in Encyclopedia of Literature and Criticism: 106-118. 
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and therefore incomplete picture of Romanticism before it would be regarded as a wildly 
inaccurate or distorted one. As such, many might be inclined to still accept the basic integrity of 
the mid-century description of the broader set of social and cultural “crises” that initiate the 
Romantics’ neo-Kantian project. In other words, it still might seem unobjectionable to say, as 
neo-Kantian Romanticists like Abrams and Wasserman first did, that the rise of creative and 
expressive theories of art in the Romantic period amounts to a response to the “collapse” of a 
network of analogical correspondences that Wasserman calls the “divine analogy” and Abrams 
describes as a “Renaissance vitalism,” which imagined an “integral universe without absolute 
distinctions, in which everything is interrelated by a system of correspondences” (171). Or that, 
as analogy surrendered its ontological status for an epistemological one, as this foundational neo-
Kantian narrative goes, analogy accordingly lost its ability to sustain this integration. 
Philosophers abandoned the divine analogy to pursue new empirical ways to justify our 
knowledge of the external world. Poets, too, were left with an epistemological rift that only the 
turn to Romantic symbolism could fill. 
 Instead of challenging the historical integrity of this neo-Kantian picture, post-
structuralism focused its critique on the mid-century’s sympathies for this neo-Kantian project 
and its celebratory treatment of Romanticism’s participation in it. Returning to Wellek’s remarks 
above, we might say that, from a general post-structuralist perspective, the problem is not 
necessarily with the historical accuracy of Wellek’s description of this central Romantic project, 
but with how Wellek himself seems to be taken in by the terms of that project. The problem is 
not Wellek’s description of the neo-Kantian “endeavor;” it is his description of this endeavor as 
“great,” an adjective which I take to refer not only to its historical import but also its elevating or 
inspirational character. Put schematically, we might say that post-structuralism does not dispense 
with Romantic Idealism; rather, it redescribes Romantic Idealism in pejorative terms as 
Romantic Ideology. Under the sign of post-structuralism, the Romantic investment in myth and 
organicism, which the mid-century critics celebrated and viewed in poetic and philosophical 
terms, comes to be seen in more firmly ideological terms and, as such, not celebrated but treated 
with suspicion, dismissed as mystification. Just a decade later, Jonathan Culler could deride the 
Romantic critics’ “love for the metaphoric” and its commitment to the “noble futility” of the 
symbol’s task (Culler 228). McGann offers what has since become the programmatic statement 
of this critique: “[T]he scholarship and criticism of Romanticism and its works are dominated by 
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a Romantic Ideology, by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own self-representations” 
(Ideology 1). 
New Historicism and deconstructionism arrive at their shared conclusion about neo-
Kantian Romanticism along different routes.39 But, from either demystified perspective, Wellek 
is on the wrong side of history and ideology here: he should be celebrating the fact that such a 
suspiciously ideological project has been “apparently doomed to failure and abandoned in our 
time” (Wellek 222), not lamenting it. Wellek’s evident enthusiasm for these strategies of 
mystification, as well as his evident disappointment in their failure, therefore reflects, at best, a 
certain naiveté about the way Romantic Literature — or all Literature — really works. From the 
post-structuralist perspective, Wellek is too deep within Romantic Idealism to see it clearly — 
which is to say critically, for what it really is, Romantic Ideology. He is also therefore too 
mystified by this narrow vision of Romantic Ideology to see the value of Romantic literary 
criticism lies in the way it resists or interrupts rather than facilitates this neo-Kantian project of 
reconciliation. 
This post-structuralist line of critique seems sound enough. Wellek’s editorializing (e.g. 
“great” and “apparently doomed to failure and abandoned in our time”) does seem odd, or at 
least clearly at odds with the somewhat stilted, passive-voice formulations he employs elsewhere 
(e.g. “a stabilization has been achieved,” “progress has been made,” “convincing agreement has 
been reached”). And, in light of this evident incongruity, it does not seem unwarranted to 
question if Wellek’s scientistic language simply dresses up what are really his own moral, 
intellectual, or even ideological preoccupations, or if these preoccupations somehow compromise 
Wellek’s critical perspective. But if Wellek is too deep within Romantic Idealism to see it as 
Romantic Ideology, then he is also arguably too deep within the neo-Kantian intellectual history 
that defines the “great endeavor” not to describe Romanticism in its special neo-Kantian idiom. 
After all, in order to recognize Romanticism as a “part” of this “great endeavor,” Wellek would 
first have to recognize the endeavor itself. In this respect, it seems worth not simply questioning 
Wellek’s sympathetic estimation of Romanticism’s contributions to this neo-Kantian project, but 
also questioning the basic integrity of Wellek’s historical account of the Romantic investment in 
                                                            
39From the deconstructionist perspective, Romantic appeals to myth and organicism — and to language more 
generally — simply obfuscate and mystify what, rightly understood, are irreconcilable aporia. From the New 
Historicist perspective, the entire enterprise of Romantic Idealism simply sublimates and distracts from real 
historical crisis — that is to say, political and economic crisis. 
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such a neo-Kantian project. We might ask, in other words, were the British Romantic poets 
manifestly interested in this neo-Kantian project, as Wellek sees it? Or is Wellek’s sense of their 
investment more properly a matter of Wellek’s investment in this great endeavor? Or simply his 
investment in a unified picture of Romanticism and, thus, in how this neo-Kantian picture 
provides one? Is it possible that this influential neo-Kantian intellectual history unduly 
encourages or even conditions Wellek, so to speak, to see Romanticism in terms of this neo-
Kantian narrative crisis-and-reconciliation? Even if all these questions turn out to be too cautious 
and counterproductive, even for instance if Wellek’s neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism turns 
out to be not only accurate but even revelatory and insightful — in other words, even if his neo-
Kantian conditioning allows him to see Romanticism correctly as neo-Kantian in ways even the 
Romantics could not have — is it possible that his evident investment in this intellectual history 
of crisis distorts this otherwise insightful picture in some minor respect? If there are any 
identifiable distortions encouraged by this neo-Kantian intellectual history, where exactly do 
they occur? How, if at all, are they significant? And how, if at all, might they be corrected? 
Before I examine some recently proposed answers to these newly pressing questions and 
offer my own, I want to observe that neither deconstructionism or New Historicism was ever 
really in a good position to ask them. 40 As I have already suggested, post-structuralist critiques 
                                                            
40 I’ll consider each case in turn. The deconstructionist seems inclined to tolerate the basic historical accuracy of this 
neo-Kantian picture largely because it is philosophically inclined to accept the “onto-linguistic” reality, for lack of a 
better word, of the crises at its center. And this is true even as it rejects how the neo-Kantian picture describes these 
crises, much less the responses they offer. As de Man writes, the dialectic of subject and object is not a legitimate 
philosophical problem but simply “a temptation that has to be overcome” (Blindness and Insight 204-5). So, more 
precisely, the deconstructionist seems willing to tolerate the seductive sense of coherence this neo-Kantian picture 
offers long enough to deconstruct it, to reveal its more basic incoherence as well as its onto-linguistic nature. This 
nuanced negotiation effectively spells out the deconstructive project: namely, to reveal Romanticism’s therapeutic 
responses to these onto-linguistic crises as unsuccessful and inauthentic: unsuccessful because therapeutic response 
is, in some sense, impossible. Inauthentic because, once one recognizes the irreconcilable nature of these onto-
linguistic crises, the only authentic response must be no response at all. There are only crises to be observed as they 
endlessly disrupt efforts to resolve them. Thus, the neo-Kantian picture of crisis-and-response aligns with the 
deconstructionist’s basic onto-linguistic picture of a reality as defined by radical indeterminacy and crisis in ways 
that make it a convenient dramatic foil: staging its failures ensures new, more sophisticated grounds for appreciating 
Romanticism, which becomes valuable for the way its failed linguistic responses to these crises expose their eternal 
character.  
 Indeed, in “Criticism and Crisis,” de Man suggests that “all true criticism occurs in the mode of crisis” (8). 
But de Man is inclined to see crisis working in reverse: for de Man, “what was considered a crisis in the past often 
turns out to be a mere ripple” and “changes first experienced as upheavals tend to become absorbed in the continuity 
of much slower movements as soon as temporal perspective broadens” (6). This view dictates the project of 
reopening crisis. But, from my perspective (at least with this neo-Kantian formation in view), crisis functions as a 
method of critique because critique tends to impose or project crisis onto the past where none, in fact, occurred or 
where it was felt as a mere ripple. In any case, this critical practice involves some sort of misdescription. 
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of this mid-century interpretation did not systematically challenge the historical accuracy of this 
neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism and took issue, instead, with the mid-century’s sympathetic 
and even celebratory assessment of this picture. Now, it is possible that most post-structuralists 
simply found this historical picture compelling and basically correct if woefully incomplete. But, 
viewed in retrospect, accepting the accuracy of this historical picture can be seen as strategic as 
                                                            
In contrast to the deconstructionist, the New Historicist is inclined to reject the legitimacy of the neo-
Kantian picture of philosophical crises more thoroughly. This is because the new historicist reads this philosophical 
picture, following Marx’s materialist critiques of Hegel’s Idealism, politically as false consciousness: an illusion that 
somehow refracts and displaces real historical crises so as to distract attention from them. McGann again offers the 
programmatic statement: “The poetry of Romanticism is everywhere marked by extreme forms of displacement and 
poetic conceptualization whereby the actual human issues with which the poetry is concerned are resituated in a 
variety of idealized localities" (Romantic Ideology 1). The New Historicist is thus more generally anti-philosophical 
than the deconstructionist and therefore views this neo-Kantian picture with a different sort of suspicion. 
Nevertheless, the New Historicist is still inclined to the historical accuracy of the neo-Kantian picture of 
Romanticism, if only because New Historicism must accept its ideological efficacy and, thus, its real historical 
significance. That is, the New Historicist must grant that a historical preoccupation with Idealism has successfully 
obscured the materialist dynamics of history. Otherwise, the New Historicist project of clarifying and correcting the 
effects of this obfuscation would be pointless.  
It also seems true that, from a New Historicist perspective, this neo-Kantian picture of philosophical crisis 
remains attractive for the way it allows one to observe materialist dynamics, as they are defined by political and 
economic crisis, through these neo-Kantian sublimations. This subtle negotiation is therefore strategic in a similar 
way to the deconstructionist’s: accepting that idealist and materialist dynamics are linked up in this way also helps 
determine the New Historicist agenda: namely, to contest these sublimations by redirecting attention to the real 
historical crisis they obscure or evade. Assuming this broader linkage also opens up a more sophisticated and 
sympathetic approach to Romantic Idealism, one in which these Romantic negotiations of crisis can start to look less 
sinister and more personal, less about power and domination and more about ideological subjects struggling under 
the weight of contradiction and using the critical tools made available by Idealism to negotiate what are, rightly 
understood, historical and economic crises. 
In her analysis of McGann’s engagement with Abrams, Beenstock suggests that “instead of subverting” 
Abrams’ neo-Kantian model or successfully replacing it with a non-ideological neo-Kantian aesthetics, McGann 
“actually perpetuates” Abrams’ neo-Kantian model in a way that “fails to separate [McGann’s] own position” from 
Abrams or to sufficiently “distinguish between the later insights of criticism and the original material contexts of the 
text themselves” (11). This seems to overstate the case against McGann, and I tend to prefer Colin Jager’s 
observation that de Man “cagily” follows the mid-century literary history as a general description of the nature of 
these post-structuralist exchanges. In any case, both perspectives support my central point that post-structuralist 
approaches prefer to retain the neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism — so as toy with it, and read it parasitically and 
hermeneutically — rather than discard it.  
Like the New Historicist, I am inclined to reject the terms offered by this neo-Kantian picture — in other 
words, its own account of its significance, be it philosophical or historical — as in some important manner a 
distortion of its actual historical significance. As such, I am inclined, with the New Historicist, to redescribe the 
nature and significance of this neo-Kantian picture as primarily ideological and rhetorical. Yet, whereas the New 
Historicist might still be willing to engage or entertain what we might call the neo-Kantian topos of crisis — even if 
only with the intention of reading that topos against the grain, hermeneutically and historically, to see the real crises 
it sublimates or obscures; or of merely drawing affective energy from this topos to describe these real crises — I 
take this topos of crisis, in some sense, to be the most suspicious aspect of this narrative. From my perspective, to 
treat this drama of crisis as a hermeneutic, to retain it even if only to appropriate it, is to fail to sufficiently 
interrogate it. It is to somehow take for granted that this topos of crisis is secondary — the narrative of “crisis” 
simply paves the way for “response” — which allows one to see the possibility of appropriating its negativity for 
demystification. But I want to suggest the ideological content of the neo-Kantian picture is in this picture of crisis 
itself. 
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well as sincere. Simply put, given their antagonistic charge, it is more convenient, and perhaps 
even necessary or constitutive, for both the deconstructionist and the new historicist to accept 
this basic historical picture and work within it than it would be to correct or challenge it.41 
Recent clarifications regarding the limited scope of the post-structuralist critique have 
encouraged a more comprehensive examination of the legacy of mid-century Romantic criticism. 
These new examinations, while abandoning the antagonistic spirit of the post-structuralist 
critiques of mid-century Romanticism, are informed by a new suspicion that the neo-Kantian 
interpretation developed by mid-century critics finally says more about their own cultural 
preoccupations than it does about the Romantics’ own investment in any neo-Kantian project. 
This suspicion has in turn encouraged more radical challenges to the basic integrity of the neo-
Kantian picture of Romanticism. My aim here is to contribute to that critical reassessment. It will 
be expedient to review a few of the more pertinent contributions in this direction so as to situate 
my contributions within and against them. 
 Gavin Budge’s essay collection, Romantic Empiricism: Poetics and the Philosophy of 
Common Sense, 1780-1830 (2007), offers the most direct critique of the neo-Kantian tendency of 
twentieth-century Romantic literary criticism.42 In his introduction, Budge questions how “the 
exclusive identification of Romanticism with philosophical idealism” (21) has “led to the 
exclusion of the Romantic empiricism of the Common Sense tradition from the theoretical 
canon” (21). From Budge’s perspective, the desire to align British Romanticism with German 
idealism has not only encouraged a neglect of Anglophone Common Sense philosophers. It has 
                                                            
41Deborah Elise White suggests along these lines that “[R]eaders on the track of ideology often seem more insistent 
on the referential status of Romantic argument than the Romantics themselves. They hypostasize the very 
mystifications ostensibly being demystified” (White 2).   
42This important intervention from Budge et al comes in the in the wake of a broader sympathetic re-evaluation of 
empiricism, largely driven by new critical interest in the relation of Romantic literary practice with Romantic 
scientific practices. In the new critical milieu, empiricism is no longer dismissed as an overly mechanical or 
reductive set of observational procedures (as epitomized, for instance, by Geoffrey Hartman’s “ocular man”) but as 
a kind of generative mode of subjectivity. Common Sense introspection, for instance, has received a notable re-
evaluation as an important moment in what Noel Jackson has called “the historicity of inwardness itself, or the 
social contexts of self-contemplation” (“Critical Conditions” 119). I discuss this scientific turn at more length in 
Chapter 2. Jonathan Kramnick has alternatively returned to Common Sense’s emphasis on “direct perception” in 
search of an “aesthetic ecology” and an alternative to representationalist theories of mind; Susan Manning, to 
Common Sense discourse of analogy for an alternative approach to comparative literary history. These various turns 
reflect a broader historical drift from the neo-Kantian framework I am more actively confronting here. See also 
Marjorie Levinson’s ennui with those past “skirmishes” waged under the sign of Kant “on a field divided between 
nature and culture, with both sectors divided yet again (as in, the nature field split into the human over against the 
merely natural, and the culture field split into different moments and versions of modernity)” (“Motion and Spirit” 
633) that precipitated her turn to Spinoza for “another way of being Romantic” (634). 
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also encouraged reading the rise of British Romanticism as a generative “break” from 
Anglophone philosophy and associationist aesthetics in favor of a more robust German idealism. 
This progressive narrative has licensed, in turn, an active dismissal and negative estimation of 
Anglophone philosophy, which is cast as intellectually inferior to German Idealism because 
“parochial,” “politically reactionary,” and “blindly nationalistic” (Budge 12). For Budge, the 
critical assumption that German idealism “influenced” British Romanticism — while now not 
only well-established but even de rigueur — is historically misleading if not entirely misguided. 
For Budge, at the least, this approach fails to register the considerable intellectual authority that 
Common Sense philosophers, particularly Dugald Stewart, enjoyed through the Romantic period 
and most of the nineteenth century. Moreover, aligning German idealism with British 
Romanticism in any direct way seems wholly unwarranted by the material record. Budge 
observes that, with few exceptions, such as Carlyle and Coleridge, the “idealist mode of 
philosophizing only became widespread in Britain during the 1860s and 1870s” (22). In the 
“absence of compelling evidence that British Romantic writers were well versed in German 
idealism,” Budge argues, critics interested in working from this assumption have to rely on a 
suspect methodology of observing what Abrams describes in Natural Supernaturalism (1971) as 
“striking analogues” between British Romantic poetry and German Idealist philosophy. For 
Budge, this way of reading is not only generally suspect: it arguably gets the lines of influence 
wrong. Viewed in light of the continental reach of Anglophone philosophy, most notably Hume, 
in the eighteenth century, any “striking analogues” would be just as likely to reflect the influence 
of Anglophone thought on German thought. 
 Following Roy Porter, Budge attributes this preference for German idealism and against 
Anglophone philosophy to an “intellectualist fallacy dear to academics who…prize ‘profundity’ 
above all and rate dead thinkers on an abstrusity scale” (Porter 10). Against this intellectualist 
fallacy and in defense of Common Sense philosophy, Budge contends: 
[W]hatever the intrinsic intellectual significance of the Common Sense school, 
which is currently being reevaluated, its historical influence on early nineteenth-
century thought is undeniable, in a way that makes it an important context for the 
study of British Romanticism; nor should it be assumed that great literary 
achievements always stem from thinking that academic philosophers would agree 
in finding philosophically significant. (Budge 12) 
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I agree with Budge’s remarks in the main, and I intend this dissertation to contribute to the wider 
reassessment of the Common Sense school he recommends. However, I find Budge and Porter’s 
appeal to an “intellectualist fallacy” to be fairly unilluminating – not to mention ungenerous — 
as an explanation for these trends. And I believe it is possible to trace them to more definite 
“cultural forces” (21) which are distinctly “neo-Kantian” in character. I will offer a few 
correctives to Budge’s analysis so as to make that character more evident. Budge, for instance, 
consistently singles out Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism as the origin of these critical biases, 
but I believe it is more appropriate to see Natural Supernaturalism as an endpoint rather than a 
starting point: that is, Natural Supernaturalism should be regarded as the culmination of the 
distinct but influential strain of neo-Kantian Romanticism emerging out of mid-century criticism 
— its latest, most thorough articulation, so to speak. Wellek’s wide survey in “Romantic Re-
examination,” conducted nearly a decade before Abrams’ seminal work, should clarify that 
Natural Supernaturalism is more terminus ad quem than terminus a quo, even as Wellek is 
obviously conducting his survey from deep within a neo-Kantian perspective as much as he is 
actually observing its widespread adoption in the mid-century.  
This adjustment to Budge’s timeline seems important for three reasons. First, I believe it 
allows us to differentiate the “intellectual historical” neo-Kantianism of the mid-century critics 
from the slightly more theoretically and historically engaged neo-Kantianism that follows it — 
best exemplified, for instance, by Paul Hamilton’s Coleridge’s Poetics (1983). I call this mid-
century formation “intellectual historical” because, as I hope to show, it is primarily read through 
the reductions of neo-Kantian intellectual history. This intellectual-historical approach, while 
exhibiting a distinctly philosophical bias, also tends to engage the philosophy at a slight remove. 
In other words, mid-century Kantianism reads an already stabilized and even doctrinal neo-
Kantian intellectual history hermeneutically and analogically for insights into literary historical 
developments. Not only this, but mid-century Kantianism tends reads literary history in a 
uniquely “intellectual historical” way, through neo-Kantian intellectual history’s metonymic 
logic and in its distinctly progressive spirit. Against Budge, then, I would argue that Hamilton’s 
later neo-Kantianism, while obviously beholden to this mid-century approach and captive to its 
progressive and reductive tendencies (as Budge’s critique suggests), still ultimately pursues a 
more direct historical and philosophical engagement with the German tradition: that is, it 
reaches, to some extent, beyond the reductive and even arguably peripheral version of Kant 
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cultivated within the neo-Kantian intellectual history of modernity.43 While obviously indebted 
to intellectual history, this later neo-Kantian Romanticism does not reflect the extensive training 
in intellectual historical hermeneutics that the mid-century critics received. Secondly, 
differentiating this strain of mid-century intellectual historical from neo-Kantianism also allows 
us to distinguish Abrams’ study within the mid-century approaches as, relatively speaking, the 
least likely to suffer from the kind of uncritical intellectualist fallacies Budge takes to be guiding 
this philosophical bias more broadly. Abrams, to my mind, turns out to be most forthright of 
these mid-century neo-Kantians because he is the least invested in reading the rise of Kantian 
epistemology progressively, as a modernity narrative, in the manner encouraged by Anglophone 
intellectual history. This is not to say that Abrams’ vision is not progressive: indeed, this 
intellectual historical approach seems to be irreducibly — not to mention unapologetically — so. 
But the “break” can be stressed in different ways and to different ends. Third and most 
importantly, acknowledging the broader mid-century consensus around neo-Kantian 
Romanticism allows us to look beyond Budge’s charge of intellectualism for other reasons neo-
Kantian Romanticism was embraced not only by a few neo-Kantian converts but by the field at 
large. Against that charge, I will argue that the widespread embrace of neo-Kantian Romanticism 
reflects the hegemonic status that neo-Kantian intellectual history had attained by the mid-
twentieth century. This hegemonic status made it not only possible or even appealing but even 
somehow inevitable or impossible not to view Romanticism — and modernity more broadly — 
through the special lens of neo-Kantian intellectual history. 
Of course, Budge’s charge of intellectualism is not entirely unfounded. Earl Wasserman’s 
literary historical account of the rise of Romanticism, for example, mobilizes a much more 
doctrinal and therefore, to my mind, more suspect neo-Kantian intellectual history. Wasserman 
begins his influential 1964 essay, “The English Romantics: The Grounds of Knowledge” with a 
concise intellectual historical survey of eighteenth-century poetic and philosophical responses to 
what he calls the “problem of the transaction between the perceiving mind and the perceived 
world” (18). Wasserman argues that eighteenth-century topographical poetry is manifestly 
preoccupied with the problem of representing the external world, but it also “betrays an uncertain 
or ineffectual conception” (17) of the nature or extent of this problem. As such, eighteenth-
                                                            
43The emphasis has now arguably moved from German idealism to Jena Romantics. For a contemporary example, 
see Thomas Pfau’s Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, 1790-1840. For an earlier, influential 
example, see Anne Mellor’s English Romantic Irony.  
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century poets’ analogical engagements with nature do more to “evade” rather than engage that 
problem. For Wasserman, eighteenth-century poets “hedged on this question, which I shall— 
very loosely — call epistemological”; eighteenth-century philosophy, on the other hand, 
“certainly did not” (18). Wasserman then offers a philosophical history of epistemology in which 
this epistemological question was incubated within British empiricism, which had “long tended 
to unsettle any assurance of an external world” (18), epitomized by Hume, who “completed 
Berkeley’s subversion of the ‘external’ by sceptically concluding that we can have no real 
knowledge of the existence of nature or the external causes of our impressions” (18), and finally 
resolved in Kant’s “epistemology of transcendentalism” (18). Kant’s success comes on the heels 
of Common Sense’s failure. Here’s how Wasserman’s survey ends: 
Meanwhile, the mechanists like Hartley and the French school tried to cut the 
epistemological knot by explaining both mind and nature as matter and motion; 
and the Scottish School took the coward’s way out by eschewing theory and 
limiting itself to description of mental phenomena on the basis of unassailable, 
God-given common sense. The stage was set for Kant and the epistemology of 
transcendentalism. (18) 
 
The stage is also set for a parallel “epistemological” response of the major British Romantics, 
who Wasserman sees as united around a shared sense of “the necessity to resolve the question 
their predecessors had made so pressing through philosophic and aesthetic concern and poetic 
neglect or incompetence” (22).   
Wasserman’s approach illustrates how subscribing to a stricter variant of this neo-
Kantian intellectual history (i.e. one centered on the drama of epistemology) encourages a 
dismissive posture towards both eighteenth-century Anglophone philosophy and eighteenth-
century poetry by reading the limitations of eighteenth-century Anglophone poetics through 
those of eighteenth-century Anglophone philosophy. Eighteenth-century philosophy is too 
confined to its transcriptional empiricism to pursue a more liberating transcendentalism. And 
through this philosophical lens, eighteenth-century poetry seems similarly transcriptional: it is “a 
poetry of hobbling simile, rather than symbol” that “never fulfills itself to allow the poet to 
withdraw from a self-supporting creation” but “ends only when the poet has spent himself, the 
poem being sustained as long as he continues to annotate his sensory data with significances” 
(my emphasis, 22).  
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Wasserman’s neo-Kantian bias is so severe that it seems to require little commentary.44 
Here and elsewhere, Wasserman’s neo-Kantianism comes off as almost doctrinal — a notable 
irony given his scathing treatment of the “Scottish School” for its appeal to the “unassailable” 
and “God-given.” One might think that the tyrannical character of Wasserman’s literary history 
— the way it not only seems to impose the philosophical problem of epistemology on literary 
history but has a distinctly neo-Kantian understanding of that problem — would make it seem, at 
the least, an undesirable approach to eighteenth-century Anglophone philosophy and poetry. And 
yet, Paul Hamilton essentially rehearses Wasserman’s critique of Common Sense philosophy two 
decades later in Coleridge’s Poetics. This direct transmission is strange because Hamilton’s neo-
Kantian study otherwise amounts to a serious, thoughtful engagement with Common Sense 
philosophy. Even as Hamilton understands Coleridge’s poetics to draw on a common sense 
philosophy of language, he still asserts with Wasserman that “the British reaction to Hume pales 
before Kant’s awakening from dogmatic slumber in Germany” (28). Even as Hamilton can 
insightfully and sympathetically characterize the Common Sense response to Hume as a call for 
a “renewed trust in the criteria for…knowledge…to which our human limitations inescapably 
bind us” (28), he can still dismiss Common Sense philosophy as hampered by a “deep 
conservatism,” which “wished to leave things as they are” (38), and Common Sense philosophy 
of language as “nothing more than documentary” (39) meant to “explain existing usages [of 
language] certainly, but not in the interests of original criticism or innovation” (38). Wasserman’s 
strongly negative assessment remains surprisingly unaltered by Hamilton’s more sympathetic 
readings. The intellectual historical narrative of “break” seems finally too essential for Hamilton 
to discard. 
Of course, in light of the more recent literary-critical turn towards a more descriptive 
practice on the anthropological models of Bruno Latour or Clifford Geertz, Wasserman and 
Hamilton’s mutual dismissal of Common Sense on the grounds of its merely “documentary” 
tendencies should already seem outdated: a relic of a former, more idealist moment in Romantic 
                                                            
44Wasserman’s tyrannical terms, which incidentally will make it seem plausible that de Man is deeply indebted to 
Wasserman for his critical sensibility and, therefore, that the proximity between post-structuralism and mid-century. 
But in the end Wasserman is a kind of neo-Kantian zealot, not to be trusted — so zealous that, even as his detailed 
elaboration of this neo-Kantian vision, viewed as a whole, proves somewhat idiosyncratic and contemporary, 
inspired and taken, for instance, by Sapir-Whorf theory, it nonetheless perfectly and enthusiastically elaborates 
along strict Kantian lines, at all levels: at the local level, most evident in his influential and distinctly Kantian 
reading of Shelley’s “Mont Blanc” to his broader picture of things. 
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literary criticism.45 But, as we will see, the taste for distinctly neo-Kantian (or epistemological) 
readings of British Romanticism has hardly subsided. Kicking this habit will require a little more 
polemic force.  
What is most frustrating about this neo-Kantian line of thinking is not necessarily its 
unapologetic progressivism or its evident bias against Common Sense (i.e. “the coward’s way 
out”). Rather, it is that it seems to be read directly off Kant’s own negotiation in the 
Prolegomena. In other words, Wasserman’s progressive interpretation of Kant’s “epistemology 
of transcendentalism” and Hamilton’s claim that Reid offers a “very crude reply to Hume’s 
scepticism” (44) is not a newly formulated critical orientation or even a later intellectual 
historical imposition. Rather, both simply and uncritically reproduce Kant’s own account of the 
superiority of his response to Hume, not to mention Kant’s sense that his epistemology is not 
only a historical project but indeed a transhistorical one: a project that simply remained 
undetected prior to Hume and even unregistered before Kant himself saw what Hume saw 
through a glass darkly. Indeed, this ostensibly transhistorical character of epistemology is what 
merits not simply Kant’s but Wasserman’s dismissive progressivism: epistemology is a problem 
that others could and should have seen but either did not or simply evaded. 
Wasserman’s (and Wellek’s) evident investment in neo-Kantian intellectual history 
should clarify that Budge’s account overlooks an earlier, important neo-Kantian constellation 
which, I would argue, Abrams’s Natural Supernaturalism effectively caps. Budge’s oversight is 
unexpected, given that his survey of neo-Kantian bias in literary studies ultimately stretches 
back, following Cairns Craig (in the same volume), to nineteenth-century British Idealism and, 
following Ian Reid, to British Idealism’s instrumental role in shaping the discipline of English up 
to the second World War (24). On the other hand, Budge’s oversight is telling in itself, because it 
speaks to the strange treatment Kant receives in neo-Kantian Romanticism, how Kant’s presence 
is so spectral that even someone looking for it wouldn’t necessarily find it. Wasserman’s single 
invocation of Kant is surely potent enough to capture the severity of his neo-Kantian bias. But it 
is also notably the only invocation of Kant in Wasserman’s entire article. Similarly, though 
Wellek is obviously looking at a neo-Kantian formation both inside and outside the field, Wellek 
only mentions Kant once in “Romanticism Re-examined” and, even then, only tangentially.  
                                                            
45 See, for instance, Heather Love, “Close but Not Deep: Literary Ethics and the Descriptive Turn.” New Literary 
History 41.2 (2010): 371-91.   
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Kant’s conspicuous absence could, of course, be regarded as evidence against my 
thesis about the dominance of neo-Kantian perspectives at the mid-century. But I believe it can 
be interpreted it in two ways that ultimately support my thesis. First, for someone deep within 
this neo-Kantian perspective, Kant would have been too obviously a part of this neo-Kantian 
picture to merit mentioning or placing at its center. After all, Kant’s critical philosophy 
essentially defines what Wellek calls “the great endeavor.” So Kant is arguably everywhere and 
nowhere. But, second, by the mid-twentieth century, Kant himself is already so strangely 
peripheral to both neo-Kantian Romanticism and neo-Kantian intellectual history that he need 
not appear. Even a doctrinal account like Wasserman’s — which explicitly and forcefully 
invokes Kantian epistemology — still must read Kantian epistemology hermeneutically in order 
to disclose the logics driving aesthetic theory and poetic practice. Epistemology helps clarify the 
underlying philosophical problem effectively generating both eighteenth-century topographical 
poetry and Romantic symbolism as (respectively, inauthentic and authentic) responses. As we 
will see, this has to do with the way neo-Kantian intellectual history treats all neo-Kantian 
responses as special, independent, and connected only by the shared crisis they observe.  
But if Wasserman’s neo-Kantian investments complicate Budge’s timeline, Wasserman’s 
uncritical reproduction of Kant’s own rhetoric certainly supports Budge’s claim that an 
intellectualist tendency in neo-Kantian Romanticism makes it inclined to take the more abstruse 
Kant at his word, even when simple good sense about rhetoric might dictate otherwise. Yet, 
appreciating this broader consensus around Kant allows us to look beyond Budge’s intellectualist 
fallacy and see other “cultural forces” that would have recommended neo-Kantian Romanticism 
not only to a few neo-Kantian converts, but to the field in its entirety. While Budge’s charge of 
intellectualism seems important, it is also insufficient and, I think, secondary. I want to suggest 
rather that the widespread elaboration of neo-Kantian Romanticism registers the monolithic 
status that the neo-Kantian picture of “crisis” had achieved by the mid-twentieth century as a 
result of its progressive sublimation through neo-Kantian intellectual history. That is to say, that 
Romantic literary critics turned to neo-Kantian accounts of Romanticism because neo-Kantian 
intellectual history was everywhere. In the period, there was only one Western intellectual 
history, and it was neo-Kantian. 
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Abrams paints a vivid — and, from my perspective, conclusive — portrait of the sheer 
ubiquity this neo-Kantian discourse of crisis had achieved in Natural Supernaturalism. It is 
worth quoting at length:  
I hope to make it clear that it was indeed a cardinal concern of Wordsworth as 
bard, and of Coleridge as both metaphysician and bard, to help redeem man by 
fostering a reconciliation with nature, which, because man has severed himself 
from his earlier unity with it, has become alien and inimical to him. I also propose 
to show that this concern was an element in a set of interrelated concepts which 
had wide currency in the age of Wordsworth and Coleridge — concepts which 
have evolved into the reigning diagnosis of our own age of anxiety: the claim that 
man, who was once well, is now ill, and that at the core of the modern malaise lies 
his fragmentation, dissociation, estrangement, or (in the most highly charged of 
these parallel terms) ‘alienation.’ The individual (so runs the familiar analysis) 
has become radically split in three main aspects. He is divided within himself, he 
is divided from other men, and he is divided from his environment; his only hope 
for recovery (for those writers who hold out hope) is to find the way to a 
reintegration which will restore his unity with himself, his community with his 
fellow men, and his companionability with an alien and hostile outer world. These 
ideas are shared in our time by theologians, philosophers, economists, 
sociologists, psychologists, artists, writers, critics, and readers of Life magazine 
and The Reader’s Digest, and the copious writings on this theme have been 
assembled into widely-read anthologies. (Abrams Natural Supernaturalism 145) 
 
This is arguably Abrams’ most direct articulation of his thesis. What is most salient is his deep 
familiarity with the neo-Kantian account of modernity. Here we see that Abrams not only has a 
clear picture of modernity as a crisis, or how this crisis of modernity inflects Romantic literary 
practice, or how it informs and saturates modern intellectual culture at the mid-twentieth century, 
but a clear sense of how all these phenomena are events in the same intellectual history: how, for 
instance, the ubiquitous modern discourse of crisis has evolved from the Romantic discourses 
Abrams examines. My claim is that neo-Kantian intellectual history makes this sense of 
continuity not only possible but so familiar as to feel rehearsed (“so runs the familiar analysis”).  
It’s worth analyzing the complexities of tone that arise from Abrams’ deep familiarity. 
Abrams’ parenthetical “for those writers who hold out hope” exhibits the same strange 
melancholy we already saw in Wellek’s editorializing (“apparently doomed to failure and 
abandoned in our time” (221)). Like Wellek’s, Abrams’ melancholy seems accompanied by an 
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ironic distance — captured, in part, “so runs the analysis.”46 But the character of Abrams’s irony 
is also distinct in a way that suggests it comes at a later moment and with a different estimation 
of the quality of this neo-Kantian picture. Wellek’s ironic appropriation of the trope of progress 
(“one could even say (if we did not suspect the word so much) that progress has been made” 
(221)) injects an anti-progressivism against his otherwise evident enthusiasm about this critical 
consensus. For Wellek, the critical consensus looks like a consolation prize given what Wellek 
sees as the abandonment of the neo-Kantian enterprise at large. At least good Romanticists can 
still independently observe its significance.  
In contrast, Abrams’ critical distance responds not to the abandonment but to the 
oversaturation and oversimplification of this neo-Kantian discourse within intellectual culture 
more broadly. By the time of Abrams’ study, the neo-Kantian theme of crisis seems to have been 
treated widely enough to have been handled at varying levels of subtlety and sophistication. This 
leads Abrams to qualify his investment in it in a way that Wellek and Wasserman do not: 
[A] similar conceptual scheme is recognizable in writings which range from 
positions near the lunatic fringe of thought to some of the most subtle attempts in 
our literature to assess man and his place in nature and in the historical process; so 
that its presence is not in itself an index to the quality or adequacy of the world 
view of which it is a part. In addition, the fact that the concept of divided and 
alienated man is one of the oldest of commonplaces does not controvert either its 
general relevance to the human condition or its special usefulness as a speculative 
instrument for examining our own greatly troubled era, which was inaugurated by 
the new science and the new philosophy of the seventeenth century and which 
reached its first great crisis in the age we conventionally call Romantic. (146) 
 
Here I think it should be clear that Abrams’s neo-Kantianism is much less committed than 
Wasserman’s. Abrams takes the critical long view, so to speak, by reframing the neo-Kantian lens 
as a “conceptual scheme” and as a “speculative instrument” (146). And, as a result, Abrams’s 
account of the neo-Kantian crisis is also more diffuse than Wasserman’s: not tightly focused 
around the Kantian drama of epistemology but extending well into the contemporary moment 
and even backwards indefinitely. Although Abrams is clearly invested in the special applicability 
of this scheme to the modern moment, it is not a characteristically modern scheme in the way 
that Wasserman takes epistemology to be. Indeed, Abrams’ most forceful gesture towards its 
                                                            
46 It is worth mentioning that this ironic distance does seem to appear in Wellek’s account. Consider, for instance, 
how the critical consensus that Wellek perceives in the field functions as a consolation against apparent 
irresolvability of the larger crisis: a minor victory. 
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general significance and away from specifically modern significance even suggests this 
conceptual scheme is not distinctly neo-Kantian. Abrams writes, in a moment of great insight, 
If we are indulged the convenience of sweeping initial generalizations, the basic 
categories of characteristic post-Kantian philosophy, and of the thinking of many 
philosophical-minded poets, can be viewed as highly elaborated and sophisticated 
variations upon the Neoplatonic paradigm of a primal unity and goodness, an 
emanation into multiplicity which is ipso facto a lapse into evil and suffering, and 
a return to unity and goodness. (169) 
 
This “sweeping initial generalization,” which reaches up and back in search of instructive 
analogues as a preliminary measure for progressive specifications, is characteristic of Abrams’s 
critical style. As a local analytic procedure, it arguably allows Abrams to dislodge himself from 
this neo-Kantian framework. And I would say that this generalization feels transgressive to 
Abrams (i.e. like an “indulgence” or a “convenience”) because of the way framing this neo-
Kantian constellation as Neoplatonic obviously compromises the specificity (read: modernity) of 
the neo-Kantian categories Abrams is setting out to describe, not to mention the specificity (read: 
poetry) of Romantic approaches to these categories. “Highly elaborated” and “sophisticated” 
work against the larger continuity Abrams proposes in order to maintain this specific difference. 
And all of these qualifications speak finally to Abrams’s special neo-Kantian investments. 
Abrams’s perspective clarifies two important aspects of the neo-Kantian topos of crisis 
at the mid-twentieth century. First, while Abrams describes this neo-Kantian topos as a 
“conceptual scheme,” as I have already suggested, its character is more thematic and dramatic 
than structural or analytic: more a motif to be taken up and elaborated than a theoretical analytic 
to be definitely applied to a specific historical or theoretical problem. Abrams is not only 
invested in the special applicability of this topos to the contemporary moment, but its iterability 
within the modern era. Indeed, one way to capture this topical character is to consider how neo-
Kantian intellectual history treats its “crisis” and its “response” in profoundly different ways. In 
neo-Kantian intellectual history, the “crisis” is defined in such a capacious manner so as to make 
it singular, unified. The neo-Kantian topos enables a way of seeing what would be wildly 
different problematics in any other context — for Wellek, the alienation of “subject and object,” 
“man and nature,” and “consciousness and unconsciousness” or, for Abrams, the division of man 
“from himself,” “from society” and “from nature” — as somehow different iterations of the same 
central crisis of modernity, which Abrams traces to the “first great crisis,” which I have roughly 
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described as the Enlightenment project of critical intellectual reform. In contrast, this topical 
character recommends treating each neo-Kantian “response” as independent and disconnected: 
the response emerges as a constellation or array. Thus, even as Abrams is obviously interested in 
describing the Romantic response to the “first great crisis,” he is arguably more interested in the 
plurality of responses this first crisis generates than any particular response, Romantic or 
otherwise. We are back to Pulos’ claim that the neo-Kantian response did not “follow a single 
pattern” but rather manifested in a variety of interrelated modern developments (5).47 Viewing 
the crisis as singular likewise recommends seeing no response as final or definitive. Indeed, for 
Abrams, the fundamental inconsistency among the different responses demonstrates that there is, 
finally, no cure, only innumerable diagnoses of the same crisis as it emerges in different forms — 
or, perhaps better, only different speculative meditations on the central topos of crisis from 
within different sites of modernity.  
Wasserman’s picture of Romantic symbolism is also distinctively plural in this sense. 
For Wasserman the originality of each individual response is precisely what guarantees its poetic 
character. As Wasserman asserts, “[e]ach of these [Romantic] poets offers a different answer, and 
each is unique as poet as his answer is special; but all share the necessity to resolve the question” 
(22). Wasserman’s statement seems to stress this individualistic or idealist logic to its absolute 
limit: it is almost the sheer idiosyncrasy of each response — not only its original character but its 
fundamentally intranslatability and irreproducibility — that guarantees its poetic aspect. This is 
essentially what Wasserman means by “subtler languages:” languages that are constituted not 
semantically but syntactically, as autonomous artistic forms. This is why I have claimed that in 
this neo-Kantian discourse, crisis proves more far more essential than any particular response, 
even Kant’s. There seems to be only a generative responsiveness to the crisis of modernity, and 
this response simply is what generates modernity.  
With this iterability in view, we can think of this neo-Kantian topos as essentially an 
“empty” formal structure. And with this description I follow Mark Greif’s recent, helpful 
analysis of what he calls the “crisis of man” discourse at the mid-twentieth century. Greif 
                                                            
47 Of course, whereas Pulos seemed to hold the different responses apart — for instance, scientific from poetic or 
philosophical — in Abrams’ view this plurality demands a kind of qualitative or comparative assessment. That is to 
say, there is something suspicious as well as appealing for Abrams about the ubiquity of this discourse. Viewing the 
crisis as singular enables assessing these different responses against each other and seeing some responses as better 
than others: some are “subtle” and others exist at the “lunatic” fringe. And yet, for Abrams, all eyes seemed 
correctly trained on the same issue of alienation in a way that clarifies and confirms its significance. 
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observes that “one of the striking features of the discourse of man…in a sense the most striking, 
is how unreadable it is, how tedious, how unhelpful” (11). Greif suggests that this obscurity is 
not simply the product of historical or cultural drift. Rather, it reflects what Greif calls an almost 
strategic “emptiness” endemic to the discourse: according to Greif, this discourse was “empty in 
its own time, even where it was at its best; empty for a reason, or, one could say, meaningful 
because it was empty” (11). To illuminate the meaningful character of this discourse, Greif 
draws an illustrative distinction between “empty discourse” and what he calls “cant.” For Greif, 
cant amounts to suspect profundity in which “words deliberately do not mean anything that can 
be questioned, argued about, or refined by disagreement” but instead tend to function like 
shibboleths, “symbols of mystery or profundity” meant to “credential the speaker’s other 
utterances without adding discriminable content” (11). In order words, Greif views cant 
suspiciously as a symptom of dogma or bad faith. In contrast, Greif sees empty discourse as a 
more noble enterprise which, while at times perplexingly numinous, “behaves as if it wishes to 
be filled with a single inductive or deductive answer—a definitive argument meant to persuade 
all hearers and end inquiry through complete satisfaction— but in fact generates the continuation 
of attempts, or tacitly admits to unanswerability” (13). The remarkable aspect of this kind of 
discourse, for Greif, is the way this this “empty gesture” generates a sense of community 
organized around a shared enterprise. For Greif, the “best part of the crisis of man” is that 
“interminable analysis” functioned as “the intellectuals’ form of action, a means to pull others 
into the framework of affirmation and contradiction that their thought created” (4). 
Greif doesn’t explicitly see a neo-Kantian framework at work here, but I believe he is 
looking at the same popular structure Abrams is. And, as Abrams’s thesis clarifies, the 
connection between this broader discourse and the more specialized Kantian version is not hard 
to see (or at least worth clarifying). In any case, the neo-Kantian observation of its topos of crisis 
is “empty” precisely in the manner Greif describes. It issues a broad, ongoing, insistent call to 
responsiveness: and this responsiveness itself generates a firm sense of what modernity is, its 
meaningfulness as a concept. This leads to my second comment about Abrams’ depiction of the 
neo-Kantian crisis. Abrams characterizes this neo-Kantian topos of crisis as a “speculative 
instrument for examining our own greatly troubled era,” but it seems to also function as a 
specialized instrument for observing or even constructing modernity. The central topos 
undergirds Abrams’ entire sense of modernity: it allows him to see “our” era as continuous with 
 74 
the Romantics. This is true for Wasserman as well, who can assert that “[t]he condition of man 
has not changed in this last century and a half; and Wordsworth’s predicament is ours” (258). 
I agree with Greif that, in the end, this empty discourse deserves more sympathy than 
suspicion, and one aim here is to offer a more subtle and sympathetic picture of what the mid-
century critics were after than the fairly ungenerous one their post-structuralist critics have long 
offered. But I also will suggest that the neo-Kantian enterprise is also capable of being so broad 
that it borders on vacuous, so ongoing that it would seem to undermine itself, at times so 
insistent on its self-evident value that it looks like dogmatic cant, and finally, so distorted that it 
is worth abandoning. If I am correct that the rise of neo-Kantian Romanticism reflects, more than 
anything, the monolithic status of the neo-Kantian picture of modernity at the mid-century, then 
it should be clear that, in order to figure out what’s distorted about these literary histories, we 
will first have to try to grasp what seemed so right about this neo-Kantian picture: its basic logic 
and appeal, so to speak. We will need to consider the factors that would have made it not only 
possible or even appealing but even somehow inevitable or impossible not to view Romanticism, 
and modernity more broadly, through the lens of neo-Kantian intellectual history. 
We can measure the sheer gravitational pull of this neo-Kantian formation by returning to 
Wellek’s “Romanticism Re-examined” and observing how thoroughly its looming presence 
seems to distort Wellek’s approach to the problem of defining Romanticism. Consider, for 
instance, how strange Wellek’s appeal to this neo-Kantian picture seems given his stated 
objective, how unappealing locating Romanticism within this neo-Kantian picture should be as a 
solution to his problem. Wellek is trying to stabilize the concept of Romanticism and to correct 
for the promiscuous “anti-historicism” that Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining Romanticism 
had encouraged. But, if you were trying to combat anti-historical promiscuity, why would you 
turn to neo-Kantian intellectual history? Why turn to a framework so unexacting that it permits 
the crises of “subject and object,” of “man and nature,” and of “unconsciousness and 
consciousness” — wildly separate problematics in nearly any other context — to be treated as 
iterations or variations of the same basic crisis? So we will have to account for how, from 
Wellek’s perspective, situating Romanticism within this loose neo-Kantian constellation could 
seem more stabilizing than destabilizing. We will have to account for how Wellek sees this as a 
move “responsible scholars” (221) make.  
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First, if the objective is to specify the essence of Romanticism, why go about this 
problem by situating Romanticism within a broader constellation? Why begin by characterizing 
Romanticism simply as one response among a plurality? This move seems at cross-purposes with 
the project of defining Romanticism.  More importantly, why attempt to define Romanticism’s 
poetic character in the distinctly philosophical terms offered by this neo-Kantian picture? This 
seems at cross purposes with the project of “defining Romanticism as poetic.” Aligning 
Romantic poetry with this broad philosophical formation would seem to establish an immediate 
and strange tension between philosophy and poetry. It also seems to encourage an incoherent and 
self-defeating logic where, in order to achieve its special status, Romantic poetry must prove 
itself to be philosophical.  This sophistication seems concede too much to philosophy from the 
start for no evident reason. In any case, it hardly seems a satisfying picture of self-determination 
through poetry. So we will have to explain how, from Wellek’s perspective, aligning Romantic 
poetry with this broader philosophical formation manages to specify or clarify Romanticism’s 
poetic essence more than confuse it.  
Abrams’s specification that the Romantic poets were “philosophical-minded” reflects a 
strange deference to philosophy similar to Wellek’s. Indeed, if we recall Budge’s complaint 
about Abrams’s appeal to “striking analogues” to support his neo-Kantian reading of British 
Romanticism, it is possible to argue that Abrams’s adoption of the neo-Kantian framework as an 
all-encompassing interpretive framework constitutes a notable departure from his preferred 
literary critical procedures. Consider, for instance, the terms in which Abrams chastises a 
prevailing critical tendency of analogy in his influential essay “The Correspondent Breeze.” 
Abrams recoils against the “logical procedure” of treating “loose analogy as though it were 
identity” (“Correspondent Breeze” 127). Abrams writes: 
This strategy, to be sure, has a singular virtue; it cannot fail. Only leave out 
enough of the qualities that make a poem, or any complex experience, distinctive, 
and it can be reduced to an abstract pattern — almost any abstract pattern, 
including, if that is our inclination, the pattern of the vegetational cycle of death 
and rebirth. From a different premise, but by a similar argument from analogy, 
Hegelians have been able to demonstrate that works of literature are moments in a 
dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis; Marxists, that they reflect the conditions of 
production and the resulting class-structure of their times; and Freudians, that they 
project the infantile fixations, especially the Oedipus complex, of their authors. 
(“Correspondent Breeze” 127-8). 
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From my perspective, it is unclear how applying the neo-Kantian crisis does not involve the 
same logical procedure Abrams ridicules here. This is not to accuse Abrams of hypocrisy. It is 
simply to suggest that the neo-Kantian framework must have been compelling and self-evident 
enough to appear legitimate to even someone like Abrams, who seems inclined to view any 
strong methodology with suspicion. The neo-Kantian approach somehow had a wider sanction 
or, in any case, a more evident appeal to make its strong methodology seem unobjectionable.  
In The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the Romantic Era (2007), Colin 
Jager proposes that the longstanding appeal of mid-century interpretations of Romanticism 
literary history has to do with the way these interpretations “naturaliz[e] romanticism’s triumph 
as a historical inevitability” in a “secularization narrative [in which] romanticism rescues belief 
— a true or sincere relationship between internal and external — while jettisoning its 
metaphysical content” (49). From Jager’s perspective, the persistence of Wasserman and 
Abrams’s account reveals a suspicious blind spot around the secularization in Romantic literary 
criticism since the mid-twentieth century. Jager too has his eye most notably on how this 
formation escaped post-structuralists’ substantial revisions:   
…[D]espite the various revisions of romanticism accomplished over the past 
decades, the narrative of secularization has provided substantial continuity in 
scholarly thinking about the period. Romantic exceptionalism has been under 
revision for some time, but we are only now beginning to challenge an 
interpretation of the period in which religion gives way to a secularized modernity 
posited as inevitable. (Jager xi) 
 
From my perspective, Jager is observing more or less the same blind spot that I observe in the 
contemporary field: what Jager is viewing through secularization I am viewing through neo-
Kantian Skepticism. And I would suggest that Jager’s analysis, while correct and insightful, is 
finally somewhat constricted by his commitment to the terms of secularization.  
To be sure, the continued currency of Abrams and Wasserman’s progressive literary 
histories likely speaks to the secular disposition of Romantic scholars.48 And Jager’s most recent 
work, Unquiet Things, forcefully reframes this narrow secularity not only as a modern 
preoccupation but one that was importantly resisted by deeply religious Romantic figures like 
                                                            
48 To use Taylor’s terms, I would say there is a general inclination to accept a version of the subtraction story 
offered by secular humanism and, as such, to accept Abrams and Wasserman’s deeply secular account of 
Romanticism as unobjectionable or, at least, not especially preoccupied with secularization, even as it can be shown 
to be preoccupied in other ways. 
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Coleridge and even disowned by irreligious Romantics like Shelley.49 And, from my perspective, 
this bias towards secular humanism does not start with neo-Kantian Romanticism but begins as 
early as Abrams’s Literature and Belief (1957) (though this volume includes a representative 
selection of religious literary perspectives).50 However, I believe it is potentially misleading to 
interpret Wasserman and Abrams’s progressive literary history as primarily symptomatic of their 
preoccupation with secularization. Rather, I want to suggest that this progressive literary history 
more likely reflects their preoccupation with neo-Kantian intellectual history as it undergirds this 
modern secular order. It seems necessary, for instance, to distinguish the content of Abrams and 
Wasserman’s literary history, which does appear to be in some sense secularization-narrative-
cum-literary-history, from its form or narrative shape, which reflects a distinctively neo-Kantian 
topos of crisis-and-reconciliation. The secularization-narrative-cum-literary-history should be 
seen, then, as one instantiation of this neo-Kantian topos. This distinction helps us see two things 
that recommend abandoning the analytic framework of secularization and pursuing, instead, 
Wasserman and Abrams’ investment in this neo-Kantian intellectual historical narrative of 
modernity.  
 First, identifying Abrams and Wasserman’s literary history as a variation of this neo-
Kantian topos helps clarify that, while this literary history is certainly a kind of secularization 
narrative, it is not a variation of the “secularization” thesis whose rampant application Hans 
Blumenberg interrogates in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Conflating these two versions of 
secularization is easy because both frameworks are flexible enough to tolerate fairly loose 
applications, and, in its looser form, the secularization thesis can look more or less like Abrams 
and Wasserman’s progressive literary history. But, as Blumenberg’s study reveals, in its strictest 
form, this secularization thesis purports to be analytic and historical, centered on transitions in 
ecclesiastical and legal distinctions (indeed, something more like the political history of 
secularity Jager pursues in Unquiet Things). Since the secularization thesis presents itself as 
socially scientific and descriptive, it is not characteristically progressive or at least professedly 
                                                            
49Michael Tomko, Jeffrey Barbeau, Lori Branch, and others have also contributed other correctives to this narrowly 
secular conception of Romanticism. See in particular Tomko, “Seasons of the Secular” Religion and Literature 41.3 
(2009): 127-37 and Beyond the Willing Suspension of Disbelief: Poetic Faith from Coleridge to Tolkien 
(Bloomsbury, 2016); and Branch, Rituals of Spontaneity: Sentiment and Secularism from Free Prayer to 
Wordsworth (Baylor, 2006).  
50In Literature and Belief, Abrams argues that all great works of art exhibit “a central and essentially ethical 
humanity which transcends particular creeds” and establish “a common base of human sympathies and values” with 
readers “whether they are believers or unbelievers” (x). 
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so. As Blumenberg’s annoyance demonstrates, only bad sorts of secularization theses gesture 
towards Progress.  
In contrast, the neo-Kantian topos operates according to a much different logic and is 
assessed by much different criteria. It reflects a uniquely “intellectual historical” way of seeing 
the history of modernity hermeneutically through the history of philosophy. Moreover, this way 
of seeing modernity is unquestionably and unapologetically progressive: it frames its narrative of 
crisis-and-reconciliation in progressive and even developmental terms. Indeed, in its loosest 
form, this progressivism turns out to be the neo-Kantian intellectual history’s essential feature: 
the most important aspect of neo-Kantian intellectual history is the break into modernity it 
observes. So while the neo-Kantian topos could be applied to construct a progressive 
secularization narrative or a progressive literary history alike, its principal value is perhaps how 
it enabled a way of reading different progress narratives (e.g. secularization, disciplinary 
specialization) so many responses to one central crisis, so many variations of one central neo-
Kantian narrative of modernity clarified by epistemology. I would suggest the “modern” progress 
narrative Wasserman and Abrams reads off this neo-Kantian intellectual history and into 
Romantic literary history — this narrative in which Romanticism “rescues belief — a true or 
sincere relationship between internal and external — while jettisoning its metaphysical content” 
(50) — is primarily a “philosophical” one and only secondarily one about secularization: more a 
story about a transition in a basic understanding of belief than a story about the transition from 
Belief to belief (though obviously the latter as well).  
Recognizing this distinction between form and content, we might then say that the 
progressive character of Wasserman and Abrams’ literary history — the feeling of “historical 
inevitability” that Jager senses from it — is intrinsic to the neo-Kantian topos itself. So we might 
say that Abrams and Wasserman’s application of the neo-Kantian topos to the literary history of 
Romanticism, while ostensibly licensed by the Romantics’ own neo-Kantian view of things as so 
many “philosophical-minded poets” (169), also speaks in a manner to Wasserman and Abrams’ 
own critical estimation of the rise of Romanticism as ultimately modern and progressive in 
character (an estimation that, admittedly, most Romanticists would still likely accept). In other 
words, Abrams and Wasserman are speaking from within this neo-Kantian perspective as much 
as they are commenting on the Romantics’ investment in it: they define Romanticism’s 
achievement in distinctly neo-Kantian terms. And the reason this seems worthwhile is because 
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these neo-Kantian terms are the most salient and significant. We might say Wasserman and 
Abrams’ application of the neo-Kantian topos to Romantic literary history is not simply a 
description but also a kind of justification of their view of Romanticism as progressive and 
modern: in other words, an attempt to confirm Romanticism’s progressive and modern character 
by linking it, hermeneutically but also legibly, to the master narrative of modernity offered 
within neo-Kantian intellectual history, which is to say, the rise of modern philosophy as 
initiated by Kant’s discovery of epistemology.  
If this analysis is correct, it would seem that Budge might have arrived at the right 
question but asked it in too narrow a manner. Budge asks why Romantic literary critics have felt 
compelled to imagine British Romantics as rejecting Anglophone empiricism for German 
idealism. And his answer, as we have seen, is a mixture of intellectualist bias along with 
institutional and cultural forces (21). But the question could equally be expanded to ask why neo-
Kantian Romanticists pursue readings of poetry through philosophy and, more specifically, in 
terms of epistemology at all. Why must poetry be explained in terms of philosophy? I hope to 
have shown that the answer might indeed have to do with a desire to justify the value of literary 
critical studies by framing it within the authoritative, monolithic neo-Kantian intellectual history 
of modernity read of the history of modern philosophy. It is as if these neo-Kantian readings of 
Romanticism are offered up as justifications for situating Romanticism within this neo-Kantian 
constellation. Or, more likely, it is as if someone like Wellek is conditioned by this intellectual 
historical manner of interpretation into seeing Romanticism in these terms. This, I would 
suggest, is why Wellek believes this is something that “responsible” critics do. Neo-Kantian 
intellectual history dictates the very definition of responsibility. 
Of course, I do not mean to discount entirely the value of reading poetry through 
philosophy, or even of neo-Kantian epistemology. My question simply has to do with why or 
how one pursues such a reading. And my sense is that neo-Kantian Romanticism, at least 
initially, pursued it for reasons that have more to do with achieving legitimacy within a mid-
century intellectual formation than engaging with the intellectual historical climate of the 
Romantic period. Indeed, I believe that using philosophy is a lens for viewing Romantic poetry 
as ultimately indispensable because I believe the Romantics themselves were in fact trying to 
represent poetic practice as philosophically legitimate, and to situate their practice within a new 
constellation of intellectual reforms. But I would suggest that neo-Kantian Romanticism is 
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finally committed to the same kind of project of cultural legitimization, and that this distorts both 
its description of the Romantic engagement with philosophy and its assessment of the outcome 
of this engagement. From the neo-Kantian perspective, Romantics look like they are shoring up 
an already established distinction between fact and value. But, I want to suggest, this distinction 
is not nearly as salient or as firm to the Romantics, who are still working with an order epistemic 
picture centered on an older concept of moral science. Likewise, the neo-Kantian picture 
imagines the Romantics successfully out-doing philosophy at its own game, through its poetic 
explorations. But it is more likely that Romantic poets saw themselves as being systematically 
displaced by an ascendant philosophy and, therefore, inclined to make poetry more amenable to 
this rationalistic vision. 
 
1.3 “Hume is the Special Prophet:” Stephen’s Neo-Kantian Intellectual History  
When a new edition of Leslie Stephen’s History of English Thought in the Eighteenth 
Century (1876) was released in 1949, the literary critic William K. Wimsatt reviewed Stephen’s 
influential intellectual history in The New Scholasticism. Though known best for his monograph 
The Verbal Icon and his formulation of the intentional fallacy, Wimsatt was also a central 
architect of neo-Kantian literary history.51 What’s relevant about Wimsatt’s review is that it does 
not treat the specific merits of the new edition — say, the introduction or the new editorial notes 
— but the work itself. Of course, Wimsatt comments on the peculiarity of his approach: any 
review of the book is “bound to be retrospective, breathing a kind of ghostly atmosphere. To 
Wimsatt, it seems distinctly of its time, “a massive Victorian celebration of the Age of Reason” 
concerned with “the minute intelligence of certain ‘battles long ago’” (348). But Wimsatt reads 
Stephen’s work for “its reflection of a more recent world-view.” It remains for him the “most 
informative single guide book from the sceptical point of view” (349). Wimsatt observes that, 
while our picture of the eighteenth century has advanced a great deal, it has not altered 
Stephen’s: it has confirmed more than it is has corrected: “What has happened in the history of 
scholarship since Stephen wrote is not so much that the peculiar era which he chose has been 
                                                            
51Wimsatt’s 1949 essay, “The Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery,” was the first major essay to adduce Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s comment about William Bowles’ “dim analogies,” as evidence of Coleridge’s dissatisfaction 
with eighteenth-century topographical poetry and his desire to develop a more integrated form of symbolism. In his 
1949 essay, “The Concept of Romanticism,” Wellek describes it as “excellent” and suggests that it “certainly 
supports my argument.” I discuss both Wimsatt’s argument and its impact in Chapter Five. 
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taken from him by later and better authorities, but that the isolation in which he tended, 
excusably, to see it has been illuminated by numerous later researches in adjacent areas” (349). 
For Wimsatt, Stephen’s work is prophetic, his insights well ahead of their time: as such, it is “no 
small marvel that so much of what is important to [eighteenth century studies] is to be found at 
least adumbrated in Stephen’s volumes” and that “he in that mistie [sic] time, could see so 
clearly” (350). 
Contemporary scholars of intellectual history have also viewed Stephen’s work as 
prophetic, but in a much different way than Wimsatt does. Whereas Wimsatt values Stephen’s 
work for its foundational success, modern scholars tend to focus on its failures, most notably, the 
unrealized potential of Stephen’s initial plan for his intellectual history and its distance from the 
intellectual history Stephen actually writes.52 As M. de Waard observes, Stephen’s introduction 
appears to offer a “programmatic manifesto” for a “new mode of inquiry” that dispenses with the 
intellectualism of disciplinary histories of philosophy for a new kind of sociological history 
focused not on what Stephen called the “logical conditions” but the “social conditions” of 
knowledge production. Stephen promotes this new kind of inquiry as a corrective to the 
simplistic picture of intellectual influence provided by historians of philosophy, one more in 
keeping with the facts of intellectual development. Historians of philosophy, Stephen writes, 
“naturally limit their attention to the ablest thinkers” (3). They “tell us how the torch was passed 
from hand to hand — from Descartes to Locke, from Locke to Hume, and from Hume to Kant” 
(3). And, in this way, they construct a tidy picture of the “progress of speculation” in which that 
progress appears “determined by logical considerations” (3), in a dialectic process in which 
“each philosopher discovers some of the errors of his predecessor, and advances to some closer 
approximation of the truth” (3). 
For Stephen, this kind of tidy picture has its place. But the obvious problem with this 
picture is that it does not capture the messiness and irregularity of intellectual development: how 
thought “moves in a spiral curve” (3), how intellectual transformations are never clear or 
complete, how superstitions “apparently suppressed, break out anew in slightly modified 
shapes,” and “a phase of thought” that once looked to “involve a new departure” turns out to be a 
                                                            
52John W. Bicknell originally establishes this question in an influential 1962 article: “Why does Stephen tell us how 
intellectual history should be written and then follow another method?” (Bicknell “Tract” 104). For Bicknell’s more 
extensive treatment of this and other aspects of Stephen’s intellectual history, see Bicknell, “Leslie Stephen as an 
Intellectual Historian.” Diss. Cornell University. 1950. 
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“superficial modification of an old order of ideas” (3). And this messiness suggests that the 
“logical instincts” must be only partial causes of intellectual transformations. This fact therefore 
recommends a new kind of inquiry into “the main influences, outside of the more logical 
instincts, which most obviously affect the progress of a new system of thought” (10).  
The problem, as modern scholars see it, is that Stephen does not end up following this 
tantalizing plan for a sociological intellectual history. Indeed, once he motivates the case for such 
a history of “social conditions” that influence thought, he seems to revert to the old intellectual 
historical model he intended to transcend. Stephen indicates that his book will “deal chiefly with 
the logical conditions” and leave these sociological conditions untreated. De Waard notes a 
“special irony” in Stephen’s inability to escape his “intellectualism,” because it seems to enact 
the same error that Stephen’s introduction diagnoses: he writes, “[I]n Stephen’s own terms, his 
notion of the persistence of ideas, of intellectual survivals and arrested growths, may apply to his 
own theorization of intellectual agency in the introduction” (466). And Stephen’s “failure to fully 
confront the disjuncture between intellectual production and social change in history makes the 
residual intellectualism of his own reflections” function as “an apt example” of the concept of 
“rationalization” that Stephen theorizes to explain this persistence in the eighteenth century. 
Rationalization, as de Waard notes, is a “form of preserving ideas that are in fact on the wane” 
(466). In this view, Stephen’s introduction simply shores up the intellectualism it claims to 
challenge.  
I agree with the general thrust of de Waard’s analysis, but here I want to suggest that 
Stephen does not simply see himself as departing from older disciplinary histories of philosophy, 
but as doing something new — or, at least, a more ambitious version of these disciplinary 
histories. In short, in his work, Stephen is newly writing and expanding the reach of neo-Kantian 
intellectual history. And it is Stephen’s version of neo-Kantian intellectual history that Wimsatt 
not only recognizes but also regards as foundational. It departs from previous disciplinary 
histories in a few important and distinctive ways that de Waard’s otherwise sound analysis does 
not capture. De Waard certainly sees the more distinctive formal features of Stephen’s text, but 
without a strong sense of neo-Kantian intellectual history, which evidently unites Stephen with 
Wimsatt, de Waard does not make enough of these formal features. 
For instance, de Waard notes that Stephen “opens his introduction…by considering a 
problem in the study of David Hume as a starting point for a more general reflection on the 
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theory of history of ideas” (462). But Stephen’s work does not merely proceed from a “problem 
in the study of David Hume.” Stephen invents a new kind of intellectual historical problem as a 
problem in the study of David Hume. As one contemporary reviewer writes, in Stephen’s text 
“Hume is the special prophet of the century” (493).53 Indeed, Stephen’s intellectual history 
begins with a looming Hume: “Between the years 1739 and 1752 David Hume published 
philosophical speculations destined, by the admission of friends and foes, to form a turning-point 
in the history of thought” (1). It is a curious, in media res way to open what Stephen bills in the 
preface as a “systematic account” of religious thought from 1688 to 1750 and the “deistical 
controversies” that defined that period. But it conforms to the metonymic logic of neo-Kantian 
intellectual history, where Hume stands in for epistemology, and epistemological stands in for 
philosophy. The image occurs in an introductory section entitled “the influence of great thinkers” 
(ix) and in an introductory chapter entitled “The Philosophical Basis.”  
At first glance, this looming image of Hume — taken with the titles of the sections in 
which it occurs — would seem to imply Hume’s direct influence on the “history of thought.” But 
again Stephen is not exactly convinced that Hume plays more than an indirect or indexical role in 
this intellectual shift. This is not only because Hume’s influence is “obscure because chiefly 
negative” but because, for Stephen, Hume was admittedly a prophet with few followers in his 
time: “[t]he uneducated masses were, of course, beyond his reach” and “even amongst the 
educated minority he had but few readers; and amongst the few readers still fewer who could 
appreciate his thoughts” (1). In any case, for Stephen, “the rapidity and extent of the 
transformation of the whole body of speculation” that followed Hume was “too manifold and 
potent to be embodied in any single personality.” For Stephen, the widespread ramifications of 
Hume’s Skepticism suggest that merely “logical conditions” cannot explain them: instead, some 
“social conditions” would have needed to be “favourable to their development” (19). So, despite 
appearances, this first section is intended as a corrective to some kind of narrower history of 
philosophy centered on Kant.  
                                                            
53The reviewer also notably regrets that “one hears nothing of Kant and other thinkers” (493) even though we “were 
never more interacting with these” (493). Of course, Kant does appear, but only at the periphery in neo-Kantian 
fashion. But the comment should speak to extent of Kant’s hold on the broader intellectual landscape, in light of 
which neo-Kantian intellectual history seems to be, bizarrely, a kind of diminishment of Kant’s presence — but 
which, as I have suggested, is actually a kind of submersion or sublimation. This sublimated and peripheral quality 
is what makes neo-Kantian intellectual history so difficult to see. 
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We can get a more complete sense of Stephen’s dissatisfaction with the current state of 
intellectual history by turning to his preface. There, Stephen specifies his intent to be to trace 
eighteenth-century deistic controversies to what he sees as their “origin” (v) in philosophy:  
In order to give a satisfactory account of the deist controversy, it thus seemed 
necessary to describe the general theological tendencies of the time; and in order 
to set forth intelligibly the ideas which shaped those tendencies, it seemed 
desirable, again, to trace their origin in the philosophy of the time, and to show 
their application in other departments of speculation. (vi) 
 
It is the clarity afforded by this philosophical basis that justifies “repeating a thrice-told tale” of 
philosophy in order to indicate “the application of the principles accepted in philosophy and 
theology” beyond these narrow fields. These applications in “other departments of speculation” 
include their application to “moral and political questions, and their reflection in the imaginative 
literature of the time” (vii).  
For Stephen, this more ambitious and holistic picture will ensure a “a more detailed and 
systematic account” of the deistic controversy and correct the “narrowness and unfairness” of 
earlier committed accounts that were “in no sense philosophical” (v). In this, he is following the 
more neutral, encyclopedic approaches to intellectual history that he sees emerging around him. 
But he is departing from the tendency of even the best of these to be “annal[s]” rather than 
“histor[ies] of thought” (vi). Stephen, in other words, is interested in a more thoroughly shaped 
and even stylized intellectual history: one with a stronger central narrative which might organize 
the otherwise diffuse and distributed effects of Hume’s skepticism.  
Stephen admits that his more ambitious moral and literary speculations remain 
inadequately developed. Pursuing them further would have meant expanding the book “beyond 
all permissible limits,” not to mention “trespassing upon the province of literary criticism” (vii). 
From Stephen’s perspective, the book had already “assumed such dimensions that I have been 
unable to describe it satisfactorily by any other than the perhaps too ambitious title which it 
bears” (vii). But Stephen does offer his own neo-Kantian literary history of sorts, and it is worth 
exploring not only as a foundation and a counterpoint to the versions developed within literary 
criticism in the mid-twentieth century, but as a way into Stephen’s map to what he imagined as a 
more thorough intellectual reform: what needed to be done to generate the kind of critical and 
scientific turn he saw unevenly developed at the fin de siècle.  
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Stephen develops this line of thought with a meditation on a line of Wordsworth’s poetry. 
Stephen wants to specify the “sentiment” behind Wordsworth’s melancholic profession in his 
sonnet “The World is Too Much with Us” that he would rather be “a Pagan suckled in a creed 
outworn” (14). For Stephen, Wordsworth’s problem is disenchantment: Wordsworth wants to 
restore the “long-vanished charm” of an earlier mythical world. And his line demonstrates the 
inability of the new scientific order to speak to these older mythical investments. For Stephen, 
the “new order, constructed by the reason, remains colourless and uninteresting” because these 
“old associations have not yet gathered round it” (14) but remain tied up in “an old mode of 
conceiving the universe.” These lasting associations mean, whenever “emotions are roused” (14), 
they revive this picture: we still have access to these superstitions through our affective registers: 
they undermine the “purely intellectual impulse” which is “of the highest importance” but finally 
motivated by only a “feeble desire” (6). This is why is rational visions are finally “colourless and 
uninteresting” (14).  
Stephen notes that while a scientific orientation would tempt one to say that 
“Wordsworth is simply wrong” (14), these sentiments are still live enough such that “any attempt 
to dispute [their] accuracy is resented as needlessly cruel” (14). And Stephen wants to show how 
Wordsworth’s lament is finally justified, how it speaks to a set of legitimate concerns. Still, he 
has to work to get to their qualified value. He concludes that the “loss which Wordsworth might 
fairly lament” was “not the loss of a mistaken theory about facts,” nor “the loss of a consoling 
prospect for the future,” but finally “the loss of a system of symbols which could enable him to 
express readily and vigorously every mood produced by the vicissitudes of human life” (16). For 
Stephen, Wordsworth is not entitled to the first two lamentations because, from Stephen’s 
perspective, both losses are finally gains. A new theory about facts is not only an unqualified 
intellectual gain, but one that can provide the basis for a new moral order, a “consoling prospect 
for the future” (16). But Wordsworth does legitimately lament the loss of a prior order of 
symbols, myths and superstitions that were once a “living reality” but which have become a 
“poetical plaything” (16). But, for Stephen, even as the desire for this “living reality” is 
meaningful, this new disenchantment is finally a gain since it necessitates a “new language” 
which “may be learnt” and by which “loss may be replaced” (16). And this new, scientific vision 
of morality will itself finally be a gain since “it will be content with direct vision, instead of 
mixing facts with dreams” (16). In this sense, Wordsworth’s attempt to hold onto these mythical 
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symbols may fruitfully identify these persistent emotional needs, but it inhibits the new scientific 
vision by sustaining an older, limited mythology. This leads Stephen to believe the “imagination 
exercises, on the whole, a retarding influence” on intellectual progress.  
It is worth momentarily measuring the distance between Stephen’s neo-Kantian literary 
history and that espoused within mid-century neo-Kantian Romanticism. For we see the same 
collapse and displacement of an older superstitious order for a new modern scientific order, and 
we see the same acknowledgement that Wordsworth turns to myth as a reaction to this order, but 
Stephen regards this response as finally unphilosophical where Wasserman and Abrams see it as 
the turn of “philosophical-minded” poets (Abrams Natural Supernaturalism 169). For 
Wasserman and Abrams, Wordsworth achieves the new symbolic language that Stephen imagines 
lying beyond the horizon and written in a more social scientific register. And, for Wasserman and 
Abrams, the moral component of Wordsworth’s negotiation is submerged, implicit in his 
responsiveness to what is more centrally an epistemological or philosophical problem instead of 
a moral one. Stephen calls for an explicit articulation of morality founded on epistemology. In 
one sense, neo-Kantian Romanticism seems to frustrate Stephen’s hope by abandoning any such 
moral articulation for an even more rigidly epistemological picture. But this moral component is 
in fact merely sublimated into a tone of moral seriousness that suffuses almost all of mid-century 
neo-Kantian Romanticism.54 
But, for Stephen, this new symbolic language will not only be decisively moral and 
practical, but more communal than individual. It will also finally need to be as rhetorical as it is 
philosophical. It must persuade the holdouts to adopt the new scientific vision in ways that its 
narrow philosophical development simply has not. It must show how these visions may be 
applied to their legitimate and intractable — even natural — moral desires for utility and 
meaningfulness. It will provide a foundation for a similar kind of humanistic ethos Abrams 
imagines in his earlier work to be organized around literature. It will arguably respond to the 
same imperative that causes Wordsworth to see poetry as the indispensable handmaiden to 
                                                            
54For Wasserman, the responsiveness is distinctly private and merely expressive: we can only observe each 
individual poet’s negotiation of symbols: and these individual negotiations offer only individual gains. They do not 
add up to a moral community; the grounds for such a community simply do not exist. And language is finally more 
confining than liberating at the level of semantic content. New symbolic negotiations must be pursued at the order of 
form, as a disruptive use of “syntactic structures.” For Abrams, that moral component only becomes an explicit 
creedal commitment once post-structuralism threatens to dispense with it altogether. See “What is a Humanistic 
Criticism?” in The Emperor Redressed. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 13-44.  
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“science.” Stephen too admits that literature and theology speak clearest to these moral desires at 
the current moment, but Stephen cannot see literature speaking as clearly or directly as science 
one day might because it must do so indirectly, by “mixing facts with dreams” (16). Even if 
literature and theology must finally remain eradicable, Stephen at the least wants the option to 
“express our emotions directly as well as by the intervention of crude hypothesis” (15). For 
Wasserman and Abrams, however, there is only the ironic literary re-appropriation of “crude 
hypothesis” (15) in the subtler and ineffable (read: formal) languages of art.  
It is also worth measuring the distance between Stephen’s view of skepticism and the 
mid-century perspective, since this will surely complicate the one-sided picture of Stephen as a 
kind of arch-skeptic committed to Polanyi’s doctrine of doubt. As discussed above, from 
Wimsatt’s perspective, Stephen’s text appears to be a “guide book” to a “sceptical point of view.” 
The comment appears to look two ways: not only to Stephen’s own Skeptical perspective but to 
the insight this Skeptical perspective allows Stephen into the rise of Skepticism in the preceding 
century. But, even as Stephen pays a clear respect to Humean skepticism in his introduction, he 
also frequently decries the kind of scientific skepticism he sees as partially responsible for the 
impoverished and underdeveloped condition of a science-based morality. For Stephen, the 
thinker who “perceives the error” in older myths is also “tempted to abandon” the moral truth 
that these teachings also convey: “If moral teaching has been for ages connected with a belief in 
hell, the thinker who sees that hell is a figment sometimes infers that the moral law is not 
obligatory” (9). Stephen notes that scholars frequently attribute this to a kind of credulity — a 
desire for novelty, but that, “at a distance,” what is “more remarkable” is the “conservatism” of 
this skeptical conclusion, not its “destructiveness” (9). As such, “The philosophic doctrine, 
misunderstood by the ruder intellect, gives rise to a crude scepticism, which is but another form 
of superstition,” which results in a kind of complacency. The skeptic’s self-satisfaction means 
that “the attempt to accommodate the hostile systems” that are “unconsciously carried out” as a 
kind of intellectual principle of natural selection is suspended. Skepticism becomes a device 
“consciously adopted” for “evading responsibility” and which may “at times lead to downright 
dishonesty and disregard of the great virtue of intellectual candour” (9). In short, Stephen has his 
own full-blown critique of the “doctrine of doubt” even as he is one of the more salient Victorian 
subscribers by Wimsatt’s standards. Stephen knows how to see Humean Skepticism as Heroic, 
but he still takes skepticism to be more often a kind of Idiocy. By the mid-century, however, 
 88 
there seems to be a much firmer and more comprehensive Heroic account of skepticism — again, 
we have something like the “intellectual probity” that even Polanyi struggles not to afford 
Skepticism despite its excesses.  
 
1.4 Collapsing Kant’s Triptych: Kant, Reid, and the Epistemologist’s Dilemma 
I would like to return to Kant’s account in the Prolegomena to examine its rhetorical and 
strategic aspect. The question is why Kant observes Hume’s skepticism as a threat only to 
dismiss that threat as apparent. From a sympathetic perspective, this is because Kant has a 
sincere appreciation for Hume’s pioneering insights. But from a suspicious perspective, Kant 
simply instrumentalizes Hume as an authoritative second opinion about the significance of his 
own project of epistemology. Rorty was arguably the first within philosophy to notice this 
strategic aspect and systematically challenge the convenience of Kant’s maneuver. Within 
philosophy, it is simply more convenient to accept Kant’s picture of things as authoritative: 
doing so places philosophy at the top of the modern intellectual hierarchy. Likewise, accepting 
this hierarchy outlines a clear program for other critical disciplines like Romantic literary 
criticism, even as literary critics have strangely had to subordinate themselves to philosophy and 
develop theories of poetry on philosophic terms.  
The fact that hardly anyone prior to Rorty entertained the idea that Kant’s negotiation 
was more rhetorical than philosophical is evidence of the profound rhetorical efficacy of Kant’s 
triptych. Kant’s triptych appeals to a shared desire to observe the modern break. Kant succeeds 
in distinguishing his response from the common sense response by convincing everyone that his 
own response is properly philosophical and critical and that the Common Sense response is 
simply reactionary and descriptive. After Kant, it somehow becomes impossible to dismiss 
Hume outright as unserious, as Kant portrays Reid and his contemporaries to have done. 
Moreover, Kant importantly succeeds in convincing most everyone not simply that Hume’s 
philosophy is epistemological but that it is finally and radically skeptical in character. The 
former distinction is how he achieves a basic continuity with Hume; the latter is how he achieves 
distance from Hume. 
 But how accurate is Kant’s triptych? What happens to this progressive intellectual history 
of modernity read off this triptych, or the literary history that mid-century critics read off this 
intellectual history, if this Kantian triptych could be collapsed into a single point, shown to be 
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more a sign of the proximity of Kant, Reid, and Hume than their distance? What would happen 
to this neo-Kantian topos of crisis read off various sites of Kant’s triptych? I want to say that a 
more thoroughly rhetorical interpretation of Kant’s negotiation ultimately makes this collapse 
possible. A closer look at Reid’s response to Hume reveals that Reid took Hume more seriously 
than Kant lets on. And a closer look at Kant’s suggests that he took Hume less seriously than he 
would seem to claim. Furthermore, a closer look at the rhetorical strategy Kant finally uses to 
dismiss Hume suggests that he significantly overstates his distance from Reid and that, in fact, 
Kant and Reid are deploying a shared anti-skeptical rhetoric. Likewise, a closer look at the 
exclusively negative role Hume plays within Kant’s anti-skeptical rhetoric suggests that Kant’s 
depiction of Hume as a radical skeptic is primarily strategic, intended to exaggerate not only the 
distance between Kant and Hume, but also the distance between Hume and Reid’s common 
sense contemporaries, and finally the distance between all three points. In this section, I want to 
take a closer look at Reid’s response to Hume in an attempt to describe what I take to be the 
actual difference between Kant and Reid. After recalibrating this difference, I want to consider 
some proposed reasons for why Kant’s response has proved more appealing and enduring than 
Reid’s. 
 To measure the distance between Kant and Reid in a different manner, we can draw on 
the general heuristic schema Michael Williams proposes for distinguishing between different 
responses to Skepticism. Indeed, Williams’s schema is merely one of numerous ways 
philosophers have attempted to parse the various kinds of objections to skepticism. But the value 
of Williams’s approach, from my perspective, is the way it focuses on the problem of “how 
seriously” one should take the skeptic.55 For Williams, there are initially two broad classes of 
responses: constructive and diagnostic. Here Williams uses constructive in a more specialized 
manner than I have been using it. For Williams, a constructive response effectively accepts the 
accuracy and legitimacy of the problem of epistemological skepticism as the Skeptic describes it 
and then constructs a system that responds directly to that skeptical challenge. As Williams 
writes, “The constructive epistemologist hopes to meet the sceptic by arguing for a positive 
theory of knowledge, a theory that will enable him to explain how and to what extent 
                                                            
55 Of course, it should be said that Williams constructs his general schema in an effort to clarify the nature of his 
own, uncommon response to skepticism — which as we will see, finally aligns with Reid’s. In this sense, the general 
schema is obviously in some sense a means to an argumentative end. But, nonetheless, I believe most will find his 
parsing uncontroversial and, finally, insightful. 
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knowledge…is possible. He therefore takes the sceptic’s questions more or less at face value” 
(Williams xvi). From this perspective, Kant’s subjective idealism is a constructive response par 
excellence. A diagnostic response, on the other hand, “suspects that there is something drastically 
wrong with the way the questions are posed” and therefore pursues not a “proof of what the 
sceptic doubts” but “further investigation of his claims to doubt it” (xvi).  
 From Williams’s perspective, there are in turn two major classes of diagnostic responses, 
therapeutic and theoretical, which amount to two distinct strategies for dismissing the skeptic 
(xvi). The therapeutic response approaches the skeptic’s problems as something that needs to be 
“dissolved” rather than “solved:” the therapeutic response believes that “the sceptic does not 
mean what he seems to mean, or even that he fails to mean anything at all” (xvi). In contrast, a 
theoretical response aims to “show that sceptical arguments derive their force, not from 
commonsensical intuitions about knowledge, but from theoretical ideas that we are by no means 
bound to accept” (xvii). From this perspective, we might say the difference between theoretical 
and therapeutic responses turns on the same problem of evidential context I discussed in the 
Overview. A therapeutic response takes the Skeptic to be on to something, on the basis of what 
Williams calls the basic “intelligibility” of the Skeptic’s claims. As Williams explains, the 
therapeutic approach acknowledges that “we will never find it easy to convince ourselves that we 
do not understand the sceptic at all. Rather, our sense that we do understand him — well enough 
at least to appreciate why certain anti-sceptical strategies [e.g. constructive approaches] are 
doomed to fail — works against the credibility of views about meaning that suggest we don’t” 
(xvi-xvii). From this perspective, any constructive response to skepticism finally looks more 
theoretical, more committed, and thus more problematic than the skeptic’s minimally theoretical 
assumptions. The same is true of any theoretical response, which tries to frame the skeptic’s 
problems as overly technical and theoretical — we might say elitist — and thus idiotic. From the 
theoretical perspective, skeptical problems do not point to intuitive problems of knowledge but 
simply reflect bad, or at least contestable and controversial, theoretical premises. 
 As Williams observes, these classes of response are not mutually exclusive but only 
roughly heuristic distinctions. This becomes apparent if we try to apply them to Boswell and 
Johnson’s respective responses to Berkeley’s skepticism. From one perspective, Boswell’s 
response would appear to be diagnostic and therapeutic because Boswell seems willing to accept 
the coherence and intelligibility of Berkeley’s skeptical proposition, even as he understands it to 
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be false at some deeper level. But considering that this intelligibility takes place at the level of 
rhetoric — as mere “sophistry” — one might also make the case that Boswell’s response is 
theoretical: that is, that Berkeley’s arguments are functioning in a hermetically sealed world of 
theory, in which such things have a look of intelligibility and coherence that does not transfer to 
the world. Likewise, from one perspective, Johnson’s kick looks distinctly constructive in 
Williams’ more specialized sense of the word: it proves knowledge of the world through contact 
with it, through its resistance to Johnson’s will, and through the pain that resistance creates. But, 
given Johnson’s adoption of Berkeley’s terms — his attempt to dissolve rather than solve 
Berkeley’s problems from within — Johnson’s kick could be seen as diagnostic and therapeutic. 
And, in one more turn, with an eye on Johnson’s deeper disdain for Berkeley and the evidently 
performative and ironic nature of this “therapeutic” response, Johnson’s kick could also be seen 
as a theoretical response. From Johnson’s perspective, we are “by no means bound to accept” 
these skeptical premises. Johnson adopts them by choice, and the choice is idiotic. 
Williams’ sees Kant’s idealist response as constructive par excellence, but I want to make 
the case that Kant’s rhetorical sophistication in the Prolegomena allows us to view Kant’s 
response along therapeutic lines. As we have seen, from Kant’s perspective, Hume identifies a 
meaningful set of issues — which Kant parses as a difference between epistemological and 
moral certainty — but draws the wrong set of conclusions regarding this meaningful issue. That 
wrong conclusion reflects on Hume’s lack of rigor and, in some sense, his incomplete 
understanding of the intuitive problem that he stumbles across. And in this sense, Kant responds 
to Hume by returning to Hume’s legitimate insights to dissolve Hume’s illegitimate ones: again, 
as Williams writes, Kant shows that Hume “does not mean what he seems to mean” (xvii). And 
Kant’s idealism emerges as a more complete diagnosis and clarification of Hume’s error, even as 
it also emerges as a constructive means to shore up Hume’s insights. Hume’s skeptical crisis is in 
this sense only apparent. 
 While the therapeutic character of Kant’s approach is certainly debatable, the value of 
reading Kant’s response as therapeutic is that it captures what I take to be the more spiritual role 
Kant plays within the neo-Kantian intellectual history. As Williams observes in his extensive 
historical survey of philosophical responses to skepticism, the therapeutic response has come to 
dominate the field as an “epistemological pessimism” has discouraged constructive and 
theoretical responses. From my perspective, this pessimistic drift away from constructive 
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towards therapeutic responses is another way to describe the broader shift in emphasis from Kant 
towards Hume in neo-Kantian intellectual history. Kant’s instrumental role was to initiate and 
standardize this therapeutic tendency by necessitating that Hume’s skepticism be taken seriously 
as a hint towards neo-Kantian epistemology. This therapeutic approach has survived long after 
Kant’s particular constructive response fell out of favor. Kant is the first to rule out a baldly 
theoretical response to Hume. After Kant, the immediate dismissiveness of the theoretical 
response looks suspiciously easy and unphilosophical: more a sign of a moral reaction to Hume 
than any intellectual engagement with him. And, with the exception of ordinary language 
philosophy and a few other schools, a therapeutic negotiation of Hume has remained the 
privileged approach. Of course, it is perhaps too much to say that Kant is responsible for the 
currency of the therapeutic approach, but it seems accurate to say that Kant’s initial negotiation 
of Hume is representative of what has become the dominant intellectual disposition. 
 Whatever the nature of Kant’s response to Hume, Reid’s is unmistakably theoretical in 
character. As I mentioned in the Overview, Reid takes Humean skepticism to be a reductio ad 
absurdum of the false premises at the center of the Descartesian project of epistemology. Hume’s 
skeptical conclusions are absurd, but soundly reasoned: therefore, they must illustrate the 
absurdity of the premises. Here’s how Reid frames it in his letter to Hume: “I agree with you 
therefore that if this system shall ever be demolished, you have a just claim to a great share of the 
praise, both because you have made it a distinct and determinate mark to be aimed at, and have 
furnished the proper artillery for the purpose” (5). In other words, Reid understands the value of 
Hume’s skepticism to be instrumental and therapeutic. But Hume’s skeptical system itself 
(insofar as he retains one) is theoretically mistaken: since “this curious system appears not to be 
fitted to the present state of human nature" (58). 
What is the theoretical error at the center of the Descartian project? For Reid, this has to 
do with the way Descartes inherits and reworks a bad analogy from an earlier Scholastic theory 
of mind. Reid explains this error by describing what he sees as the “two ways” of developing 
knowledge. The first way, “the way of reasoning,” constitutes a kind of clear, logical reflection 
that is endemic to true philosophy. Reid distinguishes this from the “way of analogy,” which for 
Reid is the “most common way, in which men form their opinions concerning the mind and its 
operations” (“Common Sense” 453). For Reid, the way of analogy may be sufficient for common 
life, but is bound to distort more than it clarifies in philosophy. Analogy is simply too 
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promiscuous and pervasive: “There is nothing in the course of nature so singular, but we can find 
some resemblance, or at least some analogy, between it and other things with which we are 
acquainted” (453). The mind even “naturally delights in hunting for such analogies and attends 
to them with pleasure” (453). For this reason, “[a]rguments from analogy are always at hand, and 
grow up spontaneously in a fruitful imagination” (454). As such, the “way of analogy” is 
naturally and instinctively more appealing than the “way of reasoning,” which though “more 
direct” and “more conclusive” demands “painful attention and application” (454). We can think 
of Reid’s distinction as one between critical and commonsense reasoning. 
 For Reid, the problem with older scholastic theory of mind is that it “seems to have been 
purely analogical” (458). By this, Reid means that it posited a basic analogy between matter and 
the mind, one which led philosophers to privilege “matter” over “mind” and to understand 
“sensation” to be dependent, in some sense, on the qualities present in matter. For Reid, this is a 
common way of reasoning about the mind, one distinctly reliable and intuitive in everyday 
context and illustrated by a pervasive system of analogies between mental and physical 
operations in ordinary language, what Berkeley calls the “analogy of language.”56 In these 
everyday contexts, Reid writes, “when we form our notions of the operations of the mind by 
analogy, this way of conceiving them seems to be very natural, and offers itself to our thoughts: 
for as everything which is felt must make some impression on the body, we are apt to think, that 
every thing [sic] which is understood must make some impression on the mind” (483-84). But 
for Reid, this way of thinking severely distorts our philosophical perception of what knowledge 
is. And though Descartes’s innovation had managed “to trust less to analogical reasoning upon 
this subject, than any philosopher had done before him” (464), Descartes’ system finally “hath 
retained some of the old analogical notions concerning the operations of the mind” despite 
“profess[ing] to set out in the way of reflection, and not of analogy” (484). From Reid’s 
perspective, Descartes does not discard the material analogy of the “old philosophy,” but simply 
shifts the privileged site from the matter to the mental impression. Retaining this basic analogy, 
for Reid, paves the way for skepticism since it necessarily privileges "the existence of ideas" and 
the "necessary relations that govern them.” These ideas and relations seem to emerge as the only 
self-evident principles (478). Relocating the certainty in the subject necessarily exacerbates the 
                                                            
56The phrase occurs in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues. The skeptic Philonous glosses it with the observation that “most 
mental operations are signified by the words borrowed from sensible things, as can be seen in the terms 
‘comprehend,’ reflect,’ ‘discourse’ etc.” (Berkeley 55).  
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rift between mind and matter by privileging the former and problematizing the latter. Following 
Descartes’s premise, for instance, Locke had chipped away at the “primary” qualities with his 
discussion of various “secondary qualities” inherent only in the mind. And Hume and Berkeley 
simply perform the same critique on substance and extension. In short, if the old system tended 
to “materialize the mind, and its operations,” the “Cartesian has a tendency to spiritualize body, 
and its qualities” (466).  
For Reid, this very distinction between primary and secondary qualities stems from the 
same representationalist fallacy: the assumption that “we can know nothing about body, or its 
qualities, but as far as we have sensations which resemble those qualities” (466). From Reid’s 
perspective, this is simply a misguided conception of knowledge and belief built on a bad 
analogy: “thought, volition, remembrance, and the other attributes of the mind, are altogether 
unlike to extension, to figure, and to all the attributes of body” (465). And this bad analogy leads 
to a woefully narrow representationalist theory of belief that reduces belief to the terms of 
discrete ideas or representations: for Reid, “in belief there is something more than an idea, to wit, 
an assent or persuasion of the mind” (46). Sensation and reflection cannot be neatly separated, as 
Hume assumes, because “every operation of the senses, in its very nature, implies judgment or 
belief, as well as simple apprehension” (481), and this “belief is not produced by comparing 
ideas, and perceiving their agreements and disagreements” (481). Rather, it is “included in the 
very nature of the sensation” and “perception” (481). 
To correct this bad analogy, Reid goes on to offer a more constructive account of the 
“first principles” of “common sense” and how these emerge from our “constitution.” This 
account is what neo-Kantian intellectual history often emphasizes. But I believe Reid is largely 
tentative about his positive description of common sense, even as he is thoroughly convinced of 
its existence. He only can surmise that common sense is more a “cause” of than an “reason” for 
his belief (9), and he generally prefers to define commonsense, as Hume does, negatively, 
against a category of the “absurd” (482), or any principles “manifestly contrary to any of those 
first principles” (482) of common sense. In any case, I want to examine Reid’s theoretical 
response, not his constructive one, much in the same way I want to examine Kant’s therapeutic 
response instead of his constructive one. The distinction between these responses simply aims to 
capture the initial posture towards Hume’s skepticism: how serious one must initially take 
Skepticism.  
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I want to suggest this difference in initial posture towards Hume is a helpful way of 
describing the difference between Kant and Reid. And an exploration of this difference affords a 
better understanding of how neo-Kantian intellectual history manages to stabilize the evidentiary 
context of Skepticism. To see this, I will need to return to Williams’ analysis of skepticism to 
consider how he finally draws on this schema for his own theoretical response to Skepticism. As 
it happens, Williams’ response tracks remarkably close to Reid’s in ways that I believe afford a 
new appreciation for Reid’s insight.   
In his response, Williams proposes that this distinction between the therapeutic and 
theoretical is finally the crux of the question: from his perspective, the “absolutely crucial 
question to ask about scepticism is this: to what extent are sceptical doubts ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ 
and to what extent are they the product of contentious and possibly dispensable theoretical 
preconceptions” (Williams 1). While Williams wants to claim Skepticism does depend on such 
“dispensable theoretical preconceptions,” his analysis carefully attends to the strong and almost 
irresistible claim Skepticism has to being a ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ problem” (17). For Williams, 
the “conviction” that it is an intuitive problem amounts to the “wellspring” of skepticism (17).  
Williams suggests that, while therapeutic responses seem more sophisticated in that they 
attempt to work with this conviction (if only finally to work against it), going down this 
therapeutic path effectively generates what Williams calls the “epistemologist’s dilemma:” 
Conceding [skepticism’s] naturalness lands us in the epistemologist’s dilemma: we 
can either accept scepticism, or make changes in our pre-theoretical thinking about 
knowledge that shrink the domain, or alter the status, of what we previously thought 
of as knowledge of objective fact. In making such changes, however, we inevitably 
appear to be making very large concessions to the sceptic. Unkindly put, the 
epistemologist’s dilemma is that we can either agree with the sceptic directly, or in a 
roundabout grudging way — Hobson’s choice. (22)   
 
For Williams, the way out of this dilemma is to locate the “the sceptic’s essential epistemological 
presuppositions” (37) — not in order to claim they are mistaken but simply to illustrate they are 
theoretical in nature and therefore contentious. That is, the task is to show that skeptical 
problems may be “fully genuine” but “only given certain theoretical ideas about knowledge and 
justification” (37). What makes Skepticism appear natural or intuitive is the way it compresses 
these theoretical ideas so thoroughly as to make them invisible: for Williams, Skepticism is the 
“distillate from a complex infusion of theoretical ideas” (41). The Skeptic’s own sincere sense of 
the non-theoretical status only submerges this distillate further. Again Williams: “the sceptic 
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does not see himself as making assumptions: rather he takes himself to be exploiting features of 
our everyday concepts that we are all bound to recognize. This is what we need to show is not 
the case” (45).  
From Williams’ perspective, once you demonstrate the theoretical and controversial 
nature of skepticism — and “redistribute the burden of theory” to the skeptic — skepticism loses 
its “powerful immediate appeal” (17); skepticism is deprived of “what would otherwise be an 
overwhelming dialectical advantage” (xvii) of seeming minimally theoretical. The task is to meet 
“The sceptic’s implicit theory of our epistemic concepts” with “an alternative which fits in 
equally well with the uncontroversial data, while failing to generate sceptical consequences” 
(39). Here Williams begins to align distinctly with Reid. For Williams, the problem of 
Skepticism begins in “a contentious epistemological theory, itself the product of mistaken 
analogies” (51). The common feature of Skeptical arguments is that they all involve making 
“analogous cuts between what we are allowed to know, at least for the sake of argument, and 
what we hope (or like to think) we know” (52). Sceptical arguments start with partitioning 
propositions into “privileged and problematic classes” (52). But, for Williams, once this simple 
assumption about the “epistemological priority” of one class over another is “in place,” 
Scepticism is “just around the corner” (52). From this perspective, the skeptic bakes in a 
theoretical distinction between problematic and privileged sites of knowledge which effectively 
generates the aporia Skepticism observes. 
  From my perspective, this is not only remarkably close to Reid’s analysis. It also bears an 
uncanny resemblance to Taylor’s analysis of the logic of subtraction story. Indeed, I take 
Williams’ “epistemologist’s dilemma” to reveal something important about the way neo-Kantian 
intellectual history stabilizes the evidential context of Skepticism. Neo-Kantian intellectual 
history would seem to privilege Kant’s therapeutic response over his constructive one largely 
because of the flexibility it affords. If neo-Kantian intellectual history stabilizes the evidential 
context of Skepticism, it only stabilizes or naturalizes a basic sense of the philosophical import 
of Skepticism. It does dictate how Skepticism is significant; or even whether Skepticism must 
finally be seen as philosophically significant. These remain open questions. This is why, as we 
have seen, Hume’s Skepticism can be viewed variously as a problem or a solution, as therapeutic 
or progressive, as irresolvable or resolvable, or any of these to different degrees. This is why 
nearly every major philosopher interested in Skepticism has been able to pursue a unique 
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interpretation of Hume. Neo-Kantian intellectual history simply dictates that one must take 
Skepticism seriously. As I said, Kant somehow makes it impossible to not take Hume seriously. 
Even as one can finally dismiss Skepticism as some kind of misunderstanding (in the way most 
New Humeans do), one cannot dismiss Hume outright (as Reid does). And this is true even as 
Hume himself seems to find this commonsense rejection to be a legitimate response to the 
Skeptic’s most anxious and excessive registers.  
 Stabilizing the evidential context of Skepticism in this loose manner seems to have 
enabled the remarkable kinds of growth we have observed the historical progression of neo-
Kantian intellectual history. It frees neo-Kantian intellectual history to repurpose itself at 
different moments for different ends and, therefore, to consolidate and reinforce its interpretive 
power: to grow into one of Connolly’s abstract machines. It is improbably an intellectual 
“platform” in both the new and old sense of the world: an organ for disseminating a message and 
an environment for constructing one. This lack of resolution generates the ceaseless activity of 
interpreting Skepticism’s philosophical significance that still dominates Humean studies, if not a 
broader set of philosophical treatments into skepticism. This open-ended structure facilitated the 
remarkable shift in Hume’s reception that took place over the nineteenth century, where, as we 
will see, Hume went from being seen in moral-individual terms as an Idiot to being seen in 
intellectual-historical (and neo-Kantian) terms as a Hero. It also enables the gradual 
displacement of Kant from the picture of things and permitted the amplification of the minimal 
topos of crisis in Kant’s triptych into an empty discourse of world-historic proportions of the 
mid-twentieth century.  
The credibility of this topos of crisis increases precisely as the contentiousness of the 
once live debate about the evidential context of Skepticism comes to seem ever quainter. As 
Carlyle shows, a sense of the quaintness of Johnson’s hostile reaction to Hume comes sooner 
rather than later. And, as neo-Kantian Romanticism shows, it does not necessarily last: Hume 
regains his threatening character as he is resituated in a different kind of therapeutic narrative of 
modernity. Establishing the significance of Skepticism in this minimal sense also seems to have 
been sufficient enough to have a staggering impact on the shape of modern intellectual history. 
The extended meditation on Skepticism recommended by neo-Kantian intellectual history does 
generate a unique and even uniquely modern social construction, the scientific fact, and a 






Neo-Kantian Critique Loves a Crisis 
 
2.1 Whose Crisis is This?   
 The neo-Kantian topos of crisis obviously has a great seductive pull, but this specter of 
crisis starts to collapse under even the most minor scrutiny. To begin to challenge the credibility 
of this topos, let’s return to Carlyle’s reading of Johnson and ask: who exactly in this picture 
would have experienced Hume as a serious threat? Whose crisis is this? Carlyle’s or Johnson’s? 
We can then build on this analysis to go farther than post-structuralist Romanticists were inclined 
to do and ask if the Romantics themselves were ever threatened by Hume or ever invested in a 
project of reconciliation and reorientation as neo-Kantian Romanticism imagines. 
 It should be clear that, while someone like Johnson reacts hostilely to Hume, it is unlikely 
that Johnson or his commonsense allies would have taken Hume’s epistemological skepticism 
seriously enough to find it capable of generating an authentic intellectual crisis. Their hostility 
would instead have been premised on the fundamental illegitimacy of Hume’s Skepticism, which 
seems misguided and immoral, more idiosyncratic than representative, more excessive than 
essential. Hume’s bad influence might indeed pose a social or moral threat — it might encourage 
similar acts of intellectual vanity — but, pace Carlyle, Hume’s skeptical reasoning would 
probably not have posed a personal or intellectual threat to Johnson or his commonsense allies. 
Beattie offers an ad hominem screed against Hume so ungenerous and loud that it is essentially 
unreadable, but his torrent comes from disdain, not fear.57 And as we have seen, Reid takes 
Hume to have achieved something momentous and, by performing reduction ad absurdum of the 
representationalist tradition initiated by Descartes and carried forward by Locke, to have 
revealed the wrongheadedness of the entire line of inquiry. But Reid has a much different 
description of Hume’s philosophical contribution than Kant because Reid has no respect for the 
more radical project of epistemology as Hume and Kant define it. 
                                                            
57See Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (1771).  
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 In this light, to experience Hume as an authentic intellectual threat in any way, one would 
have to be working within a Skeptical perspective, a neo-Kantian framework. Yet, as we have 
already seen, a neo-Kantian Romantic like Carlyle — that is, someone who would have absorbed 
both Kant and Hume’s insights — would have been more inclined to celebrate Humean 
skepticism as progressive. Again, we can think of the distance between Carlyle’s Tendency and 
Pulos’ tendency here. Carlyle may take Hume’s philosophy to be therapeutic, but this is the 
minor note to Carlyle’s more dominant progressive one. It is only in Pulos that the therapeutic 
tenor dominates or the epistemological project perceived as ongoing rather than complete. So, in 
this historical picture, it seems as if the crisis must somehow finally be Johnson’s. This sense of 
intellectual threat, therefore, would have to be imposed on Johnson, so to speak, from within a 
neo-Kantian perspective: read from or into Johnson’s hostility, against the grain of Johnson’s 
own sense of its origin or character. Indeed, this is exactly the kind of reading Carlyle pursues by 
interpreting Johnson’s reaction to Hume to be fundamentally defensive — and therefore 
illegitimate — in nature. The topos of crisis allows Carlyle to trace Johnson’s hostility to some 
other explanation than the one Johnson gives.  
 This hermeneutic of suspicion is obviously a questionable interpretive practice. That said, 
Johnson’s hostility towards Skepticism does appear problematic or at least, worth investigation, 
since it makes Johnson more inclined to dismiss Skepticism than engage it. But what is the 
source of this hostility? What critical work is it performing? Does it compromise Johnson’s 
response in the way Carlyle imagines? Can it be read another way? To answer these questions, 
we will need to return to Johnson’s kick for a more thorough analysis of Johnson’s skepticism 
and the place of his hostility within it.  
 
2.2 Johnson’s Kick, Revisited 
In the introduction, I claimed that Johnson’s kick was skeptical in form, though anti-
Skeptical in content. In one sense, determining whether Johnson is skeptical in form amounts to 
a kind of threshold judgment: we are asking if Johnson’s argument is minimally skeptical. This 
low threshold seems accurate. We can simply point to Johnson’s basic posture towards Berkeley 
for evidence of his minimal resistance. At the same time, such a low bar recommends against 
approaching the question of the skeptical character of Johnson’s kick as if it were solely a 
threshold judgment. This is not simply because I have forced the question of whether Johnson’s 
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argument is skeptical. It is rather that, with this minimally skeptical threshold in view, one might 
be inclined to accept that Johnson’s kick is indeed skeptical but refuse to accept that Johnson’s 
kick is an argument. That is, the answer to the question, “Is Johnson’s argument skeptical?” 
would more likely be “Sure” than “Yes.” The low threshold required to meet this weaker sense 
of “skeptical” is too permissive to be revealing, too vague to be interesting. Moreover, at this 
level, Johnson’s doubt looks suspiciously hot: in this case, a passionate disbelief that reaches the 
pitch of outrage and generates enough hostility towards its adversary so as to make it impossible 
to take that adversary seriously. Viewed from the outside, this hot doubt looks prima facie more 
reactionary than reasonable, more illegitimate than legitimate, and therefore philosophically 
uninteresting. Hot doubt might be justified and sincere, but it could just as well be irrational or 
cynical. A lack of clarity about the doubt’s source makes it suspect. And the fact that hot doubt 
does not bother performing the cooler argumentative labor a stronger skeptical method might 
perform in order to clarify these grounds and represent them as rational and legitimate means hot 
doubt does not necessarily demand the kind of serious attention such a labor might implicitly 
claim as its right. Hot doubt does not necessarily address Skepticism on recognizably serious 
terms.  
As such, to achieve a firm “Yes” and to make the claim that Johnson’s kick is skeptical in 
some strong, archetypal sense distinct from epistemological Skepticism, we will have to seek a 
higher level of definition. To do so, I want to push beyond this weak and inclusive definition of 
form and propose that Johnson’s argument is skeptical in form in some stronger sense: that is, 
Johnson’s argument is not just minimally skeptical but actually invokes a fuller skeptical 
machinery and completes something like a full and proper skeptical performance. To be sure, 
Johnson’s disbelief makes him initially and finally hostile towards Berkeley. This basic 
continuity suggests that the kick lands as a joke before it lands as an argument and is finally 
more humorous than serious. And we will eventually have to contend with why Johnson might 
want to foreground this hostility, even at the risk of making his skepticism look more reactionary 
than reasonable and more dismissive than engaged. It is as if, from within the perspective of hot 
doubt, a claim can be too absurd to merit a serious response, and that responding seriously would 
already amount to conceding too much. A silly claim demands a silly response. 
Yet, Johnson does not dismiss Berkeley’s sophistry outright on the basis of a 
predetermined conviction or without a clear reason (as, say, Boswell appears to do). Rather, 
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Johnson does offer Berkeley a response, with a complex of skeptical reasons so concentrated in 
Johnson’s wit that they emerge as more instinctive and intuitive than rational or discursive: they 
only minimally rise to the level of language. Boswell’s parable deftly highlights this intuitive and 
instinctive character: it is not simply Johnson’s answer that Boswell will never forget but “the 
alacrity with which Johnson answered,” how effortlessly Johnson’s response comes and how 
fully formed it arrives. Johnson is improvising in methodological skepticism, he is doing it in the 
distinctly conversational setting in which skepticism is so often improvised and summoned, and 
he delivers what turns out to be an impromptu performance meant to test Berkeley’s claim, one 
which is skeptical in a much stronger, more engaged, and better defined sense than Johnson’s 
initial disbelief. We know this because it takes place on Berkeley’s terms. The kick suggests that 
Johnson temporarily suspends his disbelief to inhabit Berkeley’s doubt. This willing inhabitation 
implies a concomitant shift in disposition. Boswell’s detail about the kick’s “mighty force” 
works as more than narrative flourish in this regard. The mighty kick is surely meant at some 
level to figure Johnson’s mighty disdain for Berkeley’s ingenious sophistry. But the kick’s 
intensity cannot be traced, at least initially or exclusively, to the strength of Johnson’s prior anti-
Skeptical convictions. Were that the case, wouldn’t Johnson’s abiding assurance of the stone’s 
real presence cause him to ease up as his foot approached it? Why risk stubbing a toe over 
something so absurd? Rather, Boswell’s detail registers Johnson’s temporary but full investment 
in Berkeley’s skeptical premise and, by extension, Johnson’s intellectual resolve, his willingness 
and even eagerness to doubt along with Berkeley despite and against his strong realist 
convictions. 
So Johnson’s argument seems to incorporate a skeptical experiment as an inner frame, 
and this skeptical experiment imposes a distinct affective disposition of its own, a show of blind 
resolve and courage. This disposition must be distinct from the more hostile skeptical disposition 
that precedes the experiment, since Johnson’s initial skeptical disposition would anticipate the 
experiment’s outcome in a manner that would compromise its integrity or, more precisely, render 
its sacrifice pointless. Again, why risk stubbing a toe? Johnson’s initial disbelief, an emanation 
of Johnson’s deeper conviction in the real, must somehow be suspended or actively discarded for 
a more disinterested, almost sacrificial state of doubt appropriate to the skeptical experiment. Hot 
doubt must be converted to cold doubt, and in this case that means Johnson must surrender his 
assurance of material reality at the expense of his physical well-being. The kick’s might signifies 
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the total character of that surrender, and Johnson’s eventual act of self-violence confirms it. 
Viewed from within the frame of the experiment, the contact with the stone must come as a 
surprise, a painful one no less. It is only outside of this skeptical frame that the stone arrives as 
expected as a kind of material proof by contradiction. 
So, even if Johnson’s argument is a joke at Berkeley’s expense, it is properly a practical 
joke, an elaborate affair involving a good deal of confusion and misdirection. It is relevant that 
any insight into Johnson’s intent only arrives as hindsight, all at once, as the joke’s punch line. 
Initially, Johnson’s kick does not signify anything at all. It is the joke’s setup, intentionally 
inexplicable and absurd. Only upon Johnson’s exclamation is the confusion surrounding his kick 
resolved, and his seemingly meaningless behavior is revealed to have been meaningful all along. 
What we might expect to be Johnson’s inarticulate cry of pain comes out as an articulate 
argument: “I refute it thus!” Johnson’s apparent absurdity turns out to be a deftly orchestrated 
moral lesson on the Skeptic’s more profound absurdity. The scene strikes me as too neo-classical 
and stoic to mention the pain of contact. But like the kick this pain is doubly significant: within 
the skeptical frame, the pain is just deserts for the Skeptic’s foolishness; outside the frame, it is 
the skeptical sacrifice Johnson has to make to confirm his convictions. 
Understanding Johnson’s pain in this double sense — not simply the Skeptic’s 
comeuppance but as itself a kind of skeptical sacrifice — clarifies Johnson’s deeper investment 
in and respect for skepticism as a formal procedure. Despite all appearances, Johnson’s kick is 
not a crude pantomime of skepticism but a studied distillation of skepticism as form and 
performance. If Johnson’s argument is a joke, it is not just a practical joke. It is also an inside 
joke. Indeed, Johnson’s kick appears to enact a methodological skepticism similar to that which 
Descartes develops in his Meditations. Descartes, like Johnson, puts his skepticism to anti-
Skeptical ends. He attempts to doubt everything, but only with the express intention of using his 
skeptical cut to reveal a firmer philosophical bedrock incapable of being doubted, and only in 
light of his confident expectation that such a bedrock exists. Descartes’s methodological 
skepticism is in this sense constructive: it aims to tear down knowledge so that it may be rebuilt 
on certain ground. Johnson’s kick cleverly literalizes this constructive skeptical quest for 
bedrock, even as Johnson turns his constructive skepticism to a different anti-skeptical 
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conclusion than Descartes.58 In the light of this constructive spirit, Johnson’s skeptical 
experiment could be said to prove his own position through skepticism as much as it refutes or 
ridicules Berkeley’s Skepticism. Johnson’s kick has two faces: one sincere and one satirical. His 
kick is a loving sendup, a folly about the excesses of Skepticism. 
If the affinities Johnson’s kick has with Descartes’s constructive skepticism clarify 
Johnson’s sincere appreciation for skepticism, a closer look at where and how Johnson swerves 
from Descartes’s methodological skepticism – or, better, where Descartes’s methodological 
skepticism seems to swerve from Johnson’s moral skepticism — affords a more nuanced 
description of Johnson’s satire. It also clarifies that this satire emerges from Johnson’s own 
constructive skeptical commitments, as an attempt to drive out epistemological Skepticism as a 
kind of theoretical excess. As philosophers studying Descartes have long observed, it is 
Descartes’ unique commitment to theoretical purity that seems to dislodge his methodological 
skepticism from the kinds of moral skepticism characteristic of nearly all forms of skepticism 
that had preceded it. The philosopher M.F. Burnyeat has notably suggested that the difference is 
that, unlike ancient skepticism, which remained “serious” because distinctly concerned with 
“practical” action in the world, Descartes’s innovation was that his skepticism was “not serious” 
but “strictly a methodological affair,” which “enabled him to take the doubt far enough to raise 
in absolutely general terms the problem of the existence of the external world” (Burnyeat 31). 
Michael Williams similarly suggests that “Descartes feels free to traffic in skepticism because he 
believes he has an ace up his sleeve: an account of the true nature of human knowledge that will 
place various fundamental truths beyond the sceptic’s reach” (Williams 2). But for Johnson this 
kind of trafficking undercuts the very stock of methodological skepticism. It divorces skepticism 
from the practical, moral context in which it gains its value. Descartes’s radical doubt is finally 
not cool or cautious in the way Descartes tries to frame it but a form of recklessness. It willfully 
violates the principle of sufficient reason that establishes the limits of moral skepticism: as 
Johnson writes, constructive skepticism must be relinquished for “moral certainty” when there 
“remains no sufficient Reason to doubt of the Truth” (Johnson Elements 75). Descartes’s 
skeptical sacrifice is finally only virtual and feigned, not costly at all or at least not in the way 
                                                            
58 Even Berkeley’s idealism could be shown to instrumentalize a similarly constructive skepticism, though Berkeley 
wishes to disabuse his readers of their false belief in material reality so that they will realize that God’s ideal mind is 
the proper ontological foundation for all perception. 
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Descartes imagines. This is why Johnson’s skeptical pain is also his comfort. It clarifies the 
legitimacy of his skeptical procedure while also confirming the soundness of his realist 
convictions.59 
This analysis of Johnson’s kick thus yields up three possible answers to my question in 
the Introduction: no, sure, and yes. Reviewing them in condensed form will help clarify and 
reinforce the theoretical distinctions I have tried to generate before I start to apply them more 
broadly to a set of historical and theoretical problems that makes Johnson’s argument a relevant 
focal point. So, the first: “No, Johnson’s argument is not skeptical, because it rejects Berkeley’s 
argument, and Berkeley’s argument is properly Skeptical. In this sense, Johnson’s argument is 
properly anti-Skeptical.” This answer would obviously turn on a preference for viewing 
skepticism as Skepticism: once again, a strong, exclusive, content-based definition of skepticism 
defined on the paradigmatic problem of modern epistemological skepticism. The second: “Sure, 
even though Johnson’s argument might be anti-Skeptical in some sense relevant to the 
disciplinary history of philosophy, his anti-Skepticism is skeptical in character. Then again, this 
doesn’t say all that much. The kick is a skeptical gesture, but it stands in place of an actual 
argument. It is joke because by simply turning and kicking a stone, Johnson illustrates how 
patently absurd he finds Berkeley’s skeptical claim to be on its face.” This interpretation would 
overlook a strong, exclusive definition of Skepticism for a view of Johnson’s argument as 
skeptical in a weaker formal sense. And third: “Yes, Johnson’s argument is distinctly and even 
strongly skeptical in form. Johnson’s kick should be seen as a distinctly skeptical performance. 
Even though this performance is satirical, it is not exclusively satirical, but also in some sense 
sincere: its formal critique comes from within skepticism and is more therapeutic than polemic. 
The way the performance blends the satirical with the sincere does not dismiss skepticism 
outright but proposes how methodological skepticism, properly applied, alleviates the excesses 
that result from its misapplication. Thus, Johnson’s kick finally reflects Johnson’s deeper 
investment in skepticism as a formal method, not to mention an appreciation for how this form 
might be mobilized against Skepticism as content.” This last interpretation would amount to a 
higher-definition account of Johnson’s argument as a skeptical performance. This extra 
definition makes the case against reading Johnson’s kick as exclusively “hot,” hostile, and 
                                                            
59 This appeal to costliness is resonant with Johnson’s well-known rebuke of sensibility: “You will find these very 
feeling people are not very ready to do you good. They pay you by feeling” (Boswell I:422). 
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dismissive of Berkeley. On this view, the skeptical performance at the center of Johnson’s 
argument demonstrates Johnson’s willingness to suspend his passionate disbelief and to take up 
the skeptic’s fearless dispassion, to trade hot for cold doubt. Even if Johnson’s argument is 
irreducibly rhetorical and finally dismissive, this cold doubt reveals, if not that Johnson is willing 
to take Berkeley seriously, at least that Johnson knows that doing so is a necessary component 
for any stronger skeptical rebuttal and that performing such seriousness involves willingly taking 
up a cold and potentially costly doubt. 
If we grant a basic integrity to this analysis of Johnson’s kick, Carlyle’s claim that 
Johnson’s hostility should be traced back, ultimately, to his failure to understand skepticism 
hardly seems tenable. Johnson’s kick is a masterful, if also parodic, performance of skepticism. It 
reveals a close attention to skepticism as a particular rhetorical and narrative performance, with 
distinct movements executed with an affect of disinterest and sacrificial resolve, and in which the 
performer’s claim to thoroughgoing doubt must be achieved by some considerable sleight-of-
hand. The argumentative force of Johnson’s kick is bound up in his total control of this 
performance, even at the level of its temporary ambiguities. He is one skeptic schooling another. 
One doubts, for instance, that Johnson’s argument would have been nearly as convincing had he 
unexpectedly struck another rock during his backswing, even as doing so would be ontologically 
equivalent to kicking the stone in front of him. Johnson’s skepticism is not about perception, but 
persuasion.  
In this sense, Johnson’s response reflects a firm control of the field of rhetoric that 
accrues within and around the skeptical performance. In the introduction, we saw Carlyle 
characterize Johnson as a “scholar” rather than a “thinker” in order to dismiss Johnson’s 
intellectual disposition as embarrassingly slavish and unoriginal. But Johnson may very well be a 
scholar of skepticism in a more favorable sense. His responses to skepticism do not seem naïve 
but studied. At the very least, Johnson’s responses mobilize skepticism against itself in a manner 
sophisticated enough to make them more interesting than simple dogmatic reflexes. Indeed, his 
responses seem to target the most vulnerable aspects of epistemological skepticism, where the 
defense of its project is arguably the weakest. “Milking the bull” attacks the rationale behind 
radical skepticism’s willed departure from the action-oriented framework in which practical 
belief naturally occurs for an alternative, theoretical account by definition detached from these 
conditions. “Milking the bull” asks: if this everyday framework operates well enough without 
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this epistemological account – if, as you admit, these theoretical considerations are immaterial – 
isn’t this theoretical account simply excessive? It may be ingenious, but how is it essential or 
insightful in the sphere of practical belief and action?  
Johnson’s kick raises a similar question, but in a more specified form. It singles out the 
Skeptic’s central justification for pursuing “total doubt” — that is, the Skeptic’s account of its 
significance and description of what Skepticism achieves — for more intense scrutiny. In his 
careful, comprehensive survey of modern approaches to skepticism, Michael Williams proposes 
that the question of Skepticism’s significance turns largely on how to interpret what Williams 
calls the “extreme context sensitivity” (xix) and “consequent instability” (10) of the Skeptic’s 
doubt. Drawing on Hume, Williams argues: 
As Hume saw, although sceptical arguments can often strike us as irrefutable, the 
conviction they command is not easily detached from the special context of 
philosophical reflection…Hume brings to light things that any worthwhile 
account of scepticism must come to terms with. Why are sceptical doubts and 
everyday certainties so strikingly context-bound? How can the conclusion of a 
philosophical argument seem to embody an extraordinary and undeniable 
discovery and yet be incapable of commanding stable assent? (xix, 10)  
 
The controversy turns on what to make of this context sensitivity: the way what seems 
irresistible in the Skeptic’s study appears incredible outside it. The question is: what, if any, 
practical value could Skepticism have? This obviously opens up to a more general question of 
the relationship of philosophy to common life.  
For Williams, the strongest argument against the significance of Skepticism comes “from 
the standpoint of common life” (author’s emphasis, 7). From this commonsense perspective, 
Skepticism obviously distorts more than it clarifies. Skepticism is a delusion endemic to the 
philosopher’s Study — a kind of occupational hazard that Reid calls a “metaphysical lunacy” 
(Reid Common Sense 482). For Reid (as well as Hume), such a disease may prevail in the study, 
but it is cured by a return “into society” where “Common Sense recovers her authority” (482-83). 
Pursuing a total detachment from everyday commitments is not only practically impossible. 
Claiming to have achieved such a total detachment is incredible enough to compromise one’s 
basic credibility or claim to reasonableness. From this perspective, Skeptical doubts are more 
unnatural than natural, more excessive than essential.  
From a Skeptical perspective, on the other hand, even as Skepticism is obviously a kind 
of distortion, the irresistibility of its conclusions demonstrates that it is a productive distortion. 
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Radical skepticism justifies its high context sensitivity by arguing that its departure achieves a 
new, revealing perspective on that framework itself: its essential groundlessness and radical 
subjectivity – even as this perspective is not attainable or workable within an action-oriented 
framework. Skepticism gains its privileged perspective into these deep aspects of knowledge by 
successfully detaching itself from the various context-dependent determinants that inform 
everyday belief. In this philosophical view, everyday belief is the true distortion because it is 
conditioned and circumscribed by the practical necessity of action: it operates according to a 
principle of sufficient reason rather than some stronger logic of necessity. For the Skeptic, these 
contextual constraints, however constitutive of everyday reasoning, distract from the purer, more 
exacting considerations made available by Skepticism. As Williams writes, “[E]veryday 
existence masks the potential for a sceptical breakdown of belief because, in common life, our 
attention is gripped by particular objects and narrow interests. By contrast, when we 
philosophize, we forget particulars” (6). Skepticism claims to offer an undistorted, minimal, 
subtractive — not to mention challenging — picture of things. This is finally a difference 
between viewing radical epistemological skepticism as a kind of excess or as a kind of essence. 
The trouble for the Skeptic is that he must square the case for viewing Skepticism as 
more essential than excessive with a baseline commonsense awareness that Skepticism is a form 
of excess: Skepticism is obviously excessive and distorted because it is obviously impracticable 
and theoretical. At a certain point, abandoning your faith in the robust soundness of 
commonsense for the exactness of the critical risks compromising a more basic credibility. Over-
investing in the critical risks a disqualifying and disorienting detachment from commonsense, i.e. 
good sense and proportion. It opens Hume up to the charge of excess and idiosyncrasy, as we 
saw with Johnson’s “milking the bull.” 
But it should be clear that by dismissing these excesses, Johnson is not abandoning 
skepticism: rather, he takes himself to be clarifying it. For the anti-Skeptic, the Skeptic’s study is 
certainly a real place, and anyone can go there with enough will, effort, or rhetorical ingenuity. 
Boswell, for instance, refers to Berkeley’s “sophistry” and even admits that it is “impossible to 
refute.” But Boswell rejects Berkeley’s argument because talk — especially Academicals talk — 
comes cheap. I would suggest that for eighteenth-century anti-Skeptics like Johnson and 
Boswell, the Skeptic’s study is worth the visit because “moral knowledge” of the world is 
unquestionably and irreducibly uncertain in the manner the Skeptic observes, and a proper 
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education requires at least one early, painful, but temporary visit to learn these hard lessons 
about rhetoric and probability so as to inoculate oneself against any enthusiastic, superstitious, 
dogmatic, or intolerant pretenses. However, anxiously worrying over uncertainty for too long 
comes at the cost of good sense and credibility. Lingering too long in the Skeptic’s study is a 
sign of arrested development and speaks to a perverse obstinacy. Claiming to have discovered 
new and better ways of looking at these ancient problems of rhetoric and probability smacks of 
“milking the bull.” And, as Johnson’s kick seems to argue, trying to carry any new radically 
Skeptical insights beyond the Skeptic’s study only gets you a stubbed toe. Putting these Skeptical 
insights into practice results in a different, unexpected kind of pain that will illuminate the utter 
painlessness of dreaming them up. From Johnson’s perspective, skeptical insights are so cheap as 
to make them too costly to entertain. This is arguably why Johnson’s kick must land as a joke 
before an argument. 
 
2.3 Two Senses of Irreligious, Revisited  
Johnson’s kick seems to offer a representative argument against Skepticism as a form of 
“Idiocy” as I have defined it in the introduction. But I would suggest that, by the eighteenth 
century, even Hume’s critics could understand his Skepticism as Heroic and meaningful in a 
qualified sense. At most, they would have been inclined to see Hume as a bad influence on 
others who, for whatever reason, did not have the intellectual wherewithal or fortitude to 
comprehend or encounter his insights appropriately. They would have been inclined to dismiss or 
correct those who saw his valid epistemological insights as a threat, to clarify the fundamentally 
uncontroversial nature of his Skepticism, which generally entailed clarifying its “irreligious” 
character.60 
 As in Chapter One, the two senses of irreligious are helpful because this basic impulse to 
clarify the “uncontroversial” status of Hume’s epistemology would have essentially united two 
                                                            
60Schey’s earlier description that Hume is “customarily figured as a ‘draw shadow’ or ‘threat’” (180) turns out to be 
especially insightful here. Schey distances himself from these negative characterizations of Hume not necessarily 
because he doubts their historical integrity (as I do) but because he intends to recover a more positive aspect on 
Hume’s skepticism as it informs a Romantic “poetics of sufficiency.” In other words, Schey is objecting to the 
distinctly negative cast Hume has received in this neo-Kantian picture: he is clarifying Hume’s positive, therapeutic, 
and corrective contributions to philosophy and to poetry. But this line of objection seems to miss the rhetorical and 
strategic function of radical Hume in the neo-Kantian tradition. Hume’s threat is almost exclusively imposed on 
others, not embraced as one’s own: a neo-Kantian understands and absorbs Hume’s skepticism and thus clarifies its 
uncontroversial status. As such, Schey’s position is arguably much closer to the Romantics who did take Hume 
seriously than any literary history premised on Hume’s threat would suggest. 
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very different approaches to Hume: 1) more hostilely irreligious applications of Humean 
skepticism such as Shelley’s pointedly irreverent Humean “demonstration” in The Necessity of 
A theism and 2) more neutrally irreligious applications such as the commonsense philosopher 
Dugald Stewart’s intermittent attempts to clarify that Hume’s insights pertained only to natural 
philosophic enquiry, not theological or moral inquiry. Shelley obviously doesn’t sense Hume as 
a threat: he’s parading what he sees as Hume’s indisputable and therefore uncontroversial 
description of belief before those he takes to be threatened by Hume. Shelley’s demonstration 
suggests that it is only worth exacerbating Hume’s threat once someone’s resistance to Hume 
appears illegitimate and incorrigible. Shelley is trolling Hume’s critics, and getting kicked out of 
school for it.61 But what licenses this irreverence in the first place is that, from Shelley’s 
perspective, it is therapeutic and therefore not irreverent at all, or only helpfully so: Hume’s 
philosophy is irreligious in a neutral sense before it is irreligious in a hostile sense. From 
Shelley’s Skeptical perspective, it appears to gain this second sense honestly, through 
disenchantment. For Shelley, Hume is simply telling it like it is, without theological or 
metaphysical preoccupations.62 Taylor’s subtraction story is hard at work.63  
 But even a conservative Christian commonsense philosopher like Stewart would not see 
Hume as an intellectual threat because Stewart would have had too assured a picture of where 
Hume’s Skepticism went right and where it went wrong. Stewart, like his mentor Reid, deeply 
respects Hume’s critical penchant. Someone like Stewart simply works to keep an appropriate, 
qualified interpretation of Hume’s Skepticism in focus for others who might try to illegitimately 
import Hume’s phenomenalism into theological or moral territory. Though Stewart’s deep 
religious convictions might have generated his hostility towards Hume, in his philosophy, 
Stewart’s corrections of Hume come from a distinctly empiricist perspective — or even a 
qualified Skeptical perspective. The principal evidence for this claim is that Stewart’s corrections 
are directed at both atheistic and theistic misinterpretations of Hume. Like Kant and Hume, 
                                                            
61 And, as Colin Jager recently suggests, Shelley started to distance himself from this younger irreverence as an 
immature orientation: Shelley finally looks “beyond” atheism to a nobler to perform “a critique not of organized 
religion but of the discourses, especially the radical Enlightenment and the French Revolution, that have made 
organized religion their primary target” (Unquiet Things 19). 
62 Shelley’s reconstruction of Hume’s testimonial argument against miracles as a geometrical demonstration is 
parodic, because Hume’s argument against miracles is more properly a probable or “moral” one. 
63 Wasserman and Abrams would also likely be inclined to Shelley’s position, though, as we have seen, their literary 
histories manage to soften Shelley’s irreverence by injecting a modern sense of irony into the crisis, reframing this 
loss of metaphysical preoccupations as bittersweet. 
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Stewart sees himself as helping rid critical philosophical discourse of its moral, theological, 
psychological and political pretensions. He’s starting with Hume’s: “In consequence of the 
inferences which Mr. Hume has deduced from his doctrine concerning cause and effect, some 
later writers have been led to dispute its truth; not perceiving, that the fallacy of this part of his 
system does not lie in his premises, but in the conclusion which he draws from them” (323). 
Stewart finds Hume’s initial premises about causation not only legitimate and uncontroversial, 
but unoriginal: “[M]any writers before Mr. Hume had remarked, that ‘the object of the physical 
inquirer is not to trace necessary connexions, or to ascertain the efficient causes of phenomena;’ 
and that, till the publication of Mr. Hume’s writing, no person, so far as I know, ever suspected 
this proposition to have a dangerous tendency” (323). Stewart accepts the heuristic, practical, and 
fictional status of efficient causation as unproblematic. Only Hume’s (and others’) attempt to 
draw theological conclusions from these empirical and epistemological premises are 
idiosyncratic and therefore illegitimate. From Stewart’s perspective, natural philosophy only has 
a claim to neutrally irreligious territory, and only as a curb to any unlicensed metaphysical 
speculation. Only atheistic reactionaries would try to carry Hume into more hostile and 
unwarranted irreligious territory. But importantly, on the other side, only theistic reactionaries 
would try to wield Hume’s atheistic conclusions to discredit legitimate applications of his 
premises within natural philosophy.64 
 What finally differentiates Stewart from Shelley is that Stewart does not try to earn a 
hostile sense of irreligious through a neutral one. Rather, Stewart’s natural theological 
perspective allows him to see religion beyond or even through epistemology, precisely because 
of epistemology’s silence on theological or moral considerations. In other words, pace Kant’s 
critique of commonsense, a commonsense philosopher like Stewart obviously subscribes to a 
distinction between epistemological and moral – or philosophical and practical — matters, even 
as he understands this distinction in empiricist rather than idealist terms. The only difference is 
that Stewart’s commitment to empiricism causes him to lean into natural theology — to deploy 
an uncharacteristic enthusiasm around design in his otherwise reserved critical philosophy  — 
                                                            
64 Stewart’s policing of theistic interpretations of Hume is best illustrated in Stewart’s defense of John Leslie’s 
Humean speculations on heat against charges of heresy in A Short Statement of Some Important Facts, Relative to 
the Late Election of a Mathematical Professor in the University of Edinburgh (1805). Stewart finds the hostility of 
Leslie’s adversaries to be indefensible and ultimately political bad faith. Despite his theism, Stewart’s embrace of 
Humean empiricism commits him to a mitigated version of Taylor’s subtraction story. 
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whereas Kant’s firmer foundationalism and idealism makes him more suspect of the reality of 
the phenomenon natural theology observed, and saw the interpretive lens of natural theological 
design to be more “regulative” than “constitutive:” more subjective than objective in character, 
but still no less a constitutive gift from God to Reason.65 In fact, Stewart’s empiricist 
commitments arguably make him more vigilant about interpreting Hume correctly than Kant 
feels he needs to be. Kant’s foundationalism lets him see God’s hand in another, stronger way 
than empirically and probabilistically through natural theology and commonsense. Kant is 
inclined to overestimate his distance from a commonsense philosopher like Stewart by 
downplaying this critical investment of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. Indeed, in 
retrospect and pace Kant, Kant’s foundationalist commitments seem finally to place him on 
much less critical ground than Stewart’s empiricism.66 
 In short, any critically inclined person — even Hume’s Common Sense critics like Reid 
and Stewart — would have been willing and even happy to draw some version of the distinction 
between moral and epistemological justification Kant puts forth in the Prolegomena. Any 
critically inclined person, atheist or theist, would have been happy and even felt compelled to 
embrace some instrumental version of epistemological skepticism. This is not only because of 
the “moral aura” that accrues around “epistemological belief” but because of what Daston 
likewise identifies as the characteristic critical interest in “diagnosis of error” that unites 
intellectual history since the seventeenth-century rise of the new science. In the context of the 
new science, epistemology’s profound scientific and even practical significance and its potent 
corrective potential become increasingly legible and self-evident. Daston argues that, by the 
nineteenth century, “epistemology ceases to be an exclusively philosophical worry” but rather 
“enters the practice of the sciences with the diagnosis of error” (4). Epistemological inquiry does 
not appear threatening but therapeutic if not panacean. It becomes an essential means of 
diagnosing “what kinds of error are most likely and most dangerous to the growth of scientific 
knowledge” and “what precautions must be taken to avoid them” (4). Stewart (as well as Reid) 
would both have had enough of a critical penchant to appreciate the value of Hume’s Skepticism 
                                                            
65 See for instance Stewart’s enthusiastic remarks on arguments from design in Elements II.404-425.  
66From my perspective, Kant’s deeper moral conservatism — on full display in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 
and more readily in the routinely overlooked second section of Kant’s famous essay, “What Is Enlightenment?” 
(1794) — is a major reason he believes Hume never places practical or moral certainty in doubt. Reid and Stewart’s 
more thorough empiricism flattens the moral and the epistemological onto the same a posteriori plane in ways that 
make Hume’s inquiries more precarious. 
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as it corrects and disciplines misguided speculation in natural philosophic practice. Indeed, Reid 
and Stewart mobilize a qualified Humean epistemology to construct the first programmatic 
critique of Anglophone philosophy of mind in an attempt to purge Lockean associationist 
psychology of its materialistic metaphors (discussed at more length in Chapter Four). This is all 
to say that Reid and Stewart’s problem with Hume is not a matter of incomprehension or even a 
lack of appreciation, but some deeper moral objection to what they perceive as Hume’s attempt 
to use epistemology to arbitrate or dismiss moral and theological matters.67 
 
2.4 The Real Crisis: Practical Rationality, Constructive Skepticism, and the Problem of Assent 
 At this point, it should be clear that the neo-Kantian topos of crisis does not offer a 
reliable description of the range of historical responses to Hume. My analysis of Johnson’s kick 
in 2.2 should clarify that it is an especially disingenuous interpretation of Johnson’s anti-
Skeptical hostility. However, the central issue with the neo-Kantian topos is not its implausibility 
as a description of different orientations towards Hume but its inaccuracy as a description of the 
problematic that a long-eighteenth-century thinker would have perceived to be at the heart of 
“epistemology.” Its central distortion may be traced to the mistaken neo-Kantian assumption that 
Enlightenment epistemology would have been preoccupied with the same sort of problematic 
                                                            
67 In A Secular Age, Taylor persuasively demonstrates how, within the subtraction story of secular humanism, these 
two senses of irreligious are easily run together, as they were with William K. Clifford, Herbert Spencer and other 
late Victorian non-believers at the turn of the nineteenth century and as they continue to be for contemporary 
militant atheists like Richard Dawkins (362-65, 539-593). As such, the deceptive potential of this professed 
indifference to religion was not lost on nineteenth-century fideists like Cardinal Newman who remained suspicious 
of how that indifference conveniently managed to devalue and restrict the purview of religious and moral 
perspectives through differentiation. Taylor’s thesis follows Newman’s suspicions and even proves them well-
founded. And I will be similarly suspicious of epistemology’s professed indifference to morals, as it followed from 
epistemology’s professed difference from them. Still, I would suggest that, as a general principle, this neo-Kantian 
perspective only recommends engaging religious or moral perspectives when they appear to have overreached, for 
instance, by discussing epistemological and therefore non-religious things in moral or creedal and therefore non-
epistemological and even dogmatic terms: by dressing up values as facts. As my discussion of Lawrence-Abernethy 
debate in Chapter Four  will show, a neo-Kantian perspective generally recommended policing the distinction 
between final causation as a moral or theological matter and efficient causation as properly epistemological and 
positivistic one. But it also generally recommended tolerating the sovereignty of moral and theological views of 
final causation. It even tolerates moral and theological views that explicitly draw on epistemological facts as primary 
evidence, as most reasonable natural theological arguments from design were taken to do. These evidentiary 
practices simply increase the intellectual stock of epistemology by implicitly reinforcing the sense that epistemology 
stands before and apart from the moral. As such, simply policing this distinction does substantial ideological work 
in the nineteenth-century, especially in light of the rapidly increasing disciplinarity. But the strategy recommends 
ignoring religious and moral perspectives before it does engaging and dispelling them. Indeed, this is still essentially 
the same strategic encouraged today for responding to natural theological arguments from design, which is to say 
not responding at all. 
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that neo-Kantian intellectual history is, or that it would have described this problematic in the 
same terms that neo-Kantian intellectual history cultivates. Here I follow Daston and Galison’s 
observation that “[T]he philosophical vocabulary of mental life prior to Kant is…notably 
different from that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (Objectivity 33) and, therefore, we 
must “read [epistemologists like Bacon and Descartes] in their own terms, rather than tacitly to 
translate, with inevitable distortion, their unfamiliar preoccupations into our familiar ones” (33).  
 Again, I’ll use neo-Kantian Romanticism as my point of entry to this distortion. A mid-
century neo-Kantian Romantic prefers to describe the effects of epistemology in the terms of 
neo-Kantian intellectual history, as a feeling of alienation and disenchantment that results from 
absorbing the hard distinction between fact and value. Wasserman begins his influential “Nature 
Moralized,” for example, with a summary of the traumatic effect of the split of fact and value in 
a “post-Baconian world:”  
When Bacon wrote that poetry subjects the shows of things to the desires of the 
mind, whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things, he 
was assenting to that divorce of head and heart, of object and value, that 
accompanied the approaching end of the Renaissance; the same divorce that the 
Romantics would later struggle to repair by once again wedding outward thing 
and inward meaning…the first task of the Romantic was to attain a world-view 
that again related subject and object; having lost faith in the older synthese, he 
had to take the world of things, which science had shorn of all but objective 
existence, and had to invest it with values through his own understanding of its 
structure and meaning. (“Nature Moralized” 39-40)  
 
On this view, Romanticism emerges as a therapeutic response to the traumatic progression from 
what Charles Taylor calls a “cosmos” to a “universe.” Disenchantment is also essential to 
Abrams’s conception of the Romantic response in Natural Supernaturalism, though Abrams 
relaxes the epistemological focus for a more general account of modern disenchantment:  
The individual…has become radically split in three main aspects. He is divided 
within himself, he is divided from other men, and he is divided from his 
environment; his only hope for recovery (for those writers who hold out hope) is 
to find the way to a reintegration which will restore his unity with himself, his 
community with his fellow men, and his companionability with an alien and 
hostile outer world. (146) 
 
I want to argue that this neo-Kantian split — read loosely off the “divorce between object and 
value” — was hardly firmed up by the Romantic period. As such, this entire neo-Kantian 
problematic amounts to a presentist projection of neo-Kantian intellectual historical 
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preoccupations. This traumatic split may indeed have been available for observation from the 
early nineteenth-century on. It may have even been the cumulative or dominant effect of the 
Enlightenment project of intellectual reform itself. But it is only through neo-Kantian intellectual 
history that this description gains its visibility, definition, and its reality. Simply put, neo-Kantian 
intellectual history only defines and reifies this distinction by continually observing it. However, 
in the long eighteenth century, the problem of uncertainty would have been observed in a much 
different manner, through a much different set of theoretical distinctions. Recovering these older 
distinctions displaced by neo-Kantian intellectual history will help us locate an alternative 
candidate for what Abrams calls Wordsworth and Coleridge’s “cardinal concern” (Natural 
Supernaturalism 145).  
 The distinction repeatedly observed and rehearsed in Enlightenment epistemology is not 
that between “objective fact” and “subjective value” (or the slightly different, more elite Kantian 
distinction of noumena and phenomena). As Daston and Galison observe, in the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century epistemology the terms “objective” and “subjective” were largely inert, 
“invoked only occasionally, as technical terms, by metaphysicians and logicians” (31). Instead, 
the epistemological distinction widely observed is one between two classes of knowledge — 
“demonstrative” and “probable” — and the different types of certainty these types of knowledge 
afford. In this scheme, “demonstrative knowledge” entailed propositions that could be proved by 
a priori logical demonstration and, thus, produced an “absolute” or “demonstrative” certainty that 
not only warranted but necessitated assent. Probable knowledge, on the other hand, comprised all 
knowledge acquired a posteriori or through experience. In The Elements of Philosophy, for 
instance, Samuel Johnson describes moral knowledge or “opinion” as “physical truths which 
related to created Natures” and “all political and historical Truths” (Johnson 75). Moral 
knowledge, unlike demonstrative knowledge, was taken to be incapable of absolute certainty or 
demonstration. For someone like Johnson or Hume, this irreducible uncertainty is understood as 
a natural consequence of the “contingent” nature of probable knowledge. Unlike demonstration, 
probable knowledge is not undergirded by any kind of logical “necessity.” Probable truths could 
always have been otherwise: their “non-existence implies no Absurdity” (75). Therefore, they 
cannot be reasoned about in a purely a priori manner; one must “experience” a probable fact to 
understand it. 
 115 
 Moral knowledge is not only an irreducibly uncertain sort of knowledge; it is inherently 
social sort of knowledge: a matter of both individual and communal evaluation. Attaining 
probable belief was taken to be a matter of ascending a graduated scale of belief ranging from 
absolute doubt or disbelief up to opinion and, finally, to the full confidence of “moral certainty” 
based on varying degrees of moral evidence.68 According to Johnson, for instance, belief in 
probable knowledge remains an interminable calculation of “Doubts and Probabilities” of which 
“there are endlessly various Degrees, according to the various Numbers and Weight of the 
Reasons for or against them” (77). Even subjective estimations of these Degrees of Probabilities 
are taken to be variable: any kind of moral knowledge may “appear more or less probable or 
doubtful to different Persons, according as the Persons have more or less Capacity or 
Opportunity to examine them, and according as they give their Attention more or less to the 
Consideration of them” (77-78). As such, this epistemological scheme does not recognize any 
firm distinction between “fact” and “value.” Physical facts and personal beliefs are 
indistinguishable members of this class of moral knowledge. Before the early nineteenth century, 
there is simply not the kind of “divorce” separating object and value that Wasserman attributes to 
Bacon. 
 The reason that there is no such distinction within probable knowledge is because, in the 
earliest versions of this epistemology, the entire class of probable knowledge looks equally 
problematic and inferior against the more perfect standard of demonstrative knowledge. But, as 
Ian Hacking observes at length in The Emergence of Probability (1975, 2006), this starts to 
change as a result of the perceived achievements of natural philosophy in the seventeenth 
century. The rising currency of the “new science” generates a new interest in the usefulness of 
probable knowledge coupled with an increasing confidence in the reliability of probable 
reasoning. The total effect of this re-estimation is to upend the older Scholastic hierarchy 
between scientia and opinio that preceded the categories of demonstrative and probable 
knowledge, respectively. In that older hierarchy, opinio or probable knowledge was regarded as 
                                                            
68Consider George Campbell’s variation: “In moral reasoning, we ascend from possibility, by an insensible 
graduation, to probability, and thence, in the same manner, to the summit of moral certainty” (66). Bailey’s remarks 
in Essay on the Formation and Publication of Opinions (1821) are also representative: “All the various degrees of 
belief and disbelief, from the fullest conviction to doubt, and from doubt to absolute incredulity, correspond to the 
degree of evidence, or to the nature of the considerations of the present to the mind” (10). Incidentally, the 
terminology used to describe the various degrees of certainty lacks stability. The term presumption, for instance, can 
mean the highest or lowest degree of certainty, depending on the context, as can the term persuasion. But the 
graduated scale itself remains constant.  
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inferior because it lacked the “demonstrative” purity offered by scientia: opinio remained the 
purview of “lower” kind of evidence characteristic of alchemy, geology, astrology, and 
medicine. As Hacking writes, because the high sciences of Scholasticism “still lusted after 
demonstration,” they could “scorn opinio” (Hacking Probability 35). However, in light of a new 
appreciation for its practical value, probable knowledge gradually receives a more favorable 
assessment. And, from a new practical perspective, probable knowledge increasingly starts to 
appear more valuable than scientia, which starts to look inert, disengaged, or overly formal. 
Knowledge itself comes to be regarded as more “active” than “contemplative.” 
 What occurs, then, is a kind of epistemic leveling, which elevates what was once 
regarded as an inferior kind of practical, moral reasoning into a “science” of probability. Locke 
offers a rich portrait of this epistemic leveling in Book IV of the Essay: 
Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather 
lowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to go 
abroad thin clad in such a day, after a fever: she clearly sees the probable 
connation of all these, viz. south-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, 
relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and 
cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which 
proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them: and the 
probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state would be 
quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and 
figure. For it very often confounds the connexion. (Locke Essay 627) 
 
Here the formalism of the Scholastic syllogism is not only extraneous but inhibiting to the 
gentlewoman’s probabilistic calculations: they “clog and hinder the mind” preventing her from 
gathering what she would “easily understand” without them. Perhaps more importantly, the 
gentlewoman’s probabilistic calculations concern distinctly practical and everyday 
considerations (whether or not to go out given the forecast).  
 It is possible to see Locke’s entire epistemological program as motivated by this project 
of epistemic leveling. Consider how Locke pursues a genial, even folksy figure of “agreement” 
to describe the interaction of ideas largely in an effort to combat not only the unnatural, still 
formality of syllogism but, more generally, the false pretenses of “innate ideas.”69 For Locke, the 
                                                            
69Consider also the practical, leveling thrust of this early programmatic passage from Locke’s Essay: “It would be 
sufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falseness of this Supposition [about innate ideas], if I should only 
shew…how Men, barely by the Use of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without 
the help of any innate Impressions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any such Original Notions or Principles” 
(48). 
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syllogism, however lauded as a normative model for right reasoning, has little value as a 
description of mental operations: “But however [syllogism] be in Knowledge, I think I may truly 
say, it is of far less, or no use at all in Probabilities. For the Assent there, being to be determined 
by the preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the Proofs, with all the Circumstances on both 
sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the Mind in that, as Syllogism” (Essay 672). And, with this new 
emphasis on practical knowledge in view, Locke’s program may be situated within a program of 
“practical rationality,” committed to propagating what Daston describes as “more modest 
reasonableness that solved everyday dilemmas on the basis of incomplete knowledge, in contrast 
to the traditional rationality of demonstrative certainty” (Daston Classical Probability xi).  
 If Locke’s philosophy exhibits the new interest and confidence in probable knowledge 
that characterizes “practical rationality,” it also exhibits the edifying and reformative impulse of 
this program of practical rationality, which, as Daston writes, not only “raised the threshold of 
the credible” (Daston “Scientific Error” 3) but changed the very concept of belief. Under the sign 
of practical rationality, knowledge not only became more active than contemplative. Belief 
became increasingly conceptualized as a matter of “voluntary assent” instead of an “involuntary” 
gift from God (3). As such, the problem of assent was given a new moral urgency and, by the 
early eighteenth century, “the insistence that belief be ‘warranted’ became and remains a 
philosophical dogma” (4). “In the whole conduct of the understanding,” writes Locke in his 
educational manual The Conduct of Understanding, “there is nothing of more moment than to 
know when, and where, and how far to give assent, and possibly there is nothing harder” (Locke 
Conduct 74). For Locke, the gap between theory and practice is yawning: “It is very easily said, 
and no body questions it, that giving and withholding our assent, and the degrees of it, should be 
regulated by the evidence which things carry with them; and yet we see men are not the better for 
this rule; some firmly embrace doctrines upon slight grounds, some upon no grounds, and some 
contrary to appearance. Some admit of certainty, and are not to be moved in what they hold: 
others waver in every thing, and there want not those that reject all as uncertain” (74).  
 With this problem of voluntary assent, we are getting closer to the way long-eighteenth-
century thinkers would have approached the problem of uncertainty and conceived of the 
enterprise of epistemology more generally. We can add definition to this picture by considering 
the philosophy of constructive skepticism that would have set the parameters for responding to 
this problem. As Richard H. Popkin, van Leeuwen, and Ferreira have observed, this program of 
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“constructive skepticism” has its origins in the probabilistic epistemologies of the late-
seventeenth century philosophers John Tillotson, John Wilkins, and to some extent, John 
Locke.70 The program is “skeptical” in the sense that it acknowledges the fact of epistemological 
uncertainty and “constructive” in the sense that it rejects that this basic fact should have any 
radical implications regarding our ability to arrive at degrees of “moral certainty” sufficient to 
justify practical action and judgment (Ferreira 2–4). Put another way, while constructive 
skepticism accepts the skeptical premise that we are unable to attain certain knowledge about 
matters of fact, it also accepts that the careful application of skeptical and rational procedures 
constitutes a sufficient response to the problem of uncertainty and, further, a viable method for 
“constructing” actionable, if still uncertain, knowledge about the world. An important aspect of 
the constructive skeptical education was the constant observance of the irreducibly uncertain 
nature of probable knowledge, the impossibility of complete or demonstrative certainty in the 
probable realm. Constructive skepticism worked to condition and internalize two responses 
towards this irreducible uncertainty: first, it recommended “withholding” assent by actively 
cultivating and searching for doubts around a proposition; but, second, it demanded an 
acquiescent posture to sufficient reason.71 Since probable knowledge could never admit of this 
level of demonstrative certainty, the evidentiary standards for proof in probable knowledge had 
to be adjusted to reflect the intuition that one can and must gain sufficient, if incomplete, degrees 
                                                            
70 Van Leeuwen offers the most extensive account of constructive skepticism in The Problem of Certainty in English 
Thought: 1630-90, though van Leeuwen traces the first use of the term to Popkin’s The History of Scepticism from 
Erasmus to Descartes (1961). Popkin describes the positive turn of constructive skepticism in this manner: “This 
skeptical conclusion is turned positive by pointing out that the moral sciences can then have the same sort of 
precision and exactitude as the natural sciences, and the same kind of certainty. All the skeptical questions 
notwithstanding, we are able to know with certainty about the empirical study of nature and of man and society, 
provided we accept that nature and man will act uniformly” (“Eighteenth-Century” 26). 
71 While I’ll be looking primarily at this Anglophone interpretation of constructive skepticism, we can also look to 
German philosophy and find a similar emphasis on the necessary interplay between commonsense and the critical. 
In The Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of Language in a Course of Lectures, Friedrich Schlegel demonstrates 
how doubt could be easily absorbed in the process of attaining knowledge as a “crisis” through which we “respond” 
by arriving at a “determinate judgment of profound certainty and unwavering conviction, or at least to a rigorous 
distinction between that which is certain and that which must forever remain uncertain” (426). Doubt, rightly 
understood, is thus “wholesome co-operative power of knowledge” (527) distinguished from “universal skepticism” 
as a pessimistic stance which forsakes the principle of doubt by “question[ing] the hope and the end of truth itself” 
and “giv[ing] up that inward search after knowledge, of which it is really designed to serve as the organ.” For 
Schlegel, universal skepticism 
...falls into a tone of unconditional decision, which involves an assumption of complete certainty, 
and, consequently, of a perfect, though negative knowledge, totally inconsistent with its true 
character. It thereby undermines its own foundation (527-8). 
Schlegel’s is only one of many proposed rationales for distinguishing and dismissing radical doubt in an effort to 
preserve a more instrumental version of doubt. 
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of certainty to justify practical action. Locke works in both constructive skeptical directions in 
the Essay: on one hand, he insists that “most of the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay 
act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth” (Essay 655). But he 
also insists that “some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about 
them; but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as if they were 
infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain” (655).  
 How does one attain this resolute level of certainty despite the irreducible uncertainty of 
probable knowledge? Locke and others imagined probable knowledge as a matter of ascending a 
graduated scale of belief ranging from absolute doubt or disbelief up to opinion and, finally, to 
the full confidence of “moral certainty” on the basis of degrees of “moral evidence.”72 The 
degree of “moral certainty” at the top of this evidentiary hierarchy was defined negatively: 
morally certain propositions were propositions that would be unreasonable to doubt regardless of 
any theoretical level of uncertainty. As Barbara Shapiro writes, moral certainty was founded on 
the premise that “reasonable men, employing their senses and rational faculties, could derive 
truths that they would have no reason to doubt” (Beyond Reasonable Doubt 7).73 One can be 
“said to have a moral Certainty,” writes Johnson, when a proposition is supported with “all the 
Reasons it is, in the Nature of it, capable of” and there “remains no sufficient Reason to doubt of 
the Truth of it” (Johnson Elements 75). In one sense, this is a matter of voluntary acquiescence: 
Johnson sees the practice as an “honest[] endeavor” to “as much as possible…divest ourselves of 
all sinister views and prejudices in favor of any vulgar Opinions, pre-conceived Schemes, or 
worldly Interests, and guard ourselves against every untoward Appetite or Passion, that may 
darken or bypass our Minds” (90). But there is also an aspiration that this final acquiescence is 
somehow more involuntary than voluntary. It arrives despite any and all voluntary skeptical 
resistance: Johnson concludes, “In all Cases, the Criterion or Test of Evidence and Certainty, is, 
when we have it not in our Power to with-hold our Assent or Acquiescence. This is called 
Science, which Term is however, by some, restrained to those Truth which are necessary and 
immutable” (my emphasis, 77). 
                                                            
72 Bailey’s remarks in Essay on the Formation and Publication of Opinions (1821) are representative: “All the 
various degrees of belief and disbelief, from the fullest conviction to doubt, and from doubt to absolute incredulity, 
correspond to the degree of evidence, or to the nature of the considerations of the present to the mind” (10) 
73 In his recent work, Rob Mitchell has developed a concept of a “variable regulative standard,” not stated positively 
but “read blindly and negatively through the actions of others” (lecture) that applies well to this “reasonable doubt” 
standard. 
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 This strange mix of voluntary procedures and involuntary compulsions illustrate that this 
Enlightenment understanding of assent differs significantly from the contemporary (and 
somewhat technical) philosophical concept of “rational assent,” which designates acquiescence 
to a proposition upon recognizing it is “true and justified.” The eighteenth-century concept is 
much broader, more uncertain in designation.74 Eighteenth-century theories of assent amount to 
quasi-normative accounts of belief. The normative appeal of assent was thought to be grounded 
in natural mental propensities or laws of belief. At least initially, rationality appeared unified and 
co-terminus with normal (i.e. not perverse) everyday intuitions. In the early eighteenth century, 
there was no firm distinction between logic and psychology. Locke effectively develops his 
associationist theory of psychology to confirm his intuition that his normative account of assent 
must also amount to a descriptive account. Daston observes that “this rationality depended 
crucially on the connection between objective (both qualitative and quantitative) evidence and 
subjective belief or ‘assent’ to an opinion. Locke’s initial epistemological treatment of 
probability spelled out how the two should be linked; his later psychology of association 
explained how they must be” (196). On Daston’s view, associationism is Locke’s mechanism to 
“explain why constant experience should produce conviction” (196). Similarly, in his elaboration 
of Locke’s associationist theory, David Hartley contends that the “foundation of assent” is 
embedded in “the fixed immutable laws of our frame” (206).75  
 Up to this point, I have only considered how a new appreciation for probable knowledge 
increasingly upsets the older Scholastic hierarchy between scientia and opinio. But this 
reconfiguration also generates a new hierarchy within probable knowledge, and this new 
hierarchy will be important for understanding the origins of the divorce of fact and value neo-
Kantian intellectual history observes. This internal shift can best be observed in the shifting 
meaning of the word probability itself. In the older Scholastic designation (which survives well 
                                                            
74 The concept of individual assent seems to be developed from a narrower political and monarchical concept of 
“royal assent,” which is to say the king’s seal of approval. I suspect it became attractive as a term to designate 
individual rational assent because of the kind of autocratic authority it implied. But the nature of its translation from 
this political to this philosophical or epistemological sense was not quite complete or clear. For instance, assent still 
contained a hint of arbitrary power which Thomas Jefferson exploits rhetorically in the Declaration of Independence 
by contrasting how the king would not give his “assent” despite the people’s “consent:” consent presumably tracing 
back to a more attractive, democratic, and legitimate kind of communal consensus. This lingering monarchical sense 
is perhaps why it fell out of favor in commonsense political and moral discourse. 
75 Although Hartley’s concept of assent is notably and strangely contentless: “whatever be meant by [the] phrase” of 
“obligation to assent” merely signals the “close association of the ideas suggested by the proposition, with the idea, 
or internal feeling, belonging to the word truth” (206). 
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into the eighteenth century), the term probability would have referred almost exclusively to a 
kind of reliable human testimony. As Hacking notes, remarking on the “probability” of a 
proposition would have been more evaluative than descriptive. It would have registered the 
“approvability of an opinion” (Hacking Probability 23), the extent to which a proposition had 
been vouchsafed by a trustworthy or “probable” authority. This older signification remains 
available through the eighteenth century, but it is increasingly displaced by a new, aleatory 
concept of probability. In Locke’s gentlewoman passage, for instance, Locke’s use of probability 
notably departs from this older Scholastic signification. Locke is talking about observing the 
“probable connexion” of the natural events themselves: he refers to “the probability [the country 
gentlewoman] perceives in things” directly, what Hacking calls probability as “internal 
evidence” — the signs given by the probable connection of the “circumstances” themselves — 
rather than probability as testimony or “external evidence.”  
 Under the Scholastic system, the appeal to a more authoritative opinion would have 
represented the best response to believing in an uncertain world.76 But under the new intellectual 
order, probability was best observed firsthand. “Internal evidence” is increasingly privileged 
over “external evidence.” The Royal Society’s motto, nullius in verba, captures this new 
intellectual imperative towards direct, unmediated observation. As Alexander Welsh observes, 
this new order privileges the “strong representations” of internal evidence because of the way 
such “direct” testimony of the senses appears to eschew the problematic aspects of human 
testimony, which comes with the obvious threat of misperception and manipulation (Welsh 8). As 
Welsh notes, the elevation of “internal evidence” — or, alternatively, “presumptive proof” and 
“circumstantial evidence” — is an increasing conviction that the “circumstances cannot lie” in 
ways that humans obviously can.  
 What makes Locke’s country gentlewoman passage especially rich — and relevant for 
my purposes — is that it nicely (if inadvertently) demonstrates how this emerging distinction 
between “internal” and “external” evidence never quite escapes the older concept of testimony. 
Locke certainly subscribes to direct and unimpeded observation of probable circumstances as the 
best manner of judging probable belief. To what method, Locke asks in the educational primer, 
                                                            
76 As Jager notes, following Taylor, belief under this Scholastic system would have “presuppos[ed] a relationship 
and a certain posture or orientation — commitment, cherishing — toward that relationship, something partly 
captured in the Latin credo, also often translated as ‘believe.’ Consequently, to lose one’s belief was a moral and 
emotional failing more than an epistemological one” (33-34) 
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Conduct of the Understanding, can “a novice, an enquirer, a stranger” finally appeal to determine 
whether to grant or withhold his belief?: “I answer, use his eyes. There is a correspondence of 
things, and agreement and disagreement in ideas, discernible in very different degrees, and there 
are eyes in men to see them if they please” (74). Yet, in the country gentlewoman passage above, 
the country gentlewoman is still being told the relevant details. Her sense of the probable 
connections is mediated by this telling. In this way, the new ideal of an “internal evidence” is 
largely aspirational and, ultimately, mystifying. As John Bender and David Wellbery have 
observed, Enlightenment thinkers attempt to “contravene[]” the older rhetorical model of 
testimony by developing a “mode of discourse conceived as neutral, non-positional, and 
transparent” (Bender and Wellbery 7) and defined by a stylistic commitment to perspicacity. 
Jules David Law likewise observes that this rhetoric of empiricism “constant[ly] analogi[zes]” 
between the “optical sensations and verbal language in terms of one another” (23). There seems 
to be a clear line from this rhetoric to the emergence of the “modern fact” that Mary Poovey 
surveys as “the story of how description came to seem separate from interpretation or theoretical 
analysis” and how one kind of “epistemological unit” “came to seem immune from theory or 
interpretation” (Poovey Modern Fact xii). 
 It seems accurate to regard this gradual elevation of a privileged kind of probable “fact” 
as a prehistory to the fact-value split that neo-Kantian intellectual history observes. This 
continuity, I would argue, is what has ensured the neo-Kantian account to be a tolerable enough 
approximation to retain. However, the trouble with the neo-Kantian narrative — especially as it 
plays out in neo-Kantian Romanticism — is that it must necessarily embrace this kind of 
mystification and posit the successful break of fact and value in order to pursue Romanticism’s 
therapeutic response. As we have seen, neo-Kantian Romanticism posits the success of this break 
less on the basis of its descriptive accuracy (though its misreading a la Bloom is not necessarily 
inaccurate so much as distorted, partial) than on the basis of its reformative and generative (read: 
secularizing, modernizing) potential. Yet, if we can entertain Latour’s constant refrain that “we 
have never been modern” and appreciate how incomplete and tenuous these distinctions between 
fact and value were (and always have been), we can appreciate the ways in which Romantic 
literature might work against rather than within them. Rather than reading Romantic literature as 
taking “the world of things, which science had shorn of all but objective existence” and 
reinvesting it with “values through…[an] understanding of its structure and meaning” (“Nature 
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Moralized” 39-40), I want to read Romantic literature as it questions whether the world of things 
— that is, of appearances and circumstances — were ever thoroughly shorn of acts of valuation, 
perception, and interpretation in the manner that the fact-value dogma implies. 
 
2.5 Moral Evidence as the “Province of Rhetoric”  
 As I suggested in my introduction, one way to resist the pull of these neo-Kantian 
distinctions is to recover and examine their rhetorical aspect. The same procedure can be 
performed on the distinctions offered by Enlightenment epistemology. Consider Locke’s claim 
that we assent to some probable propositions “as if they were infallibly demonstrated.” The claim 
should appear almost self-defeating given that Locke’s larger goal is ostensibly to assert the 
difference between moral and demonstrative certainty. And it certainly indicates that, however 
much estimations of probable knowledge were changing, demonstrative knowledge never quite 
lost its intellectual cachet. As we will see, this is especially true of Euclidean geometry in 
England, which was the first “queen of the sciences” before (and even after) the nineteenth-
century embrace of Kantian epistemology. But Locke’s “as if” illustrates the fundamental 
instability and indeterminacy surrounding the distinction between probable and demonstrative 
knowledge in the period: that is to say, the essentially hermeneutic and empty quality of the 
distinction, and the rhetorical play that occurred at the line of demonstrative and moral 
knowledge. The sense is that no one knew quite what to do with the distinction beyond the 
routine that constructive skepticism recommended: that is, asserting the irreducible uncertainty 
of moral knowledge as well as the necessity to act despite this. While, in epistemological 
treatises, intuitions about the sufficiency of moral certainty were developed with reference to 
widely-observed and fairly uncontroversial natural regularities (e.g., the rising and setting of the 
sun or the ebb and flow of the tides) or to widely attested historical or geographical facts (e.g., 
that there was a historical figure named Julius Caesar or that a city called Rome existed), many 
had little reservations about applying the label of moral certainty to less regular, more 
controversial facts and wielding this constructive skeptical routine in less than forthright ways.  
 This is all to say that appeals to any kind of certainty, moral or demonstrative, could seem 
suspiciously rhetorical. Although the promise of the uncontroversial nature of “internal 
evidence” as a species of probable knowledge led many to minimize or efface the presence of 
rhetoric and controversy, an increasing appreciation for the possibility of psychological error 
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(figured by memory) led others to emphasize the probable and therefore rhetorical and 
controversial character of all knowledge. The new currency of probable knowledge led many to 
question whether demonstrative knowledge ever deserved privileged status. Since all 
demonstrative knowledge had to be communicated as probable knowledge, it seemed distinctly 
possible that moral certainty was the highest standard we could ever gain, and that the previous 
esteem for demonstrative knowledge was not only misplaced but misguided since it did not 
properly factor in how all knowledge much be experienced as probability before one could 
clarify any further epistemic distinctions.77  
 Scottish New Rhetoric, for instance, can be viewed along both axes. In one sense, New 
Rhetoric unapologetically elevates and promotes the stylistics of perspicuity that define the 
unmarked rhetoric of empiricism that Law, Bender, and Wellbery observe. The New Rhetoric 
was, in this respect, most markedly a turn away from the older vertical, hierarchical relations that 
dictated the formality of classical rhetoric towards a new horizontal relation of what Bender and 
Wellbery call “rhetoricality.” As James Engell nicely summarizes, New Rhetoric “subordinates 
[the] formal division, long lists of terms, and rote strategies” promoted by classical rhetoric “in 
favor of a robust psychological approach, natural style, and a firm linguistic and 
grammatological foundation” (218).78 But the New Rhetoric’s distinct emphasis on psychology 
(as clarified by the newly privileged discourse of epistemology) also motivated a strong 
psychological realism in addition to its fairly uncritical embrace of a grounding concept of 
experience. In his influential The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776), for instance, George Campbell 
attacks the “pride of mathesis” by noting that “the possibility of error attends the most complete 
demonstration” (158) and that “no demonstration whatever can produce, or reasonably ought to 
produce, a higher degree of certainty than that which results from the vivid representations of 
                                                            
77In Observations on Man (1749), David Hartley pursues an extensive case for the “value of dependent and 
independent or concurrent evidence, and the probability of general conclusions formed by induction and analogy” 
(209). Hartley makes this case by showing that this kind of probable reasoning undergirds many more fields than 
one might expect. For Hartley (himself a mathematician), the recursive procedures involved in Newton’s differential 
method (say, of working from set points to discover the curve which organize them) looks a lot like reasoning from 
induction and analogy. For Hartley, the “parallel” is “pertinent and instructive” since it indicates that even a 
“mathematical conclusion” formed “in a way that is strictly just” and with “the greatest possible probability in its 
favour” is “however, liable to the same uncertainties, both in kind and degree, as the general maxims of natural 
philosophy drawn from natural history, experiments, &c” (214). 
78Adam Smith inaugurates and epitomizes this turn from classical rhetoric with his often quoted comment that 
ancient and modern systems of rhetoric devoted to these kind of distinctions amount to “a very silly set of books and 
not at all instructive” (Smith Lectures 26). 
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memory, on which the other is obliged to lean” (158). For Campbell, this observation clarifies 
the “natural subordination” of demonstrative knowledge to the probable. With “reasonably ought 
to produce,” Campbell is appealing to a stricter kind of error reduction than any naive faith in 
demonstration would recommend, one that is more attuned to the irreducible error and 
uncertainty which threatens even the communication of demonstrative knowledge.  
 Campbell forwards this case against demonstration as a part of his larger case for the 
indispensable value of a rhetorical education in light of these imperfect epistemological 
conditions. Campbell asserts that “moral evidence” or “all decisions concerning fact, and things 
without us” remains the “province of rhetoric” (65).  The rule of Demonstration may be 
“despotic,” but its sphere is “narrow” (68). Demonstration’s “rival,” rhetoric, “hath less power, 
but wider empire…the whole world is comprised in her dominions” (68). Campbell is offering a 
philosophy of rhetoric: a rhetoric written through and for philosophy, in light of the conditions of 
knowledge that epistemology discovers.79 The most important aspect of these conditions is the 
irreducible uncertainty of probable knowledge. For Campbell, if memory’s fallibility undercuts 
demonstrative knowledge, it is even more consequential in moral reasoning: there is “implicit 
faith in the clear representations of that faculty” without which “we could not advance a step in 
the acquisition of experimental knowledge” (80). This for Campbell reflects “an irremediable 
imbecility in the very foundation of moral reasoning” (80). More importantly, Campbell looks to 
stress the irreducibly rhetorical, controversial, and even oppositional nature of all probable 
knowledge. If there is a “manifest contradiction” in demonstrative knowledge, we can expect 
that one side “must be fallacious and sophistical” (67). But, with “moral evidence,” barring a 
“few singular instances” (i.e. direct evidence of experience), “there is always real, not apparent 
evidence on both sides” of any question: there are “contrary experiences, contrary presumptions, 
contrary testimonies, to balance against one another” (67). For this reason, Campbell notes, we 
                                                            
79 Framed in this manner, it seems possible to use New Rhetoric to correct the traditional narrative of the “death of 
rhetoric” put forth, for instance, by Paul Riceour in The Rule of Metaphor (1975). Riceour’s history draws a strong 
contrast between Aristotelian rhetoric and its transformation within Western rhetorical education. From Riceour’s 
perspective, that Western tradition “sever[s]” rhetoric from “philosophy” which robs rhetoric of its motivating 
problematic and turns it into a process of taxonomizing “figures of speech” (10). For Riceour, Aristotle's rhetoric 
was “far more embracing,” “solidly bound to philosophy by the theory of argumentation” and committed 
“harness[ing] [rhetoric’s] dangerous power by means of a special technique” 10). New Rhetoric would constitute an 
important break in this long historical trend of rhetoric as taxonomy, one that reactivates the line between 
philosophy and rhetoric. 
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must assess probability based on “the proportion which the evidence on the side that 
preponderates bears to its opposite” (67). 
 From my perspective, what Campbell’s New Rhetoric clarifies is that probable 
knowledge — as an uncertain, social knowledge — can be conceived in distinctly rhetorical 
terms in the Enlightenment: terms that I believe have been lost with the rise of both Kantian 
epistemology and a viable notion of objectivity. This is true even for the class of “experience” 
that Campbell elevates as beyond this kind of controversy. Consider the example Campbell 
offers by way of illustrating the thrust of such morally certain facts: 
Many cases might be supposed of belief, founded only on moral evidence, which it would 
be impossible to shake. A man of known probity and good sense, and (if you think it 
makes an addition of any moment in this case) an astronomer and philosopher, bids you 
look at the sun as it goes down, and tells you, with a serious countenance, that the sun 
which sets to-day will never rise again upon the earth. What would be the effect of this 
declaration? Would it create in you any doubts? I believe it might, as to the soundness of 
the man’s intellect, but not as to the truth of what he said. Thus, if we regard only the 
effect, demonstration itself doth not always produce such immovable certainty as is 
sometimes consequent on merely moral evidence. (82). 
 
In this example, it is social exchange — the “telling” — that is foregrounded, even more so than 
in Locke’s gentlewoman passage. Here Campbell seems to be attacking a certain kind of 
seriousness and formality: “expert declaration” of the astronomer and philosopher stands in for a 
kind of excessive speculation concerning the contingency and irreducible uncertainty of the sun’s 
rising and setting. Incidentally, for Campbell, the logic goes the other way: moral certainty 
seems to account, in part, for the stability of certain kinds of demonstrative knowledge: 
And if there are, on the other hand, some well-known demonstrations, of so great 
authority that it would equally look like lunacy to impugn, it may deserve the 
attention of the curious to inquire how far, with respect to the bulk of mankind, these 
circumstances, their having stood the test of ages, their having obtained the universal 
suffrage of those who are qualified to examine them, things purely of the nature of 
moral evidence, have contributed to that unshaken faith which they are received. (82-
3). 
 
 In this scenario, Campbell not only speaks to the persistence of the older sense of probability — 
the “universal suffrage of those who are qualified to examine them” (82) — as it emerges as 
 127 
“expert” opinion. He also identifies demonstration and the expertise which identifies and attests 
to demonstration as “purely of the nature of moral evidence” (82).80 
 With these passages in view, it should be clear that, even as Campbell’s New Rhetoric 
subscribes to the rhetoric of empiricism, his distinctly social account of moral evidence notably 
cuts against that rhetoric’s tendency to obscure what Shapin has famously called the “social 
history of truth” and what Paul Wood glosses as “the fact that much of what we count as 
knowledge about people and things comes to us secondhand, through reports, testimonies, and 
writings of others” (Wood 355). In this second account especially, Campbell also seems to 
observe (and to bring to the “attention of the curious”) what Shapin calls the “massive mismatch 
between dominant characterizations of the sources of our factual knowledge and the ways we 
actually secure it” (Shapin Social History xxv). As Shapin shows, the discourse of epistemology 
generates this kind of distortion well before it was exacerbated by neo-Kantian intellectual 
history in the way Rorty and Latour observe. 
 I will explore Hume’s similar investments in this social account of “moral evidence” as it 
grounds a definition of moral reasonableness in the next chapter. And, indeed, Campbell’s 
speculations seems to be inspired, largely, by Hume’s revisionary account of moral evidence in 
The Treatise. But, to end this survey, I want to return to the constructive skeptical procedure for 
sifting through moral evidence in search of moral certainty and present this as a non-Kantian 
candidate for Wordsworth and Coleridge’s “cardinal” philosophical (or epistemological) 
concern. 
 
2.6 Johnson’s Science 
 Over the last three sections, I have pursued a rough sketch of the broader program of 
practical rationality that informed long-eighteenth century epistemology. I have offered this 
sketch in an attempt to recover the original terms of that program since displaced by those of the 
familiar neo-Kantian epistemology. Now we are in a position to ask: what bearing, if any, might 
                                                            
80With his appeal to the primacy of moral evidence, Campbell anticipates Cardinal John Newman’s later 
observations about the primacy of other forms of authority as they structure belief: “Supposing a boy cannot make 
his answer to some arithmetical or algebraical question tally with the book, need he at once distrust the book? Does 
his trust in it fall down a certain number of degrees, according to the force of his difficulty? On the contrary, he 
keeps to the principle, implicit but present in his mind…that the book is more likely to be right than he is; and this 
mere preponderance of probability is sufficient to make him faithful to his belief in its correctness, till its correctness 
is actually proved” (Newman Grammar of Assent 170-71). 
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this epistemological program of practical rationality — addressed to the problem “moral 
certainty” — have had on Romantic literary authors?  
 To propose an answer, I’d like to return to Johnson’s description of constructive skeptical 
procedures as a kind of “Science.” Again, Johnson writes, “In all Cases, the Criterion or Test of 
Evidence and Certainty, is, when we have it not in our Power to with-hold our Assent or 
Acquiescence. This is called Science, which Term is however, by some, restrained to those Truth 
which are necessary and immutable” (77). How should we interpret Johnson’s use of science? 
First, it should be evident that Johnson is offering this definition explicitly against the older 
Scholastic concept of scientia. That Scholastic sense still obviously has currency, but it seems 
secondary: Johnson, ever the Scholar, is trying to be comprehensive. Johnson’s acceptance of 
this new designation as primary suggests that he has experienced the epistemic leveling ushered 
in by practical rationality — so much so that he is willing to forward a definition of knowledge 
in constructive skeptical terms. Though the antecedent of this is ambiguous, Johnson seems to 
intend science to denote the dynamic constructive skeptical procedure (“criterion” or “test”) 
more than the knowledge than results from it: process over product, form over content. Johnson 
forwards this constructive skeptical definition even as Johnson elsewhere in this account of 
“assent” grants demonstrative certainty a clear superiority to moral certainty.81  
 Johnson’s science is surely closer to our contemporary understanding of science than it is 
to scientia, but I want to suggest that it is more unfamiliar than familiar, and even quite specific 
to the eighteenth-century theory of assent. If its “moral” or uncertain character clearly separates 
it from scientia, its generalized character seems to distinguish it from any technical, specialized, 
or disciplinary account of science. Hoyt Trowbidge’s observation several decades ago that, when 
discussing “opinion” (in the technical sense), Johnson can often “assume[] — as a writer today 
surely could not assume — that his readers are familiar with the technical or semi-technical 
vocabulary of logic” (1) seems pertinent, as does Trowbridge’s conjecture from this fact that “a 
branch of logic, particularly concerned with the kind of empirical reasoning which gropes toward 
truth, sometimes attaining a fair approximation to it but never full intellectual clarity and 
certainty must have been quite well known to the educated reading public of Johnson’s day” 
                                                            
81Johnson, like Locke, is more inclined to resolve moral certainty into a kind of apodictic “intuition” that looks a lot 
like demonstration (Johnson calls this “the free arbitrary Will of the Deity, and Matters of meer Intuition” (75)). 
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(Trowbridge 1). This sense of science, then, is more semi-technical than technical, more general 
than specialized, though historically-specific.82 
 In the past two decades, there have been numerous excellent studies of the interrelation of 
scientific and literary practice in the Romantic period. But these studies have often pertained to 
technical scientific concepts emerging out of specific disciplines: most recently (and perennially 
for that matter), the life sciences.83 Here I want to use Johnson’s science to think about how 
Romantic authors would have absorbed or responded to eighteenth-century epistemology. I 
believe it is the generalized character of this definition that especially recommends it as a context 
for Romantic authors. Simply put, this would have been the most widely available, non-
specialized treatment of epistemology: one that would have been widely rehearsed, and readily 
accessible both to adopt and critique.  
 Johnson’s science seems very close, for instance, to the science Coleridge invokes in his 
psychological criticism of Hamlet. For Coleridge, Shakespeare’s construction of Hamlet 
demonstrates his “deep and accurate science in mental philosophy” (my emphasis, 136). 
Explaining this claim, Coleridge proposes that one of Shakespeare’s common procedures is to 
inhabit some intellectual faculty and distort it so as to bring its operation into focus. For 
Coleridge, Shakespeare’s “mode” of creation is experimental: Shakespeare “conceive[s] any one 
intellectual or moral faculty in morbid excess” (136) and then “place[s] himself...mutilated or 
diseased, under given circumstances” (136). With Hamlet, Coleridge continues, Shakespeare 
seems to “have wished to exemplify the moral necessity of a due balance between our attention 
to the objects of our sense, and our meditations on the workings of our minds” (my emphasis, 
                                                            
82 The OED offers this specialized definition (5b) dated to the late eighteenth century: “The intellectual and practical 
activity encompassing those branches of study related to the phenomena of the physical universe and their laws, 
sometimes with the implied exclusion of pure mathematics.” ("science, n." OED Online, Oxford University Press, 
June 2017, www.oed.com/view/Entry/172672. Accessed 14 September 2017.) 
83For a recent treatment of Romantic literary engagements with materialism, see Amanda Jo Goldstein, Sweet 
Science: Romantic Materialism and the New Logics of Life. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2017; with concepts of 
auto- and epi-genesis, Denise Gigante, Life: Organic Form and Romanticism; with science of mind, Alan 
Richardson, The Neural Sublime: Cognitive Theories and Romantic Texts. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2010; with geology, Noah Heringman, Romantic Rocks, Aesthetic Geology. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004. See also Richard Sha, Perverse Romanticism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008; Rob Mitchell, Experimental Life: Vitalism in Romantic Science & Literature. In a recent essay on “model 
systems” in literary criticism, Mary Poovey provocatively suggests that “the trope of the organic whole continues to 
organize most of the strains of criticism that now dominate U.S. practice…[and] simultaneously makes 
contemporary criticism resemble a romantic lyric and converts its analytic objects into lyriclike organic wholes” 
("Model System" 432) — although in her forthcoming “Ideas of Order: A Field Report,” Marjorie Levinson has 
notably raised questions about the accuracy of Poovey’s account and, more particularly, its application and 
relevance to contemporary — as opposed to bygone — literary critical practices. 
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137). For Coleridge, Hamlet’s example is a negative one. Hamlet’s inaction demonstrates how an 
“overbalance” in the “contemplative faculty” causes an individual to become “the creature of 
mere meditation” and to “lose his natural power of action” (137). Hamlet’s “almost enormous 
intellectual activity” breeds a “proportionate aversion to real action” (137) and results in 
Hamlet’s inability to respond to “circumstances, under which it is obliged to act on the spur of 
the moment” (137). Coleridge’s mental philosophy is distinctly action-oriented. It is centered on 
illustrating principles of “moral necessity” and the “obligation to action.” Both would have been 
constructive skeptical imperatives.84  
 William Wordsworth disowns a similar kind of paralysis caused by the “morbid excess” 
of the intellect in the final books of the Prelude. Under a new oppressive desire for certainty and 
justification, Wordsworth subjects all “passions notions, shapes of faith” to trial and 
“suspiciously/Calling the mind to establish in plain day/Her titles and her honours” (X.890-1) 
and “demanding proof/And seeking it in everything” (X.896-7). As a result of this Skeptical 
critical violence — which ostensibly discovers the lack of a clear “ground/Of moral obligation” 
(X.894-5) — he “yielded up moral questions in despair” (X.900) and “turned towards 
mathematics, and their clear/And solid evidence” (X.903-4). What Wordsworth narrates is a way 
out of these “speculations” and “reasonings/False from the beginning” (X.883-84), “misguiding 
and misguided” (X.888).  
 In his reading of this moment in the Prelude, Abrams suggests that Wordsworth “makes a 
desperate attempt to reestablish on abstract premises and by logical analysis and reasoning, what 
had originally been his spontaneous confidence in life and his hope for man” (Natural 
Supernaturalism 108). Instead, Abrams writes, “the attempt leads only to utter perplexity about 
‘right and wrong, the ground/Of moral obligation,’ until [Wordsworth] breaks down completely” 
(108). But I want to suggest we can read this differently with the tradition of constructive 
skepticism in view. Wordsworth appears to draw on a constructive skeptical developmental 
narrative here which represents this demand for pure or absolute certainty as something which 
every maturing intellect must encounter and overcome. Consider, for instance, how James 
Gambier narrates this transition in his popular textbook on moral evidence, Introduction to the 
Study of Moral Evidence (1806). Gambier considers how a matter of fact can be assumed to 
“rise so high as to exclude all reasonable doubt” while “fall[ing] short of absolute certainty” (5). 
                                                            
84Remark about Francois’ Open Secrets?  
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While he concedes that “we are often apt to expect stronger evidence, than the nature of the thing 
[i.e. probable knowledge] admits; and, thence, to feel dissatisfied, though the point be fairly 
proved,” he urges that we should nonetheless “accustom ourselves to yield our assent” if “such 
evidence be produced in a sufficient degree to counterbalance all that can be fairly urged against 
it” (Gambier 93). Gambier continues: 
. . . [I]f in studying the evidence on any question of fact, we employ ourselves in 
examining whether there be not a possibility that it may be false, instead of 
considering whether there be not a sufficient probability that it is true, we shall 
certainly raise strong doubts in our minds. But, then, we should not study the 
subject rationally. Demonstration is the only species of reasoning, which, if even 
conducted correctly, can exclude the possibility of error. But facts do not admit of 
demonstration. They admit of moral evidence alone. The examining, therefore, 
into the possibility of error is inconsistent with the nature of the subject, and an 
absurd practice. (93–94) 
 
I want to say that Gambier is rehearsing a fairly standard constructive skeptical developmental 
narrative. The drama of this narrative turns on the proper absorption of the irreducibly uncertain 
nature of moral evidence. Gambier’s assertion regarding the “irrationality,” “inconsistency,” and 
“absurdity” of fixating on the “possibility of error” with respect to moral evidence was a 
common refrain within eighteenth-century epistemology. The desire to attain degrees of certainty 
thought to exceed “reasonable doubt” was generally treated in this manner as an intellectual 
error, a refusal to accept the basic epistemic conditions governing the evaluation of matters of 
fact—what Gambier refers to as the “nature of the thing.” Importantly, Gambier takes the high-
level of certainty promised by demonstration to be part of the problem. It threatens to encourage 
a kind of pathological obsession for certainty that, thwarted by the uncertainty of worldly affairs, 
is seen to collapse in skepticism. For Gambier, a “mind that has been accustomed to yield its 
assent to demonstration only generally finds great difficulty in being satisfied with a lower 
species of evidence.” It is from this epistemological letdown that “arises that tendency to 
scepticism, which has been imputed to the study of mathematics" (Gambier vi-vii).  
Returning to the Prelude with the constructive skeptical developmental narrative in view, 
I would be inclined to say that it is Wordsworth’s first encounter with rationality which dislodges 
him from this spontaneous confidence in the world. Wordsworth is trying to leaven this severe 
and unworkable rationality with a new moral confidence to generate a practical rationality. 
Indeed, even as Wordsworth aims to rework its narrow conception of rationality and mend the 
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violence it has committed on his perception of moral truth, Wordsworth finally prefers this new 
critical consciousness. Wordsworth’s turn to mathematics is not a failed attempt at therapy; it is 
form of evasion. This is what makes it morally reprehensible enough to warrant the severe 
critique Wordsworth brings to it.  
 These two examples are evidence that Wordsworth and Coleridge’s understanding of 
epistemology is largely trained in the constructive skeptical project of practical rationality. 
Recognizing these constructive skeptical investments opens up a way of seeing Romantic authors 
working within the Enlightenment rationality rather than outside it.85 This might sound somewhat 
questionable since the British Romantic poets are traditionally seen as programmatically (and 
generatively) rejecting the narrow critical dictates of Enlightenment rationality. In Mirror and the 
Lamp (1953), for instance, Abrams argues that “romantic poets faced…the charge that, by the 
all-comprehensive criterion of science, the passions are deceptive and the products of 
imagination illusory, hence that poetry is false not only in its parts, but in its entirety” (Abrams 
Mirror 297). The demand for a “literal and mathematically plain discourse in science and 
sermons” (286) led “poets and critics to re-examine and to redefine the permissible limits of 
metaphor in the language of a poem” (286) and finally to employ “symbolism, animism, and 
mythopoeia” with “an inventive freedom, vitality, and puissance unprecedented in literature” 
(295). In Poetic Madness (1996), Frederick Burwick builds upon this foundational narrative to 
argue that the Romantics understood the necessity of “establishing [Art’s] claims to intellectual 
integrity” on critical — even explicitly philosophical, epistemological, or skeptical — grounds. 
The philosophical discourse of aesthetics threatened to “relegate[]” Art to “the so-called ‘lower 
faculties’” (Burwick 144) as irrational and therefore in some regard compromised, disqualified 
as a viable site of knowledge. For Burwick, this generates a paradox: poetry must establish its 
legitimacy as a form of reasonableness even as, for Burwick, the “truth of art...is an unreasonable 
truth” and “[a]rt, by its very nature, opposes the rational judgment of orthodoxy” (145).  
 In his account, Burwick sees Romantic poetry as overcoming this paradox by rejecting 
any claim to rationality and embracing its unreasonableness. As this canonical literary history has 
                                                            
85 In this regard, I would want to translate Elizabeth Millan-Zaibert’s recent claim that Early-German-Romanticism” 
was committed to a “rational anti-foundationalism” that worked to continue an Enlightenment project of rationality 
more than it depart from it. That anti-foundationalism constituted “an attempt to capture the inherent incompleteness 
of philosophy and knowledge” which would put “philosophy…in contact with aesthetic experience and poetry" 
(154-55). See Millan-Zaibert, "Romantic Rationality" Pli 10 (2000):141-155. 
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it, then, Romanticism relinquishes any claim to mimetic representation of the world to pursue, 
first, subjective expressionism and, eventually, an autonomous and unfettered logic, art for art’s 
sake: art pursues what Wasserman calls “subtler language” and what Charles Taylor, recently 
resuscitating Wasserman, associates with a kind of implicit, non-creedal, post-Durkheimian 
discourse.86 This freeing of art is generally — and understandably — celebrated. But given the 
Romantics’ evident embrace of critique (for the second generation, explicitly as embodied by 
Hume), and the wider cultural hegemony epistemology had achieved by the Romantic period 
(especially following the reception of Kant’s Copernican response to Hume), stressing 
Romanticism’s generative departure from rationality strikes me as somewhat disingenuous, 
especially if one wants to claim that the “threat” of Hume’s epistemological skepticism somehow 
effects the Romantics’ transformative turn by finally breaking a hobbling metaphysics (which, on 
Wasserman’s account, the reigning aesthetic and intellectual orders of the eighteenth century 
were simply trying to prop up).87 
 Rather than framing Romanticism as a willing and empowering departure from 
Enlightenment rationality, it seems more accurate to say that poetry was being systematically 
diminished under the sign of epistemology and increasingly perceived as radically subjective and 
even primitive, thus increasingly undesirable and dispensable in the modern era. In this regard, 
the poet and essayist Thomas Alfred Peacock’s Four Ages of Poetry (1820), while certainly more 
comic than serious, paints a more honest picture of the sad fate of poetry under epistemology 
(not to mention sobering and prophetic in its own right): the speculative procedures of Peacock’s 
                                                            
86 See Taylor, A Secular Age, 353-363. Taylor glosses Wasserman’s thesis this way: “Earl Wasserman has shown 
how the decline of the old order with its established background of meanings made necessary the development of 
new poetic languages in the Romantic period” (353). 
87 Again, it’s worth correcting the neo-Kantian account of the Romantic uptake of Hume. Although Wordsworth and 
Coleridge would have shared this critical ethos with Hume, it is unlikely that either Coleridge or Wordsworth would 
have absorbed this critical ethos from Hume. It was cultivated in a much wider project of intellectual reform which 
began in mid-seventeenth century and which Hume was only a later, if also influential, contributor. I would argue it 
is really only in the second generation Romantics that one can detect any real absorption of Hume at the level of 
style or substance. But, again, like Carlyle, Shelley and Byron would have seen Hume’s Skepticism as a boon, not a 
threat: a further corrective to both a constricting moralism and overbearing rationality. This is arguably why the 
second generation’s reactions to the first generation seem to be equal parts rejection and exacerbation of Coleridge 
and Wordsworth’s qualified rationality. The “Preface” of Shelley’s Alastor, for instance, appears to invoke a 
Wordsworthian critique of judgment to the overly critical Alastor. But its Wordsworthian call to the sufficiency and 
stability of moral truth unspools into a dizzying Humean interrogation of subjectivity and exhausts itself in the 
protagonist’s unapologetic and annihilating pursuit for the ideal. Keats develops the concept of “negative capability” 
explicitly as an indictment of what he saw as Coleridge’s overweening demand for certainty (Keats 492). 
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conjectural history appear to construct a more or less accurate picture of the fate of contemporary 
poetry at the institutional level. Peacock writes that in the eighteenth century 
[e]nquiry was roused, the activity of the intellect was excited, and poetry came in 
for its share of the general result. The changes had been rung on lovely maid and 
slyvan shade, summer heat and green retreat, waving trees and sighing breeze, 
gentle swains and amorous pains, by versifiers who took them on trust, as 
meaning something very soft and tender, without much caring what: but with this 
general activity of intellect came a necessity for even poets to appear to know 
something of what they professed to talk of. (Peacock 13) 
 
For Peacock, philosophy has goaded poetry into a new and unprecedented intellectual discipline 
and descriptive integrity. The initial shock is invigorating and focusing, but poetry is 
constitutionally doomed under the new sign of enquiry. An unadorned scientific rhetoric has 
effected even deeper changes that finally prove more fatal than therapeutic to poetry’s 
dependence on figure and artifice: for Peacock, it was always in some sense evident that “reason 
and understanding are best addressed in the simplest and most unvarnished phrase” while 
“feeling and passion are best painted in, and roused by, ornamental and figurative language” 
(Peacock 9). For this reason, “pure reason and dispassionate truth” would be “perfectly 
ridiculous in verse, as we may judge by versifying one of Euclid’s demonstrations” (9). The 
newer, harder fact of the new intellectual regime is that “this will be found true of all 
dispassionate reasoning whatever, and all reasoning that requires comprehensive views and 
enlarged combinations” (9). Perspicuity is a total, unremitting discipline. By the end of its 
course, plain speak should be a mentalese, a kind of mental clarity and force.  
 This new, more exacting discipline immediate reduces poetry’s domain to only the most 
obvious and “tangible points of morality” which “command assent at once, those which have a 
mirror in every mind, and in which the severity of reason is warmed and rendered palatable by 
being mixed up with feeling and imagination, that are applicable even to what is called moral 
poetry” (9). Legitimate forms of feeling and imagination must be aligned with — not against — 
rationality, and self-evidently so. In the end, the scientific approach will finally be so total and 
desirable that poetry will lose even this narrow function: “as the sciences of morals and of mind 
advance towards perfection,” Peacock writes, “as they become more enlarged and 
comprehensive in their views, as reason gains the ascendancy in them over imagination and 
feeling, poetry can no longer accompany, them in their progress, but drops into the back ground, 
and leaves them to advance alone: Thus the empire of thought is withdrawn from poetry, as the 
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empire of facts had been before” (9). Peacock’s vision, in this way, looks a lot like Leslie 
Stephen’s early neo-Kantian intellectual historical vision. 
 For Peacock and Shelley alike — and finally for most critically inclined Romantics and 
neo-Kantian Romantic literary critics, pace Burwick — poetry seems to have to earn its 
legitimacy by going through or over philosophy, not away from or around it, by presenting 
poetry as instrumental and therapeutic to philosophy or even finally more philosophical than 
philosophy, ur-philosophical. At any rate, poetry must be an enterprise which philosophy ignores 
at its own peril. Poetry’s critique of rationality must finally seem accommodating and 
complementary: philosophy is simply too prestigious and already inclined to see poetry as 
problematic, in need of differentiation and quarantine. Philosophy is already too happy to place 
poetry on the periphery, or to grant poetry its own sovereignty, as it does theology. This prestige 
only grows through neo-Kantian intellectual history and, from my perspective, this cultural 
prestige not only explains the mid-twentieth century turn to neo-Kantian Romanticism but also 
the kind of narratives it constructs in which poetry outperforms philosophy somehow on 
philosophy’s own terms.  
 Thus while Wordsworth’s dissatisfaction with the constrictions of Enlightenment 
rationality — and, similarly, with neoclassical poetic artifice — may inspire his purported 
“return” to nature to common language, Wordsworth does not reject Enlightenment rationality 
outright. Rather, he works to redefine and widen what constitutes rationality: returning to the 
terms of the Prelude, he aims to recover the “exactness of a comprehensive mind” which has 
been “sacrificed” for “scrupulous and microscopic views” “placed beyond/The limits of 
experience and truth” (X.849). He wants to use poetry to recover a “grand and simple Reason” 
obscured by the narrow picture of rationality abstracted from that “…humbler power/Which 
carries on its no inglorious work/By logic and minute analysis” (XI.124-6). “Logic and minute 
analysis” is a fine gateway to Reason. Even here, amidst a full-blown critique, Wordsworth can 
only speak of it with praise (“no inglorious”). But this constricted picture of rationality is finally 
“of all Idols that which pleases most/The growing mind…” (XI.127-8). It must be abandoned for 
a more comprehensive science of moral reasoning, one that philosophy, with its uncompromising 
critical penchant, simply cannot construct. This return to moral reasoning is framed in distinctly 
constructive skeptical terms, as a recommitment to moral certainty. 
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 In the Prelude and, more programmatically, in the “Preface” to the Lyrical Ballads, 
Wordsworth not only declares poetry’s special claim to moral reasoning but insists that the 
current picture of moral reasoning is wholly inadequate because it has yet to be articulated by 
poetry. Wordsworth’s sense of the “comprehensive” mind far exceeds Peacock’s more 
computational vision. Yet, in other respects, Wordsworth is hardly that far from Peacock. 
Wordsworth appears to conceive of poetry as one of Peacock’s “sciences of morals and of mind” 
(9). In his 1800 Note to The Thorn, Wordsworth characterizes poetry as the “history and science 
of the feelings” (594). I believe we should see Wordsworth and Peacock’s invocations sciences 
as looking backwards and forwards, respectively: Wordsworth to Johnson’s Science and Peacock 
to Leslie Stephen’s. But, as many of the recent studies of Romantic engagements with the 
emerging disciplinary sciences show, we should also see Wordsworth situating poetry within the 
new intellectual and scientific order Peacock and Stephen project. 1802 “Preface” to the Lyrical 
Ballads, Wordsworth calls his lyrical ballads “experiments” and insists that the Poet must remain 
an indispensable handmaiden to the “Man of Science” (606), “at his side, carrying sensation into 
the midst of the object of the Science itself” (606). It is as if Wordsworth must assert the standing 
of the Poet by emphasizing the Poet’s indispensable role within (but also beside) this new 
intellectual order. But it is also poetry finally exists above it, cultivating the irreducible 
subjectivity that pursues the “object of the Science itself” (606).  
 What’s remarkable about Peacock’s reception of Wordsworth is that he takes Wordsworth 
and Romanticism to have made a defiant swerve away from this intellectual imperative, towards 
an irremediable and anti-intellectual metaphysics, a move that is sure to hasten poetry’s demise. 
“While the historian and the philosopher are advancing in, and accelerating, the progress of 
knowledge,” Peacock writes, “the poet is wallowing in the rubbish of departed ignorance, and 
raking up the ashes of dead savages to find gewgaws and rattles for the grown babies of the age” 
(Peacock 15). The Romantic poet is “remaining studiously ignorant of history, society, and 
human nature, cultivated the phantasy only at the expence of the memory and the reason” (14). 
Wordsworth can hit the right moral and descriptive notes, but for some reason “cannot describe a 
scene under his own eyes without putting into it the shadow of a Danish boy or the living ghost 
of Lucy Gray, or some similar phantastical parturition of the moods of his own mind” (15). But I 
would argue that, from Wordsworth’s perspective, embracing and exacerbating these 
superstitions is what poetry offers: it places them under a new kind of observation, one that, at its 
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best, is radically sympathetic and responsive, inclined or even insistent on taking them seriously, 
on suspending the act of dismissal as long as possible to perceive the wide and mysterious arc on 
which these superstitions emerge as rational and to glimpse “grand and simple Reason” beyond 
the false image the Enlightenment constructs of it. As Deborah E. White nicely puts it (speaking 
more generally of Romantic poetry), this new poetic observation works to reveal “the very 
concept of superstition as, itself, superstitious — the ideological imposition of a modernity 








There Was No Radical Hume 
 
3.1 Neo-Kantian Romanticism Misreads Hume 
 The preceding chapter should clarify that reading a broader topos of crisis from the 
hostility of Hume’s critics is largely disingenuous; it finally reads more content into that hostility 
than it does from it. It is certainly possible and viable to construct a radically skeptical Hume 
from the most concentrated, anxious moments of his prose: for instance, Hume’s shipwreck 
imagery at the end of Book I of the Treatise. Numerous philosophers and literary scholars have 
pursued such an interpretation of Hume credibly and generatively, and there is no doubt that 
these passages are stylistically stunning, and achieve a wholly original pitch, even taking into 
account the distinctly melodramatic character of most skeptical performances since at least 
Descartes. Hume’s skeptical moments are profoundly serious, open-ended, and suggestive, 
especially in the provocative, honest, and searching prose of the Treatise. But reading Hume as a 
radical skeptic also takes some will and effort. One has to turn a blind eye to Hume’s frequent 
vacillations regarding the legitimacy of radical skepticism, not to mention Hume’s evident drift 
from the darker, more radical skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature to the more matter-of-
fact, mitigated skepticism of Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding. Embracing and 
exacerbating the Treatise’s anxious register risks doing considerable violence to the tenor of 
Hume’s philosophy, given that Hume himself steadily worked to dampen or even extinguish it.  
 It’s worth surveying how neo-Kantians have critics have justified pursuing Hume as 
radical skeptic despite these facts. A thoroughly committed neo-Kantian Skeptic like Leslie 
Stephen simply dismisses Hume’s vacillations as temporary (if sustained) relapses into fideism. 
He even presents them as superficial and personal rather than philosophical or even theological. 
Stephen explains that, while Hume “unlike Berkeley and Locke” held no “theological 
prepossessions” and “alone, amongst contemporary thinkers, followed logic wherever it led 
him,” still “Hume, indeed, may be accused of some divergence from the straight path under the 
influence of literary vanity. To that cause we must partly attribute his singular attempt to 
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extinguish his early and most complete work” (43). “Literary vanity” refers to Hume’s desire for 
a positive public reception. The “straight path” is the strict ethos of doubt that nineteenth-century 
intellectuals like Stephen and J.S. Mill adopted under the neo-Kantian sign of critique.88 With 
this version of the straight and narrow in view, Hume’s divergences from Skepticism do not look 
like a regained sense of proportion, but intellectual and moral incontinence. 
 Another more forgiving and more credible approach to Hume’s vacillations sees them not 
as primarily personal in nature but rather responses to a central, intractable problem endemic to 
skepticism. In his treatment of Hume’s ambivalence, for instance, Pulos brings into focus what 
he calls the “positive” side of skepticism, the inescapable fact that every skeptic must finally 
“reconcile[] doubt and the inevitability of entertaining opinions.”89 Pulos’ survey of attempted 
responses is instructive:  
The sceptical tradition, it should be remembered, has its positive as well as its 
negative side. The ancient Pyrrhonists reconciled doubt and the inevitability of 
entertaining opinions by relying on custom, the New Academy by expounding a 
doctrine of probability — the doctrine that, while no knowledge is certain, 
propositions differ in the degree to which they have the ‘appearance’ of truth. 
Most Renaissance sceptics recommended faith as a solution to doubt. Hume, in a 
manner of speaking, returned to the probabilism of the New Academy. His 
probabilism however, took two forms, profoundly different in effect if not in 
principle. (38-9) 
 
Pulos resolves Hume’s ambivalence by splitting Hume’s response to this central problematic in 
two. From Pulos’ perspective, Hume pursues a weaker probabilism which only accepts a 
positivistic and non-metaphysical “world of appearance” and a stronger one which purports to 
observe the “ultimate nature of reality.” This bifurcation allows Pulos to embrace the weaker 
(more thoroughly skeptical) probabilism as privileged and philosophical while rejecting Hume’s 
                                                            
88This ethos of doubt is epitomized in William K. Clifford’s uncompromising “ethics of belief:” “it is wrong always, 
everywhere, and for anyone,” writes Clifford, “to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford 295). 
Stephen and Clifford’s respective appeal to this ethos exemplifies the currency of Polanyi’s “doctrine of doubt,” 
especially within late nineteenth-century intellectual culture, when its stock was arguably at its highest. Remarking 
on J.S. Mill’s adoption of this ethos, Polanyi notes, “popular thought in the nineteenth century was dominated by 
writers was dominated by writers who, with an eye on the natural sciences, declared with complete assurance that 
they accepted no belief whatever that had not passed the test of unrestricted doubt” (Polanyi 270). 
89 To be fair, Stephen does acknowledge this inevitability. But he seems inclined to read Hume’s recantation of his 
doubts not as a commonsense return but as a sign that he has been irreparably damaged by his skeptical excursion, 
so as to abandon effort altogether. it is as if Hume simply doubts doubting. Glossing Hume’s performance, Stephen 
writes, “We have reached, it is plain, the fullest expression of scepticism, and are not surprised when Hume admits 
that his doubts disappear when he leaves his study. The old bonds which held things together have been completely 
dissolved. Hume can see no way to replace them, and Hume, therefore is a systematic sceptic” (Stephen 82). 
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stronger (and more fideist) probabilism as problematic and preoccupied. They can and somehow 
must be kept apart despite their basic philosophical continuity.   
 More recent interpretations of Hume from within neo-Kantian Romanticism still follow 
Pulos’ basic tactic of privileging Hume’s skeptical tendencies and problematizing his fideistic 
ones. And some Romantics — most notably Terrence Hoagwood — do this by deftly engaging 
with the “positive side” of skepticism.90 A post-structuralist penchant for the radically skeptic 
Hume has more often recommended bypassing this “positive side” altogether, taking Hume’s 
radical epistemological skepticism for granted, and wielding its anxious register against the 
suspect confidence of Hume’s ethics: by observing, for instance, an apparent incoherence in 
Hume’s unqualified embrace of an ethics of sympathy given his epistemological misgivings 
about resemblance. Abstracting almost exclusively from Hume, Nancy Yousef writes, 
“Skepticism and sympathy are thus bound in a strangely complementary structure in eighteenth-
century philosophical discourse, whereby the first generates an excessive anxiety about the 
accuracy and reliability of our apprehension of things and the second presumes an improbable 
confidence about our intimacy with other persons” (Yousef 7). Following Yousef, Schey writes 
that analogy functions as a “fault line through Hume’s own philosophical project:” “One the one 
hand, Hume makes conspicuous the limits of analogy in his skeptical writings on human 
                                                            
90While offering some subtler treatments of skepticism in Romantic literary criticism, even Hoagwood demonstrates 
a clear prejudice for radical negotiations of this problem, and a unwillingness to entertain the same question pursued 
from an anti-Skeptical perspective. In Skepticism and Ideology, for instance, Hoagwood patiently and 
sympathetically develops the concept of facticity to explain how the skeptic might “formulate imperatives” and 
“engage in materially efficacious action, without any of the dogmatism, even tentative or provisional, that 
skepticism has already undermined” (57-8). This negotiation is possible because “where dualism (the mind-matter 
dogma) and materialism can only warrant that advice by hypostatizing fictional externalities, the skeptic notices that 
the real distinction is between perceptions that are subject to voluntary power and those that are not” (58). But, in 
Byron’s Dialectic, Hoagwood is decidedly more suspicious of more anti-skeptical treatments of “context-
sensitivity:” “The appeal to ‘practical’ exigencies that set aside merely abstract doubts is simply an announcement 
that one prefers the unreflective credulity of animals (I am thinking of Santayana’s concept of ‘animal faith’)” (96). 
From the skeptic’s side, the problem can be addressed as a legitimate but only apparent one, which can be carefully 
explained away through sophisticated theoretical distinctions. But, when the same issue is raised from an anti-
skeptical orientation, it appears much less legitimate, amounting to a creedal preference for “unreflective credulity” 
(96). The point is not necessarily that such sophistication is unpersuasive; it is simply that Hoagwood does not 
demonstrate nearly the same generosity when treating one rather than the other. And this is because Hoagwood 
refuses to accept the possibility that the skeptic cannot resolve this problem in any satisfactory manner. And, since 
he takes his account of the “fictionality” of externalities (elsewhere “practical exigencies) to be ontologically 
accurate, he does not need to entertain this possibility. This is why such externalities are merely “hypostatized” 
rather than really observed in some other manner. But how is such an anti-realist assertion not itself dogmatic? And 
how is the commonsense appeal to “practical exigencies” finally more voluntary than involuntary? Or why should a 
claim to the “involuntary” nature of these practical exigencies be perceived as more suspect than the “involuntary” 
perceptions finally and necessarily admitted by the skeptic?
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knowledge, rendering uncertain the relations that make all inference possible; on the other hand, 
he develops the first robust account of sympathetic identification in his writings on morals and 
the passions, treating as unproblematic the analogies that structure interpersonal relations” (6). 
 This strategy of pitting Hume’s radical epistemology against his conservative ethics or 
politics — and appealing explicitly to Hume’s affective registers as its warrant — is more or less 
unique to contemporary post-structuralist readings of Hume. Its critical thrust is radically 
different, for instance, from how Hume’s Skepticism would have been historically deployed. The 
interpretation is still essentially neo-Kantian in that it accepts the significance of Skepticism. It is 
evidently indebted to mid-century neo-Kantian Romanticism because it understands Hume’s 
Skepticism to be predominantly therapeutic in value. But it invokes a post-structuralist specter of 
crisis that effectively upends the standard logic of these neo-Kantian commitments. The tension 
it observes between Hume’s ethics and his epistemology amounts to a site of ideological 
contradiction. It is “strangely complementary” because self-evidently contradictory, i.e. ripe for 
Romantic critique via a Levinasian critique of identity. Hume’s skeptical anxiety is first 
symptomatic: it is a displacement of the anxiety he should have about sympathy. It is only 
latently therapeutic. The interpretation must notice this strange “fault line” and transport Hume’s 
appropriate skeptical anxiety to upset his suspect confidence: it is as if Hume’s skepticism simply 
did not — could not — reach far enough into his ethics and politics or, alternatively, displaced 
other ethical or political crises at the center of these fields. In this way, it adopts a New 
Historicist approach. However, as we have seen, Kant and even Stewart sought to separate 
Hume’s epistemology from his ethics: to Kant, Hume does not doubt the moral certainty of 
causation, and rightly not wrongly so. In other words, this post-structuralist interpretation 
reverses the original neo-Kantian program: it asserts the fundamental interrelation between 
ethics and epistemology where Kant and Stewart were at pains to keep them separate. In this 
way, it is more aligned with Shelley, Stephen, and Pulos: more enthusiastic about pushing the 
“irreligious” character of Skepticism into controversial moral territory.91 The subtraction story is 
still at work as we push towards a more authentic ethics instructed by radical epistemological 
skepticism.  
                                                            
91 Consider how William Jewett uses Pulos’ Hume to argue that Shelley’s Cenci represents a “dramatic application 
of identical arguments Hume had made in extending the epistemological critique of his Treatise to moral and 
cultural problems” (my emphasis, 146). Extend to critique and correct. 
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 Of course, Yousef’s departure from the historical neo-Kantian program is hardly damning 
in itself. It is clear that the neo-Kantian topos of crisis does more to enable than stifle Yousef’s 
critical resourcefulness and creativity, and this is what makes the topos so endlessly appealing 
and generative: its emptiness is what gives it its fullness, functionality as a cipher. Here we can 
also see how a baseline post-structuralist hermeneutics of suspicion renders the topos of crisis 
especially potent because of the way it recommends searching for ostensibly quiet and stable 
cultural sites (i.e. sympathy) and disrupting their apparent calm with some latent or displaced 
crisis. It’s not even that Yousef’s interpretation is even incorrect or unsound, either historically 
or theoretically. William Hazlitt and Percy Shelley would both pursue different ethical 
interpretations of Humean epistemology. But I would suggest that Hazlitt and Shelley do so 
against the grain and idiosyncratically, askew to Hume.  I also ultimately want to follow Yousef 
and read the way Romantic literature at once embraces and interrogate an improbable confidence 
that propels Enlightenment philosophy. But I would argue that this confidence — this sense of 
assured calm and stability — is finally a confidence about the power of skeptical critique to 
construct or undo forms of certainty: the ability, for instance, of “reasonable doubt” to manage, 
correct, and resolve irreducible error and uncertainty or, as Yousef would have it, to disrupt and 
discredit with problematic intuitions and ideological mystifications — again, the “moral aura” 
around Daston’s “ur-belief.” It seems no coincidence that, in Yousef’s generalization above, the 
symptomatic bent of critical close reading plays unwittingly into the suspect logic of metonymy 
embraced within neo-Kantian intellectual history. Hume’s epistemology is definitively skeptical 
and anxious. A tension between skepticism and sympathy does not simply obtain in Hume but all 
of eighteenth-century philosophical discourse. In both cases, what recommends this improbably 
neat, almost synecdochal alignment is a distinct optimism about the instrumentality of 
Skepticism, its ability generate crisis around problematic assumptions. Critique sets them up to 
knock them down.92 Yousef calls this Skeptical anxiety “excessive,” but this excess in fact 
essential to the critical procedure. It establishes the differential flow from Hume’s epistemology 
to his ethics. But, as Wittgenstein argues in On Certainty, “doubt itself rests only on what is 
beyond doubt:” that is, doubt can only generate instability against stability. And here the stable, 
privileged structure is skepticism itself: its self-evident meaningfulness. To upset the calm I want 
                                                            
92 As Simon During notes: “modern critique…most often deploys a particular scalar structure: a discrete and small 
thing (a text, an image, an event) is examined as an example of or portal into larger structure” and must work to 
“make this scalar leap persuasive” (74). 
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to here, we will need to question rather than embrace the privileged role afforded Skepticism, 
and entertain that Skepticism — not to mention the moral aura that surrounds it — can distort as 
much as it clarifies, or even mystify as much as it deconstructs: in other words we will have to 
accept that Skepticism can be excessive, and not instrumentally so. As Wordsworth writes in The 
Prelude, while Critique is unquestionably empowering, it threatens to make you an “enemy of 
falsehood” rather than a “friend of truth.” This leads Wordsworth to try and find a way to 
preserve the value of critique while rejecting its excesses. And I believe his solution, much like 
Hume’s, is to open himself up to a kind of moral confidence that will shore up an excessive 
epistemological anxiety, not the other way around. From Wordsworth and Hume’s perspective, 
only a hermeneutics of reconciliation can recover the legitimacy of the kinds of moral reasoning 
critique mistakenly aims to diminish or suppress as problematic — as metaphysical excess or 
ideological contradiction — at the expense of understanding or even embracing moral reasoning.  
 
3.1.1 Kemp Smith’s Hume 
 Contemporary philosophical discussions of Hume’s philosophy provide a helpful way out 
of this neo-Kantian investment in Skepticism because, while philosophers still widely adopt a 
Skeptical perspective and routinely pursue interpretations of Hume as a radical Skeptic, they 
pursue this interpretation in an entirely different and, from my perspective, more credible 
manner. This difference in approach reflects the widespread absorption of Norman Kemp Smith’s 
field-altering case against Hume’s radical skepticism in favor of a “naturalist” interpretation of 
Hume.93 In Kemp Smith’s view, the epistemology of Book One of the Treatise is not strangely 
sealed off from the ethics of Book Two and Three; rather, it amounts to a “preliminary” study 
intended to demonstrate that our broader knowledge of the world has the same fundamental 
character as our sympathetic and passionate knowledge of other people.94 Kemp Smith thus 
                                                            
93 Kemp Smith began in a series of early twentieth century essays and completed in his 1941 study The Philosophy 
of David Hume. His most programmatic statement of this approach: “I shall endeavour, in the course of this volume, 
to establish the contention that Hume’s philosophy can be more adequately described as naturalistic than as 
sceptical, and that its main governing principle is the thorough subordination — by right, if not always in actual fact 
— of reason to the feelings and instincts, i.e. to the ‘impressions’ of sensation and reflexion. These, as constituting 
our human nature, are the foundation upon which — to quote Hume’s own words — “we in effect propose [to erect] 
a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can 
stand with any security” (84-86). 
94As Paul Russell glosses Kemp Smith, to the extent that Hume wants to apply naturalism to epistemology and 
metaphysics, “Hume’s morals and metaphysics are all of one piece” (Russell 5). Karl Shafer’s remarks are also 
pertinent: “Thus, for Hume, probable inference shares many important characteristics with certain patterns of 
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warns against the distinct risks of reading Book One without an appreciation for this broader 
naturalist project: “when taken by themselves,” the first sections “give a very misleading 
impression, alike in regard to Hume’s ultimate purposes and in regard to the bearing of the 
conclusions to which they more immediately lead” (14). As such, Kemp Smith imagines 
interaction between Hume’s registers in exactly a reverse manner as Pulos or Yousef. Hume’s 
confident ethics of sympathy finally disciplines and soothes his anxious epistemology.  
 In his polemic against interpretations of Hume as a radical skeptic, Kemp Smith argues 
that the “sheerly negative” (5) interpretation of Hume he saw dominating the field at the end of 
the nineteenth century was largely a rhetorical construction uncritically inherited from Hume’s 
critics, one meant to discredit Hume by exacerbating Hume’s skeptical register. Kemp Smith 
calls this the “Reid-Beattie interpretation” since it “first gained general currency through the 
writings of Thomas Reid, Beattie and Dugald Stewart” only to be “later accepted, almost without 
question, by James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Bain” (80). What motivates Kemp Smith’s 
revisionist critique is his reception, among other things, of Leslie Stephen’s neo-Kantian 
treatment of Hume. From Kemp Smith’s perspective, it is forgivable that Hume’s nineteenth-
century critics would adopt this “polemical” picture. But he is struck by “its surprising 
reappearance, almost unmodified in Leslie Stephen” (81). For Kemp Smith, this reappearance is 
both surprising and objectionable because Stephen’s aims are purportedly “historical” not 
polemical. For Kemp Smith, Stephen should obviously be correcting this polemic picture of 
Hume’s skepticism, not reproducing it.  
 A detailed look at Hume’s reception in the nineteenth century shows that Kemp Smith’s 
critique merely echoes and systematizes frequent, intermittent laments from nineteenth-century 
philosophers about the largely negative, anxious, and radical picture of Hume as a “systematic 
skeptic” that had united the commonsense and neo-Kantian reception of Hume. “Everybody 
knows that Hume was a sceptic,” writes the Scottish philosopher James McCosh in 1875, but 
“[i]t is not so generally known that he has developed a full system of the human mind. Students 
of philosophy should make themselves acquainted with it” (126). “Hume was not lost in the 
quagmire of subjective idealism” (80), writes the Hegelian William Wallace in 1894: as such, 
“Kant’s Hume is therefore a somewhat imaginary being” (80). What Kemp Smith’s revisionist 
                                                            
passionate response—something that leads Hume to repeatedly stress the analogies between his account of probable 
reasoning and his account of these passionate responses” (Shafer 193). 
 145 
history does not adequately capture is that, while this radically skeptical interpretation of Hume 
remains constant, its polarity and character progressively shifts from negative to positive, from 
suspicion to sympathy.95 Much of this has to do with its convenient fit with a variety of modern 
projects and intellectual historical narratives that emphasized its break from Enlightenment 
projects. Within philosophy, for instance, Hume’s skeptical critique of induction accorded well 
with the project of logical positivism which, in addition to its aim to reformulate logic outside of 
natural language, also sought to establish knowledge on more solid, rigorous grounds than 
“intuition.” As such, by the early twentieth century, Hume’s skepticism looks much less like a 
threat to the philosophical tradition and more like early articulation of the rising critique of 
Enlightenment, a foundation of modern thought.96 
From this perspective, Kemp Smith’s reading of Stephen seems somewhat imprecise, and 
correcting it introduces yet another wrinkle in this narrative of the neo-Kantian provenance of 
radical Hume. Kemp Smith laments that Stephen reproduces this polemical version of radical 
Hume in his historical text, but as we have seen, Stephen’s text is more accurately “intellectual 
historical” than “historical:” it is inclined to a stylized, symbolic treatment of Hume’s role in 
history. Or, at least, Stephen’s text emanates from a different historical-specific concept of 
                                                            
95 Consider Anthony Gottlieb’s recent claim in The Dream of Enlightenment (2016): “Some writers in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries regarded Hume’s work as primarily mischievous and destructive; but from the early 
twentieth century onwards, it has generally been viewed in a warmer light. Instead of being seen as perplexing in a 
bad way, his arguments are now usually seen as challenging in a good way” (Gottlieb 196). In a recent popular 
piece, Simon Blackburn points to this new emphasis on Hume’s naturalism (and a characteristic “discrediting” of 
Hume’s skepticism to “a cultural need prompting philosophers to separate themselves as far as possible from the 
unwashed skeptics, nihilist, relativists or ironists of postmodernism” which he associates with the “late Richard 
Rorty” but which he argues have “infiltrated many humanities departments” (np). A movement like Maurizio 
Ferraris’ New Realism targets precisely this sort of “overcorrection” that postmodernism makes in the spirit of 
Hume’s radical skepticism. 
96 This intellectual-historical Hume is captured nicely in Bertrand Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy (1945). 
Russell argues that Hume’s skepticism, whether “true or false, represents the bankruptcy of eighteenth-century 
reasonableness” (“History” 672) itself. For Russell, Hume’s skepticism is not the impulsive result of one man’s 
perverse thought but simply the “logical conclusion” (659) of pursuing the “the empirical philosophy of Locke and 
Berkeley” (659) with a “better intellect than Locke, a great acuteness in analysis, and a smaller capacity for 
accepting comfortable inconsistencies” (672). At the same time, Russell’s estimation of Hume is not that high. He 
argues that “when Hume achieves some degree of consistency he is wildly paradoxical” even as “no one has yet 
succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consistent” (612-13). Russell sees “the growth of 
unreason” since Hume to be a “natural sequel to Hume’s destruction of empiricism” (611). He writes, “For my part, 
I find none of their refutations convincing; nevertheless, I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume’s 
system may be discoverable” (659). And finally Russell sees Hume’s assessment of probability working for his 
skepticism rather than his naturalism: “The analysis of such "probable" knowledge led Hume to certain sceptical 
conclusions, which are equally difficult to refute and to accept. The result was a challenge to philosophers, which, in 
my opinion, has still not been adequately met” (663). 
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history97. From my perspective, this intellectual historical impulse suggests that Stephen would 
not simply or uncritically absorb the Reid-Beattie interpretation of Hume. Rather, it seems more 
plausible to say that Stephen actively embraces this negative picture of Hume, reappropriates it 
for his neo-Kantian intellectual history, and turns its threat back on Hume’s critics — or, as John 
Bicknell notes, to metaphysically preoccupied and retrograde Victorian contemporaries (“Tract” 
112-13). Stephen takes what was arguably intended as a moral-individual indictment of Hume 
and repurposes a negative Hume of world-historical proportions fit to generate the crisis of 
modernity he wishes to observes. Much as the post-structuralists did with the mid-century critic’s 
unabashed neo-Kantian Romanticism, it is as if Stephen preferred to retain this controversial 
version of Hume and wield it to his own ends, even as he finally took Hume to be more 
enlightening than threatening.  
While philosophers have taken issues with its particulars, Kemp Smith’s revisionist 
account of Hume’s naturalism has effectively made an exclusively or radically skeptical view of 
Hume — or even a monotonic, definitive view of Hume’s epistemology — more controversial 
than self-evident, not to mention prima facie more incredible than credible. In short, Kemp 
Smith’s study fundamentally reframes this dichotomy between skepticism and fideism to one 
between skepticism and naturalism, and demands engaging Hume’s naturalism in newly 
sympathetic, and in any case, more rigorous terms.98 Kemp Smith’s influence has resulted a 
much more robust and sympathetic (though still contentious) picture of Hume’s “positive 
response” (in Pulos’ phrase), or his “naturalism” (in Kemp Smith’s). Treating Hume’s positive 
response reductively and dismissively as fideist seems now largely unpalatable; grounding 
                                                            
97 This suggests that either Kemp Smith does not recognize this genre of neo-Kantian intellectual history at all or 
recognizes it too well. Kemp Smith’s final insistence on the differences between Reid and Kant’s responses to Hume 
despite their similarities suggests the latter: “The parallel between Reid and Kant is to this extent only partial, and 
may easily prove misleading. Both were awakened by Hume to the insufficiency of principles upon which they had 
been relying. Both also drew from Hume’s teaching conclusions opposite to those drawn by Hume himself. But in 
all further respects the parallel ceases to hold. Kant continued in the view that the content of knowledge comes by 
way of ‘ideas’; it was not until much later in the course of developing his own Critical principles that he began to 
question the sufficiency of this part of his own and of Hume’s teaching. Also, he was aware of other important 
lessons which he had learned from Hume; and in all his references to Hume speaks of him with profound respect as 
showing how, in the hands of so supreme a master, the sceptical type of philosophy can be fruitful and beneficent” 
(8). In his retrospective Loeb independently observes the distorting effects Kemp Smith’s “idealist sympathies” have 
on his account of Hume’s naturalism (253). 
98 As Louis Loeb observes in a recent retrospective assessment of Kemp Smith, the dichotomy of naturalism and 
skepticism has “framed the terms of debate in the study of Hume for sixty-plus years” and “almost every significant 
piece of work on Hume has Kemp Smith in the rear-view mirror” (245). 
 147 
Hume’s skepticism in his either the content or the dominant affective disposition of Book One of 
the Treatise likewise seems unviable99, and even actively discouraged.100  
 
3.1.2 The Skeptic’s Study and Context Sensitivity 
 Transforming this skeptical picture of Hume into a more faithful dialectic has not simply 
led to a more refined picture of Hume’s own thought; it has generated more sophisticated 
descriptions of the “positive side” of Skepticism itself and more searching interrogations of the 
significance of Skepticism. For my purposes, what distinguishes contemporary philosophical 
approaches to Skepticism from those adopted within neo-Kantian Romanticism following Pulos 
is the way these approaches suspend (at least ostensibly) their unquestioned appreciation for the 
significance of Skepticism: they way they are willing to put the significance of Skepticism in 
play as an open question, in ways that neo-Kantian Romanticism simply cannot. They accept that 
Skepticism’s significance cannot be taken for granted — and must be pursued at length. More 
importantly, they accept that a case for Skepticism’s insignificance not only remains credible but 
in some manner fundamentally persuasive and, in any case, necessary because instructive. They 
accept the controversy around the question to be generative rather than incomprehensible. They 
are still guided by an anticipatory confidence — an intuition — regarding the significance of 
                                                            
99 We can see this impact in the way Michael Williams has recently handled Hume’s progressive drift to a less 
anxious picture of skepticism. Williams, like Yousef, accepts the credibility of seeing Hume’s philosophy as finally 
skeptical. In this way Williams works against Kemp Smith. But unlike Yousef, he does not find it credible to build 
this argument from the anxious register of Hume’s skepticism, or to accept that register to be dominantly and 
consistently anxious. Instead, he feels compelled to dismiss Hume’s shift in affective registers as superficial, not 
essential, far from the key to Hume’s skepticism. Williams acknowledges that in the Enquiry the “fright and despair 
[of the Treatise] give way to ‘momentary amazement,’ and the human condition is not so much dark as ‘whimsical’” 
but nonetheless affirms that “the underlying philosophical view has not changed, only its affective 
coloration…Hume may have made his peace with the groundlessness of our believing: he has not changed his mind 
about it” (5). From Williams’ view, if you are reading affective shifts as essential, it is much harder to argue that 
Hume’s philosophical view of skepticism remains unchanged. The burden is demonstrating Hume’s sustained belief 
in the significance of radical skepticism despite affective evidence to the contrary. 
100 David and Mary Fate Norton’s edition of Hume begins with a caveat that basically standardizes Kemp Smith’s 
interpretation, filing off its more contentious aspects: “Hume was openly sceptical about many important aspects of 
religious belief. As a consequence, many of his contemporaries were motivated to denounce him as a dangerous 
infidel and to characterize all his philosophy as essentially destructive. These negative assessments have since been 
repeated by those who have failed, as many still do, to read Hume with care. Whatever we may suppose accounts for 
this long-standing view that Hume is simply a destructive skeptic, the view is not supported by the text of the 
Treatise” (113). In her 2010 dissertation, Elizabeth Goodnick suggests that “Before the pioneering work of Norman 
Kemp Smith, most Hume scholars read him as a thoroughgoing skeptic. The dominant view today is that, for Hume, 
‘natural beliefs’—paradigmatically, beliefs based on induction—are warranted in virtue of features of the 
psychological mechanisms that produce them; moreover, Hume would endorse a suitable naturalistic theory of 
warrant to sustain this position” (vii). See Goodnick’s dissertation for a comprehensive survey of the four major 
approaches to Hume’s naturalism. 
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Skepticism, but this enthusiasm sustains the interrogation rather than compromising it.101 They 
simply accept the credibility of anti-Skepticism as it sustains the productive controversy around 
Skepticism itself, as it keeps the question of Skepticism’s significance live, its evidential context 
open-ended.  
 In “Johnson’s Kick Revisited,” we have already seen that the evidential context of 
Skepticism may be reframed as a question about what Michael Williams calls the “high-context 
sensitivity” of the Skeptic’s study: whether or not we should view the Skeptic as a Hero or an 
Idiot, and Skeptical insights as a kind of essence or a kind of excess, a productive or an 
unproductive distortion. Here I want to follow Williams’ description of Hume’s approach to this 
problem, as a way into observing the “mitigated” or qualified nature of Hume’s skepticism: that 
is, how Hume’s skepticism is not only conditioned and checked by his naturalism, but is only 
valuable insofar as it emerges from it.  
Williams proposes that the trouble for a Skeptic like Hume is that he must square the case 
for viewing Skepticism as more essential than excessive with a baseline commonsense awareness 
that Skepticism amounts a form of excess: Skepticism is self-evident excessive and distorted 
because it is obviously impracticable and theoretical. Hume must find a way to square his 
investment in critique as it corrects bad commonsense with his more basic allegiance to 
commonsense as it tethers and orients critique. From Williams’ perspective, the only way Hume 
can negotiate this is by accepting that attaining a Skeptical perspective takes minimal effort and 
becomes intelligible and accessible upon “slight reflection.” Indeed, elsewhere, we have seen 
this is what amounts to a therapeutic estimation of the problem of Skepticism: the sense of its 
minimally theoretic or even non-theoretic nature of its problem. Taken from another direction, 
Hume has to believe that it does not require an overly refined theoretical or idiosyncratic 
apparatus to observe the distorted nature of commonsense concepts; rather, that problematic 
status becomes immediately apparent under any critical scrutiny. Likewise, he has to believe the 
inclination to Skeptical scrutiny arises more naturally than artificially. In this way, Williams 
argues, Hume finds Skepticism “deeply embedded” as a naturalistic tendency, not an 
                                                            
101 Similar considerations lead Barry Stroud admits in his influential The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism 
(1984) that there is something that finally smacks of bad faith in the entire Skeptical enterprise. In the Claim to 
Reason, Stanley Cavell describes Skepticism as a kind of inhumanity (26). Stroud, Cavell, and many others, 
generally present these reservations even as they choose not to renounce their faith in a Skeptical perspective. 
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idiosyncrasy: this is “why scepticism tells us something about the condition of mankind, not just 
about the consequences of some particular philosophical ideas” (5). 
 
3.1.3 Hume’s General Rules 
Williams actually presents Hume’s negotiation of Skepticism’s “context sensitivity” in 
generalized terms, as the only credible negotiation of the evidential context of Skepticism. 
Williams is only incidentally interested in Hume as a kind of arch-Skeptic; Hume offers what 
Williams sees as the most viable of many different approaches for preserving the significance of 
Skepticism (though Williams admittedly rejects the legitimacy of this “subtractive logic” on 
rhetorical grounds which I will want to explore). But there are two good reasons to believe that 
Hume would have had his eye fixed on this dialectic relation between the critical and the 
commonsense, and more generally on the dialectic between philosophical and everyday 
reasoning. The first is historical. As Robin Valenza observes in The Intellectual Disciplines in 
Britain (2009), eighteenth-century intellectual culture was still largely divided on whether to 
pursue more generalized “commonsense” accounts or more specialized critical and technical 
discourses. Valenza writes 
…[T]he growing distance between expert and the reader…was a signal 
preoccupation of the eighteenth century. The public perception of intellectual 
specialization created a crisis of relevance. Critics of specialization pointed out 
that if disciplines became narrower in their focus, it would no longer be clear how 
their research pertained to the daily lives of individuals, or to the political life of 
the state. (3). 
 
Of course, in retrospect, it is evident that critics of specialization (Valenza points to Johnson as 
an example) could not prevent the increasing intellectual stratification, specialization, and 
isolation which they feared (19). And the long eighteenth century would have been defined more 
generally by the which transformed the “the Renaissance ideal of a disciplinary system in which 
a single person participated in many fields of knowledge to the modern one in which an 
individual primarily belongs to a single discipline” (19) But in the eighteenth century critics of 
specialization would have occupied an advantageous position because, as Valenza notes, the a 
distinct anti-Scholastic bent of English thought (as we will see, inspired largely by Locke) would 
have been inclined to see the disciplinary specialist as recapitulating the “fault of the medieval 
scholar:” namely, that “his researchers bore not at all on the world outside his study” (3). Indeed, 
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Valenza notes that our current “disciplinary blinkers make this a difficult problem to see” (27). In 
any case, Valenza persuasively argues, we should see the “efforts to create a lingua communis to 
describe a common knowledge, or to appeal to common sense” which are “so often seen as 
characteristic of the eighteenth century” to have “their origins in the need to build bridges 
between the difficulty of learned writing and the abilities of an often ill-educated body of 
readers” (4). So there would have been a distinct imperative to justify the “practical results and 
public benefits” of any specialized field: and specialists “both announced and defended their own 
expertise even while closing it off from general access” (4).  
The second good reason has to do with Hume’s own evident epistemic preferences for 
studying “general” phenomena. Hume offers a thorough meta-theory of evidence at the 
beginning “Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences.” Hume begins the essay clarifying 
the importance of a sound distinction between chance and causation:  
Nothing requires greater nicety, in our enquiries concerning human affairs, than to 
distinguish exactly what is owing to chance, and what proceeds from causes; nor 
is there any subject, in which an author is more liable to deceive himself by false 
subtleties and refinements. (58) 
 
Interestingly, Hume sees “nicety” is a standard of accuracy explicitly defined against subtlety 
and refinement: an accuracy grounded in an orienting sense of proportion. In one sense, this 
seems alien as a positive standard, since one might be more inclined to value subtlety as a kind 
of nicety. But Hume seems to be drawing on a shared pejorative sense of the term as well as 
“over-refinement” still available today. In any case, Hume sees the problem as one of working 
between two extremes. On the one hand, ascribing everything to chance or seeing everything as 
arbitrary prematurely forecloses what may prove to be a fruitful inquiry and “leaves the writer in 
the same state of ignorance with the rest of mankind” (58). Intellectual inquiry demands some 
kind of individual boldness, some sort of departure from doxa to achieve a new illuminating 
insight. It demands some pursuit of causation. Yet, once you embrace the possibility of detecting 
causation, it immediately opens you up to an excessive confidence in the ability to detect and 
describe causes. Hume imagines it as an kind of intellectual vanity: supposing an event “to 
proceed from certain and stable causes,” an author “may then display his ingenuity, in assigning 
these causes.” And, for Hume, this is not a particularly hard or special thing to do: indeed, “a 
man of any subtlety can never be at a loss in this particular” and “he has thereby an opportunity 
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of swelling his volumes, and discovering his profound knowledge, in observing what escapes the 
vulgar and the ignorant” (58).  
It should be clear here that Hume has a very different idea of intellectual vanity than the 
kind a neo-Kantian like Leslie Stephen accuses Hume of flattering. From Stephen’s perspective 
(not to mention Pulos), Hume’s deference to common opinion is a kind of intellectual 
incontinence. Hume’s desire for widespread acceptance causes him to shrink from his bold 
Skeptical vision. But from Hume’s perspective, this deference is what tethers one’s reasoning. 
Hume’s critique targets the critical persona’s condescending elitism. Of course, Stephen clearly 
shares some attenuated version of Hume’s deference to commonsense: this is what demands that 
Stephen make Hume a “representative” figure and encourages him to see Hume’s negative 
influence despite a confessed lack of material evidence. But Stephen is effectively trying to 
negotiate how to embrace Hume not only despite but because of the singularity of his reasoning. 
Hume emerges as uniquely disciplined and logical — as Stephen says, Hume was “absolutely 
free from theological prepossessions” (43). 
This problematic motivates Hume to develop a “general rule” to determine the distinction 
between chance and cause which is remarkably probabilistic but which effectively conflates 
chance with idiosyncrasy and cause with generality. As Hume writes, “What depends on a few 
persons is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: What 
arises from a great number, may often be account for by determinate and known causes” 
(emphasis in text, 58). This broader rule is in turn recommended from “two natural reasons” 
(58), which amount to probabilistic principles, one quantitative and qualitative. Hume develops 
the first, quantitative reason by considering biased dice. If you throw biased dice a few times, 
Hume reasons, this bias may or may not disclose itself. But, over many throws, the bias will 
“certainly prevail in a great number, and will cast the balance entirely to that side” (58). “In like 
manner,” reasons Hume, 
When any causes beget a particular inclination or passion, at a certain time, and 
among a certain people; though many individuals escape the contagion, and be 
ruled by passions peculiar to themselves; yet the multitude will certainly be seized 
by the common affection, and be governed by it in all their actions. (58-59)  
 
Here we might note Hume’s frequent use of “certain,” which he appears to earn by pursuing an 
appropriately uncontroversial level of abstraction. Hume values the uncontroversial, and he 
values this kind of binary thinking for establishing the extremes of the inquiry and outlining the 
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flexible middle space, which amounts to the problematic between common sense and criticism 
itself. And we can notice here that peculiarity is not simply a methodological error but a 
stochastic principle. This is what recommends such a strong though ultimately heuristic 
conflation. The same kind of reasoning informs Hume’s second, more qualitative reason. For we 
find that the “nature” of the principles or causes that are “fitted to operate on a multitude” (59) 
are themselves “always of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject to accidents, and less 
influenced by whim and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only” (59). The 
problem with refined sorts of phenomena is that they are 
commonly so delicate and refined, that the smallest incident in the health, 
education, or fortune of a particular person, is sufficient to divert their course, and 
retard their operation; nor is it possible to reduce them to any general maxims or 
observations. Their influence at one time will never assure us concerning their 
influence at another; even though all the general circumstances should be the 
same in both cases (59).  
 
This is all to say that, despite the nature of his early skeptical interrogations, Hume has little taste 
for highly technical lucubrations: they are simply too hard to confirm and it is too easy to delude 
oneself about them.  
 
3.1.4 Hume’s Mitigated Skepticism 
 Accepting the plausibility of Williams’ account helps explain why Hume would work 
towards a more staid, matter-of-fact register in the Enquiry. The salience of Skepticism’s excess 
would arguably make it finally more important to downplay any anxiety around it than to 
exacerbate it, especially if you wanted anyone to remain persuaded by your analysis. At a certain 
point, abandoning your faith in the robust soundness of commonsense for the exactness of the 
critical risks compromising a more basic credibility. Over-investing in the critical risks a 
disqualifying and disorienting detachment from commonsense, i.e. good sense and proportion. It 
opens Hume up to the charge of excess and idiosyncrasy, as we saw with Johnson’s “milking the 
bull.” At a certain heightened pitch, the Skeptic simply looks like an Idiot. From this perspective, 
we can see Hume’s shipwreck scene as indulging in this trope of “rudderlessness,” precariously 
trying to reverse its moral charge. The young Hume seems almost to relish this terrifying 
disorientation. It has the existential frisson of a rollercoaster ride or a bungie jump. Young Hume 
works to make Skepticism look not idiotic but heroic: to redefine intellectual courage as 
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unmooring oneself in this most painfully Skeptical way.102 And from a neo-Kantian perspective, 
Skepticism does decidedly look heroic, and Hume’s Skepticism even prophetic. But in the 
eighteenth century it would have more likely looked Idiotic for anyone who believed criticism to 
be the handmaiden to commonsense. Beattie’s reaction to Hume is representative in its hostility 
to Idiocy: “Those unnatural productions, the vile effusion of a hard heart, that mistakes its own 
restlessness for the activity of genius, and its own captiousness for sagacity of understanding, 
may, like other monsters, please a while by their singularity; but the charm is soon over” (444-5). 
And Reid writes, “If a man pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the informations [sic] of sense, 
and yet prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men do, he must excuse my suspicion, that 
he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon himself” (373).  
 Yet, Hume himself — who even from the Treatise sought to correct critical philosophy 
by “communicat[ing]” a “gross earthy mixture” of commonsense as much as he sought to correct 
commonsense with a healthy dose of critical skepticism — seems capable of a similar hostility, 
and he gives it the last word — or at least the last chapter — in the Enquiry.103  Hume argues that 
commonsense finally disciplines an immature excessive skepticism into a “mitigated” 
skepticism. Hume writes: “There is, indeed, a more mitigated skepticism or academical 
philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this 
Pyrrhonism, or excessive skepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, 
corrected by common sense and reflection” (161, Hume’s emphasis). Excessive skepticism lacks 
the appropriate definition: it is overly generalized when it should be specified, targeted, and 
constructive. Excessive skepticism is vague and metastatic when it should be more clearly 
defined and locally applied. Excessive skepticism is finally more disorienting than clarifying 
since it underappreciates its irreducible instrumentality, its need to be “durable and useful” for 
commonsense and action, to be more stabilizing than destabilizing. Foregoing this 
                                                            
102 Sarah Tindal Kareem has persuasively argued along these lines that Hume “gothicizes” induction and scepticism 
(162-3) and “characterizes…belief…in terms of romance’s apparitional effects” (153). See “Lost in the Castle of 
Scepticism” in 
103 Kemp Smith remarks that ‘Hume was no less ready than Reid and Beattie to agree that a philosophy stands self-
condemned if it forbids us to indulge in [common sense principles]. Any attempt to displace them either by other 
beliefs or by a sheerly sceptical refusal to entertain any beliefs whatsoever is, Hume has insisted, bound to be self-
defeating. If the choice be only between them and a philosophy which denies them, it is common sense that must be 
held to” (8). Consider Stephen Boulter’s recent articulation of this commonsense imperative in The Rediscovery of 
Commonsense Philosophy: “There must be such a distinctive and legitimate contribution philosophy makes in [a 
wider educational context] if it is to avoid redundancy or the fate of all hermetically sealed endeavours, namely, a 
lingering death due to its irrelevance to the wider context” (7). 
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instrumentality to exacerbate an excessive instability is idiotic: and finally self-defeating because 
undermined by the inevitable return of commonsense stability. Again Hume: “The great 
subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and 
the occupations of common life” (159). Excessive skepticism must finally answer to its 
significance on moral and commonsense grounds: “For here is the chief and most confounding 
objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can every result from it; while it remains 
in its full force and vigour” (159). The final crucible is not philosophical but rhetorical and 
moral: “We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all 
these curious researches?” (159). For Hume, the question about Skepticism’s significance is for 
commonsense, not critique, to answer. For Hume, excessive skepticism is “subverted” by 
“action, and employment, and the occupations of common life;” it is disciplined into mitigated 
skepticism by something like Booth’s rhetoric of reasonableness. 
 
3.2 Hume Misreading Locke 
In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748, 1777), Hume introduces his 
discussion of “probability” with a short critique of the inadequacies of Lockean probability: 
Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we 
must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise 
tomorrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide 
into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such argument 
from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition. (56) 
 
This criticism of Locke’s failure to register these nuances with the realm of probability in the 
Enquiry resumes similar critiques Hume levies in The Treatise against insufficient philosophical 
attention to the nuances of probable knowledge. In the Abstract to the Treatise, Hume echoes 
Leibnitz's observations that philosophers, while “very copious when they explain the operations 
of the understanding in the forming of demonstrations” (408), are “too concise when they treat of 
probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and 
which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations” (408).  
A moment in the Treatise again identifies the major consequence of this general neglect 
to be an insufficient attention to the different degrees of certainty afforded by probable 
knowledge. The problem, for Hume, is illustrated concisely by observing the distance between 
philosophical and popular uses of the term probable. Philosophers use probability to designate 
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the entire class of knowledge related to contingent “matter of facts” and distinguish this class 
from the more traditional, a priori class of demonstrative knowledge related to “relations of 
ideas.” Popular usage, on the other hand, reserve probability as a subjective assessment of the 
moderate degree of belief warranted by specific probable facts or arguments. Although Hume 
accepts the importance of philosophy’s distinction between demonstrative and probable 
knowledge, he also felt that the popular usage of the term illustrated how this foundational 
distinction could not tell us much about the nature of probable knowledge and how we use it and, 
more preciously, tended to flatten the class of probable facts in a way that ignored how many 
facts — though theoretically probable — were far from merely probable in the common sense. 
He ultimately adopts the philosophical distinction but objects that 
...’tis however certain, that in common discourse we readily affirm, that many 
arguments from causation exceed probability, and may be receiv’d as a superior 
kind of evidence. One wou’d appear ridiculous, who wou’d say, that ’tis only 
probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye; tho’ ’tis plain we 
have no farther assurance of the facts, than what experience affords us. (86) 
 
To remedy this defect, Hume again recommends — as we saw in the Inquiry — designating a 
class of “proof” within probability which might distinguish “those [probable] arguments, which 
are deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect, and which are entirely free from doubt and 
uncertainty” (86). 
There are many aspects of this critique which are consistent with and even representative 
of Hume’s skeptical philosophy. For instance, it exhibits a general skepticism towards misleading 
philosophical constructions, particularly those which are promoted as clarifying. It also features 
Hume’s characteristic appeal to common sense and common language as a corrective to bad 
philosophical constructions which, for Hume, were the result of conducting philosophical 
investigations without sufficient attention to the way people actually live. As it often does, 
Hume’s skepticism turns common speech into its crucible, curbing the errors of philosophy by 
reading those errors back to it: showing that what may seems sensible in philosophy can sound 
“ridiculous” in any other context. But what I want to focus on is how this skeptical moment is 
inconsistent with the interpretation of Hume as arch-skeptic.  
Though Hume deploys skepticism to motivate and justify his complaint, the force of 
Hume complaint here is not skeptical but naturalistic: in short, deploys skepticism to recommend 
against any doubts about our ability to attain practical certainty which the distinction between 
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demonstrative and probable knowledge might seem to encourage. Unlike the more searching, 
anxious plunges into radical skepticism in the Treatise, Hume here offers a constructive 
skepticism: a positive skepticism meant to reconstruct knowledge on the ground cleared by 
negative skepticism. Hume is not agonizing over the irreducible uncertainties that attend 
probable knowledge (which demands its distinction from demonstration in the first place). 
Rather, he is dismissing the relevance of this irreducible uncertainty with respect to everyday life 
and action. He is not worrying about the prospect of missing the importance of irreducible 
theoretical uncertainty, but of missing this crucial categorical distinction that shows the practical 
limits of uncertainty: how certain probable inferences might be “entirely free from doubt and 
uncertainty” (86). Common sense, for Hume, grounds out negatively in what cannot be doubted.  
These observations are perhaps sufficient evidence that the version of Hume-as-radical-
skeptic popular in neo-Kantian Romanticism, at the least, fails to capture the whole picture of 
Hume’s philosophy — most importantly, how his negative skepticism functions largely in the 
service of his positive, constructive naturalism. Or, if this claim seems too strong, at the least 
how his skepticism is informed and inflected by his naturalism. And it is perhaps no small irony 
that the version of Hume-as-radical-skeptic might be said to reproduce a similar sort of oversight 
Hume pins to Locke. Where Hume argues that Locke’s two-class epistemology overlooks the 
crucial third category of “proof”, one could argue the Hume-as-radical-skeptic approach 
overlooks the philosophical implications of Hume’s abiding interest in this third category. 
Moreover, this oversight arises from the way the Hume- as-radical-skeptic approach privileges 
Hume’s more widely known skeptical engagements with the two broader categories of 
demonstrative and probable knowledge — most notably, his critique of “necessary connection.”  
Of course, there are good reasons for emphasizing Hume’s many skeptical interventions, 
not the least of which being that Hume himself tends to promote them as his major philosophical 
achievements. There is a section of the Inquiry entitled “The Idea of Necessary Connection” but 
no section titled “The Importance of the Category of Proof.” However, there are also good 
reasons to believe that Hume’s skepticism works in the service of his naturalism. 
Consider, for instance, how Hume’s complaint about Locke appears to more or less a 
willful misreading of Locke’s account of probability which, pace Hume, does appear to observe 
something like Hume’s category of proof or practical certainty. In his treatment of probability in 
the Essay, for instance, Locke concedes that while “most of the Propositions we think, reason, 
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discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have undoubted Knowledge of their Truth” it is 
also evident that “...yet some of them border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all 
about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as if 
they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain” 
(IV.XV.2).  
To be sure, there are ways to create space between Locke and Hume here. Locke and 
Hume are obviously in pursuit of a similar sort of practical certainty within probability based, in 
large part, on observing the same set of natural regularities (e.g. the sun will rise tomorrow, all 
humans die). But Locke and Hume theorize practical certainty in very different ways, and I will 
eventually want to consider that difference since it affords insight into other foundational 
differences, most notably, their differing assessments of the ultimate relation between 
demonstrative and probable knowledge (i.e. whether and how these two continents of knowledge 
connect back up somewhere below the evident gulf). But for the moment I would like to work 
from the assumption that Locke’s qualification here sufficiently accounts for the distinction 
Hume wants to make and that, in this sense, Hume either misses or misreads Locke on this point.  
If Hume misreads Locke in this way, how should we interpret this misreading? The 
philosopher M. Jamie Ferreira proposes one promising approach in Skepticism and Reasonable 
Doubt (1982). Leaving aside the question of “whether or not Hume was correct in attributing this 
failure to Locke,” Ferreira concentrates on the fact that Hume saw this reading of Locke as 
“unproblematic” (1). For Ferreira, this fact only makes sense if we understand Hume to be 
judging Locke’s failure relative to the more thorough emphasis placed on this category of proof 
in the anti-skeptical tradition founded by Locke’s contemporaries, Tillotson, Wilkins, and 
Chillingworth, but ultimately eclipsed by Locke’s popularity. That tradition established a 
“constructive skeptical” program which absorbed skeptical objections about the fundamental 
uncertainty of probable knowledge but, in the face of these objections, pursued a category of 
“moral certainty” which, they argued, pace the skeptic, was sufficient to guide belief and action 
and not subject to doubt. As such, Ferreira argues that Hume’s naturalism should be seen as 
participating in a mid-eighteenth-century revival of this tradition initiated by Joseph Butler’s 
probability-based apologetics, continues in Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy, and 
culminates in Cardinal John Newman’s theory of assent in the mid-nineteenth century.  
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Ferreira’s argument seems historically illuminating and plausible enough. Yet, by 
ultimately sidestepping (though conceding) the more direct question of misreading, Ferreira’s 
relatively conservative case for Hume’s naturalism fails to capitalize on the interpretive potential 
of this moment: something I want to pursue here as evidence against what I have called the neo-
Kantian misreading of Humean skepticism. For one, Ferreira does not adequately capture 
Hume’s preoccupation with the category. First, we see that Hume was actively searching for the 
category of proof in Locke but still did not find it. And, second, we see that Hume sustained this 
reading from the Treatise to the Inquiry. It was there in the Treatise, and thus not some 
conservative addition made to the polished, evenhanded Inquiry or, alternatively, some errant 
juvenilia cut from the raw Treatise. More to my purposes, it does not do enough to combat the 
view of Hume as arch-skeptic and to expose that view as a form of misreading itself.  
Indeed, I believe Hume’s misreading implies more than simply an objection to Locke’s 
relatively insufficient attention. Rather, it has the character of Harold Bloom’s poetic misprision 
or “strong misreading.” As in the Introduction, I am not particularly interested in translating all 
of Bloom’s claims about the poetic tradition and applying them to this philosophical tradition. 
But, at the least, approaching Hume’s engagement with Locke through Bloomean misreading 
supports a stronger interpretation of Hume’s engagement with Locke and, as such, a stronger 
case for Hume’s naturalism than Ferreira gives. After all, we do have a young philosopher (in his 
mid-twenties when he published the Treatise) trying to situate himself within a crowded 
tradition. And this negotiation involves, notably, an idiosyncratic re-appropriation of aspects of 
Locke’s philosophy: not simply the category of “proof” but even the concept of “proof” which, 
for Locke, refers more precisely to the mediate ideas that form the chain of “agreement” between 
two relatively distant ideas. But, more importantly, Bloom’s misprision allows us to assert the 
special weight Hume wants to place on this category of proof and signals the special emphasis 
we should place on his naturalism. Bloom, of course, understood such misreading to be the 
primary means of engagement with the poetic tradition, more telling than any explicit criticisms 
of professions of allegiance a poet might make. In our case, we might say whatever skeptical 
aspects of his philosophy Hume promoted as his major achievements, here we haves compelling 
evidence for his preoccupation with and investment in this particular naturalist intervention and, 
as such, further evidence that the version of Hume-as-radical-skeptic constitutes its own form of 
misreading. 
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We can approach this same question through a third theory of misreading Mary Poovey 
develops in A History of the Modern Fact (2001) to register the rapidly shifting ground of 
eighteenth-century epistemology. Poovey’s approach predicts that a philosopher like Hume, 
when reading backwards to a predecessor such as Locke for his own epistemology, will 
inevitably generate a “misreading” of the early theory that fails, in some way, to reproduce the 
“author’s intentions” or the precise “political, philosophical, and semantic contexts in which the 
text was produced” (21) and, as such, which can be used to measure “changing configurations of 
knowledge” (21). Poovey calls these configurations “ensembles” as sees them as integrated, 
consistent systems organized in “hierarchies of kinds of knowledge, whose individual members 
may change definition and whose internal order may change too” (21). For Poovey, as these 
ensembles evolve with “some ways of knowing acquir[ing] enhanced prestige while others fall in 
status,” questions that “once made sense to an intellectual community become problematic” (21). 
In this sense, misreadings often take the form of reversing the direction or poles of inquiry: 
misreadings appear as “solution[s] to a problem that was never posed in the terms in which the 
solution is being offered” or as answers which “transform what was initially a statement into a 
question, which the answer now addresses” (22).  
Poovey’s approach to misreading allows us to draw out the distance between Locke and 
Hume’s understanding of practical certainty. I bypassed these differences earlier, in part, to 
follow out the assumption that Hume’s critique of Locke amounts to a “strong misreading” in 
Bloom’s sense and its implications for the significance of Hume’s naturalism. But I also 
bypassed them because registering those differences requires understanding the different ways 
Locke and Hume imagine this category of practical certainty to fit within the hierarchy of 
probable knowledge and in relation to demonstration. We will now have to pursue these 
differences here to give a more precise account of the character of Hume’s misreading of Locke’s 
third category, which I will argue is representative of how Hume’s naturalism (mis)reads Locke’s 
naturalism more generally. 
Let’s begin to sketch this hierarchy of knowledge by returning to Locke’s Essay and 
observing how Locke constructs his account of probable certainty through an analogy with 
demonstrative certainty. For Locke, we assent to these practical certain propositions “as if they 
were infallibly demonstrated:” our knowledge of them is “perfect and certain.” He applies a 
similar analogical formation elsewhere, at one point describing the same class of probability 
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which “though it never amounts to Knowledge, no not to that which is the lowest degree of it: 
yet sometimes the intermediate Ideas tie the Extremes so firmly together, and the Probability is 
so clear and strong, that Assent as necessarily follows it, as Knowledge does Demonstration” 
(IV.XVII.16).  Quite obviously, Locke’s analogy only makes sense if we accept a vertical, 
hierarchical relation obtaining between demonstrative and probable knowledge. The analogy 
elevates a species of probability to the higher realm of demonstration. 
This analogical description is pervasive in empiricist epistemologies developing out of 
Locke. It is also the common way Tillotson, Wilkins, and others in the constructivist tradition 
preceding Locke describe the category of “moral certainty.” It is unclear if Hume also subscribed 
to this vertical scheme, even as he does accept that demonstration affords an absolute degree of 
certainty probability does not allow. But when Hume describes the certainty afforded by 
probable “proof,” he notably avoids analogizing practical certainty with demonstrative certainty 
as Locke does. Instead, as we have seen, he measures that certainty against the good sense 
exhibited in ordinary language (“one wou’d appear ridiculous, who wou’d say, that ’tis only 
probable the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye”). I believe Hume’s resistance to 
this kind of analogizing is exceptional in this sense, and we are in a position to ask if Hume 
intentionally avoids this analogy, and why. 
There are good reasons for assuming Hume would have wanted to avoid this analogy. For 
one, Hume was interested in preserving a firm distinction between probability and 
demonstration, and this particular analogy conspicuously undermines it. Positing a practical 
equivalence between the two classes of knowledge undercuts the more basic claims about their 
incommensurability. It turns a self-evident distinction into a hermeneutic problem: or, to hijack 
Poovey’s critical terms for a moment, it turns that distinction into a question rather than an 
answer. The analogy traffics in the same fuzzy, wishful thinking Hume sees as responsible for the 
mistaken “idea of necessary connection,” a central target of his skepticism. To Hume, the 
concept of logical necessity is, rightly understood, valid only in “reasoning about ideas” and has 
only been illegitimately and hazily imported into the probable realm to describe the “feeling” of 
necessity that causal reasoning about matters of fact typically inspires. But, for Hume, this 
feeling of necessity is psychological not logical. Logical necessity requires a systematic principle 
of non-contradiction like the one that obtains in demonstrative reasoning. In “matters of fact” — 
where associative relations are always contingent and could always possibly have been otherwise 
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— necessity in this binding, logical sense never holds. For Hume, this stronger, metaphysical 
idea of necessary connection assumes a fundamental unity between demonstrative and probable 
realm that not only contradicts claims of their incommensurability but fundamentally distorts our 
account of probability. Probable reasoning is not rational in any logical sense but rather 
imaginative, associative, and “practically” rational.  
The desire to describe this system of practical rationality — the kind of rules and 
mechanisms that govern it — propels Hume’s skepticism. Likewise, this skepticism is generally 
directed at incursions from demonstration which threaten the integrity of this account of practical 
rationality. And so, in this sense, it seems quite reasonable that Hume would have viewed the 
analogy comparing moral certainty with demonstrative certainty as perilous and misguided.  
As it happens, for Locke, the analogy between probable and demonstrative reasoning 
goes much deeper than a heuristic comparison of “moral” with “demonstrative” certainty. As 
David Owen argues, Locke’s view of the structure of probable reasoning is “strictly analogous” 
to his view of demonstrative reasoning: both involve “a chain of ideas” and differ only in the 
sense that “connexion[s] between each link” (148) vary in degrees of certainty. Intervening or 
mediating relations of ideas — the connections Locke idiosyncratically calls “proofs” — are 
“absolutely certain” in demonstration but only true “for the most part” in probability. Locke also 
understands probable and demonstrative knowledge to both be grounded in a more immediate, 
sensual (often visual) perception of truth as “agreement,” which Locke calls intuition (Essay 
531). Lockean intuition makes the distinction between probable and demonstrative somehow 
both a matter of kind and a matter of degree. Again, like the heuristic analogy, it obscures the 
nature of this distinction. It’s no surprise that Hume responds to Lockean intuition as he does 
“necessary connection.” Though he accepts a form of intuitive, immediate perception similar to 
Lockean intuition, Hume confines it to “immediate” “reasoning about ideas” (as opposed to 
demonstrative chains of reasoning, which were “mediated”) and bars it from his account of 
probable reasoning about “matters of fact.” Insofar as this analogy is enabled by this mode of 
intuition, we have even stronger independent evidence that Hume would have been avoiding the 
analogy. 
These various objections — to necessity, to intuition, and to any kind of traffic between 
demonstrative and probable knowledge — illustrate how Hume’s naturalism demands a rejection 
of any analogy, heuristic or otherwise, of probable proof with demonstrative. But, as Poovey’s 
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model of misreading would anticipate, Hume’s objections against the irrelevance of 
demonstration to his naturalist project entails a more fundamental reconfiguration of the 
hierarchy of knowledge, one that inverts the vertical hierarchy we have already encountered. 
That hierarchy was organized by theoretical degrees of certainty, but this naturalistic hierarchy is 
organized by practical utility: in this scheme, practical “proof” constitutes the highest certainty in 
the field of probability, and probability more generally supplants demonstration as an infinitely 
more valuable and practical guide to everyday judgment. However certain demonstration may 
be, it is of little practical value. 
Though Hume’s philosophy perhaps more thoroughly internalizes this second, revised 
hierarchy, it is also central to Locke’s philosophy. Hume finds Lockean intuition interfering with 
the pursuit of a naturalist account of probability, but Locke’s unifying concept of intuition seems 
in some way an effect of Locke’s own naturalist intervention in the scholastic tradition that 
preceded him. I have been describing Locke’s epistemology in the terms Hume provides, 
probable and demonstrative knowledge. But Locke’s philosophy more accurately appropriates 
and radically revises the older scholastic distinctions of “knowledge” and “opinion” that I 
described in Chapter Two. In the same way Hume rejected the practical relevance of the logical 
necessity of demonstrative reasoning, Locke rejects the practical value of the syllogistic logic 
and a priori demonstrative reasoning of scholastic “knowledge.” Locke’s demonstrative 
“knowledge,” though “certain” in some sense like scholastic “knowledge,” is grounded in a more 
naturalistic intuition and governed by a non-formal rationality. He levels the older version of 
knowledge — once seen as the only legitimate form of knowledge compared to the illegitimate, 
low “opinion” (“probability” in the older scholastic sense of “approved” by some authoritative 
figure) — and relocates it on the same epistemological ground, if slightly higher than, a more 
capacious concept of “probability.”  
I have been pursuing the possibility that Hume observed Locke’s account of practical 
certainty and “misread” it in a way that was, against appearances, not simply youthful 
insouciance, a la Bloom, but doing some significant critical and corrective work, a la Poovey — 
even if that work might be powered more by the differential between the knowledge “ensembles” 
engulfing Locke and Hume than any differential between Locke and Hume. On this supposition, 
I observed that Hume avoids analogizing practical proof with demonstration the way Locke does, 
and then considered some plausible reasons to assume that Hume intentionally avoids this 
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analogy, motivated by his desire to pursue an undistorted and autonomous description of 
probability. I then made the case that Locke’s analogy between demonstration and probability, 
though viewed suspiciously by Hume, is an effect of Locke’s own naturalistic intervention in 
scholastic philosophy. In which case, Hume’s misreading of Locke’s analogy in the name of 
naturalism potentially obscures their shared commitment to reorganizing knowledge in the name 
of common sense and practical utility. So from here we’d have something like this progression: 
Locke’s individual intuition establishes a naturalistic unity of mind that flattens the scholastic 
division of knowledge and opinion. Hume, in turn, recoils from the way this unity licenses 
communication between probability and demonstration and, as such, reasserts a firm break 
between demonstration and probability. In this way, Hume’s naturalism is propelled by a global 
misreading of Locke’s naturalism. The local misreading Hume makes of Locke would then be 
symptomatic of this more general misreading.104  
Now, I believe this is a sufficiently persuasive account of character of Hume’s 
naturalism.105 And I submit this as evidence against a radical Hume since it suggests, against the 
neo-Kantian misreading of Hume, that, if anything, Hume would have been so invested in moral 
certainty that he would have been inclined to misread Locke in this naturalistic direction: to 
believe that Locke had in some way left this high degree of probabilistic certainty out of the 
accounting. But as it stands, this reading still only gives us a negative of picture of the methods 
Hume refuses to employ to construct his category of proof. It does not provide a sense of the 
methods he does use to build it. Likewise, insofar as this account stresses Hume’s rejection of 
Locke’s analogy between probability and demonstration, it obscures how Hume’s construction of 
proof still draws heavily and even analogously from the structure exhibited by demonstrative 
reasoning. Hume’s search for the limits of his third category of proof is organized as a search for 
sufficient “analogues” to the rules of demonstrative reasoning which might apply in “proof.” 
Indeed, his use of proof here seems to be a kind of catachresis. In any case, this heuristic, 
predictive approach to analogy is central to the way Hume builds his epistemology and his 
                                                            
104 Compare with Ian Hacking’s claim that “Hume completed that historical transformation by which the signs of the 
low sciences [i.e. internal evidence] beame identical with the causes of the high” (Probability 183).  
105 Compare Owen’s account of Hume’s correction of Locke: with his theory of probable reasoning “Hume had 
Locke, or a Lockean theory, very much in mind. And both Locke and Hume thought that conformity with past 
experience was a ground of probability…But Locke thought that opinion based on probability was grounded in 
reason and the understanding every bit as much as demonstrative knowledge. Hume’s argument concerning probable 
reasoning is an attack on this Lockean thought. Of course, Hume then goes on to give his own account of the nature 
and basis of probable reasoning…” (Owen 152) 
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ethics. I will discuss Hume’s approach to analogy at length in the next two sections, but it is 
worth introducing here in this context as a way of wrapping up this misreading a la Poovey. 
To observe this analogical method, I want to look at the way Hume grounds the certainty 
of “proof” negatively as that which it would be ridiculous to doubt or assume to be otherwise. In 
the Treatise, for instance, Hume’s claim that “‘tis however certain, that in common discourse we 
readily affirm, that many arguments from causation exceed probability” is supported by the 
observation that “One wou’d appear ridiculous” to say otherwise. Another intermittent discussion 
of probability Enquiry, offers a similarly negative formulation: “Nor does any man ever entertain 
a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts; as in all 
other instances, which have ever fallen under his observation” (Enquiry 104). And here I will 
suggest that these formulations — which center on the absurdity of imagining otherwise — are 
organized with the principle of non-contradiction that governs demonstrative knowledge. Indeed, 
Hume is preoccupied with the absence of this principle in probable knowledge. He sees its 
absence as the primary reason probable reasoning operates differently than demonstrative 
reasoning. Hume, like his contemporaries, understood a “contradiction” explicitly as “absurd” in 
a more specialized sense of wholly “unintelligible” or incapable of being imagined or conceived 
(e.g. 2+2=4=5): 
Whatever is absurd is unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to 
conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration. But as in reasonings from 
causation, and concerning matters of fact, this absolute necessity cannot take 
place, and the imagination is free to conceive both sides of the question, I still ask, 
Wherein consists the deference betwixt incredulity and belief? (66) 
 
Hume ultimately struggles to find a satisfactory difference between incredulity and belief, simply 
admitting that belief is “something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the 
judgment from the fictions of the imagination” (66). But I want to suggest the feeling of 
absurdity – the ridiculousness of imagining otherwise – functions as a probable analogue to the 
“absurdity” of contradiction, as a negative feeling motivating Hume’s grasps at a positive 
description of the feeling of belief — the “different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a 
superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness” (68)). 
Hume seems to finally ground his account of moral certainty not only on this 
psychological concept of “stability” but on a social desire to not appear and act in ways that are 
credible and not absurd. Much like Campbell, he foregrounds the older concept of “probability” 
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as the basis of moral evidence. But Hume’s concept of probability is motivated by a shared 
aversion to looking absurd or incredible:  
Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, 
deriv’d from a consideration of their motives, temper and situation. Thus when we 
see certain characters or figures describ’d upon paper, we infer that the success of 
Augustus, the cruelty of Nero; and remembering many other concurrent 
testimonies we conclude, that those facts were once really existent, and that so 
many men, without any interest, wou’d never conspire to deceive us; especially 
since they must, in the attempt, expose themselves to the derision of all their 
contemporaries, when these facts were asserted to be recent and universally 
known. The same kind of reasoning runs thro’ politics, war, commerce, 
oeconomy, and indeed mixes itself so entirely in human life, that ’tis impossible 
to act or subsist a moment without having recourse to it. (my emphasis, 260) 
 
Hume’s emphasis is on moral facts as they socially and historically exchanged and verified. The 
veracity and stability of these moral facts is underwritten by a distinctly social and psychological 
aversion of being “exposed…to the derision of all their contemporaries” (260). Rationality and 
reliable knowledge emerges as an imperative to appear and act credible. And a mutual 
confidence in this shared aversion is absolutely necessary to common life: for Hume, this kind of 
necessity gives the lie to the concept of free will and liberty: “as nothing more nearly interests us 
than our own actions and those of others, the greatest part of our reasonings is employ’d in 
judgments concerning them” and “whoever reasons after this manner, does ipso facto believe the 
actions of the will to arise from necessity, and that he knows not what he means, when he denies 
it” (260).  For Hume, this kind of moral reasoning is not only universal, it is also 
indistinguishable from the kind of probabilistic reasoning about “natural” or physical facts: 
“indeed, when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together, and form 
only one chain of argument betwixt them, we shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of the 
same nature, and deriv’d from the same principles” (261). Here, we see how thoroughly Hume’s 
ethics and his epistemology align and intersect in a philosophy of action. 
 
3.3 What Crisis of Analogy?  
 The previous two sections should clarify that the radically skeptical interpretation of 
Hume pursued by neo-Kantian Romanticism risks severely distorting Hume’s philosophy by 
diminishing or ignoring its naturalistic thrust. Hume’s remarks on mitigated skepticism should 
make it clear that Hume finds skepticism to be valuable only insofar as it remains conditioned 
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and corrected by commonsense. They should also clarify that Hume not only acknowledged the 
tension between his naturalism and his skepticism but understood this tension to be a productive 
dialectic. In this light, characterizing Hume’s varying orientations towards skepticism as some 
sort of ideological contradiction that Hume somehow elides — for instance, as a fault line 
between Humean ethics and epistemology rather than a dialectic play between Hume’s 
commonsense and critical investments— is misleading. Yet neo-Kantian Romanticism simply 
prefers emphasizing a radical Humean epistemology to a more proportional or representative 
picture of his philosophy. Moreover, it prefers to take this radical skeptical epistemology to be 
somehow representative of Enlightenment skepticism more broadly and as such to amplify the 
supposed anxiety around Humean skepticism to generate a wider crisis of belief. Neo-Kantian 
intellectual history prefers a metastatic picture of generalized doubt. Positing this wider 
“generalized” doubt produced by Humean skepticism, in turn, enables different “rise of 
Romanticism” narratives as this generalized doubt about accessing objective truth becomes a 
precondition of the Romantic turn to subjectivity. But privileging Hume’s skepticism at the 
expense of Hume’s naturalism not only misrepresents the character of Hume’s philosophy; it 
also overlooks what makes Hume’s philosophy representative of the broader tenor of 
Anglophone skepticism. In short, no eighteenth-century Anglophone philosopher, including 
Hume, could embrace radical skepticism in an unqualified manner. To be sure, skepticism had to 
be thorough and even total to be an effective intellectual discipline. But it also had to remain 
constructive and instrumental; the commonsense and the practical had to remain in focus. 
 This neo-Kantian distortion is most evident and problematic in the way neo-Kantian 
Romanticism has approached Hume’s thinking about analogy, largely because of how neo-
Kantian Romanticism must enlist Hume’s more trenchant skeptical critiques of analogical 
reasoning — most notably, Hume’s critique of natural theological arguments from design in his 
posthumous Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) — to generate a broader ontological 
“crisis” of analogy which, according to one influential tradition of neo-Kantian literary history, 
initiates the rise of Romantic poetics. In terms of our microcosm, we can review the conscription 
of Humean skepticism in this narrative as illustrative of neo-Kantian intellectual history’s 
remarkable flexibility and ingenuity as a hermeneutic: the way the neo-Kantian topos of crisis 
can effortlessly detached or abstracted from this specific philosophical context to lend a 
meaningful shape for any number of accounts of the rise of modernity; or, put another way, the 
 167 
way neo-Kantian intellectual history enables tracing a wide variety of phenomena back to the 
rise of epistemological skepticism.  
 In Wasserman’s variant of the crisis of analogy thesis (arguably the most influential and 
complete), the rise of epistemological skepticism places increasing pressure the ontological 
system of correspondences inherited from the Renaissance that undergirds this neo-classical 
poetics of analogy. 106 Wasserman refers to this system as the “divine analogy.”107 With the rise 
of epistemological skepticism, philosophers and poets alike began “[n]o longer thinking 
analogically but consciously thinking about thinking analogically” (71). Hume’s Dialogues in 
particular “threw a dark shadow of doubt over the entire subject” (“Nature Moralized” 57). As a 
result of this widespread critique of analogy, analogy loses its ontological status and falls into the 
irreducibly and problematically subjective fields of rhetoric and associationist psychology. For 
Wasserman, this widespread “loss of faith” in the divine analogy has important consequences 
within poetics. While the divine analogy once provided the Elizabethan poet with a generative 
set of recognizable correspondences, once it was “brought out of the mist of faith” and 
“examined for a rationale,” this enervated framework becomes more constricting than enabling. 
The eighteenth-century poet “became timid lest his analogies be reckless, more limited to only 
small fragments of the total analogical pattern, and less confident of its ontological validity” 
(41). What results is a “poetry of hobbling simile, rather than symbol” (22), one that merely 
“dodges” the neo-Kantian project of reconciliation: as Wasserman writes, “The resort to analogy 
only dodges the problem, since it both pretends to a relation between subject and object and yet 
keeps them categorically apart” (21). It is only once the divine analogy finally “collapse[s] 
through over-much probing” that Romanticism’s neo-Kantian task becomes apparent: it becomes 
“obvious to the Romantic that his first task was to put the two worlds together again” (“Nature 
Moralized” 41). Romanticism relinquishes any investment in mimetic correspondence, liberates 
itself from the strictures of rationality, and confidently and heroically embraces a mythopoetic 
symbolism and a radically subjective expressionism. 
                                                            
106 See Wasserman, “Nature Moralized: The Divine Analogy in the Eighteenth Century” (1950), The Subtler 
Language: Critical Readings of Neoclassic and Romantic Poems (1959), and “The English Romantics: Grounds of 
Knowledge” (1964). 
107 Abrams refers to it as “Renaissance vitalism;” Foucault the Renaissance episteme; A.O. Lovejoy’s examines its 
logic of degrees of being as “great chain of being.” 
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 Wasserman’s history of the collapse of neo-classical analogy and the rise of the Romantic 
symbol has undergone several substantial critiques since its mid-century articulation. But, in 
keeping with the patterns I have outlined above, most Romantic scholars have remained 
unwilling to contest the basic credibility of either its description of analogy’s “crisis” or of the 
Romantic’s distinctly neo-Kantian response to this crisis. In his influential polemic against this 
literary history, for instance, Paul de Man questions Wasserman and Abrams’ shared enthusiasm 
for Romantic’s neo-Kantian ambitions, their shared conviction that Romantic symbolism 
achieves what it set out to do, and even their shared sense that Romantic symbolism somehow 
departs substantively from analogy.108 But de Man conspicuously does not reject the crisis of 
analogy itself. As Schey nicely observes, this creates a situation where de Man, Abrams, and 
Wasserman all reject analogy but for different, even seemingly contradictory, reasons: “From the 
deManian perspective of allegory, analogy appears to be a device of mystification that hides 
difference under an illusion of ontological identity” while “from the Wassermanian and 
Abramsian perspective of the Romantic symbol…analogy appears too demystified, too obviously 
rhetorical, and not at all ontologically secure” (183). Schey suggests that the symbol-allegory 
debate amounts to a “displaced symptom” of a “tension intrinsic to analogical thought” (184). I 
would say that de Man and Wasserman simply end up on two sides of the same neo-Kantian 
coin, and that this shared neo-Kantianism interferes with both de Man and Wasserman’s analyses 
of eighteenth-century analogy more than it points up any trans-historical aspect of analogy. Once 
again, it is the topos of crisis that proves the invariant, distorting core of neo-Kantian 
Romanticism. 
 It has only been within the last decade that critics have started to put more thorough 
pressure on Wasserman and Abrams’ description of the crisis of analogy itself. In The Book of 
God (2007), Colin Jager offers one of the earliest and strongest cases to date against this neo-
Kantian literary history and its conspicuously progressive picture of analogy’s collapse. Jager 
observes:  
[I]n the writings of Abrams and Wasserman, analogy keeps showing up as the poetic 
habit that romanticism kicked...Within this progressive narrative analogy is a kind of 
                                                            
108 For de Man, Romantic symbolism “certainly never abandoned” analogy as “an epistemological pattern” (159); 
rather, it mystifies analogy through a commitment to organicism in order to obscure the instability of analogy 
exposed by Enlightenment critique. On these ideological grounds de Man notoriously rejects Romantic symbolism 
and embraces neo-classical allegory (via Rousseau) as a demystified alternative which foregrounds its own 
constructedness. 
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regression, a refusal or inability to face up to the new day that is breaking in all 
around. Analogy seems to lack both rigor and originality; it makes nothing happen; it 
is the province of second-rate poets and derivative thinkers. (Jager 49-50) 
 
In one sense, Jager argues, “the romantic overcoming of analogy” functions as “just…an 
example of secularization” that signaled “the romantic’s willingness to strike out on their own 
rather than rely upon the traditions of the past” (Jager 49). But, in another sense, given analogy’s 
strong metaphysical and theological associations, Romanticism’s ostensible rejection of analogy 
provides “an argument for construing romanticism as that which overcomes or secularizes an 
entrenched religious tradition” (51). As such, Jager sees the mid-century “crisis” of analogy 
thesis as conforming to (and confirming) a secularization thesis in which “Romanticism rescues 
belief — a true or sincere relationship between internal and external — while jettisoning its 
metaphysical content” (Jager 50).109  Put another way, the crisis of analogy thesis would seem to 
identify Pulos’ “tendency” of Romanticism as secularization: it makes a case for defining 
Romanticism as secularization and even secularization as Romanticism110 — a case, I would 
argue, this is only plausible under the sign of neo-Kantian intellectual history. 
 Indeed, returning to Wasserman’s early articulations of this literary history leaves little 
question about the strong effect of Wasserman’s progressive secularism. In “The Grounds of 
Knowledge,” for instance, Wasserman suggests that it is “unnecessary to examine the manner in 
which science, skepticism, and rationalistic deism shattered the Christian myth” and “scripture 
became fiction, or allegory, or metaphor — anything but literal truth” (“Grounds” 40). To be 
sure, in an earlier essay, “Nature Moralized,” Wasserman offers a comprehensive survey of 
eighteenth-century theological negotiations of analogy to support this claim. But Wasserman 
approaches these theological negotiations from a position of condescension which, to my mind, 
severely constricts his investigation. Throughout, he is quick to observe and dismiss these 
theological negotiations on the grounds of logical contradiction and inconsistency. Only Hume 
                                                            
109 This pattern of crisis-and-reconciliation is also reflected in Wimsatt’s “The Structure of Romantic Nature 
Imagery” (1954). Both Wimsatt and Wasserman’s accounts of the relation between neo-classical and Romantic 
poetics is to establish a progressive narrative underwriting the superiority of Romantic poetics — with its principles 
of organic unity – through a contrast with the inferior poetic practice of eighteenth-century.  Wimsatt’s negative 
estimation of eighteenth-century poetry is so evident that, by the end of his essay, neoclassical poetics has nearly 
dropped out of his discussion of poetic structure altogether: what begins, presumably, as a comparative analysis of 
neo-classical and Romantic structures ends as a validation of the metaphysical and Romantic structure. 
110 Jager also notes de Man’s embrace of this secularization narrative: “The force of [de Man’s] distinction between 
symbol and allegory makes it difficult to see that he shares with his humanist opponents a belief in the necessity of 
secularization” (54) 
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holds the appropriate critical orientation towards analogy; everyone else in Wasserman's survey 
either misses, resists, or evades the writing on the wall with bad faith or rationalization.111 
Wasserman’s use of “unnecessary” should clarify that he does not see find this interpretation 
controversial; rather he sees himself performing a kind of neo-Kantian normal science: dotting i’s 
and crossing t’s. Neither his description of this collapse or of Romanticism’s neo-Kantian 
response are breaking new ground: they are simply providing a finer and more convincing 
clarification of what we already know to be true. This doctrinal attitude likewise inspires 
Wasserman’s claim that it was “obvious to the Romantic that his first task was to put the two 
worlds together again” (my emphasis, “Nature Moralized” 41). From Wasserman’s mid-century 
neo-Kantian perspective, it is simply self-evident and uncontroversial to define Romanticism in 
neo-Kantian terms. At one point, Wasserman describes the divine analogy as “the master key to 
the total scheme of creation” (41). And it does not seem too much of stretch to suggest that 
Wasserman approaches the neo-Kantian project of reconciliation as a similar kind of 
hermeneutical master key.  
 To be sure, there are some aspects of this neo-Kantian literary history that remain 
compelling, especially as they are outlined in Abrams’ Natural Supernaturalism. There is little 
doubt, for instance, that there was a broader reformative project centered on displacing this 
analogical scheme with rational and critical forms of analogy more suitable to a new Baconian 
view of science. And there is also little question that this project of critical reform placed a new 
attention on distinguishing legitimate forms of "philosophical" analogy from illegitimate forms 
of "poetic" or "rhetorical" analogy. But the progressivism inherent to literary historical narrative 
encourages it to overestimate the extent and the efficacy of this critical project. And its narrow 
emphasis on the collapse of divine analogy easily gives the false impression that this critical 
project (though certainly momentous) was more impactful than it finally was, especially in the 
eighteenth century. And in this respect Jager's critique is again instructive. While Jager ultimately 
accepts the bulk of this neo-Kantian literary history, his central innovation is to reject its 
selective emphasis on the “static scaffolding” of the neo-Platonic divine analogy (arguably 
encouraged by its secularizing aims) and to recover a more flexible, dynamic line of analogical 
                                                            
111For example, of one early eighteenth century divine, Wasserman writes, “At heart he is grasping after a vanishing 
faith in a divine scheme, while he secretly suspects it is man-made and that the correspondence is only an imperfect 
make-shift of the mind to realize its own abstractions. Finally, he knows too well other contemporary analyses of the 
foundations of analogy, and they have raised more questions than he can answer” (52). 
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thinking cultivated within natural theology obscured by Wasserman's conflation of all theological 
approaches to analogy with this neo-Platonic structure (113). Teasing out this natural theological 
approach to analogy, Jager demonstrates how natural theological arguments from design not only 
remained immune to Enlightenment critique but also became instrumental in grounding 
Romantic notions of the “designedness” of aesthetic objects and informing contemporary 
theorizations of the intentionality of literary texts. Unsurprisingly, Jager achieves his distance 
from Wasserman and Abrams in part pursuing a more sensitive reading of Hume’s Dialogues that 
resists the tendency to collapse the Dialogues into a straightforward critique of arguments from 
design and instead embraces the indeterminacy introduced by its literary form. Jager argues, for 
instance, that “the primary contribution” of the Dialogues is “not its powerful critique of 
design’s philosophical worthiness but rather its acknowledgement that the habits of mind and the 
structures of sociability associated with design can triumph over intellectual critique” (37). In 
other words, even as Jager seems to accept the force of Hume’s critique of analogy, Jager rejects 
Hume’s easy identification with the skeptical character Philo. And in this way departs from 
Wasserman’s intellectualist interpretation of Hume’s skeptical critique of analogy as maximally 
efficacious and definitive to register Hume’s ambivalence about the corrective power of critique 
when set against the habitual and commonsense. 
 Other literary scholars have attempted to complicate this neo-Kantian account of 
analogy’s crisis by recovering the wider range and complexity of eighteenth-century orientations 
towards analogy: though most, like Jager, have remained deferential to this neo-Kantian literary 
history, often surprisingly so given the radically different portraits of analogy these more 
comprehensive analyses paint.112 In any case, as Jager’s example nicely illustrates, this broader 
re-estimation of analogy in the Enlightenment has generally followed from rejecting a radically 
skeptical Hume and pursuing a more detailed attention to Hume’s naturalistic and optimistic 
reasonings about analogy. As Susan Manning cautions in her recent attempt to recover a more 
                                                            
112 Devin Griffiths’ recent monograph, The Age of Analogy (2016), accepts the validity of the eighteenth-century 
crisis of analogy as a prehistory to its robust and otherwise whiggish description of nineteenth-century analogical 
practices in literature and science (70). Marilyn Samuels’ unpublished 1974 dissertation by the same title ultimately 
defers to Abrams and Wasserman’s thesis even though her extensive analysis of eighteenth-century traditions of 
analogy leads her to protest that “too often…the major departures [of Romantic poetics] are looked on as a complete 
break with the analogy of Art and Nature, instead of a practically inevitable outgrowth of it” (151). From my 
perspective, both Samuels and Griffiths are in strong positions to contest this narrative more radically and, in any 
case, invoke it only peripherally. The crisis looks especially out-of-place and inactive in Griffiths’ otherwise 
whiggish history of science.  
 172 
robust eighteenth-century discourse of analogy, “Though he disputed fideist conclusions derived 
from such reasoning, David Hume’s sceptical epistemology established empirical understanding 
of the world on principles of correspondence and analogy” (xi).113 To be sure, Hume does adopt 
a critical orientation towards analogy, but that critical approach is largely conditioned by Hume’s 
naturalistic embrace of analogy. Hume’s deeper faith in the reliability of analogy makes Hume’s 
critical orientation towards analogical reasoning far more complicated than neo-Kantian 
Romanticism wants to allow given its desire to enlist Hume’s skepticism in a neo-Kantian topos 
of crisis.  
When neo-Kantian Romanticism draws a line between Hume’s approaches to analogy, it 
tends to do so between Hume’s sympathetic ethics and his skeptical epistemology. This line is 
drawn in the spirit of privileging Humean skepticism over Humean naturalism and with the 
intent of using one to critique the other. While I reject the credibility of this way of dividing up 
Hume's approach to analogy, I believe it is possible and necessary to draw some line. However, I 
want to argue that we should draw it between what I will call Hume’s commonsense and critical 
orientations towards analogy. I will hold off on defining these orientations in full until the next 
chapter, when I introduce a fuller analytic to contextualize Hume’s thinking about analogy within 
a wider set of orientations towards analogy in the long eighteenth century. But here I simply 
want to suggest that both orientations are underwritten by Hume's more basic confidence in both 
a) the basic legitimacy and stability of many forms of analogical inference and b) in the ability to 
assess the precise scope and force of any analogy by appealing to a formal theory of analogy. In 
this sense, Hume adopts what I will call a strong orientation towards analogy. Strong thus aims to 
capture a) Hume’s confidence that formal criteria for analogy are not only desirable but 
discernible and b) the critical impulse to discipline and judge analogy that follows from this 
confidence. So we can say that Hume holds a strong commonsense and a strong critical view of 
analogy, depending on the context, where commonsense and critical aim to capture Hume's 
vacillating sense of how strict, technical, theoretical, or counterintuitive those formal criteria for 
analogy should be.  
                                                            
113 Likewise, Schey recently observes that “[i]f Hume demolishes the argument from design in his Dialogues,” 
Hume also “concludes in his writings that ‘All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of 
Analogy” (Hume Enquiry 104). Following Deleuze, Schey takes Hume to have established the “first great logic of 
relations” (180). And for this reason, Schey is inclined to accept the picture of “generalized doubt” offered by 
Wasserman despite his dissatisfaction with both Wasserman and de Man’s negotiation of the question of analogy. In 
this sense, I would argue, Schey remains within the neo-Kantian Romantic paradigm. 
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 Highlighting this underlying confidence that must be present for a critical reform of 
analogy to even look viable should give us a sense of what’s wrong with Wasserman’s 
predominantly anxious picture. Anyone who adopted a strong orientation would have been 
motivated not by a loss in faith in analogy but by deeper confidence in the possibility of 
disciplining analogy into a reliable tool for both everyday and philosophical reasoning. Indeed, 
this renewed critical attention to analogy follows from the wider positive re-estimation of the 
value of probable knowledge discussed in the previous, once which began in the mid-seventeenth 
century following the remarkable advances of natural philosophy and the consequent 
reconceptualization of "science" as active, practical, and worldly rather than contemplative, 
philosophical, and ethereal. I will diagnose and correct this problem with neo-Kantian Romantic 
approaches to analogy more thoroughly in the next chapter. But at the moment want to consider 
how these strong orientations play out in Hume’s Dialogues. 
 
3.4 Commonsense and Critical Analogy in Hume's Dialogues  
 A strong orientation towards analogical reasoning can be especially inhibiting when 
approaching Hume’s complicated treatment of analogy in Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (1779). As Martin Warner observes in Philosophical Finesse (1989), many critics have 
been ill-served by approaching Dialogues as a clear-cut philosophical argument against natural 
theology merely wrapped in literary form. Martin Bell likewise rejects any so-called 
“camouflage” approach that assumes “it is possible to strip out the philosophical message from 
the historically determined literary form” or that “dialogue form is…merely a cover that modern 
readers need to remove” (Bell 229). As Bell, Warner, and others have noted, this approach to the 
Dialogues’ literary form unhelpfully flattens the text’s interpretive complexity and extinguishes 
what Jonathan Dancy has nicely referred to as the “shimmering” produced by its more difficult 
indeterminacy. As Warner observes, Dialogues is “designed to be read hermeneutically” (352), 
its dialogic form informed by the distinctly rhetorical principles of Ciceronian controversy (352), 
which Warner glosses in this way: 
[p]hilosophy should properly be carried on by means of cross-examination with 
an eye to revealing the probable; this will only be adequately done if each position 
is expounded at length so that each school’s opinion on a particular matter can be 
seen in its larger context, and its conceptual framework seen in relation to those of 
its rivals; as demonstrative certainty is impossible here, the persuasive force of 
such controversy in revealing what is most plausible has much in common with 
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that of the best rhetoric; the philosopher, therefore, should be ‘versed in rhetoric’, 
and the orator in the Academic ‘system of Philosophy.” (63) 
 
Warner offers up this framework on the grounds of Dialogues obvious debts to Ciceronian 
dialogue. But the broader philosophical landscape I have sketched around Hume’s philosophy 
also recommends this rhetorical picture. Like Ciceronian controversy, that landscape — typified 
by Campbell’s New Rhetoric — constantly observes a similar inability to generate 
“demonstrative” proof for any set of propositions and, thus, the irreducibly controversial, 
rhetorical, and probable nature of all “moral” knowledge: probable here itself modeled on 
testimony.  
One of the disadvantages of a strong orientation towards analogy is that, much like 
Skepticism, it tends to close down the this fuller, controversial rhetorical situation the Dialogues 
works to create. From a modern perspective, Philo’s Skeptical perspective is simply too superior 
to admit the credibility of Cleanthes’ deistic or Demea’s theistic perspective. And this 
argumentative superiority has long encouraged critics not only to identify Philo as the 
unquestionable “hero” of the dialogue but to identify Hume directly with Philo. A critical, 
secular perspective makes this kind of reading almost imperative, as a guard against the 
persistent seduction of natural theological reasoning. And some combination of these 
perspectives has led even literary critics to fairly unconvincing treatments of the more difficult 
aspects of its literary form and to mobilize irony in order to explain away the difficult facts that 
Cleanthes appears to win the argument, or that Philo appears to recant his line of Skeptical 
reasoning, or that Philo pursues two arguments rather than one. Again, on the “camouflage” 
interpretation, these difficulties are simply so many winks in the Skeptical, secular reader’s 
direction: in the most common version, Cleanthes only ostensibly wins, and Philo only gives his 
assent to Cleanthes’ God after he evacuates its content so thoroughly as to make this assent 
meaningless. 
But this secular bias for Philo’s critique can mask how serious and difficult Hume intends 
these formal aspects to be. And it also struggles to register how speculative, provisional, and 
finally inconclusive I believe Hume finds (or at least anticipates the contemporary reader to find) 
Philo’s more critical lines of argument against Cleanthes’s argument from analogy to be or how 
natural and intuitive the deistic concept of design would have felt prior to Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. When pursuing Philo’s more extreme speculative positions, Hume seems to be 
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interrogating his own understanding of analogy as much as he is interrogating Cleanthes’s 
natural theological use of analogy. From a modern perspective, Hume’s attempt to undermine 
Cleanthes’ argument from design may seem definitive and irresistible; but I want to suggest that 
it leaves Hume questioning the possibility of a critical theory of analogy altogether or, at least, a 
satisfactory critical explanation or rebuttal of the persuasive appeal of natural theology. And this 
is to say that we still do not have an appreciation of how Hume’s commonsense investments 
limit his critical ones in Dialogue.  
To be sure, while we should reject any easy identification of Philo with Hume, I believe 
there is little question that Hume ultimately feels more intellectually equipped to develop Philo’s 
Skeptical case. Indeed, in a frequently anthologized letter to Gilbert Elliot, Hume appears to 
grapple with how his critical, formal bias makes it difficult to inhabit or appreciate Cleanthes’ 
position:114  
[Philo] I coud [sic] wish that Cleanthes’ Argument coud be so analys’d, as to be 
render’d quite formal & regular. The Propensity of the Mind towards it, unless 
that Propensity were as strong & universal as that to believe in our Sense & 
Experience, will still, I am afraid, be esteem’d a suspicious Foundation. Tis here I 
wish for your Assistance. We must endeavour to prove that this Propensity is 
somewhat different from our Inclination to find our own Figures in the Clouds, 
our Face in the Moon, our Passions & Sentiments even in inanimate Matter. Such 
an Inclination may, & ought to be controul’d, & can never be a legitimate Ground 
of Assent. (Hume “Letter” 26) 
 
As a preparation for approaching the Dialogues, I would like to pursue the normative theory of 
analogy implicit in this passage. If we take his word for it, Hume finds Cleanthes’ argument 
difficult to inhabit because his preference for a normative, formal approach to analogy makes 
him not only inclined to view Cleanthes’ argument from analogy as irregular but to view its 
irregularity with a baseline suspicion. Cleanthes’ position is suspect because, without this clearer 
formal articulation, it appears indistinguishable from another kind of analogizing Hume finds 
demonstrably suspect and worth abandoning, which Hume figures as a form of prosopopoeia. It 
is only this lower “Inclination” that Hume explicitly chastises, but the implication seems clear: 
the burden is on the natural theologian to clarify what elevates this natural theological Propensity 
to see design and distinguishes it from this errant psychological compulsion which “may” and 
                                                            
114 Hume imagines the “best way of composing a Dialogue” would have been to do so jointly, with someone “of 
different Opinions” so that “that vulgar error” of “putting nothing but Nonsense into the Mouth of the Adversary” 
(25). 
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“ought to be controul’d” and makes it worthy of a “legitimate Ground of Assent” (“Letter” 26). 
Hume has trouble seeing the distinction, and is perhaps even inclined to believe one does not 
exist. And Hume even seems inclined to generalize his own suspicion with the passive “will 
still…be esteem’d.” But he also seems willing to entertain that his own thinking on the 
Propensity is somehow inadequate, limited by his Skeptical inclinations. And entertaining this 
inadequacy keeps the question of the illegitimacy of the Propensity open. He concedes, if not 
that this Propensity could be proven legitimate, that there are others who find it more convincing 
than himself.   
 One important question here is what Hume believes a “legitimate Ground of Assent” to 
look like. In his letter to Elliot, Hume seems to propose a positive and a negative standard. A 
legitimate ground of assent must produce a degree conviction “as strong & universal” as that 
propensity “to believe in our Sense & Experience” (“Letter” 26). Negatively and perhaps more 
importantly given the Enlightenment emphasis on error reduction, a legitimate ground of assent 
must be in some sense be so involuntary as to be out of our control; only an illegitimate ground 
seems capable of disciplining (“may be policed”). And, being involuntary in this manner, a 
legitimate ground of assent must be so unobjectionable and even profitable to be worth 
cultivating rather than eradicating; only an illegitimate ground “ought to be policed”. With a 
legitimate ground of assent, Hume is looking for something that is truly — almost mechanically 
— irresistible, compulsive in a legitimate rather than an illegitimate way.  
 Importantly, for Hume, while there may be a way to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate propensities, or even manage illegitimate propensities, there is no way to extinguish 
bad mental propensities entirely. One simply gains a better handle on them, detects them sooner, 
and voluntarily rejects them when they arise. So a better question here is what procedures Hume 
believes one might use to confirm the legitimacy of a good propensity or “control” a bad one — 
and, moving from the reflective and voluntary to the instinctive and involuntary, what 
mechanisms produce legitimate belief and which illegitimate. Louise Loeb argues persuasively 
that “[Hume’s] assessments of justification depend upon the properties of kinds of belief-forming 
mechanisms, rather than features of individual beliefs” (Loeb Stability 13). 
 As many critics have observed to varying degrees, the basic mechanism belief for Hume 
is more a function of the imagination than reason. It is more physiological and psychological 
than logical. Reason — as reflection — arises only after these processes have occurred to 
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examine their reliability. In the Treatise, Hume can do is to identify a few of the more evident 
lines of “unphilosophical probability,” and propose “general rules” that might be summoned as 
reliable evidentiary procedures or epistemic ideals. Indeed, one of Hume’s principal rules 
cautions against an uncritical faith in resemblance. Since, Hume writes, an “imperfection” of 
resemblance as a reliable form of knowledge is “very sensible in every single instance” and “still 
encreases by experience and observation” we might “form a general rule against the reposing 
any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a 
feign’d resemblance and contiguity” (Treatise 76). Here this issue is the illusory insight of 
resemblance, which is itself incapable of being suppressed.  
 Of course, Hume is quick to admit that this uncompromising rule against resemblance is 
only aspirational and largely unworkable. Hume concedes that without “some degree of 
resemblance, as well as union” no reasoning ever would occur” (Treatise 97). The inescapability 
of resemblance thus recommends a different approach to assessing the reliability of a 
resemblance, one based on assessing the degree of resemblance. Whereas Hume’s letter seems to 
gesture towards a kind of taxonomy of mental propensities, in the Treatise Hume adopts what I 
want to call a principle of verisimilitude which correlates degrees of apparent likeness with 
likelihood: something like the New Academic probabilism that Pulos ascribes to Hume as his 
“positive” response to Skepticism. For Hume, since “resemblance admits of many different 
degrees,” the validity of analogy reasoning “becomes proportionally more or less firm and 
certain” (97) based on the degree of resemblance. Hume formalizes this principle into a “rule of 
analogy.” In the Treatise, this law of analogy seems to pertain exclusively to resemblance, and to 
be in some sense separate from causation and contiguity. In An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, Hume seems to elevate this structure to all probable knowledge. Hume asserts 
there that all “probable reasoning regarding matters of fact” amounts to a “species of Analogy” 
in which inferences about unfamiliar events are formed on the basis of perceived similarity with 
familiar events. And, in this general context, the soundness of any probable inference may be 
reliably correlated with the perceived degree of likeness. “When the causes are entirely similar,” 
Hume observes, “the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain 
and conclusive.” And this is true even as probable knowledge itself is categorically and 
irreducibly uncertain. Even where “the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less 
conclusive,” a probable inference still has “force in proportion to the degree of similarity and 
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resemblance” (Enquiry 104). In the section of the Enquiry devoted to probability, the logic 
amounts to an intuitive, zero-sum game of subjective assessment: “There is certainly a 
probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side; and according as this 
superiority encreases [sic], and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a 
proportionate encrease, and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side, in which 
we discover the superiority” (Hume Enquiry 56).  
 The class of “perfect” analogies fills out the class of “proofs” discussed in “Hume 
Misreading Locke.” This class is generated itself by the Propensity — or to use Loeb’s language, 
mechanism — that Hume associates in his letter with organizing “Sense & Experience.” Again, 
from Hume’s naturalistic perspective, this analogical inference is only perfect and reliable 
because it is finally more involuntary than voluntary, more instinctive than reflective — and, 
from a normative perspective, more beneficial than erroneous. As Lorraine Daston notes, 
Hume’s sense of these pre-theoretical, naturalistic calculations is statistical and remarkably 
precise.115 And, in general, we should regard a naturalistic confidence in the reliability of 
analogical inference as the rule in Hume’s philosophy rather than the exception. And this 
naturalistic confidence is underwritten, in large part, by Hume’s confidence in his own ability to 
assess the validity of any perceptual analogy through critical reflection. Again, Loeb offers the 
appropriate naturalistic correction to Hume’s occasional skepticism: “For all Hume claims in Part 
III of Book I, causal inference based on perfect experience, probability based on infrequent 
experience or contrary causes, and analogy provide justified belief. In sum, far from claiming 
that there is a skeptical problem of induction that obliterates distinctions between good and bad 
non-demonstrative arguments, Hume is committed in Part III to a number of such distinctions” 
(47).  
 The important thing to note here is that Hume’s theory of verisimilitude is not all that 
critical. Indeed, its operative correlation of degrees of likeness with degrees of likelihood seems 
meant to be not only “regular” but intuitive, natural. Hume tends to confine this confident 
commonsense approach to analogy to everyday perceptions of and inferences about sense 
                                                            
115 Hume writes, for instance, that the “mind can judge of” the “minute differences” of “large probabilities” so 
accurately that “when the chances or experiments on one side amount to ten thousand, and on the other to ten 
thousand and one, the judgment gives the preference to the latter, upon account of that superiority” (96). And this is 
true even though “’tis plainly impossible for the mind to run over every particular view” (96). In other words, this 
calculation is not a matter of reflection but of instinct, intuition, and imagination. 
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impressions.116 But there are moments where Hume freely extends this evidentiary principle of 
analogy beyond the sensible, and wields it in a more heuristic and speculative capacity. Most 
notable here is the opaque “great analogy” that Hume perceives between his hypothesis of 
causation and his lesser known hypothesis of “the double relation of impressions and ideas” 
(Treatise 193). For Hume, this analogy “must be allow’d to be no despicable proof of both 
hypotheses” (190). Therefore, for Hume, if you perceive an analogy, it seems to be naturally 
significant, especially if you can specify and articulate its partial similarities. The question is 
how significant it should be, what degree of credence it demands. The special problem with the 
perception of resemblance is that it emerges as “intuition” — as “momentary glimpses of light” 
which then must be retrospectively assessed and adjusted. But they cannot be prevented, and 
their unbidden emergence and their basic intelligibility makes them meaningful. So even if 
Hume’s letter makes it seem like the burden is on Cleanthes’s natural theology, it should be clear 
that — even on Hume’s looser, commonsense theory of analogy — if the perception of analogy 
emerges, it is prima facie more credible than incredible, pending investigation of the ground of 
the resemblance. In the passage from his letter to Elliott above, this admission is captured in 
Hume’s benefit of the doubt about the argument from design. But Hume also addresses his 
perplexity with the intuitive appeal of design more explicitly in the letter’s post scriptum: 
If you’ll be persuaded to assist me in supporting Cleanthes, I fancy you need not 
take Matters any higher than Part 3. He allows, indeed, in Part 2, that all our 
Inference is founded on the Similitude of the Works of Nature to the usual Effects 
of Mind. Otherwise they must appear a mere Chaos. The only Difficulty is, why 
the other Dissimiltudes do not weaken the Argument. And indeed it woud [sic] 
seem from Experience & Feeling, that they do not weaken it so much as we might 
naturally expect. A Theory to solve this woud be very acceptable. (Hume “Letter” 
28)   
 
Eliott need not read past Part 3 because that is where Cleanthes offers his central case against 
Philo, one which Philo will spend the remainder of the Dialogues trying to discredit before, 
somewhat unexpectedly, conceding defeat in Part 12. What I want to focus on is how this 
synopsis of the crux of the argument differs from how this difficulty is actually figured in 
Dialogues: how the central “Difficulty” Hume identifies here is not ever figured explicitly or 
                                                            
116 For Hume, the mechanism of analogy generates our imaginative perception of cause and effect, as well as our 
own consistent identity. Both fictions are only reinforced and underwritten by the constant recurrence of 
impressions: and these impressions, while distinct, are experienced as identities in a manner that produces an 
illusory but irresistible sense of continuity or of causation. 
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precisely in these terms. We can track the distance the synopsis achieves from the form itself in 
the way the voice shifts from sentence to sentence. “He” in the second sentence refers to 
Cleanthes. But the articulation of the “Difficulty” seems to come from Philo: it is the burden that 
Philo presents to Cleanthes: what are we to make of the evident dissimilarities? But with “it 
woud [sic] seem from Experience & Feeling,” Hume appears to abandon Philo or Cleanthes’s 
voices entirely, to register both his own experience and feeling and his dissatisfaction with his 
representation of this disparity between his “experience and feeling” of design and what his 
method of verisimilitude would “naturally” suggest. 
 Philo seems to confront the same basic problem as Hume. And we know this because 
Philo frames his central objections to Cleanthes’ analogy with a similar appeal to the theory of 
verisimilitude. For Philo, there are some a posteriori arguments which are “most certain and 
irrefragable” (“That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has solidity”). But, as we 
have already seen in the Treatise and the Enquiry, the certainty of these proofs depends on “the 
exact similarity of the cases” which “gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event” (Dialogue 
46). But, Philo argues, “wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you 
diminish proportionably [sic] the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, 
which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty” (46). From Philo’s perspective, “Unless the 
cases be exactly similar, they repose no perfect confidence in applying their past observation to 
any particular phenomenon.” Likewise, “every alteration of circumstances occasions a doubt 
concerning the event” (49). From this general reasoning Philo asserts: 
If we see a house, Cleanthes, we conclude, with the greatest certainty, that it had 
an architect or builder; because this is precisely that species of effect, which we 
have experienced to proceed from that species of cause. But surely you will not 
affirm, that the universe bears such resemblance to a house, that we can with the 
same certainty infer a similar cause, or that the analogy here is entire and perfect. 
The dissimilitude is so striking, that the utmost you can here pretend to is a guess, 
a conjecture, a presumption concerning a similar cause. (46)  
 
I will want to return to both Philo’s concept of “weak analogy” and the low “presumption 
concerning a similar cause” that Philo grants it in the next chapter, since both will be important 
to understanding what I will want to call the “weak orientation” towards analogy that would have 
been available as an alternative to the “strong” orientation Philo and Hume exhibit here. But for 
the moment I want to see how Philo responds to these “striking” dissimilitudes with Hume’s 
“Difficulty” in mind. For we do not see Philo meet this “Difficulty” in the same general terms as 
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Hume does in his synopsis. Rather, we see Philo117 construct what Cleanthes calls “illustrations, 
examples, and instances” meant to emphasize and exacerbate those dissimilitudes so as to 
weaken the argument from design, to demonstrate its non-intuitive, theoretical and problematic 
nature. And, as such, he develops a number of analogies which highlight the theoretical 
assumptions that Cleanthes’ analogy of design must introduce.  
 Philo’s objections center on two theoretical procedures which, in his view, Cleanthes fails 
to justify. The first amounts to the rationale for selecting the human mind as the model for the 
entire universe. As Philo puts it, “What peculiar privilege has this little agitation of the brain 
which we call thought, that we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?” (50). And 
elsewhere: “[W]hat priority can we assign it for the original cause of all things?” (50). The 
second has to do with how the sheer singularity of the universe’s creation seems to thwart any 
attempt at an argument from experience, which depends on recurrence and resemblance: “But 
how [an argument from experience] have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are 
single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain” (51). 
Here I only want to focus on how Philo articulates the first objection through a number of 
analogical illustrations meant to clarify the fundamentally arbitrary and unwarranted nature of 
the initial comparison.  
 Philo compares Cleanthes’s act to a peasant who takes his “narrow views” of his 
“domestic oceonomy” and makes it the “rule for the government of kingdoms” (50). This is 
merely one of a number of analogies Philo forwards against any attempt to “transfer[]” a 
“conclusion” from “parts to the whole” in the face of a “great disproportion” (49) or unevenness 
between phenomenon:  
From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything concerning the 
generation of man? Would the manner of a leaf’s blowing, even though perfectly 
known, afford us any instruction concerning the vegetation of a tree…But 
allowing that we were to take the operations of one part of nature upon another 
for the foundation of our judgment concerning the origin of the whole…why 
select so minute, so weak, so bounded a principle as the reason and design of 
animals…found to be upon this planet? (51) 
  
For Philo, though the proximity and familiarity of reason and design — not to mention our 
“partiality in our own favor” (50) — may offer them up as sound candidates for such a model of 
                                                            
117 Loeb, for instance, observes, “[T]here is strong reason to think that Hume’s early endorsement of causal 
inference is pre-theoretical in the sense that it is in place independently of any theory of justification” (13) 
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the universe, but “sound philosophy ought carefully to guard against so natural an illusion” that 
such limited examples could dictate or reproduce general terms of the universe (50).   
 What are we to make of Philo’s abandonment of his formal theory of verisimilitude for 
these analogical illustrations? Stephen Barker has argued that Philo’s turn discovers something 
essentially non-formal and contextual about all analogical reasoning: “in deciding what 
judgments to make in this area we cannot let ourselves be wholly guided by the mechanical 
application of formal rules. That is, we do not have available any ‘decision procedure’ to guide 
us, any routine consisting of a prescribed sequence of unproblematic formal 
operations…Judgments about the strength of an inductive argument by analogy cannot be made 
in that mechanical way” (Barker 177). I certainly agree with Barker’s claim in principle, but I do 
not believe it adequate captures how the Dialogues reads Philo’s turn. Warner suggests that 
Philo’s turn demonstrates his recognition that Cleanthes’s “irregular argument needs to be 
matched with ‘irregular’ argument” (263). From Warner’s perspective, these analogical 
illustrations — in concert with Philo’s other counterfactual speculations about the origin of the 
universe — are designed merely to present the “availability of alternative visions.” Put another 
way, Philo performs something like a “theoretical” diagnosis of Cleanthes’ argument similar to 
the one Williams and Reid tries to perform on Skepticism. Once these alternatives are 
“imaginatively grasped,” Warner argues, Cleanthes’ (and Hume’s for that matter) “appeal to 
‘feeling’ is correspondingly weakened, and the thought that ‘common sense’ may be no more 
than a function of education and habituation rendered a live issue” (263).118 
 These are certainly credible interpretations of the effect of Philo’s ingenious analogizing 
(especially on the contemporary reader), but they also are quite optimistic. They do not seem to 
capture either Hume’s lingering dissatisfaction with the inefficacy of these appeals to 
dissimilitude that we saw in the post scriptum, where “feeling” does seem to still prevail. More 
importantly, they fail to adequately appreciate the credibility the Dialogues grant Cleanthes’ 
skeptical response to Philo’s analogical turn. For Cleanthes, the problem with Philo’s exercises is 
that they are themselves marked by its own irregularity: it is marked by its own theoretical 
character. Cleanthes can easily dismiss Philo’s analogical illustrations as unserious, as “cavils of 
the philosophers” (54). Cleanthes can elect to meet Philo’s “carelessness” not with “serious 
                                                            
118Jager offers a similar reading of the total effect of the Dialogues in terms of habituation: for Jager, “truth of the 
world is not that its designer can be glimpsed through its phenomena, but that those phenomena appear to us only as 
the result of an idea [i.e. design] produced by its iteration and reiteration” (72). 
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argument and philosophy” but “in the same manner, by illustrations, examples, and instances” 
(54). Indeed, in Part III, Cleanthes offers his own fanciful illustrations in favor of his case: “an 
articulate voice…heard in the clouds” (54) and “books as natural productions” (55). He also 
offers a reinterpretation of an episode from the history of astronomy Philo offers up to Cleanthes 
as a parable from which he tells Cleanthes to read “your own condemnation” and “that the 
subject in which you are engaged exceeds all human reason and enquiry” (53). And the point of 
these unserious exercises is to demonstrate that they exist on equal argumentative footing to the 
more searching analogizing that Philo must pursue once Philo’s intuitive appeal to verisimilitude 
fails.  
 From this perspective, it seems possible to imagine that Cleanthes has a stronger case for 
the non-theoretical and non-argumentative status of his position: that is to say, that Cleanthes can 
occupy the same rhetorical ground that Williams takes the Skeptic to occupy. As Jager has noted, 
Cleanthes’s central case is not “an argument at all” but “more like an assertion” (110), or what 
Jager calls an “argument from perception” (110): “Because belief in design strikes us with 
extraordinary force every time we consider the eye, Cleanthes seems to argue, it is natural and 
instinctual to accept this belief.  In fact, to reject design is effectively to close our eyes to the 
truth, obscuring, as he says, our ‘natural good sense by a profusion of unnecessary scruples and 
objections’” (110). Similarly, Warner observes that “the reader is encouraged to suppose that 
Cleanthes’ argumentative weakness masks a deeper strength — the power of authentic feeling. 
That appeal to this touchstone marks something of a retreat from the presentation of a ‘formal 
and regular’ argument operating according to ‘all the rules of analogy’ is indicated by Cleanthes 
himself” (257). On this view, Philo’s acceptance of the basic intelligibility of the similitude of 
design despite its irregularity ultimately places Philo in a version of the “epistemological 
dilemma.” By accepting this basic intelligibility, he has already conceded too much ground to the 
natural theologian. Even as Philo’s critical approach to analogy appears to discover its 
illegitimacy, the intuitive aspect of design undermines the very value of this kind of criticism. It 
turns it into an unreasonable form of skepticism, compromised by its “careless” departure from 
common sense. As Cleanthes writes: 
The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject abstruse, 
remote and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts 
of nature: and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force, that 
he cannot, without the greatest violence prevent it. Now the arguments for natural 
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religion are plainly of this kind; and nothing but the most perverse, obstinate 
metaphysics can reject them…The most obvious conclusion surely is in favour of 
design; and it requires time, reflection and study, to summon up those frivolous, 
though abstruse, objections, which can support infidelity. (56).  
 
After this speech, Pamphilus the narrator remarks that “Philo was a little embarrassed and 
confounded” (57). And in his letter to Eliott, Hume contends that “the Confusion in which I 
represent the Sceptic seems natural” (26). I take this instance of “natural” to be at odds with 
Hume’s claim in the post scriptum that observing the many dissimilitudes is not as disqualifying 
as “we naturally expect” (28) from verisimilitude. And, from this perspective, the theory of 
verisimilitude is Philo (and Hume’s) best effort to appeal to an intuitive, commonsense route 
against design. But once this intuitive ground is abandoned, and Philo pursues his more critical 
line, that critical line (however insightful we now find it) is marked in the Dialogues as 










Making (Common) Sense of Analogy 
 
4.1 Bad Analogies: Two Perspectives on Formal Analogy 
When Richard Price presented Thomas Bayes’ unpublished “Essay towards solving a 
Problem in the Doctrine of Chances” in late 1763, Price framed one of Bayes’ major 
contributions to be its “clear account” of “the strength of analogical or inductive reasoning” 
(Bayes 2). For Price, Bayes’ speculations advanced what had been a woefully incomplete 
account of the “force” of analogical reasoning, which 
...at present, we seem to know little more than that it does sometimes in fact 
convince us, and at other times not; and that, as it is the means of acquainting us 
with many truths, of which otherwise we must have been ignourant [sic]; so it is, 
in all probability, the source of many errors, which perhaps might in some 
measure be avoided, if the force that this sort of reasoning ought to have with us 
were more distinctly and clearly understood. (Bayes 2) 
 
Price has clearly registered the fact that not all analogies are reliable. And this sense of analogy’s 
mixed character comes not from rational reflection but direct experience and introspection. Some 
analogies convince us, others do not. However, rationalizing from this description of analogy’s 
mixed character leads Price to suspect that the descriptive and the normative accounts of analogy 
may not be identical: analogical reasoning may “in all probability” be the source of many errors. 
“In all probability” here appeals to a higher imperative of error control that attends all probable 
knowledge; it is a kind of due diligence that is more speculative and pessimistic than his 
experience of analogy affords. Whatever he thinks about the presence of bad analogies, Price 
seems to have basic confidence in his ability to discriminate a good from a bad one. He is more 
familiar with analogy as that which “acquaints us with many truths…of which otherwise we 
must have been ignourant” (2). Though he speculates that unreliable analogies may not only 
exist but escape detection, it still seems likely that a formal theory of analogy is not only 
discoverable but would do something to improve the situation: that “errors” of analogy “might in 
some measure be avoided, if the force 
 186 
distinctly and clearly understood” (2). A strong orientation unites these beliefs in a) the basic 
legitimacy and stability of many forms of analogical inference, b) the possibility of arriving at a 
formal or general theory of analogy and c) of applying a general formal theory of analogy to 
assess the precise scope and force of any particular analogy.  
Price’s strong orientation towards analogy may be regarded as representative of the 
general spirit of the critical program of analogy in practice since at least Bacon. By this spirit, I 
mean not only the cautious orientation towards what Schey calls the “duplicitous” character of 
analogy, or the general acceptance of the inescapability of analogy, but a certain confidence in a 
critical program that might discipline analogy119  through formalization. As John Norton 
explains, the “natural response” to the mixed character of analogy has historically been to 
develop “more elaborate formal templates” and “embellished schema” capable of 
“discriminat[ing] more finely” between good and bad analogies (1). Though this strong 
orientation would have united a broad swath of critical-minded eighteenth-century thinkers 
otherwise at odds — say, Hume, Price, and Reid — this strong orientation was not the only or 
even most representative orientation towards analogical reasoning in the long eighteenth century. 
And we can contrast it productively to the weak orientation towards analogy espoused by Joseph 
Butler in his popular physio-theological account, Analogy of Religion (1736).  
Where Price welcomes a formal theory of analogy, Butler refuses to “enquire further into 
the Nature, the Foundation, and Measure of Probability; or whence it proceeds that Likeness 
should beget that Presumption, Opinion, and full Conviction, which the human Mind is formed 
to receive from it” in order to “guard against the Errors, to which Reasoning from Analogy is 
liable” (v). He likewise refuses to “say, how far the Extent, Compass, and Force, of analogical 
Reasoning, can be reduced to general Heads and Rules” (v). Butler dismisses this kind of critical 
scrutiny because, for Butler, no amount of critical scrutiny would affect our basic perception of 
the value and appeal of analogical reasoning since “we may be, as we unquestionably are, 
assured, that Analogy is of Weight, in various Degrees, towards determining our Judgment, and 
our Practice” (vi). It seems that Butler, like Price, accepts that analogical reasoning comes in 
                                                            
119Ellen Spolsky has commented on the “promiscuity” of metaphors, which “…breed promiscuously in the brain, 
producing analogies among unconnected or incommensurable ideas. These analogies are not only illimitable in 
number; they cannot, in principle, be restrained semantically…Given the impossibility of regulating breeding, and 
the uncontrollability of the results, it is not surprising that metaphors are sometimes perceived as threatening” (Ellen 
Spolsky “Cognitive Literary Historicism” 161). 
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different degrees of reliability and relevance. And, from one perspective, Butler’s weak 
orientation seems to make him more confident than Price about analogical judgment: more 
confident not only in his own ability to detect good and bad analogical reasoning, but in the basic 
reliability of analogy itself. On this view, Butler does not pursue a formal theory of analogy 
because he doubts it would improve on his own “natural, just, and conclusive” sense of analogy.  
But this line of thought is somewhat misleading, and from a different perspective, it 
would appear that Butler has a much less optimistic picture of analogy than Price. This 
counterintuitive claim is supported by the broad but finally weak manner in which Butler uses 
analogy in his apologetic argument. Butler famously pursues systematic analogy between the 
natural and revealed orders, or “that System of Things and Dispensation of Providence, which 
Experience together with Reason informs us of, i.e. the known Course of Nature” and “that 
System of Things and Dispensation of Providence, which Revelation informs us of” (vii). And he 
does so in what, in hindsight, many critics have noticed to be a fairly reckless and unsound 
manner. From a strong perspective, this is just bad faith analogizing, but I want to suggest that 
Butler’s low estimation of analogy is what recommends this strategy.  
According to Butler, some elaborations of analogy will inevitably appear more persuasive 
than others, but analogic proof is importantly concurrent and accumulative, not discursive. A 
good elaboration of systematic analogy may improve the case for his broader systematic analogy, 
but no particular bad analogy will compromise its integrity. This is because Butler develops his 
systematic analogy not to be conclusive but only to afford a minimal “presumption” that both 
systems “have the same Author and Cause” (vii). The key term here is presumption, and it’s 
worth saying something about the profound instability of this term in the long eighteenth century. 
We have seen Johnson use presumption to refer to the highest degree of evidence (equivalent to 
“persuasion” and “moral certainty). Others will frequently use “presumptive proof” as a 
synonym for circumstantial evidence, and in this context it could denote a high degree of 
probable evidence though it increasingly earns its current, more suspect status by the early 
nineteenth century, especially in legal contexts. However, for Butler, presumption denotes the 
lowest kind of probable evidence,120 and Butler’s argument attempts to exploit analogy’s lowly 
and uncertain status. The fact that analogy is incapable of complete or certain proof or 
                                                            
120 “Probable Knowledge,” as Butler writes, “is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits 
of Degrees; and of all Variety of them, from the highest moral Certainty, to the very lowest Presumption” (i). 
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demonstration allows Butler to pursue a much lower bar: he simply needs the systematic 
analogy, by virtue of its presentation, to appear more plausible than not. Because probable 
knowledge is a matter of competing degrees, as long as there is “Weight on the side of Religion” 
in any degree, then “this Argument from Analogy is in general, unanswerable.” And this is true 
“notwithstanding the Objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real Ground which 
there may be for Difference of Opinion, as to the particular Degree of Weight which is to be laid 
upon it” (xv-xvi). So Butler’s insistence that analogy is “of Weight, in various Degrees” (vi) is 
more a concession than a dogma. From this perspective, Butler doesn’t pursue a formal theory of 
analogy because he doubts one would even be possible, and, in any case, his case is all the better 
for it.  
Of course, Butler’s concession is also convenient and strategic. If Butler’s one-sided, 
accumulate logic of analogy — in which good analogies improve a case, but bad ones do not 
detract from it — seems suspicious, this is because we are far more inclined to adopt Price’s 
stronger orientation towards analogy and to reject this kind of loose analogical argumentation as 
deceptive and illegitimate. As we have seen with Hume, a strong orientation recommends little to 
no tolerance for this kind of looser, minimal application of analogy: as Hume writes, these 
propensities “can & should” be controlled. These particular “bad” uses not only depart from the 
normative criteria; they threaten to compromise the integrity of that formal theory by 
masquerading as arguments more forceful than they are. 
More generally, we can think about the distinction between strong and weak orientations 
as a question about what makes a bad analogy bad. From the strong perspective, we would 
measure a particular bad analogy against a normative standard that would articulate the 
problematic status of a bad analogy and, in the process, preserve the value of sound analogical 
reasoning. Some analogies may fail dismally, but this formal theory provides the justification for 
a high degree of confidence in at least some analogies, especially if the limits of their heuristic 
value are sufficiently clarified. The strong orientation of analogy is not initiated by a loss of faith 
in analogy but by a renewed interest in and desire to remake analogy so that it may be 
legitimately used in philosophy, to preserve it, so to speak, from illegitimate uses. Analogy 
moves from being a “naïve” hermeneutic for analysis to being a hermeneutic object demanding 
analysis itself, but philosophers only pursue it as an object of analysis because of its 
acknowledged importance in a world marked by inferential, probabilistic reasoning. 
 189 
From the weak perspective, on the other hand, a particular bad analogy speaks less to a 
bad individual application of analogy than it does to the more basic epistemic unreliability of 
analogy in general. From a weak perspective, analogy is simply too twilit, provisional, and 
contextual a practice to be expected to conform to normative criteria. No formal criteria could be 
mobilized to assess a particular use of analogy as good or bad. More importantly, no individual 
use of analogy — good or bad — does much to impact this general estimation of analogy. Even a 
good analogy, however persuasive, would be subject to the basic limits of analogizing itself. And 
even if a formal theory of analogy were possible, it would arguably not be superior to our 
naturally calibrated intuitions about analogy. On the weak orientation, we simply live in 
analogies and perceive a particular analogy as reliable or unreliable, relevant or irrelevant, loose 
or strict, good or bad, based on a practical, proportional, and contextual common sense 
judgment. Each particular analogy has to be judged on its own merit, in context, according to 
past personal experiences with it and, more importantly, its wider currency and acceptance.  
 
4.2 Weak Analogies in Tristram Shandy 
I have said that a strong orientation would be more inclined to discipline a loose use of 
analogy than a weak orientation. And that discipline would identify the weak orientation’s lack 
of rational discretion as problematic. However, a weak orientation is not entirely indifferent in 
this matter and could pursue anti-rationalist critique of the strong orientation’s confidence in the 
ability to judge correctly and rationally between good and bad analogies. A weak orientation 
would find any attempt to have analogy do anything more than provisional argumentative work 
comical, if not absurd. From the weak perspective, this entire critical project of analogy seems 
wholly misguided: confidence in the critical or rational abilities to discipline analogy seems 
wholly misplaced. By way of illustration, consider this short but rich episode from Laurence 
Sterne's Tristram Shandy: 
Every thing in this world, continued my father, (filling a fresh pipe) —every thing 
in this earthly world, my dear brother Toby, has two handles; —not always, quoth 
my uncle Toby; — at least, replied my father, every one has two hands,—which 
comes to the same thing. —Now, if a man was to sit down coolly, and consider 
within himself the make, the shape, the construction, com-at-ability, and 
convenience of all the parts which constitute the whole of that animal, call’d 
Woman, and compare them analogically — I never understood rightly the 
meaning of that word, — quoth my uncle Toby. —ANALOGY, replied my father, 
is the certain relation and agreement, which different — Here a Devil of a rap at 
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the door snapp’d my father’s definition (like his tobacco-pipe) in two, — and, at 
the same time, crushed the head of as notable and curious a dissertation as ever 
was engendered in the womb of speculation. (79) 
 
In this episode, Walter Shandy invokes analogy as a hermeneutic lens only to have Toby raise a 
question about its status as a hermeneutic: to redirect attention back onto the tool. Walter 
interprets Toby's interruption not as an indication that there may not be a "rightly understood" 
meaning of analogy, but as a request for a definition, which Walter seems to have at hand. And 
reading this turn to the general definition to clarify the particular application, we might say that 
Walter holds a strong orientation towards analogy. Likewise, we might say that Toby holds a 
weak orientation: a frequent sense of confusion regarding what analogy entails. But, while Toby 
appears to be the student and not the master, the episode's comedy comes at the expense of 
Walter's strong orientation. The farce turns not simply on Walter’s idiosyncratic use of analogy 
but on Walter’s undeterred confidence in his grasp of analogy despite Toby's confusion. The 
knock at the door interrupts Walter's formal definition of analogy, but the boldly idiosyncratic 
nature of Walter’s application of analogy suggests it would in fact clarify little. Toby's initial 
corrections to Walter's overzealous generalization likewise clarify this. Walter wants to say 
something analogical about "every thing in this earthly world." But, as Toby makes him concede, 
he is only speaking about the manner in which humans "grasp" the world, i.e. with hands, by the 
handles. And finally, Walter is only speaking about grasping women. In this way, the 
interruption invites conflating Walter's "dissertation" with his "definition”: Walter's general 
definition of analogy achieves no distance from his particular application of analogy; the 
definition simply obscures Walter's idiosyncratic definition with the impoverished formal 
definition circulating through eighteenth-century philosophical treatises. The definition, like the 
dissertation, is simply another example of Walter's overzealous desire to generalize. Consider the 
rich ambiguity of Tristram's comparison between Walter's definition of analogy and his tobacco-
pipe: "my father's definition" is not only "snapp'd" like his tobacco-pipe but is itself "like his 
tobacco-pipe" because no less a personal possession of Walter's.121 Again, from the weak 
perspective, attempting a general definition of analogy seems misguided, almost comical. 
                                                            
121 The satire aims well beyond the discourse of analogy and, like Walter’s character as a whole, directs itself to the 
broader generalizing tendencies of Enlightenment philosophy. The intimate, ranging, and bizarre conversations 
between Walter and Toby taken together seem intended to model the general reading circuit relationship between 
author and reader. Walter is the characteristic speculative philosopher — part “natural” and “moral” philosopher 
(78), hamstrung by his over seriousness and self-defeating commitment to system — but also marked by an 
 191 
 At a crucial moment in The Subtler Language, Wasserman turns to Tristram Shandy to 
make a broader case about the collapse of the communal networks that the divine analogy once 
held together:  
In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the literate had shared a constellation of 
synthesizing myths by means of which man could grasp relationships that gave 
significant pattern to otherwise discrete things and experiences. These systems 
transformed man and his world into a lexicon of symbols and integrated the 
symbols by meaningful cross references. But by the end of the eighteenth century 
these communally accepted patterns had almost completely disappeared — each 
man now rode his own hobby-horse...In Tristram's world, meaning had become a 
function of each person's private, subjective concerns, which alone remained as an 
interpretive organization...What is more, in this completely individualistic world 
none of these private principles ever succeeds in organizing life, and chaos is 
forever breaking in. The facts of the world — the squeaking of a door-hinge, Mrs. 
Shandy's inability to ask a question, the falling of a window — frustrate and 
dissipate Walter's grandiose theories, just as the worldly routine of winding a 
clock frustrates his homunculi. (170) 
 
I would agree with almost everything in Wasserman's exceptional reading except the somber tone 
in which it is delivered. The problem in Tristram Shandy is not the fact that everyone has a 
hobby-horse: it is that some people are inclined to regard their hobby-horse as something more.  
Walter's misguided theorizing is comic, not tragic: it is forgivable and endearing, 
illustrative of the folly of reason. And yet, critics have often followed Wasserman by reading 
farce as something more tragic than comic. Stephen Werner writes that "Tristram Shandy" is a 
"work of scepticism and arabesque" in which [a]nalogy functions as "a kind of infinite mode" 
where "anything can be compared with anything else." From Werner's (neo-Kantian, Skeptical) 
perspective, Walter is a "sceptic" who "retreats from the chaos of everyday experience into a 
world of private mythology (what Sterne calls 'analogy' — 'everything in the world has two 
handles')" (Werner 36-7). In his careful 1982 study of analogy in Tristram Shandy, however, 
Mark Loveridge objects to this skeptical reading of Tristram Shandy as an "embodiment of 
                                                            
irreducible idiosyncrasy. Walter is Sterne’s loving, parodic treatment of excessive and self-defeating preoccupations 
of the eighteenth-century speculative philosopher: 
Whether this was the case of the singularity of my father’s notions, — or that his judgment, at length, 
became the dupe of his wite; — or how far, in many of his notions, he might, tho’ odd, be absolutely right 
— the reader, as he comes at them, shall decide…he was serious — he was all uniformity; — he was 
systematical, and, like all systematick reasoners, he would move both heaven and earth, and twist and 
torture every thing in nature to support his hypothesis. In a word, I repeat it over again; — he was serious… 
(41) 
Walter’s noble but quixotic attempts at rigor and comprehensiveness, whose reductive opening salvos and initial 
confidence in the task make for non-starters, are fundamentally inadequate. 
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demonic analogy" on the grounds that "when an argument of this kind is advanced...the 
commentator tends to conclude that Tristram Shandy is no more than sceptical whimsy, utter 
relativity, and with no absolute standards whatsoever" (39). Against this reading, Loveridge 
proposes that Sterne’s text interrogates "the process of analogy becoming demonic in the thought 
of the eighteenth and late seventeenth centuries" (39) and "establishes and uses analogy — 
analogy between arts, between things which exist on the same level — to examine and satirise 
the use of analogy between different levels, between absolute standards and the relative 
standards which prevail in the human world" (Loveridge 108). In other words, Loveridge 
correctly reads the episode as commenting from a weak orientation, in which analogy is 
conceived horizontally, about strong attempts to have analogy work vertically, formally, from 
general to particular. Indeed, for Loveridge, Sterne’s critique is not centered on unjustified 
theological uses of analogy like natural theology so much as on bad natural philosophical 
applications of analogy. 
This episode with Tristram Shandy helps us diagnosis a central problem with a neo-
Kantian perspective on eighteenth-century analogy. The neo-Kantian literary history seems to 
speak from within a strong orientation towards analogy in a way that simply fails to account for 
both the existence and the currency of the kind of weak orientation towards analogy that, I would 
argue, would have had a wide currency in the eighteenth century. From a neo-Kantian, Skeptical 
perspective, this weak orientation looks benighted, not properly critical. Yet, with an eye to the 
fundamentally ironic and mythopoetic structures of symbolism that neo-Kantian Romantics 
finally promote (and locate in Shelley), it also seems possible to say that the neo-Kantian literary 
history itself forwards a newly weak orientation towards analogy that differentiates itself from 
both the strong (read: rational) project of critical reform and the earlier weak (read: uncritical, 
metaphysical) orientation recommended by divine analogy: neo-Kantian literary history 
promotes an orientation that is both anti-metaphysical and anti-rational. Put another way, it 
outlines a Romantic orientation towards analogy that differs in kind both from the weak 
orientation recommended by the neo-Platonic scheme of divine analogy, typified by 
metaphysical poetry, and from the strong, rationalist approach to analogy, typified by neo-
classical poetics of wit or of moralizing topographical poetry. Moreover, the neo-Kantian 
position fetishizes the earlier weak orientation of neo-Platonic divine analogy as the enchanted 
counterpart to Romanticism’s disenchanted symbolism. 
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A basic alignment between these “weak” orientations, while debatable, seem credible 
enough. But, from my perspective, where neo-Kantian literary history goes off track is how it 
represents the interaction between the weak neo-Platonic and strong rational orientations towards 
analogy. Neo-Kantian Romanticism misreads the new strong orientation towards rational 
analogy as an anxious attempt to shore up an enervated neo-Platonic system collapsing under the 
new intellectualist reform. But the critique of analogy was marked by a distinct confidence and 
enthusiasm about the value of analogy in natural philosophical practice once it had been cleansed 
of these older, unphilosophical and poetic relations. Likewise, neo-Kantian Romanticism 
misreads as a kind of anxious response what is essentially a confident anti-rationalism adopted 
by the weak orientation towards the rational critique of analogy. The mistake is that neo-Kantian 
Romanticism simply cannot see this anti-rationalist thrust of the weak orientation on its own 
terms: it takes Romantic anti-rationalism (which is also an organicism) as the only authentic 
kind. But while a preacher like Sterne seems to adopt a similarly pessimistic view of analogy, 
Sterne’s orientation is more likely traceable to his general sense of the fallenness of human 
knowledge, not his absorption of any rationalist critique of analogy. From Sterne’s perspective, 
one would be foolish to think analogy did anything other than pretend to offer a final accounting 
of things, and a rational approach to analogy only exacerbates this pretension.  
 
4.3 Commonsense and Critical Orientations 
In the last section, I have argued that neo-Kantian Romanticism provides an insufficient 
account of the “weak” orientation towards analogy available in the long eighteenth century. This 
is, in part, because the anti-metaphysical anti-rationalism it reads off Romantic symbolism makes 
it hard to see the more fideistic anti-rationalism that informs this weak orientation. From my 
perspective, this fideistic anti-rationalism would have inoculated the weak perspective from any 
rational critique. Indeed, it makes that rational critique seem somewhat misguided, overconfident 
in analogy itself and, by extension, overconfident in human Reason. Despite these important 
differences, these two weak orientations do share a pessimism about rational analogy. And this 
makes it worth thinking about them together. However, to appreciate the distance between these 
two weak orientations, we will need to introduce another axis of consideration in this analytic of 
analogy.  
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In addition to the basic distinctions between strong and weak orientations I have outlined 
above, I want to suggest both strong and weak orientations have a commonsense and a critical 
variant. Commonsense and critical have slightly different inflections as they are applied to weak 
and strong. While I want to get to the weak orientation, it is best to start by thinking about how 
these distinctions play out in the strong orientation, since we have already in some sense 
encountered this in Hume. In the strong orientation, the difference in a commonsense and a 
critical orientation amounts to different estimations of how complicated or technical a normative 
account of analogy should be. A strong commonsense orientation expects that this formal rule 
will be relatively legible and subject to an adequately intuitive and minimally theoretical 
description. This is what recommends verisimilitude to Hume in the Treatise, the Enquiry, and 
the first line of argument Philo pursues against Cleanthes. This is what Philo uses to undercut the 
natural theologian’s claim to intuitive analogy by claiming this rule of verisimilitude to be not 
only the more rational but the more intuitive rule from which natural theological arguments from 
design obviously depart.  
A strong critical orientation, on the other hand, anticipates that the normative criteria of 
analogy must be more theoretical and counterintuitive than intuitive.122 This strong critical 
orientation is best typified by the second line of argument Philo pursues. That argument centers 
on clarifying the non-intuitive and theoretical status of the natural theologian’s analogy, which, 
from this strong critical perspective, has left two important and contestable assumptions 
unaddressed. From a strong critical perspective, examples like natural theology illustrate that the 
normative rules of analogy must depart significantly from our looser psychological propensity to 
analogy, that intuitive analogies are more likely to be distorting than clarifying, that a proper 
analogical perception must be cultivated and expertly applied. And that a proper theory of 
analogy will likely be counterintuitive, only minimally reflective of these natural propensities. 
Despite these important differences, both strong perspectives are still united in important ways: 
both are suspicious enough of analogy to question its reliability but confident enough in 
                                                            
122 For examples of strong critical approaches, see John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability. London: St. 
Martin’s Street, 1921: 215-277; Mary Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1970 and “On Defining Analogy.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 60 (1959-60): 
79-100; for a dominant cognitive-scientific approach to formal analogy, see Dedre Gentner, “Structure-Mapping: A 
Theoretical Framework for Analogy.” Cognitive Science 7 (1983): 155-70 and Dedre Gentner and Arthur B. 
Markman, “Defining Structural Similarity.” Journal of Cognitive Science 6 (2005): 1-20; for a recent, 
comprehensive philosophical approach, see Paul Bartha, By Parallel Reasoning: The Construction and Evaluation 
of Analogical Arguments. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.   
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analogy’s force to pursue its conditioning through formalization (or are at least aware of its 
inevitable, if problematic, appeal) and optimistic enough about the existence of a normative 
criteria of analogy to find it worth pursuing.  
In the weak orientation, the difference between common sense and critical approaches 
amounts to a difference in the source of a shared skepticism about analogy’s basic credibility. 
From a weak commonsense perspective, this skepticism has to do with analogy’s lowly epistemic 
status — its worldliness as figured by its prominent role as the imperfect but sufficient kind of 
reasoning God has provided for understanding our twilit and probative situation. Again, this is 
what Reid calls the “way of analogy.” It is more attributable to the fallibility of human Reason 
itself than any perverse application of reason.  It is the best we can do — at times magnificent, 
but also subject to all kinds of errors and intolerable when used in ways that are not elevating and 
instructive but idiosyncratic. Analogies are sufficient as guides to reflection, but to take them too 
seriously is to forget the instrumental and secondary nature of the analogical image itself, which 
was meant to look upward, towards God — not downward or inward.123 For a weak critical 
                                                            
123 . I keep leaning into these theological terms because, when I try to imagine this orientation towards analogy, I 
think of the ease and to-handness with which an eighteenth-century clergyman — or for that matter, any poet — 
might draw upon and quickly dispense with an analogical figure. In Observations on Man, David Hartley, a 
clergyman, describes analogy as 
…that resemblance, in some cases sameness, of the parts, properties, functions, uses, &c. any or all, of A to 
Be, whereby our knowledge concerning A, and the language expressing this knowledge, may be applied in 
the whole, or in part, to B, without any sensible, or at least, any important practical error. (127) 
Even Hartley has a critical impulse and reserves the right to reject an analogy. But this does not suspend his 
confidence in even a loose application with the right import. An analogy can exhibit a “sensible” error but not a 
“practical one.” Hartley continues:  
Now, analogies, in this [looser] sense of the word, some more exact and extensive, some less so, present 
themselves to us every where in natural and artificial things; and thus whole groups of figurative phrases, 
which seem at first only to answer the purposes of convenience or affording names to new objects, and of 
pleasing the fancy…pass into analogical reasoning, and become a guide in the search after truth, and an 
evidence for it in some degree. (127).  
Hartley follows this with an astounding miscellany of “instances of analogies of various degrees and kinds” (127). 
The payoff of these analogies is how, once pursued, they begin to sink in and structure one’s thinking. For Hartley, 
this licenses the pursuit of artificial analogies such as “[s]imiles, fables, parables, allegories &c” to highlight and 
clarify “instances of natural analogies” (131). What these artificial forms achieve is that they “insensibly” transfer 
the “properties, beauties, perfections, desires, or defects and aversions, which adhere by association to the simile, 
parable, or emblem of any kind” upon “the thing represented” (131). Analogies offer an orienting figure. And 
through them “the passions are moved to good or to evil, speculation is turned into practice, and either some 
important truth felt and realized, or some error and vice gilded over and recommended” (131). What makes an 
analogy good or bad from Hartley’s weak perspective is not how formally precise the analogy is. Rather what 
matters is whether or not you employ the rhetoric of analogy appropriately as a “guide in the search after truth” 
(127). 
In his illuminating analysis of the appeal of natural theological arguments of design, Jager notes that what 
attracts a person like William Paley to analogy is that it is a “source of possibility: it allows [Paley] to see likenesses 
everywhere, and to confer likeness through the power of language itself” (120). With this last line, Jager captures the 
urgency that would have recommended pursuing elevating analogies at length: for Jager, Paley also 
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perspective, on the other hand, this pessimism arises from the perceived failure of any kind of 
strong formal theory of analogy to emerge. The critical perspective takes it for granted that, were 
analogy to be philosophical at all, it would need to demonstrate some kind of formal or logical 
regularities. The evident lack of a satisfactory formal or regular account recommends 
abandoning analogy altogether as a philosophical practice.124 From a weak critical perspective, 
the absence of a readily available formal theory — critical or commonsense — recommends 
abandoning the search for one altogether. Furthermore, the more elaborate the formal theory 
grows, the more unrealistic it is.125 Analogy may be useful and indispensable in contextual, 
commonsense, or everyday situations, but analogy will always distort more than it clarifies when 
applied philosophically. We are better served pursuing different kinds of argumentation. Holding 
out for the possibility of a formal theory of analogy is simply misguided: it gives analogy more 
credit than it deserves and allows its distortions and seductions to continue. 
Another way to think about the difference between weak commonsense and weak critical 
is to think about the source of each orientation’s anti-rationalist objections to “strong” 
orientations of analogy. A weak commonsense anti-rationalism comes from a more thorough 
distrust of all intellectual ambitions, which from its more fideist perspective looks like so much 
                                                            
“acknowledg[es] that the rhetoric of analogy itself confers designedness upon the objects of the world” (120). The 
weak practice of analogy is clarifying, elevating, and conditioning activity. This orientation is slightly different than 
Butler’s because Paley does not see himself as elaborating some complicated concurrence of analogy. But it 
embraces the epistemic weakness of analogy in the same way. As Jager notes, Paley simply finds a way to dispense 
with the necessity of situating each elaboration of analogy into a broader systematic analogy. Each object is a self-
enclosed evidence of design. Paley turns design into a specialized hermeneutic itself, to show how the intuition of 
design can unlock any object in the world, and makes it so that every object in turn testifies to reliability of this 
intuition of design and clarifies the capacious, weak character of the concept of design in ways that makes 
Cleanthes’ emphasis on human design seem less controversial because more figurative than ontological. This is why 
Philo can’t gain any traction by pointing out how the analogy introduces more definition than can be justified. 
Cleanthes accepts that the analogy is distorted, especially when elaborated to high levels of specific definition. Held 
to a strict enough standard, any analogy — even an analogy between natural events — will break down and stop 
serving its useful purpose. We are humans, so we access this principle through human design. But the perception of 
design is what matters: an analogy assists in this “search after truth” and provides “evidence for it in some degree” 
(127). 
124 The analytic philosopher Nelson Goodman illustrates this orientation in his influential “Seven Strictures on 
Similarity” (1974): “…I submit, is insidious...a pretender, an impostor, a quack.  It has, indeed, its place and its uses, 
but it is more often found where it does not belong, professing powers it does not possess” (Goodman “Seven 
Strictures on Similarity” 437). This weak critical orientation makes the analytic philosopher Goodman an 
improbable bedfellow of a deconstructive critic like Paul de Man, who calls tropes like analogy “not just travellers” 
but “smugglers and probably smugglers of stolen goods at that” (“Epistemology of Metaphor” 17) and of a cognitive 
metaphorist like George Lakoff, who worries over the problematic naturalization of certain embodied metaphors 
even as he celebrates their indispensable role in structuring complex abstractions. 
125 As Paul Norton writes of Bartha’s sophisticated new normative model: “if an account this complicated is what is 
needed for a successful formal treatment of analogy, we surely have reason to wonder if a formal analysis is the right 
approach” (12) 
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intellectual vanity. A weak critical perspective, on the other hand, retains a faith in the efficacy 
of reason and logic but simply resists an attempt to dress up the hopelessly psychological 
phenomena of analogy in formal terms of logic. Both analogy and logic lose something in the 
bargain. The following diagram offers a way of visualizing these orientations:  
 
ORIENTATIONS TOWARDS ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT 
Weak Critical 
 
• demands formal theory but skeptical 
about possibility of normative 
criteria 
• skeptical about analogy because it is 
never properly philosophical, more 
deceptive or distorting than 
illuminating, not worth risk 
• skeptical, intolerant of ALL 
"philosophical" applications, tolerant 
of loose applications 
Weak Common Sense 
 
• indifferent or skeptical towards 
formal theory 
• optimistic but qualified estimation of 
the force or value of analogy 
• some analogies may be deceptive or 
unreliable, but some may be 
illuminating, elevating 
• worth the risk because monitored by 
"naturally calibrated" good sense 
Strong Critical 
 
• demands formal theory and 
optimistic about normative criteria 
• anticipates formal criteria will be 
counterintuitive, highly theoretic 
• high estimation of force of legitimate 
argumentative uses of analogy 
• deceptive but worth but unavoidable 
and useful if subject to stricter 
discipline, constructive skepticism 
• intolerant of weak applications 
Strong Common Sense 
 
• demands formal theory and optimistic 
about normative criteria 
• anticipates formal criteria will be 
intuitive, minimally theoretic 
• high estimation of force of legitimate 
argumentative uses of analogy 
• analogy deceptive but unavoidable and 
useful if disciplined by good sense and 
minimal reflection, constructive 
skepticism 
• intolerant of weak applications 
 
In the rest of this chapter, I want to explore various interactions among these orientations 
— how they coexist with and speak to each other. But here I want to make a few general remarks 
about these orientations.  
First, I want to clarify that these orientations are not meant to be definitive but heuristic. 
The analytic attempts to draw distinctions in fairly obvious, uncontroversial, but also 
approximate ways — not to mention ways that I think are essential to understanding orientations 
towards analogy in the long eighteenth century which, unlike contemporary orientations, are not 
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captured by either “strong” or “critical” approaches but which remain fairly fluid. These 
orientations are also not mutually exclusive, and — as we have already seen with Hume — one 
thinker can adopt different orientations in different contexts. More importantly, all four 
orientations should be seen as coming through a weak commonsense orientation or inhabiting 
some version of it as a baseline. This is to say that, pace neo-Kantian Romanticism, no one 
would have had a naive or particularly fragile view of analogy. All orientations fundamentally 
accept that analogy is of lesser ontological stability, subject to irreducible uncertainty, and in 
need of monitoring and even altogether eradicating in certain instances. It is simply that some 
prefer an optimistic or confident belief in their ability to distinguish between good and bad 
analogies. And in any case, all four orientations accept that bad analogies are unavoidable, 
instinctive, and not just a matter of rhetoric but psychology. And all think of this badness as a 
kind of unavoidable and therefore forgivable mistake up to a point which, in certain critical 
contexts, becomes a punishable intellectual offense. 
Finally, I want to say something about the general historical progression of these 
orientations towards the critical project of analogy. As Paul Bartha recently and persuasively 
demonstrates, early critical theories of analogy almost invariably reflect a strong commonsense 
orientation until at least the mid-nineteenth century. The theory of verisimilitude Hume himself 
adopts and gives to Philo was widely embraced as a sufficient, and potentially very accurate, 
estimate of analogy. Its logic was intuitive, intelligible, plausible, and additive in a way that 
accorded nicely with the degree-based structure of probable knowledge more generally. The 
more similarities one could detect, the more probable and reliable an analogy would be, and any 
dissimilarity perceived would obviously be seen as decreasing the probability of the analogy. 
There was not really a strong inclination to designate some elaborations of an analogy as more 
structurally relevant than others until after J.S. Mill’s Logic. Every elaboration of an analogy was 
seen as equivalent — one point in favor or one strike against an analogy — much in the same 
way as they were with Butler (and indeed Butler’s approach to analogy would have been 
foundational to someone like Reid or Hume’s strong commonsense picture). The difference, 
however, is that where Butler tends to resist the merit of a disanalogy, Hume and Reid’s strong 
commonsense orientations perceive these disparities as probable indicators of error.  
Though the theory of analogy was almost exclusively strong commonsense in the long 
eighteenth century, this should not be taken as an accurate reflection of how analogy was applied 
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in natural philosophical practice, which was far more liberal and variegated than any formal 
theory of analogy could capture. Strong critical approaches are available as early as Boyle126 in 
scientific practice, and more specialized technical approaches to analogy are increasingly 
fostered and regulated within nearly every disciplinary practice from the early nineteenth century 
onward, even as these practices are still justified or explained through a strong commonsense 
theory.  In this way, Hume’s analogical investigations in the Dialogues should be regarded as 
uncharacteristically speculative and critical — a critical exception to the commonsense rule, not 
only more attentive to the workings of analogy but to the role of affective orientation and desire 
in ways that his more mechanistic account of analogy in the Treatise simply is not. This perhaps 
is the great payoff of the hermeneutic character of the Dialogues. An over-appreciation for the 
soundness of Hume’s reasoning obscures how exploratory and inconclusive that reasoning was 
for Hume (though he obviously was partial to it). Indeed, weak critical orientations towards 
analogy do not become prominent or explicit until the late nineteenth century onwards. As Devin 
Griffiths has nicely observed, this pessimistic orientation becomes more pronounced as the 
theological or speculative connotations of analogy become more suspicious. And it is only 
possible because nineteenth-century scientists find a way to retain the speculative practices of 
analogy by redescribing them as expert acts of “comparative analysis,” with its modern 
designation as an analytic mode that coordinates similarity and contrast. Under a critical regime, 
analogy is displaced by — or, alternatively, rehabilitated as — the modern comparative method. 
 
4.4 Disciplining Playfair’s Analogies: The Persistence of Scientia  
So far, I have distinguished between two weak orientations, but there remains one more 
important, older weak orientation that needs clarification. And I want to pursue this one by 
considering a case study from late eighteenth-century mathematics: Robert Woodhouse’s cold 
reception of John Playfair’s use of analogy to explain the significance of imaginary numbers127 
through abstract geometry. I’ll leave the details of Playfair’s approach aside, and focus on 
                                                            
126 Boyle serves as an early and crucial example for D. Gentner’s strong critical approach. See Gentner and Jeziorki, 
“The Shift from Metaphor to Analogy in Western Science.” Metaphor and Thought. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 447-80. 
127 By Parallel Reasoning (2010), Paul Bartha draws on Playfair’s analogies to generalize his “articulation” theory 
of analogy, a strong critical approach. Bartha’s interest in this example supports my claim that strong critical (i.e. 
provisional, heuristic but technical, specialized) practices would have been practiced in the eighteenth century in 
ways that are not captured by the largely commonsense theory of analogy promoted in the period.  
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Woodhouse’s rationale for rejecting analogy. In his response, Woodhouse works to “shew that the 
principle of analogy ought to be abandoned” altogether in geometry. Woodhouse’s more formal 
treatment of Playfair’s looser speculative approach is meant “to discipline a vague, perilous, and 
irregular analogy, into a strict, sure, and formal demonstration” (92). 
Woodhouse here seems to represent the “weak critical” position but would actually be 
better placed in the “weak common sense” position because his negative orientation to analogy 
comes from his continued esteem for demonstrative knowledge, not from his desire to condition 
analogy for formal practice. Woodhouse, in other words, is one of the people who Johnson 
mentions who still see Scientia as functioning in the older way. He is not a part of the contingent 
of natural philosophers who are promoting the limited viability of analogy — or at least, the 
inevitability of it — as a justification for its careful use in disciplinary or critical practice. To 
Woodhouse, “disciplining” analogy means dispensing with it altogether, not shoring it up. 
Woodhouse provides an example of how a “weak common sense” orientation can look almost 
indistinguishable from a “weak critical” one. In both cases, there is something fundamentally 
diminished about the status of analogy at a formal level: its lack of clarity as a hermeneutic, or its 
own distorting hermeneutic status and unruly dynamism, makes it prima facie suspicious. But in 
Woodhouse’s case it is more about the fact that analogy cannot lay claim to science at all. It is a 
matter of policing the boundary between the a priori theoretical from the a posteriori empirical.  
Woodhouse’s orientation illustrates the continued appeal of this foundationalist model of 
knowledge, which, as Martin Warner notes, elevated Euclidean geometry as both an archetypal 
instance and model of perfect knowledge. As Joan Richards has beautifully shown, this 
foundationalist picture of knowledge was uniquely dominant in British intellectual culture, 
enlisted by the broader conservatism of Oxford and Cambridge.128 Philosophers of science such 
as Whewell imagined geometry to be methodologically significant as a kind of strict intellectual 
discipline, a primer to good reflective practice (again, think of Wordsworth here acknowledging 
the developmental role of logic before the need to abandon it for a more capacious view of 
things): it is a training ground, but one that also unquestionably crowns knowledge, establishing 
the highest, unquestionable standard of a formal system, especially as it aligns perfectly with the 
                                                            
128See Richards, Mathematical Visions: The Pursuit of Geometry in Victorian England. New York: Academic 
Books, 1988.  
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natural space.129 Richards measures this orientation by the unique resistance that English 
intellectuals put up to the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry, which seemed wholly 
uncontroversial to Continental intellectuals.130 This orientation also notably inflects the British 
reception of Kant, since Kant had licensed, in some sense, this conservative picture by 
designating our knowledge of space as synthetic a priori, which, regardless of how Kant saw it, 
looked to most English intellectuals (all the way through George Lewes) as the apodictic 
knowledge that formed the linchpin between the theoretical and the empirical.131   
In this light, Woodhouse’s reaction might be read as an overreaction to analogy’s 
perceived colonization of all knowledge (typified by Campbell or Hume’s attacks on 
demonstration) and its threat to the claim to “necessary truth” that made mathematics – and 
particularly geometry – the archetypal model of knowledge. This is supported by Charles 
Babbage’s rebuttal to Woodhouse’s position in his 1817 lecture, “Observations on the Analogy 
which subsists between the Calculus of Functions and other branches of Analysis.” Babbage 
offers a qualified but confident defense of analogy’s application in mathematics: 
It is my intention in the following Paper to offer…some remarks on the utility of 
analogical reasoning in mathematical subjects…The employment of such an 
instrument may, perhaps, create surprise in those who have been accustomed to 
view this science as one which is founded on the most perfect demonstration, and 
it may be imagined that the vagueness and errors which analogy, when 
unskillfully employed, has sometimes introduced in other sciences, would be 
transferred to this. (197).  
 
Babbage’s orientation is strong critical. The emphasis here is on “skillful” employment of 
analogy as “a guide to point out the road to discovery” for which purpose “it is admirably 
adapted” (197). From this perspective, a carefully developed analogy can be exploratory and 
                                                            
129Whewell writes of geometry: “This science is one of indispensable use and constant reference to every student of 
the laws of nature; for the relations of space and number are the alphabet in which those laws are written. But 
besides this interest and importance of this kind which geometry possesses, it has a great and peculiar value for all 
who wish to understand the foundations of human knowledge, and the methods by which it is acquired. For the 
student of geometry acquires, with a degree of insight and clearness which the unmathematical reader can but feebly 
imagine, a conviction that there are necessary truths, many of them of a very complex and striking character” 
(Whewell 97).  
130See H. Helmholtz, “The Origin and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms.” Mind 1.3 (1876): 301-21 and “The Origin 
and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms.” Mind 3.10 (1878): 212-25. For summaries of this debate, see Joan Richards, 
“The Evolution of Empiricism: Hermann von Helmholtz and the Foundations of Geometry.” The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science 28.3 (1977): 235-53; David Hyder. The Determinate World: Kant and Helmholtz on the 
Physical Meaning of Geometry. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009. 
131Bertrand Russell still treats the rise of non-Euclidean geometry in Britain these Kantian terms in his dissertation. 
Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897. 
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even revelatory despite its risks. James Clerk Maxwell puts forth a similar position in his essay 
on how to interpret Michael Faraday’s speculations about electrical “lines of force.”132 By way of 
explaining the value of Faraday’s conceptualization of electricity in terms of force, Maxwell 
notes that “the first process…in the effectual study of the [electrical] science, must be one of 
simplification and reduction” of prior investigations to “a form in which the mind can grasp 
them” (155). While “purely mathematical formula” can provide this kind of digestion, such 
formulae risk “entirely los[ing] sight of the phenomena to be explained” (155). Likewise, 
adopting a “physical hypothesis” lacks the appropriately illuminating level of abstraction and 
risks “see[ing] the phenomena only through a medium” (155). For Maxwell, there is a need for 
“a method of investigation” that allows “a clear physical conception, without being committed to 
any theory founded on the physical science from which that conception is borrowed” (156). And 
to achieve this requires that we “make ourselves familiar with the existence of physical 
analogies” or “partial similarit[ies] between the laws of one science and those of another which 
makes each of them illustrate the other” (156). Both Maxwell and Babbage stress thoroughly the 
constructed, fictional, and formal character of these disciplinary analogies and tie their 
production to a certain kind of disciplinary expertise, which had thoroughly absorbed both this 
fictionality (anti-metaphysical, positivistic) and also had become thoroughly acquainted to all the 
relevant facts (empiricist) to make these analogical intuitions sound. “By the method which I 
adopt,” writes Maxwell, “I hope to render it evident that I am not attempting to establish any 
physical theory” about electricity but “to shew how, by a strict application of the ideas and 
methods of Faraday, the connexion of the very different orders of phenomena which he has 
discovered may be clearly placed before the mathematical mind” (157-8). This is analogy as 
modeling and visualization.  
 
4.5 Analogy as Presumption: The Lawrence-Abernethy Debate 
  I have said that a strong orientation is typically intolerant of any weak applications of 
analogy, since it holds out for the promise of a more rigorous, formalized analogy. A strong 
orientation generally attributes any weak application of analogy to metaphysical preoccupations; 
                                                            
132 By way of explaining the value of Faraday’s conceptualization of electricity in terms of force, Maxwell notes that 
“the first process…in the effectual study of the [electrical] science, must be one of simplification and reduction” of 
prior investigations to “a form in which the mind can grasp them” (155). While “purely mathematical formula” can 
provide this kind of digestion, such formulae risk “entirely los[ing] sight of the phenomena to be explained” (155).  
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compares it, unfavorably, to poetic practice; and generally dismisses it as unphilosophical. For a 
rich example of this kind of policing in emerging disciplinary, critical milieu of the early 
nineteenth century, we can turn to the Romantic-era debate between the physiologist John 
Abernethy and his student, William Lawrence.  
In his 1814 Hunterian Oration before the Royal College of Surgeons, Abernethy 
delivered two lectures in defense of a vitalist theory of life. Vitalism, which rejects the reduction 
of life to a matter of material organization alone and posits instead that life must be the result of 
some vital principle superadded to matter, had recently come under attack from French 
physiologists after having enjoyed pre-eminence in the eighteenth century. Accepting that no 
certain or definitive proof of the vitalist principle does or likely will ever exist, Abernethy 
concentrates on establishing the plausibility of a vitalist hypothesis, a sufficient warrant for 
believing in a vital force in the absence of direct proof. Abernethy deploys a number of 
argumentative strategies to this effect. For instance, he appeals to the authority of the Oration’s 
namesake, John Hunter, who ascribed to a variant of the vitalist theory. But the rhetorical 
strategy I want to focus on here is a contentious analogy Abernethy draws between life and 
electricity to establish what Abernethy calls the “probability” of the vital principle. 
“The phaenomena of electricity and of life correspond,” Abernethy asserts. Just as 
electricity requires a material conduit, so life adheres in and courses through vegetable and 
animal substances; just as electrical force may dissipate or be annulled over time, so life can 
have its powers “lost by degrees” or “annulled” in death; just as electrical motions are swift and 
vibratory, so too are the vital motions of irritability. In light of these correspondences, Abernethy 
asks his audience to consider the possibility that life, like electricity, may be attributable to a 
similarly “quick and mobile” substance: “When therefore we perceive in the universe at large, a 
cause of rapid and powerful motions of masses of inert matter, may we not naturally conclude 
that the inert molecules of vegetable and animal matter may be made to move in a similar 
manner, by a similar cause?” (Abernethy “An Enquiry” 50) or that “it is probable that a similar 
substance pervades organized bodies, and produces similar effects in them[?]” (51). 
Abernethy’s 1814 case for the “probability” and “rationality” of a vitalist theory of life 
would elicit a strong rebuttal from his student, William Lawrence, and set off a series of lectures 
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from 1814-18 now collectively known as the “vitality” debate.133 In his response, Lawrence 
objects to Abernethy’s vitalist theory on a number of grounds, but Lawrence takes special pains 
to discredit Abernethy’s application of analogy as wildly subjective, speculative, and 
undisciplined and even devotes considerable attention in his own lectures to formulating a 
normative theory of analogy suitable for guiding comparative anatomical and physiological 
inquiry. For our purposes, the debate affords an excellent look at the way a strong critical 
orientation approaches a weak commonsense orientation and, in turn, the cultural process of 
“differentiation” that defined the emergence of disciplines like comparative anatomy.  
Scholars who have treated the debate have tended to see Abernethy’s analogy between 
life and electricity as largely idiosyncratic or, like his embrace of vitalism itself, a thinly-veiled 
justification for his conservative political and theological commitments.134 This line of 
ideological critique has its merits. And the fact that Abernethy’s analogy was so poorly received, 
                                                            
133The Lawrence-Abernethy debate perhaps received its most thorough critical treatment in philosophy and history 
of science in the 1960s, where it became a foundational case study exhibiting the merits of broadening critical 
inquiries beyond “internal” or “endogenous” scientific concerns and to consider cultural and political influences. 
Karl Figlio asserts that the debate should be read as “the expression of wider and deeper interests through the 
scientific format and language” (29); likewise, Owsei Temkin agrees that the primary interest of the debate lies in 
the “intricate interdependence” of its scientific, theological, and political concerns. In his treatment of the debate, 
L.S. Jacyna elevates it an argument that history of science 
should not rest content with an abstract description of intellectual productions but seek[] to lodge them 
in the nexus of events where they originated and with which their meaning is inextricably bound. From 
this vantage point, many of the boundaries conventionally drawn between the histories of science, 
political theory, and political actions are revealed as artificial positions of what should be a unified field 
of study. (329). 
Recent literary critical interest in this debate seems to begin with Marilyn Butler’s treatment of it as a direct 
influence on Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein. More recently, Sharon Ruston and Denise Gigante have considered the 
debate as an important intertext for P.B. Shelley’s poetic representations of life. In a recent dissertation, Jeffrey 
Johnson also suggests the debate’s influence on Coleridge’s theory of life. 
134 One exception to this rule is June Goodfield-Toulmin’s early analysis of the debate. Goodfield-Toulmin offers 
two important contexts appreciating Abernethy’s analogy between life and electricity. First, Goodfield-Toulmin 
considers the general effect of the recent discovery of electricity, which would have amounted to a revolutionary 
moment in the science of the period that afforded grounds for speculation about the plausibility of other forms of 
invisible phenomena: “...the status of this ‘subtile’ mobile matter was highly ambiguous, but so too was the status of 
electricity” (294).  Second, Goodfield-Toulmin considers Abernethy’s explicit appeal to the authority of Newton and 
locates several “extraordinarily close analogies” between the form of Abernethy’s speculative vital principle and 
Newton’s theory of gravitation. As Goodfield-Toulmin explains, the vital principle could be regarded, like 
gravitation, as an “ultimate fact” since  
by the very same processes of thought which force us to regard gravity as an ultimate fact…[w]e 
see genuine and real properties and relate these back to the existence of an inherent principle. That 
there should be an unexplained mechanism here does not surprise these men, since they have, they 
believe, an excellent precedent in the unexplained mechanism of gravity, and so far in physiology 
no other explanation seems to be comprehensive (292).  
This accounts, in her view, why Abernethy’s language seems to draw explicitly on Newton’s hypothesis regarding 
“a most subtle spirit, which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies, by the force and attraction of which spirit, all 
particles of bodies attract one another and all sensation is excited” (286). 
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even by those were ultimately sympathetic to Abernethy’s vitalism, makes it plausible that 
Abernethy was doing something unrecognizable.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was purported 
to have attended Abernethy’s 1814 lecture, dismisses it in “Theory of Life” as “a mere diagram 
on [Abernethy’s] slate, for the purpose of fixing the attention on the intellectual conception” 
(“An Enquiry” 66). Coleridge here reaches for a weak commonsense interpretation to save 
Abernethy’s argument from analogy — one with a distinctly theological thrust — and his 
response is more or less representative of Abernethy’s sympathizers. They, like Coleridge, took 
the analogy to be largely unconvincing and even counterproductive because of the way 
Abernethy likened the vital principle to a material phenomenon and at times nearly identified the 
vital principle with electricity itself. 
Like Coleridge, I also take Abernethy’s analogy to be working within a weak 
commonsense framework. But I want to suggest that Abernethy’s approach to analogy is in some 
sense more formulaic than idiosyncratic in the eighteenth century and, thus, the fact that it was 
perceived as idiosyncratic in the early nineteenth century is suggestive. I do not primarily mean 
that Abernethy would have learned this loose practice of analogizing widely between different 
natural forces for illustrative and speculative ends from eighteenth-century natural philosophy, 
although — as examples from George Berkeley to Joseph Priestley would show, and as 
Loveridge and other critics have long observed — this was the rule, not the exception. Instead, I 
want to highlight Abernethy’s indebtedness to a model of argument from analogy promoted 
within George Campbell’s influential “new rhetoric,” a model that I want to suggest was 
abstracted from the kind of weak argumentative approach Butler adopts in The Analogy of 
Religion (1736) on the basis of its perceived success as an apologetic and especial sensitivity to 
contemporary epistemology. 
 I’ll need to first say something about the reception of Butler’s text. Hardly anyone 
outside of theology reads Butler now, but it is difficult to overestimate the intellectual impact of 
Butler’s Analogy of Religion (1736) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Several dozen 
editions of the Analogy were published through the eighteenth century, with translations into 
French, German, Greek, Italian, and Welsh available. Dozens more appeared in the nineteenth 
century, along with countless articles and book-length commentaries concerning the practical 
and theoretical influence of Butler’s text. His impact seems to have been especially pronounced 
in Scottish intellectual culture. Reid attempts a full chapter-by-chapter synopsis of Butler 
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(though he gives up halfway). Hume was so impressed by Butler’s reasoning that he actively 
pursued Butler as a first reader, a fact which many scholars since have used to explain the 
conspicuous absence of Hume’s major critiques against religion. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when Butler’s influence was arguably at its height, every significant divine following 
Butler felt compelled to comment on Butler’s work. Several of these took the form of personal 
accounts of the practical influence of Butler’s treatise on a divine’s own conversion or faith. But 
the majority of these publications took the form of commentaries and interpretations of Butler’s 
argument itself, either as popularizations that attempted to provide a simplified account of its 
subtler or esoteric points or as authoritative commentaries produced to assess the argument’s 
efficacy as an apologetic, to provide a measure of what George Chalmers referrers to as “the 
precise argumentative force of [Butler’s] peculiar reasoning.” Butler’s argument felt peculiar but 
powerful and therefore worthy of extensive study and commentary. 
 In the section of The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1772) on “analogical evidence,” Campbell 
describes Butler’s work as an “excellent treatise” which “hath shown us how useful the mode of 
reasoning may be rendered…for refuting the cavils of infidelity” (78). This looks like a case for 
analogy’s profound force. But, for Campbell, what Butler discovers is the strength in analogy’s 
epistemic weakness. Campbell describes “analogical evidence” as “at best but a feeble 
support…hardly ever honoured with the name of proof” (75). But, he continues, 
Nevertheless, when the analogies are numerous, and the subject admits not 
evidence of another kind, it doth not want its efficacy. It must be owned, however, 
that it is generally more successful in silencing objections than in evincing truth, 
and on this account may more properly be styled the defensive arms of the orator 
than the offensive. (75-6). 
 
I believe this is the context we should use to assess Abernethy’s intent. Indeed, Abernethy 
appears to follow Campbell’s recommendation almost to the word. He finds himself in an 
apologetic situation, defending vitalism from what he perceives as its materialist adversaries. In 
the absence of direct observational proof, he pursues a multi-faceted analogy that will lend 
credence to his vitalist hypothesis: these are “defensive” not “offensive” arms. Perhaps most 
importantly, Abernethy is looking not at the strength of his analogy but at its weakness — that is, 
the limited obligation the analogy places on its audience to accept the plausibility of his 
argument. The purpose of Abernethy’s analogy with electricity is not meant to prove the 
existence of the vital principle. He wants to link this existence with a known (and admittedly 
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strange) natural phenomenon similar to the hypothesized vital principle. Doing so does not prove 
the existence of this vital principle. It simply makes it harder to discredit or dismiss such a 
principle as unserious. Reformulating this analysis in Butler’s terminology, Abernethy uses the 
analogy to establish a “presumption,” or minimally sufficient evidence, for entertaining the 
vitalist hypothesis. 
Abernethy’s appeal to presumption provokes a fairly hostile reaction from Lawrence, 
which suggests that by 1814 natural philosophic practice had undergone a change that makes 
Abernethy’s analogizing intolerable. Most saliently, Lawrence rejects the accumulative or 
accretive logic that informs Abernethy’s deployment of analogy: that is, the idea that any and all 
perceptible analogies might be cited in support of an argument, even as these analogies could be 
said to vary in persuasiveness. Instead, Lawrence installs a distinction between “superficial” and 
“relevant” analogies and argues that the problem with Abernethy’s analogy between life and 
electricity is that it proceeds by falsely “select[ing] one or two minor points [of similarity], to the 
neglect of all the important features” so that “a distant similarity [between life and electricity] 
may be made out; and this…only in appearance” (“Two Lectures” 170).  
At this level, Lawrence’s response looks like it could be strong commonsense: it appeals 
to a logic of verisimilitude. But Lawrence’s approach is properly strong critical. Lawrence does 
not dismiss the scientific use of analogy altogether and has a very optimistic estimation of its 
value. Indeed, Lawrence seems to conceive of the entire practice of comparative anatomy in 
terms of analogy: in comparative anatomy, writes Lawrence, one “proceed[s] on the observation 
of facts, of their order and connexion… notice[s] the analogies between them; and deduce[s] the 
general law, to which they are subject” (“Two Lectures” 165). For Lawrence, analogy may be the 
only legitimate empirical manner of achieving these general laws. But Lawrence also assumes 
that our natural propensity to analogize exists in excess of these orders and, as such, contributes 
largely to our tendency to distort or confuse them. And legitimate analogizing only comes with 
sufficient expertise and more severe discipline.135 For Lawrence, the problem with Abernethy’s 
                                                            
135 Addressing the major problem of defining speciation in his later, controversial Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, 
and the Natural History of Man Delivered at The Royal College of Surgeons (1822), Lawrence follows the German 
anatomist Johanne Blumenbach by asserting that “we must resort at last to the criterion” of “draw[ing] our notions 
of species and zoology from analogy and probability” (Lawrence Natural History of Man 183). For Blumenbach, 
this is a hard but honest realization: “To assist us in forming a determination in such cases, there are no rules 
applicable in practice but those drawn from analogy; the proposal of Ray, Buffon, and others, to fix the character of 
a species by the possibility of producing fruitful progeny, is uncertain and inadequate to the object proposed” 
(Manual 15-16). 
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superficial comparison is that it is not sufficiently disciplined and is therefore more likely 
attributable to illegitimate, poetic analogical propensities than legitimate, scientific ones. 
Lawrence compares Abernethy to the character of Polonius in Hamlet searching for formal 
resemblances in the passing clouds: “To make the matter more intelligible, this vital principle is 
compared to magnetism, to electricity, and to galvanism; or it is roundly stated to be oxygen. 
’Tis like a camel, or like a whale, or like what you please” (“Two Lectures” 169). 
It’s important to think about what Lawrence is not policing here, for it will help correct 
some frequent misinterpretations of the central thrust of Lawrence’s critique, not to mention 
provide a better picture of the process of differentiation Lawrence is performing here. Many 
critics, for instance, are inclined to take Abernethy’s characterization of Lawrence’s position as 
materialist at face value, and to accept that the debate is one between materialism and vitalism. 
But Lawrence is himself a vitalist of a different stripe. And this comes through when we consider 
how Lawrence generalizes the kind of endemic analogical procedure he sees working within 
comparative anatomy as an organizing principle for all disciplines. For Lawrence, disciplinary 
boundaries respect and reflect real ontological distinctions between autonomous natural orders. 
Their autonomous structure means that while analogizing can take place within them, 
analogizing cannot occur across them. For this reason 
[t]he science of organized bodies should…be treated in a manner entirely 
different from those, which have inorganic matter for their object…the peculiar 
phenomena [of organized bodies] present no analogy to those which are treated in 
chemistry, mechanics, and other physical sciences: the reference therefore to 
[other orders] can only serve to perpetuate false notions in physiology. (“Two 
Lectures” 161) 
 
Lawrence’s autonomous disciplines could be said to be analogously structured orders, each 
organized around the same practice of scientific generalization through the perception of 
analogies among facts endemic to each. And this means that Lawrence imagines something like 
an autonomous set of “vital” principles that must be discovered in their own right. This reflects 
the kind of logic of specialization that Valenza and Flanagan identify. 
A second thing to note is that Lawrence’s strong critical response does not read 
Abernethy’s error primarily as rhetorical but as psychological. To be sure, the problem seems to 
be in some sense Abernethy’s specious rhetorical act of “comparison” (“Two Lectures” 169). 
But, for Lawrence, this rhetorical maneuver plays to a deeper psychological weakness. This is in 
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part the import of Lawrence’s rhetorical use of vitalism. As Robert Mitchell has recently noted, 
the term vitalism was more polemical than descriptive. It functioned largely as a “gatekeeping 
term” that is “designed to serve both as a warning and to encourage self-monitoring, for...the 
vitalist’s collapse into the irrational prehistory of biology is the result of some psychological 
failing” (Mitchell Experimental Life 5). For Lawrence, Abernethy’s vitalism involves a 
fundamental misinterpretation of the sorts of conclusions analogical reasoning can support 
within comparative anatomical inquiry, and this has resulted from Abernethy’s lack of discipline, 
which has caused him to forward unjustified speculative claims. 
For Lawrence, there is no doubt about the existence of vital properties: simple 
observation of the special nature of life “led[s us] to admit the vital properties [i.e. irritability and 
sensibility], already spoken of, as causes of the various phenomena” (Lawrence “Two Lectures”  
165). But the problem with Abernethy’s naive vitalism is that it assumes that these “vital 
properties” observed through analogical comparison — or the term life that generalizes them — 
must indicate a special essence, not simply a process. For Lawrence, while positivist inquiry can 
select out these vital phenomena for observation, it should never “profess to explain how the 
living forces...exert their agency” (“Two Lectures” 65). But, for Lawrence 
…some are not content to stop at this point; they wish to draw aside the veil from 
nature, to display the very essence of the vital properties, and penetrate to their 
first causes; to shew, independently of the phenomena, what is life, and how 
irritability and sensibility execute those purposes, which so justly excite our 
imagination. (“Two Lectures” 165-66) 
 
For Lawrence, Abernethy and others make this invalid inference because of a weak 
psychological disposition, a will to believe that exceeds scientific warrant and compromises what 
should be the impartial, agnostic orientation of the scientist.136 For Lawrence, naive vitalism 
itself is a form of superstition: this “hypothesis or fiction of a subtle invisible matter” is “only an 
example” of a more general “propensity in the human mind” that “has led men at all times to 
account for those phenomena, of which the causes are not obvious, by the mysterious aid of 
                                                            
136 Here Lawrence also seems to be following Blumenbach: “I trust that it is unnecessary to inform the greater part 
of my readers, that the term Formative Impulse, like the names applied to every other kind of vital power, of itself, 
explains nothing; it serves merely to designate a peculiar power formed by the combination of the mechanical 
principle with that which is susceptible of modification; a power, the constant agency of which we ascertain by 
experience, whilst its cause, like that of all other generally recognized natural powers, still remains, in the strictest 
sense of the word—‘qualitas occulta.’ This, however, in no way prevents us from endeavoring, by means of 
observation, to trace and explain the effects, and to reduce them to general principles” (Blumenbach Manual 12) 
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higher and imaginary beings” (“Two Lectures” 175). Lawrence identifies this propensity most 
closely with “poetry” (176) and “personification,” or “our disposition to clothe all surrounding 
objects with our own sentiments and passions, to animate the dead matter around us with human 
intellect and expression” (176).  “The fictitious beings of poetry are generally interesting in 
themselves and are brought forwards to answer some useful purpose; but the genii and spirits of 
physiology are awkward and clumsy, and do nothing at last which could not be accomplished 
just as well without them: they literally encumber us with their help” (Natural History of Man 
72-3). With this “poetic ground of physiology,” we “quit the path of observation, and wander 
into the regions of imagination and conjecture” (72). So Lawrence’s problem with Abernethy’s 
analogy is not that far from Hume’s problem with natural theology. It plays to propensities that 
can and should be moderated. 
Then again, Lawrence’s problem is not Hume’s because it is decidedly not with natural 
theology. In fact, for Lawrence, one of the greatest payoffs for the emerging field of comparative 
anatomy is that it so thoroughly confirms the validity of natural theological arguments from 
design: “[t]he gradations of organization, and the final purposes contemplated by Nature in the 
construction of her living machines…receive their only clear illustration and incontrovertible 
evidence from comparative anatomy” (Natural History of Man 42): for Lawrence, “[w]e must 
take refuge either in verbal quibbles, or in an exaggerated and unreasonable scepticism, if we 
refuse to recognize in the relation between peculiarity of structure and function those designs and 
adaptations of exalted power and wisdom, in testimony of which all nature cries aloud through 
all her works” (Natural History of Man 46-7). This should clarify, contrary to many critical 
treatments, that Lawrence’s objections to Abernethy are not atheistic (or crypto-atheistic) but 
agnostic. And they are agnostic only within the positivistic, empirical contexts of physiology and 
comparative anatomy. His objections are about keeping the question at hand at the forefront, 
undistorted by moral or metaphysical preoccupations: 
You must bring to this physiological question a sincere and earnest love of truth; 
dismissing from your minds all the prejudices and alarms which have been so 
industriously connected with it. If you enter on the inquiry in the spirit of the 
bigot and partisan, suffering a cloud of fears and hopes, desires and aversion, to 
hang round your understandings, you will never discern objects clearly; their 
colours, shapes, dimensions, will be confused, distorted, and obscured by the 
intellectual mist. Our business is, to inquire what is true; not what is the finest 
theory; not what will supply the best topics of pretty composition and eloquent 
declamation, addressed to the prejudices, the passions, and the ignorance of our 
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hearers…Truth is like a native rustic beauty; most lovely when unadorned, and 
seen in the open light of day. (Natural History of Man 92) 
 
We should see Lawrence making a patently “epistemological” move here: he is establishing the 
primacy of comparative anatomy as it affords a separate “basis” for valid moral and theological 
reasoning. And he is doing this by establishing the proper conditions in which analogy can be 
employed within the discipline. This is more defensive than offensive: it establishes the 
autonomy of the disciplinary practice, but it does not dictate how its purer epistemological facts 
might be used outside beyond the discipline of comparative anatomy. This is the first sense of 
“irreligious” before it is the second. But Lawrence does not venture a positive vision for the 
prejudices. Rather he frames the negotiation as a matter of disciplinary boundaries. The 
theologian and the physiologist pose different questions that only they can answer. Lawrence 
writes,  
“...[T]he theological doctrine of the soul, and its separate existence, has nothing to 
do with this physiological question [of life], but rests on a species of proof 
altogether different. These sublime dogmas could never have been brought to 
light by the labour of the anatomist and physiologist. An immaterial and spiritual 
being could not have been discovered amid the blood and filth of the dissecting-
room” (Natural History of Man 7)  
 
Lawrence attributes the belief that science might be able to legislate such doctrinal questions to a 
misguided “esprit de metier” that might cause overreach in either direction: not only the 
theologian but the physiologist can illegitimately cross disciplinary boundaries. And Lawrence’s 
job is simply to police incursions into his territory.137  
 
4.6 Rhetoric and Psychology  
I want to continue to press on Lawrence’s choice to see Abernethy’s error as 
psychological first — a kind of superstitious atavism — and rhetorical second. And I want to 
suggest that this has to do with the way Lawrence does not see analogy in rhetorical terms, but 
rather in cognitive ones: or the way he doesn’t really see his analogical practice as trafficking in 
rhetoric and, therefore, prefers to see Abernethy’s approach as more continuous with his own 
                                                            
137L.S. Jacyna also asserts that “[Lawrence] was concerned, he claimed, to amend the current cultural status of 
physiological discourse — to assert its autonomy of and immunity from such exogenous claims on its attention. 
Above all, Lawrence insisted that evidence drawn from physiology was irrelevant to the question of the existence of 
the soul” (312) 
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practice of analogy. The question is how continuous Abernethy’s approach actually is with 
Lawrence’s at this psychological level (however obviously it is not at the disciplinary level).  
In some sense, accepting a continuity between Abernethy and Lawrence’s views of 
analogy seems sound because Abernethy seems to be drawing on Campbell who, as a new 
rhetorician, presents analogy in more psychological terms than rhetorical terms — or, rather, 
Campbell sees the rhetorical account of analogy following directly and naturally from an 
epistemological account (and further, from a naturalized psychology). Importantly, Campbell’s 
low estimation of analogy derives not from analogy’s problematic rhetorical status. Instead, it 
reflects analogy’s relatively low status on the hierarchy of evidence adapted by the New Rhetoric 
from contemporary epistemology as a part of its reformulation of the rhetorical tradition. As a 
form of moral evidence ranked below the privileged direct observational experience, analogy has 
little argumentative purchase except in the absence of direct experience itself (i.e. “evidence of 
another kind”) or, alternatively, as analogy more closely approximates experience itself (i.e. 
“when the analogies are numerous”).  
Campbell’s view of analogy is so thoroughly epistemological that, from my perspective, 
he offers one of the more sophisticated accounts of the intuitive appeal of the logic of 
verisimilitude (again, the standard grounding strong commonsense approaches to analogy). 
Campbell finds the rule of verisimilitude satisfying because he understands the rule itself to 
emerge naturally and inductively through associationist psychology. Put another way, 
verisimilitude is a “second-order” rule that arises out the natural working of analogy. Just as 
early associations of ideas may be loose and confused only to become tighter and more accurate 
through experience, so our ability to “assess” the merit of similarity starts out poor but becomes 
increasingly refined in a way that produces the rule of verisimilitude itself. Campbell explains it 
this way: 
I have learned from experience that like effects sometimes proceed from objects 
which faintly resemble, but not near so frequently as from objects which have a 
more perfect likeness. By this experience, I am enabled to determine the degrees 
of probability from the degrees of similarity, in different cases. It is presumable 
that the former of these ways has the earliest influence, when the mind, 
unaccustomed to reflection, forms a weak association, and consequently, but a 
weak expectation of a similar event from a weak resemblance. The latter seems 




Campbell offers a speculative metatheory of analogy. He is interested in analogy as a universal 
psychological mechanism that spontaneously (and reliably) generates its own (consistent) rule. In 
this way, Campbell is not too far from Hume’s naturalistic picture of analogy, and arguably doing 
a better job of accounting for how it generates its graduated structure of degrees than Hume does. 
Campbell’s engagement with epistemological accounts of analogy challenges what Susan 
Manning has described as the received view that “eighteenth-century poets and rhetoricians 
regarded figurative language as an embellishment rather than a constituent of meaning, and that 
the cognitive properties of metre, rhyme, and trope were ‘discovered’ and debated by Romantics, 
notably Blake, Wordsworth and Shelley” (Manning 41). Of course, this received view (at least as 
it relates to “tropes” of symbolism) originates largely in neo-Kantian Romanticism; it aligns 
perfectly with the kind of literary revolution it wants to narrate. But, as Manning writes, this 
separation does not capture how invested eighteenth-century rhetoricians were in the cognitive 
properties of metaphor and the problems of “how to manage figures of speech” and “distinguish 
distracting adornment from a compression that would be functional in communication and 
comparison” (41). It likewise does not capture the New Rhetorical interest in analogies as 
“relational modes of perception and understanding” (8).  
Indeed, while poetic approaches to analogy no doubt shift over the long eighteenth 
century, neo-Kantian Romanticism does a poor job describing this shift because of its 
preoccupation with break. The distinction between rhetorical and cognitive (read: philosophical) 
treatments of metaphors used to differentiate between eighteenth-century and Romantic 
metaphor is arguably more obscuring than clarifying. And the same is true of an oversimplified 
conflation between eighteenth-century “rhetorical” and “psychological” accounts of analogy that 
a neo-Kantian like Wasserman pursues, for instance, on the supposed basis of their shared 
problematic subjective status in relation to the communal analogies offered by the neo-Platonic 
analogy. Both approaches are too simplified and schematic to capture the difficult relation 
between rhetoric and philosophy in the period. Importantly, a new rhetorician like Campbell sees 
his epistemological account of analogy simultaneously as departing from traditional rhetorical 
accounts, investing in philosophy, and elaborating from philosophy into a new kind of 
rhetoric.138 As Devin Griffiths observes, while “the classical rhetorician Quintilian had worked 
                                                            
138Adam Smith inaugurates this turn from classical rhetoric with his often-quoted comment that ancient and modern 
systems of rhetoric devoted to these kind of distinctions amount to “a very silly set of books and not at all 
instructive” (Smith Lectures 23). 
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hard to restrict the definition of analogy to a perception of a linguistic pattern,” Campbell 
explicitly “criticizes that restriction, arguing [analogy] should equally apply to tropes of 
similitude” (14). Against Quintilian, Campbell objects, “But what are rhetorical comparisons, 
when brought to illustrate any point inculcated on the hearers (what are they, I say), but 
arguments from analogy?” (Campbell 193). With this maneuver, Griffiths suggests that Campbell 
“overwrites a long-held distinction between rhetorical tropes and modes of philosophical 
thought139” (14). 
All this is to say that Lawrence seems right, in one sense, to interpret Abernethy’s error as 
psychological before it is rhetorical. The aim of Abernethy’s argument from analogy is in some 
sense to visualize an immaterial, spiritual, and therefore morally gratifying principle of life, and 
this weak commonsense application of analogy would have been recommended by Campbell and 
Hartley alike. Indeed, while Lawrence (not to mention current critics) finds Abernethy’s moral 
investments immaterial and embarrassing to the disciplinary context, Abernethy is not 
embarrassed to admit them140. But where we can start to see the difference between Abernethy 
                                                            
139 In Griffiths’ recent eighteenth-century prehistory of comparative method, Campbell’s flattening of rhetoric into 
philosophy affords the grounds for the nineteenth-century rehabilitation of analogy as more philosophical than 
rhetorical or theological. But, from my perspective, Campbell is not innovating here but merely elaborating on 
Butler’s interesting reinterpretation of Quintilian’s use of analogy. Butler’s interpretation of analogy represents a 
significant departure from other apologetics of the period; for instance, Peter Browne’s Divine Analogy (1733) or 
Samuel Clarke’s On the Being and Attributes of God (1706) also grounded their methods in analogy but approached 
the question of analogy and its apologetic value along traditional Thomistic lines. A central question within this 
Thomistic tradition concerned the extent to which one might form a valid conception of the nature and attributes of 
God — for instance, God’s wisdom — by reasoning from analogy with the attributes of man. Butler’s justification 
of the value of analogy largely sidesteps these scholastic concerns and, instead, appeals to the authority granted 
analogical reasoning within the emerging account of probable knowledge, appropriating it for what appears to be a 
wholly original interpretation of analogical argumentation. As evidence of this originality, we might consider the 
relation of Butler’s argumentative strategy to the guidelines for the rhetorical use of analogy presented by the 
Analogy’s epigraph, which comes from Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria. In its original context, Quintilian 
recommends analogy as a response to the linguistic problem of determining case inflections for unfamiliar words. In 
such a case, one properly reasons by establishing an analogy with similar, more familiar words: “What [analogy] 
requires is that a writer or speaker should compare whatever is at all doubtful with something similar concerning 
which there is no doubt, so as to prove the uncertain by the certain” (np). Butler effectively converts this method of 
linguistic inquiry through analogical comparison to an argumentative method. 
140 That is, Abernethy has no problem admitting that he is simply trying to counteract a “sceptical 
disposition...disinclined to believe anything that was not directly an object of their senses” (54-55). For Abernethy, 
the doubt or suspension of belief recommended by this disposition is “so fatiguing to the human mind, by keeping it 
in continued action, that it will and must rest somewhere.” The formation of opinions being inevitable, Abernethy 
recommends that “our enquiry ought to be where it may rest most securely and comfortably to itself, and with most 
advantage to others” since “in the uncertainty of opinions, wisdom would counsel us to adopt those which have a 
tendency to produce beneficial actions” (93). In other words, Abernethy justifies his vitalism as an appeal to the 
practical value of certain forms of speculative belief, if and when they promote action that might be regarded as 
beneficial (92-95). But practical here means something much different than it does for Lawrence, who would 
perceive it in more physiological, active terms. 
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and Campbell’s approaches to analogy, on one hand, and Lawrence’s, on the other, is when we 
consider what their respective epistemological inquiries recommend. From Campbell’s weaker, 
commonsense orientation, once one “descends” from “experimental reasoning” to the 
“analogical,” one comes “upon a common to which reason and fancy have an equal claim” (96-
7). For Campbell, analogy departs from experience in a manner that makes it prima facie 
imaginative, speculative, and unreliable in all situations. This is what recommends such a low 
rhetorical estimation of analogy: this, for Campbell, is what Butler discovered about analogy. It 
is hardly reliable but is a sufficient vehicle to image and therefore preserve the truth. For 
Lawrence, on the other hand, the perception of analogy is less a kind of argument loosely 
affiliated but ultimately discontinuous with experience (Campbell refers to analogy as a “more 
indirect form of experience”). Rather, analogy is itself a kind of experience or form of 
perception. And, for Lawrence, this recommends not a low general estimation or loose rhetorical 
application of analogy, but an even more severe disciplining of analogy. And this is in part 
because analogy is more indispensable to Lawrence’s comparative anatomical practice than it is 
to Abernethy or Campbell, and therefore in need of a more serious and cautious treatment. 
In one sense, the general unintelligibility of Abernethy’s approach in 1814 reveals how 
conditioned Campbell’s account was by his special investment in analogy as it was deployed by 
eighteenth-century Christian apologetics and the limitations of what a New Rhetorician like 
Campbell would have assumed to be a general, descriptive account of analogy’s persuasiveness, 
well grounded in the associationist psychology emerging out of Lockean epistemology. But from 
another perspective, this unintelligibility seems somewhat strategic on Lawrence’s part, an 
                                                            
For Abernethy, establishing the probable grounds of the vital principle has a direct moral appeal. The vital 
principle, with its dualist implications, constitutes a morally edifying physiological belief that fits comfortably with 
the Christian doctrine of the soul. Abernethy perceives his arguments as providing a safe and sufficient warrant for 
holding a belief that is at once scientifically sound, morally productive, and (as almost a side-effect) natural even as 
it is uncertain. “I am visionary enough,” Abernethy writes,  
to imagine that if these opinions should become so established as to be generally admitted by philosophers, 
that if they once saw reason to believe that life was something of an invisible and active nature superadded 
to organization; they would then see equal reason to believe that mind might be superadded to life, as life is 
to structure...Thus even would physiological researches enforce the belief which I may say is natural to 
man; that in addition to his bodily frame, he possesses a sensitive, intelligent, and independent mind: an 
opinion which tends in an eminent degree to produce virtuous honorable, and useful actions. (94-5).  
On the other hand, he writes in his 1817 lecture, “to exchange opinions for other opinions [i.e. materialism], as in 
this case seems required of us, when the barter is so disadvantageous, would be the highest absurdity. We should 
give up that which is in every respect, and in the greatest degree, useful and dignifying, and what experience has 
proved to be durable, for that which is pernicious and derogatory, and which evidently cannot last” (51-52). Here we 
see something like the logic of Johnson’s kick. Abernethy puts forth a weak analogy because it is not worth the cost 
of engaging materialism in a more thorough manner. It would cost too much. 
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expression of Lawrence’s discomfort with respecting the explicitly rhetorical terms of 
presumption Abernethy proposes. Curiously, when Lawrence returns to analogical reasoning in 
his later Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man (1822), he writes that 
the unreliability of analogical argument recommends one foregrounding an argument from 
analogy’s rhetorical and heuristic status: although “arguments from analogy are of great service 
in physiology and other departments of natural history” they “should rather be resorted to for 
illustration than relied on for direct proof” (Natural History 78). Of course, Abernethy’s aim is 
illustrative and suggestive, not conclusive or direct. And Lawrence even explicitly recognizes 
that Abernethy’s analogy is meant to “make the matter more intelligible” (169). But Lawrence 
prefers to see Abernethy’s attempt at illustration as more illegitimate than legitimate, even as 
Abernethy is obviously not seeking anything like “direct proof” of vitalism. Lawrence does this 
by tracing Abernethy’s rhetoric back to its illegitimate psychological grounds and taking 
Abernethy to be pursuing a stronger kind of proof than he is. Lawrence seems to know that 
Abernethy is using rhetoric, but he prefers to see this rhetoric as exploiting a bad psychological 
disposition.  
Lawrence’s negotiation of Abernethy illustrates a broader problem that the strong critical 
ethos has articulating the differences of its own formalized analogical practices and the 
analogical practices it dismisses as superstitious and illegitimate. While experts like Blumenbach 
and Lawrence largely work to maintain the integrity and autonomy of their own critical 
disciplines from analogical invasions (from natural theology or other disciplines), they have a 
distinct enthusiasm for legitimate applications of analogy within their respective disciplines. By 
the mid-nineteenth century, the strong critical confidence in the difference between scientific and 
theological uses of analogy starts to look particularly conspicuous. In his massive Analogy, 
Considered as a Guide to Truth, and Applied as an Aid to Faith (1864), the theologian James 
Buchanan aims to show that “Analogy, as applied to Religion, is neither less legitimate nor less 
valid than when it is applied to any other department of human knowledge; and that in Science, 
as well as in common life, it asserts its prerogative, as a law of human thought, and a ground of 
rational belief” (Buchanan 6-7). It is arguably in response to objections like Buchanan’s that 
scientific disciplines work to divest themselves of the term analogy. In general, rather than 
mounting any specific justification or distinction between religious and scientific applications of 
analogy, scientists in the period seem inclined to remain equivocal about how or why one is 
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different than the other. In an 1856 speech, “Are There Real Analogies in Nature?” for instance, 
Maxwell takes a meta-theoretical turn to interrogate what such a claim could or would have to 
mean and to offer a kind of preliminary, but ultimately inconclusive, sketch of the ontological 
conditions that would have to apply.141  
 
4.7 Common Sense, For and Against Analogy  
In the last section, I tried to complicate the received view regarding the eighteenth-
century approaches to analogy by performing some differentiating work between “rhetorical” 
and “psychological” accounts of analogy. In this section, I want to pursue this differentiation 
further by considering how, from a certain perspective, rhetorical approaches to analogy seem to 
disappear altogether with the rise of strong orientations in epistemology and are displaced by a 
more thoroughly psychological attention to analogy. The best way to capture this is to say that, as 
the distinction between internal and external evidence of probable knowledge gains currency, 
analogies are increasingly treated less as rhetorical constructions and more as natural 
appearances that impose themselves upon the mind.  More precisely, the disciplinary rhetoric 
around analogy shifts from an indictment of the moral (or philosophic) character of those who 
use analogy (as apparent in Bacon and Locke) to an indictment of analogy’s duplicitous 
character itself. Analogy is treated less as a rhetorical problem and more as a psychological one, 
and it is treated much more seriously. 
For Bacon, for instance, bad acts of analogy are almost wholly rhetorical. He only 
prescribes 
[c]onformable and Analogous Instances which indicate (as I said at the beginning) 
Physical Resemblances; that is, real and substantial resemblances; resemblances 
grounded in nature, not accidental or merely apparent; much less superstitious or 
curious resemblances, such as the writers on natural magic (very frivolous 
persons, hardly to be named in connexion with such serious matters as we are 
now about) are everywhere parading; similitudes and sympathies of things that 
have no reality, which they describe and sometimes invent with great vanity and 
folly. (Novum Organum 176)  
 
Bacon obviously doesn’t deny the existence of physical instances of analogy or the natural 
philosophical value of pursuing them. Indeed, he imagines his elusive and tantalizingly 
                                                            
141See Maxwell, “Are There Real Analogies in Nature?” in The Life of James Clerk Maxwell, eds Campell and 
Garnett, 235-44. For a contemporary analysis of this speech along these lines, see Henderson, “The Physics and 
Poetry of Analogy.” 
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underdeveloped prima philosophia as the complete articulation of what Katherine Park describes 
as “the real correspondences and similitudes stretching from object to object” (Park 294) that 
Bacon took to structure the universe. Bacon notes that these deeper resemblances are not “only 
similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of 
nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters” (Advancement 91). Powerful 
analogies are everywhere in nature, and people don’t take them seriously enough. They are not a 
mere matter of rhetorical “similitude.”  Bad analogies, on the other hand, are distinctly a matter 
of rhetoric. The blame is laid not on analogy itself but on the bad natural philosopher who picks 
up and amplifies a superficial analogy or claims it is grounded in nature when it is in fact 
grounded in everything else but “nature” — attributable to the “writers” who are themselves 
“very frivolous persons” who “parad[e]” and “describe” and “invent with great vanity and folly” 
(2.27). The psychological act of analogizing is not itself in question; instead, it is the distortion 
and amplification of bad analogies by “frivolous persons” who are “hardly to be named in 
connexion with such serious matters as we are now about” (2.27). Analogical perception is not 
itself a serious problem for the true natural philosopher since it is so obviously different from 
these bad analogical acts. Bacon does not see the perceptual act of analogy as itself a mysterious 
or duplicitous aspect of nature that must be placed under investigation: he is confident in his own 
analogizing. He has a strong commonsense orientation, and he takes his own proper analogical 
perception to align deeply with nature, even as idols of the mind constantly threaten that 
alignment with “folly” and “vanity.” An alchemist has to work up and dress up natural analogy to 
create a bad one. It is an act of rhetorical idleness. 
In contrast to Bacon, someone like Lawrence is more sympathetic to the error of 
analogical perception itself. Lawrence is still inclined to accuse Abernethy of superstition, but he 
is also more inclined to see superstition as something to which he himself could also succumb 
and against which he must arm himself. Good natural analogies do not sort themselves out from 
superficial ones as evidently as Bacon imagines. The threat of a lapse into a party spirit or 
superstition is constant. That’s what makes Abernethy’s rhetoric of analogy more serious and 
worth disciplining than idle and worth ridiculing. For Lawrence, this kind of analogizing is much 
more exploitative and therefore much more egregious. Vulgar passions are not idiosyncratic but 
common and difficult to resist, especially when they are aided by a compelling figure. And, for 
Lawrence, the risk of error occurs at the analogical perception of life, as a misreading of its 
 219 
mysterious, hermeneutic character. That misreading sees a content and substance where it should 
see form and process. Analogy contributes to this misreading because it so thoroughly identifies 
that form and process as a kind of unity that analogy threatens to substantialize it. The difference 
between Lawrence’s reflective vitalism and Abernethy’s naive vitalism is finally that Lawrence 
knows how to read the force of the analogical perception of life in an agnostic, skeptical, and 
positivistic way, which is, finally, future-oriented and risk-averse, and this discipline must be 
maintained against his enthusiastic and baffled observation of the mysterious properties of life 
and the mysterious power analogy has in revealing them. 
Of course, this is not to say that someone like Hartley or Campbell would not understand 
how the power of analogy might be harnessed and amplified through the art of rhetoric. And the 
distinction between rhetoric and “real” analogies remained a viable and important distinction 
within theological discussions of analogy from the deistic controversies of the early eighteenth 
century to Buchanan in the mid-nineteenth century.142 But, for Hartley and Campbell, as long as 
an act of figuration serves truth, it is not marked as rhetoric. Rhetoric only emerges against more 
righteous acts of analogical perception, and it is not the primary view of analogy itself, which is 
seen as a potent force for good as much as a dark art. 
To gain some more definition between Bacon and Lawrence, I want to return to Reid’s 
critique of Lockean epistemology discussed in the first chapter. As we have seen, this distinction 
between the “way of analogy” and the “way of reflection.” Reid employs a distinction between 
“way of analogy” and the “way of reflection.” In his theoretical response to Hume. Reid’s 
objections to this line of thought can be regarded as strong commonsense: he is pointing to the 
inapplicability of commonsense figures within the critical realm. For Reid, a bad analogy 
between mental and material phenomena has distorted this entire line of thinking about the mind, 
and this analogy needs to be abandoned entirely to gain a clear picture. So Reid here is not that 
far from Lawrence. 
                                                            
142Drawing on his survey of these early eighteenth-century theological approaches, Buchanan observes a distinction 
between “such analogies as may be employed for the purposes of proof, and such as are applicable only in the way 
of illustration. The latter may possess great power in the hands of the poet or the rhetorician, as a method of 
conveying to the minds of others a vivid idea of his meaning” but “the former only belong to the province of the 
reasoner” (62). And “real analogies” entail a “real resemblance between the two objects which are directly compared 
with each other, — as when knowledge, wisdom, power, justice, and goodness, as they exist in man, are say to be 
analogous to similar, but infinitely higher, perfections of God” (70). For all these appeals, the qualifying feature 
seems to be the relation of the image insofar as it figures that which cannot be represented (i.e. God).  
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The crucial question is how Reid thinks this bad analogy originates, since this question 
helps clarify why Reid feels the analogy must be policed. Reid sees the error as primarily 
psychological, not rhetorical. That is, Reid takes this bad analogy to have been illegitimately 
transferred from the practical “way of analogy” into the “way of reflection.” The problem is not 
that the analogy is bad in itself. It is valuable, indispensable, and even miraculous — God-given, 
instinctive, and available to everyone. The problem is that it is a weed in the garden of reflection. 
Analogy has no place in a theory of mind because Reid is distinctly optimistic about the 
possibility of an autonomous language fit to describe mental phenomena themselves. Indeed, 
Reid is one the first philosophers to pursue what Michael Kearns, following Owen Flanagan, 
describes as an “autonomy thesis:” the idea that psychology should “frame its laws and 
principles in terms of its own specialized, autonomous vocabulary without trying to force 
translations into the vocabulary of any already existing natural science” (Kearns 4). Reid views 
this language as unmarked — non-rhetorical and observational — in way that makes it an 
example of what Law describes as the “rhetoric of empiricism.” 
Reid’s student, Dugald Stewart, would develop this critique in a more systematic, less 
stylized manner that fleshes out what he takes to be the psychological origins of this analogy. 
The error, for Stewart, is developmental. He writes in Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind:  
In consequence of [an] early familiarity with the phenomena of the material 
world, they appear to us less mysterious than those of mind; and we are apt to 
think that we have advanced one step in explaining the latter, when we can point 
out some analogy between them and the former.  It is owing to the same 
circumstance, that we have scarcely appropriated language with respect to mind, 
and that the words which express its different operations, are almost all borrowed 
from the objects of our senses. (Stewart Elements I.20) 
  
So Stewart understands how the bad analogy arose, and he sees the clearest evidence of these 
origins in what Berkeley calls the “general analogy of language:” “Such transferences can hardly 
be ascribed to accident, but may be considered as proofs that the analogies which the philosopher 
afterwards points out between the objects which are distinguished by the same name, had been 
perceived by the inventors of language, although it is more probable that they never expressed 
them in words, nor could even have explained them if they had been questioned on the subject” 
(I.115-6). What is incomprehensible is how persistent and widespread this error has been in 
philosophic practice. Tracking down all of the thinkers that have succumbed to this bad analogy, 
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Stewart finds himself amazed at how persistent it has been despite its obvious inaccuracy, how 
thoroughly it has “retard[ed] the progress of the philosophy of mind” (I.19). How has it managed 
to impose itself on so many different thinkers? For Stewart, it is so obviously mistaken: “It must, 
however, appear manifest, upon a very little reflection, that as the two subjects are essentially 
distinct, and as each of them has its peculiar laws, the analogies we are pleased to fancy between 
them, can be of no use in illustrating either” (I.20). Stewart prescribes Reid’s autonomy thesis as 
a cure for this error.  
Scholars have situated Reid and Stewart’s programmatic critique in illuminating but 
slightly misleading ways. Paul Hamilton, for instance, persuasively locates Reid and Stewart’s 
critique within a broader philosophical reaction to the problematic conflation of knowledge and 
vision installed by "empiricist metaphors for how we acquire knowledge” (28). But Hamilton’s 
account of the significance of this critique is suspiciously neo-Kantian. For Hamilton, Reid and 
Stewart are reacting against the constrictions this empiricist model places on epistemology. Reid 
and Stewart do this by revealing the basis of these metaphors to be psychological and rhetorical, 
not philosophical (read also: distorting not clarifying). For Hamilton, the Common Sense critique 
correctly observes that the “activity of imagination produc[es] the analogical character of 
language” (28) and, thus, these kinds of suspicious analogies. In other words, Reid and Stewart 
deconstruct this bad analogy by tracing it back to its imaginative (read: irrational) origins that 
empiricism “so ably rationalized” (40).  
However, as we might expect, this critique has its limits in Hamilton’s neo-Kantian 
literary history. According to Hamilton, while Common Sense philosophy could diagnose the 
problem of empiricism in this manner, its “linguistic conservatism was not capable of providing 
a radical alternative to empiricism” (40). From Hamilton’s perspective, Reid and Stewart could 
not locate a non-analogical ground from which to levy its critique: Common Sense’s “appeal to 
the authority of ordinary language over the analogical language of philosophers could be a clear 
and precise way of dealing with misleading philosophical theories but for one thing: the problem 
is that Reid admits that the common language with which we describe acts of the mind is of 
course equally analogical and metaphorical” (38). This refusal to relinquish analogy simply 
exacerbates the empiricist regime. For Hamilton, “[w]hat was needed was an innovatory attitude 
quite opposed to the conservative temper of common-sense philosophy — new metaphors and 
analogies opposing those which empiricism so ably rationalized” (40). On this view, a Romantic 
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like Coleridge might have gathered a sense of the problem from Common Sense philosophy but 
would have had to turn to “German aesthetic theories, especially from those of Kant and 
Schiller” (39) to solve it.  
I will take a look at Coleridge’s actual uptake of Common Sense analogy in the next 
chapter, but for the moment, we can find grounds for a non-Kantian interpretation by examining 
Hamilton’s account of how this empiricist metaphor gained its ascendancy in Locke and Hume. 
Hamilton speculates that the metaphor “may first have been conceived of as a useful tool for 
dealing with a highly abstract relation.” But the problem, for Hamilton, is that the metaphor  
“eventually…assume[s] control of the investigation which employed it” (28) and starts to 
obfuscate the relation it initially aimed to clarify: namely, the “nature of the correspondence 
between the basic items of knowledge and the basic particulars of experience” (28). I am 
persuaded by Hamilton’s claim that Locke and Hume might have first adopted this metaphor as 
an instructive kind of rhetoric. However, with this interpretive line, Hamilton departs 
significantly from Reid’s more naturalistic diagnosis of the problem in illuminating ways. Again, 
for Reid and Stewart, this analogy may be linguistic but it is not rhetorical: it is rather more 
psychological and developmental, a kind of superstition whose roots have been effaced. The 
nature of Reid’s critique is not that analogy itself is unnatural. He is not trying to imagine a way 
out of analogy; it is that this analogy — however natural and good in the world — is no good for 
philosophy. Philosophers should be studying it as linguistic phenomenon and evidence for 
commonsense, not applying it to construct models of mind which cannot honor the uniqueness of 
mental phenomena.  
Simply put, we should view Reid and Stewart’s critique as emerging from their new 
optimism about an autonomous discourse of psychology that would not depend on these models, 
a discourse achieved through the empirical act of introspection. What is important is that, from 
this new perspective, even if Locke and Hume were employing this metaphor functionally, Reid 
would see it as a deeper psychological error. For Reid and Stewart, the mistake is embarrassingly 
psychological and unphilosophical, and it is because of its strange alignment with this 
psychological tendency that the analogy has been undetected and reified. But this seems like a 
newly optimistic way of viewing language’s representational capacities. Someone like Locke 
would have taken up his figurations fairly unapologetically, since he would have had a more 
pessimistic orientation towards language’s representative capacities than Reid or Stewart. 
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In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke seems to banish rhetoric from 
natural philosophical enquiry: 
I confess, in Discourses, where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than 
Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as are borrowed from [Wit and 
Fancy], can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if we would speak of Things as they 
are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all 
the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for 
nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead 
the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat [and] they are certainly, in all 
Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. (Locke 508) 
 
As de Man noted long ago, Locke’s theory of mind is thoroughly metaphorical. De Man suggests 
that Locke “would have been the last man in the world to realize and to acknowledge” (16) this 
dependence, but I would argue that Locke was certainly aware of his figurative tendencies, and 
simply tolerated them because he had a more pessimistic sense of the ability of language to 
clarify more than it distorts as a medium. Wilbur Marshall Urban proposed nearly a century ago 
that “scepticism of the word is the underlying assumption of all periods of empiricism” (23). I 
would agree, but I would suggest that Locke and Reid’s empiricism recommend different kinds 
of skepticism. Locke may have a low estimation of rhetoric and may see bad analogies as 
rhetorical problems, but, whatever Locke says about the “Art of Rhetoric” generally, he finds his 
own figures to be unproblematic because they are in the service of “order and clearness” (508). 
They lead judgment instead of misleading it. And Locke is putting them to skeptical, therapeutic 
uses: he is offering a less dogmatic picture of the way the mind works. This noble function 
means his figures are not marked as rhetoric.143 However, for Reid and Stewart, this is not the 
case. Such metaphors are conspicuously false because Reid and Stewart are in search of a more 
thoroughly autonomous discourse of mind. For Reid and Stewart, they look conspicuously like 
illegitimate imports from the otherwise legitimate “way of analogy.” Ironically, it is less Locke’s 
own promotion of plain rhetorical style for empirical study than the criticism Locke would 
receive for failing to meet his own epistemic standard which helped ensure the currency and 
viability of a strong critical approach to analogy. Sir William Drummond, actually speaking of 
Locke’s specious use of analogy in his account of the mind, captures this sentiment in 
Academical Questions (1805): “Now although it be very difficult to speak of the mind, without 
                                                            
143For an illuminating and refreshing re-examination of Locke’s metaphorical descriptions of mind, see Sean Silver, 
The Mind is a Collection: Case Studies in Eighteenth Century Thought. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2015.  
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employing figurative language, and without borrowing something from analogy; yet it is 
altogether un-philosophical to build an argument on a trope, or a system on a simile” (28). 
Reid and Stewart certainly anticipated they could achieve a more precise, less 
compromised description of the mind. But, we might ask, why did Reid and Stewart demand this 
new level of detail? Devin Griffiths has recently argued that Reid and Stewart might have been 
pursuing this account in part because it implies a dualist theory of mind amenable to their 
religious conservatism. Griffiths writes that in their focus on analogy Reid and Stewart “double[] 
down on skepticism: the insufficiency of analogy served as another example of the division 
between thought and the physical world” (“Intuitions of Analogy” 652). From Griffiths’ 
perspective, policing analogy in this way is less about shoring up an autonomous discourse of 
psychology but guarding against an encroaching materialism. I am more inclined to accept 
Griffiths’ appeal to commonsense conservatism here than I am to Hamilton’s, but I believe both 
appeals miss the partial and qualified nature of commonsense critiques of analogy.  
I believe the best way to think about Stewart and Reid’s orientation towards analogy is to 
see them as newly interested in examining analogy as a disciplinary object — as a psychological 
and linguistic feature and as explicit evidence in favor of a universal, physiological common 
sense. Although Stewart and Reid rejected this analogy’s explanatory value as a theory of mind, 
it is also significant that both more or less accepted its value as supporting evidence and 
justification for other central commitments of common sense philosophy. For Stewart, the 
seemingly universal presence of such analogies across natural languages appeared to confirm the 
common-sense belief in the existence of “constituent principles of human nature, or in the 
universal circumstances of the human race,” “universal circumstances” which included the 
habitual disposition to resort to analogy itself.  
For our purposes, the most important problem Stewart encounters in this naturalistic 
interrogation of analogy has to do with the indistinguishability between analogy and experience. 
In short, Stewart’s investigation of analogy’s role in perception causes him to depart from the 
more thorough confidence in this distinction someone like Campbell exhibits and to pursue a 
stronger, more critical account of analogy. In the second volume of Elements of the Philosophy of 
the Human Mind, Stewart explicitly worries over the dependence of all “evidence of experience” 
upon the process of analogy. For Stewart, the issue turns on what allows him to anticipate 
sameness between circumstances where there is always only similarity:  
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My question does not relate to the soundness of this inference, but to the principle 
of my nature, which leads me thus not only to reason from the past to the future, 
but to reason from one thing to another, which in its external marks, bears a 
certain degree of resemblance to it. Something more than experience, in the 
strictest sense of that word, is surely necessary to explain the transition from what 
is identically the same, to what is only similar; and yet my inference in this 
instance is made with the most assured and unqualified confidence in the 
infallibility of the result. No inference, founded on the most direct and long-
continued experience, nor, indeed, any proposition established by mathematical 
demonstration, could more imperiously command my assent. (II.241). 
These epistemological misgivings mirror Stewart’s misgivings about the “transitional” properties 
in language itself, what he calls the “magical influence of a common name” (II.249). They result 
in his questioning the philosophical use to which this distinction between analogy and experience 
has been put: for Stewart,  
this doubt [does not] lead merely to a question concerning phraseology: it 
produces a hesitation which must have some effect even on the judgement of a 
philosopher; the maxims to which we have been accustomed, in the course of our 
early studies, leading us to magnify the evidence of experience as the sole test of 
truth; and to depreciate that of analogy, as one of the most fertile sources of error. 
(II.462).  
 
For Stewart, this indistinguishability between analogy and experience makes any attempt to 
relegate analogy to either a solely rhetorical or a lower epistemological status not only too easy 
but misguided. It leaves “much room…for the operation of good sense” and “of habits of 
scientific research, in appreciating the justness of that authority which, in particular instances, the 
popular forms of speech may assign to each” (II.410). As his thought on analogy develops, 
Stewart begins to acknowledge the indispensability of even disciplinary analogies for 
representing knowledge. Instead of banishing analogy altogether, elsewhere Stewart recommends 
“to vary, from time to time, the metaphors we employ, so as to prevent any one of them from 
acquiring an undue ascendan[ce] over the others, either in our own minds, or in those of our 
readers” for “it is by the exclusive use of some favourite figure, that careless thinkers are 





4.8 Analogy as Assent: Associationist Aesthetics 
With the last two sections, what I have tried to capture is the extent to which one should 
and should not distinguish between rhetorical and psychological accounts of analogy in the 
eighteenth century. From one perspective, I have argued that it is misleading to insist upon too 
strong a distinction between rhetoric and psychology because, for someone like Campbell, a 
rhetoric of analogy must absorb and reflect an epistemological account of analogy. From this 
perspective, it is the low epistemic status of analogy that explains what for Campbell is the 
obviously weak rhetorical purchase of analogy. For Campbell, analogy is simply different from 
experience and, once we depart into analogy, we are in a kind of speculative territory only 
indirectly related to experience and therefore inferior. However, from another perspective, I have 
tried to show that a psychological or epistemological account of analogy largely eclipses or 
displaces an older rhetorical account. By this I mean not only that philosophers attend more 
thoroughly to this epistemological and naturalistic aspect of analogical reasoning, but that they 
begin to privilege this naturalistic side of analogy as, in a sense, non-rhetorical. For someone 
like Lawrence or Stewart, this means not only a new appreciation for the scientific value of 
analogy but a new imperative to discipline it in certain contexts on account of its seductive 
psychological appeal. Again, for Stewart, taking the distance between experience and analogy 
for granted only opens oneself up for error. Analogy is inescapable and bad ones are not easily 
detected as partisan or idiosyncratic without a severe self-discipline. 
However, despite this disciplinary aspect of strong critical thinking, someone like Stewart 
also perceives this widespread psychological disposition to analogy as a potential ground for 
uncovering something like a “universal” human nature.  From my perspective, is only with this 
context in view that we can appreciate the intuitive appeal of eighteenth-century associationist 
aesthetics. As Cairns Craig notes, while “almost all accounts of Romanticism” take 
“...associationism...to be the dead weight from which Wordsworth and Coleridge had to release 
themselves before they could take flight on the wings of the Kantian transcendental” (43), it is 
possible to view associationist aesthetics as singling out different forms of “analogy” as evidence 
of what Craig calls the “the bond of our common existence” and “a reassertion of our sense of a 
shared identity” (59). What makes these universal bonds is that they are preserved in analogical 
perceptions that seem to unite widely different subjective perspectives as intimations of a 
universal order. What is most striking about these analogical associations, from an associationist 
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perspective, is how arbitrary they should or seem to be, and yet how universal they end up being. 
Associationist aesthetics seems to trace out “exceptional” accounts of analogy that depart from 
the more traditional theory of verisimilitude and which, on account of their potential significance 
as evidence of the ground of “common sense” and “communal assent” but also their perceived 
“poetic” aspect, manage to largely escape the critique levied against philosophical analogies by 
Reid and Stewart. In the next chapter, these exceptional accounts become important for a poet 
like Wordsworth. 
One of the most important analogical perceptions seems to be the metaphor of taste itself. 
As David Marshall notes in his illuminating reading of analogy in Hume’s “Essay on the 
Standard of Taste,” the metaphor of “taste” was widely read as evidence of the very “possibility 
of a standard of taste” (324).144 For an associationist like Henry Home, Lord Kames, taste is 
bound up inextricably with the moral sense. In The Elements of Criticism, Kames explains that 
both taste and the moral sense “discover what is right and what is wrong” and “rooted in human 
nature, and governed by principles common to all men” (14). Kames announces the “design of 
the present undertaking” to “trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as well as those that 
are naturally disagreeable” so as to “discover, if we can, what are the genuine principle of the 
fine arts” (14). His aim is to establish a “foundation for reasoning upon the taste of any 
individual” to determine where it is “correct” and where “incorrect, perhaps whimsical” (14). For 
Kames, some of the strongest evidence comes from what he calls the “natural signs of emotions” 
or the “wonderful uniformity” by which “each class of emotions and passions being invariably 
attended with an external appearance peculiar to itself” (296). This language — by which we 
associate a smile with happiness, a frown with sadness — is “a natural language, expressing to 
all beholders emotions and passions as they arise in the heart” (296), and the skill of 
                                                            
144Marshall proposes that what is appealing about this metaphor for Hume is the way it compresses (to use 
Manning’s term here) so as to articulate the nature of artistic taste. Marshall observes: 
By beginning his essay on taste with a discussion of tongues, by underlining the dual meaning of 
tongue as language and organ of taste, Hume brings together two sets of metaphors that compel us to 
consider what it means to ‘employ these terms in the literal and metaphorical sense…Hume’s 
argument depends on our belief in the resemblance between mental and bodily taste, our acceptance of 
his claim that it does not matter whether we employ these terms in the literal or metaphorical sense. 
Taste in the figurative sense, he asserts, is like taste in the literal sense” (235, 330).  
Marshall argues that instead of answering the question of universal taste directly, Hume prefers to establish a 
hermeneutic relation between the literal and metaphorical concept of taste which will “prove what no one ever saw” 
(330). “It is this metaphor,” writes Marshall, “that will teach us how to apply” Hume’s story about tasting wine: 
“arguing by analogy, resemblance will teach us how to understand likeness” (330).  
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“deciphering” its “plain and legible characters” as well as “dark and more delicate expressions” 
comes from experience. Kames is astonished not only by the arbitrary nature of these relations 
but by their “remarkable conformity or resemblance to the passions that produce them” despite 
the ostensibly subjective processes by which we discover them. It speaks to a providential order: 
“That we should be conscious intuitively of a passion from its external expressions, is 
conformable to the analogy of nature: the knowledge of that language is of too great importance 
for it to be left upon experience; because a foundation so uncertain and precarious, would prove 
a great obstacle to the formation of society. Wisely therefore it is ordered and agreeably to the 
system of Providence, that we should have nature for our instructor” (305-6).  
Later articulations of associationist theory tend to lose this providential interest, and take 
a more explicitly psychological and descriptive turn.145 For Archibald Alison, in contrast to 
Kames, the interest seems to be less in the cultivation and discernment of “right” taste than in the 
preservation and cultivation of certain edifying natural progressions of mind which, from 
Alison’s perspective, are less corrupted by experience than they are effectively disciplined out in 
the developmental process. For Alison, what is initially striking about these associative trains of 
thought are how they passively and spontaneously arise from the encounter with certain objects: 
as Alison writes in his “Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste,” these associations require 
“no labour of thought, or habits of attention” and “rise spontaneously in the mind, upon the 
prospect of any object to which they bear the slightest resemblance” (21). They are also 
remarkably stimulating, and lead the mind “almost insensibly along in a kind of bewitching 
reverie, through all its store of pleasing or interesting conceptions” (21-22). For Alison, aesthetic 
reveries differ from the “ordinary trains of thought” structured by everyday concerns of logic, 
utility, and interest in one important which makes them worthy of special preservation and 
attention. While “in our ordinary trains of thought, there seldom appears any general principle of 
connection among the ideas which compose them” (76), in the “trains…suggested by objects of 
Sublimity or Beauty, however slight the connection between individual thoughts may be,” there 
seems to be “always some general principle of connection which pervades the whole, and gives 
them some certain and definite character” (77). The benefit of these associative trains, then, is 
not only that they are pleasurable, or generative: they are also distinctly unifying, both at the 
                                                            
145 As Philip Flynn observes, “Alison was not the first to admit the vagaries of personal associations,” but prior 
associationists “tried hard to develop some objective standard of taste” and Alison remained convinced that 
“individual associations” were “inevitably shaped by our personal experience and temper” (7).   
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level of the individual mind and, insofar as they are registered and observed widely, at the level 
of community. For Alison, the problem with these kinds of aesthetic trains of thought is that, 
however natural or passive, they can also “decay” both temporarily and permanently. As these 
objects are approached with more explicit logics of self-interest and utility, the “disposition…or 
opportunity to consider them as objects of Taste diminishes” and “gradually disappears” (105). 
The threat is indifference: the condition where one might come to regard “elegance” and 
“magnificence” with “no farther emotion” than what one receives from “common furniture” 
(76). As such, associationist theory puts forth an imperative to cultivate and maintain these 
associations — and the process, preserve and clarify them. For Alison, practicing breeds a new, 
edifying kind of strength and potency in feeling: “the more that are our ideas are increased, or 
our conceptions extended upon any subject, the greater the number of associations we connect 
with it, the stronger is the emotion of sublimity and beauty we receive from it’ (my emphasis, 
36-7).  
Francis Jeffrey draws heavily from Alison’s associationist theory, but Jeffrey is focused 
more intently the role the sensitive poet plays in drawing out analogical perceptions for 
recognition and sustaining them. In one sense, the poet’s ability to detect these associations is 
simply a difference in degree rather than in kind: “What the poet does for his readers…by his 
original similes and metaphors…even the dullest of those readers do in some degree, every day, 
for themselves” (30), and “the beauty which is perceived, when natural objects are unexpectedly 
vivified by the glowering fancy” of the poets is “precisely of the same kind that is felt when the 
closeness of the analogy enables them to force human feelings upon the recollection of all 
mankind” (30). The difference is that the “poet sees more of beauty in nature than ordinary 
mortals, just because he perceives more of these analogies and relations to social emotion, in 
which all beauty consists” (30).146 This higher sensibility would seem to isolate the poet’s taste, 
but the value of a poet’s analogical perceptions must finally be weighed in their communal 
                                                            
146Here it seems worth noting that Jeffrey draws on a discourse of analogy to describe associations in a way that 
Alison simply does not. Alison is inclined to use analogy methodologically and heuristically – to consider, for 
instance the “very strong analogy” between the “progress of musical sounds, and the progress of sounds in the 
human voice” (159) or between the qualities of touch and “certain qualities of mind” (e.g. harsh, gentle, delicate). 
But, as we have seen, Alison also sees the perception of (even slight, undetected) resemblance as undergirding the 
perception of unity. And this leads Alison to assert that “to reduce a number of apparently dissimilar particulars 
under one general law of resemblance” affords not only “one of the strongest evidences of the exertion of wisdom 
and design” (in keeping here with the apologetic, providential bent of Kames) but “also productive of one of the 
strongest emotions of beauty which design can excite” (256).  
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reception. Jeffrey advises the young artist with the “ambition of creating beauties for the 
admiration of others” to “be cautious to employ only such objects as are the natural signs, or the 
inseparable concomitants of emotions, of which the greater part of mankind are susceptible” 
(39). If, on the other hand, a poet “obtrude upon the public, as beautiful, objects that are not 
likely to be associated in common minds with any interesting impressions” then his taste will 
then deserve to be called bad and false (39). In this manner, Jeffrey’s associationist criticism 
seems to marry the prescriptive impulse of Kames’ associationism with the more capacious, 
empirical impulse of Alison’s. Good taste is refined through the poet’s individual sensibility and 
wide experience (as in Alison). But right taste can and must be confirmed at the level of the 
community (as in Kames). For this reason, Jeffrey recommends that a poet cultivate “two tastes” 
— one private “to enjoy” and one public “to work by:” “one founded upon universal 
associations, according to which they finished those performances for which they challenged 
universal praise — and another guided by all casual and individual associations, through which 
they might still look fondly upon nature, and upon the objects of their secret admiration” (39). In 
the next chapter, I will want to consider how tension that associationist aesthetics constructs 













Romantic Analogy Reconsidered 
 
 In the previous chapter, I pursued a broad survey of Enlightenment orientations towards 
analogy intended correct two major distortions introduced by the critical (and secular) lens 
Romantic literary scholars (especially under the sign of neo-Kantian Romanticism) have often 
use to assess eighteenth-century analogy. First, I recovered the currency of what I called “weak” 
orientations towards analogy cultivated within theology and rhetoric. Those weak orientations 
were not narrowly limited to the neo-Platonic divine analogy but were indeed more widespread, 
viable, and robust than the neo-Kantian secularization narrative of analogy’s ontological collapse 
would suggest. This robustness is best captured, positively, in the concept of “analogy-as-
presumption” critically operative in both Butler’s physio-theological apologetic and natural 
theological arguments from design and best captured, negatively, in the anti-rationalist, skeptical 
critique this weak orientation articulates against the confident, rationalist project of formal 
analogy. Second, I recovered the distinctly psychological character of philosophical (and 
especially epistemological) treatments of analogy as a corrective to neo-Kantian attempts to 
portray eighteenth-century approaches of analogy as narrowly rhetorical (in anticipation of 
Romanticism’s cognitive approaches). This new recognition of the psychological role of analogy 
— specifically as it emerges out of Common Sense philosophy — motivates the strong critical 
disciplining of seductive but illegitimate analogies and also puts pressure on the crucial 
distinction between analogy and experience that underwrites the principle of verisimilitude 
endorsed within a strong commonsense theory of analogy. Finally, I illustrated how this 
psychological and naturalistic account of analogy helps explain the appeal of associationist 
aesthetics. For someone like Alison, weaker analogies (slighter, less visible resemblances) are 
valued largely because of their irrational and inexplicably communal aspect. For someone like 
Jeffrey, poets are valued for their sensitive ability to perceive and communicate such weaker 
analogies. I capture this appeal in the concept of “analogy-as-assent.”  
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 In this chapter, I want to draw on this survey to think about Romantic philosophical and 
literary engagements with Enlightenment analogy. As we have seen, in the traditional, neo-
Kantian view, the Romantics’ generative turn away from analogy towards symbolism is taken to 
reflect a dissatisfaction with the moralizing tendencies of eighteenth-century analogical poetics. 
However, this account has largely been distorted by a neo-Kantian desire to narrate a secular 
break. Here I want to think about how this new philosophical context offers a different way to 
think about Romantic engagement with Enlightenment analogy. 
 
5.1 Coleridge’s Dim Analogies 
 The strongest material evidence for the traditional neo-Kantian view is a passage from 
Coleridge’s 1802 letter to William Sotheby, from which we can extract the traditional reading of 
Coleridgean organicism. The letter features Coleridge’s critique of the analogizing tendencies of 
his eighteenth-century predecessor and minor poet, William Leslie Bowles. Coleridge writes: 
[Bowles’] whole [1802] volume is woefully inferior to it’s [sic] 
Predecessor.  There reigns thro’ all the blank verse poems such a perpetual trick of 
moralizing every thing — which is very well, occasionally — but never to see or 
describe any interesting appearance in nature, without connecting it by dim 
analogies with the moral world, proves faintness of Impression.  Nature has her 
proper interest; & he will know what it is, who believes & feels, that every Thing 
has a Life of it’s own, & that we are all one Life.  A Poet’s Heart & Intellect 
should be combined, intimately combined & unified, with the great appearances 
in Nature — & not merely held in solution & loose mixture with them, in the 
shape of formal Similes.  I do not mean to exclude these formal Similes — there 
are moods of mind, in which they are natural — pleasing moods of mind, & such 
as a Poet will often have, & sometimes express; but they are not his highest, & 
most appropriate moods.  They are ‘Sermoni propiora’ which I once translated — 
‘Properer for a Sermon.’  (Letters 2:864). 
 
The passage offers one of Coleridge’s earliest articulations of an aesthetics founded on a 
principle of organic unity that would be seen not only as a hallmark of his poetics and his theory 
of imagination, but as a hallmark of Romantic poetics. It is an aesthetics whose articulation 
relies, importantly, on a series of critical binaries: the organic form it privileges (“combined, 
intimately combined, & unified”) is defined against a mechanical or artificially imposed form 
(“merely held in solution & loose mixture”). Organic and mechanic forms are aligned 
respectively with the unifying and combining power of the Imagination and the mere aggregating 
power of the Fancy. The principle of organic unity is, finally, correlated with an emphasis on 
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attentive observation and close description, not explicit moral interpretation, of natural 
phenomena. For ease of reference, I will call this practice of close description Coleridge’s 
descriptive imperative. 
From the perspective of the traditional narrative we are examining, the special 
significance of this passage lies in the way that Coleridge’s remarks can be and have been read as 
Romanticism’s definitive critique of the eighteenth-century loco-descriptive and didactic 
tradition. Furthermore, they set the desiderata of the mid-century critic: to provide an objective 
justification for Coleridge’s subjective but valid intuitions regarding the inferiority of Bowles’ 
verse. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this passage in the break with analogical 
narrative. Nearly every major mid-century neo-Kantian refers to it. Wasserman quotes the 
passage in full as corroboration of his account of the lack of aesthetic value in eighteenth-century 
poetry (“Grounds” 21). The most important close reading of the period, W.K. Wimsatt’s “The 
Structure of Romantic Nature Imagery” (1954), does all it can to exemplify the letter’s critique in 
practice.  The essay’s central comparative analysis between Bowles’ sonnet “To the River Itchin” 
(1789) and Coleridge’s later imitation of that sonnet, “To the River Otter” (1796), is obviously 
suggested by the letter.  Furthermore, Wimsatt’s evaluation of the superiority of Coleridge’s 
sonnet closely follows the same critical principles Coleridge outlines in the passage.  Where 
Coleridge complains of a “loose mixture” in the shape of “formal Simile,” Wimsatt identifies the 
non-integrated and “simple association (by contiguity in time)” of Bowles’ sonnet’s sensibility 
and structure, drawing this “simpler” form of association directly back to eighteenth-century 
associationist psychology.  Coleridge, in contrast, demonstrates a greater concern with “the more 
complex ontological grounds of association (the various levels of sameness, of correspondence 
and analogy)” (108). This interest results in more than the “flat announcement of a Hartleian 
association” Bowles offers. Wimsatt likewise correlates that concern with Coleridge’s greater 
emphasis on natural description: “…the speaker has kept his eye more closely on the 
object.  There are more details.  The picture is more vivid” (108)).  The result is the poem’s 
unified metaphoric structure, where “tenor and vehicle are…wrought in a parallel process out of 
the same material” (109). 
In Formal Charges (1997), Susan Wolfson revisits the disciplinary debate surrounding 
the legacy of Coleridgean formalism. She argues, as I have above, that the terms of the debate 
were such that both mid-century critics and their deconstructive opponents overstated the extent 
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to which Coleridge (and, by extension, Romanticism) was committed to the principles of unity 
and organicism.147 Wolfson suggests that, while it is impossible to deny the prominence of 
organicist rhetoric in Coleridge’s literary criticism, the necessity of disentangling Coleridge from 
organicism becomes apparent when we take into account how Coleridge’s various critical 
pronouncements in favor of organic unity and against simile typically rely on the use of simile 
and other analogical forms. Wolfson thus explores simile in Coleridge’s poetry as “a resource for 
representing those very orders of thought that symbol would overcome: the tentative, the 
provisional, the uncertain, the ambiguous, the illusory” (73). Finally, Coleridge’s “poetics of 
simile” should “contest [his] title as the champion of organic form and organicist ideology” (66). 
With this poetics in view, Wolfson suggest that Coleridge is “more accurately a double agent, 
invested in the several competing theories of poetic form that descend from Romanticism” (66). I 
will expand on the “poetics of simile” Wolfson locates in Coleridge’s poetic practice in the next 
section. But, for the moment, I want to follow her suggestion that we can find Coleridge 
simultaneously invested in a number of poetic theories — and more specifically, competing 
approaches to poetic uses of simile — and that these investments complicate the narrow picture 
of Coleridgean organicism constructed by mid-twentieth century neo-Kantian Romanticism.   
Indeed, we can find evidence for Coleridge’s investment in competing theories in the 
same 1802 letter to Sotheby. Immediately following the passage on Bowles quoted above, for 
instance, Coleridge offers a “formal Simile” to illustrate the source of Bowles’ poetic inferiority. 
I leave the simile in context to provide the flavor of Coleridge’s epistolary style:  
The truth is — Bowles has indeed the sensibility of a poet; but he has not the 
Passion of a great Poet.  His latter Writings all want native Passion…but he has 
no native Passion, because he is not a Thinker — & has probably weakened his 
Intellect by the haunting Fear of becoming extravagant / Young somewhere in one 
of his prose works remarks that there is as profound a Logic in the most daring & 
                                                            
147Perhaps more fundamentally, the many attempts to resuscitate the dynamic potential of Coleridgean organicism 
seem to grant, following the post-structuralist critique, that the locus classicus for this mid-century interpretation of 
Romanticism is in fact Coleridgean organicist poetics. But, in hindsight and with a sufficient appreciation for the 
mid-century’s neo-Kantian investments, the locus classicus of this neo-Kantian current is arguably more likely 
Shelley’s radical epistemology, as originally and systematically elaborated by Wasserman in his influential account 
of Shelley’s “skeptical idealism” and carried forward by John Wright, Jeannie Hall, Jerrold Hogle, William Keach, 
and, most recently, Mark Bruhn. To be sure, it is not necessarily incorrect or even misguided to identify mid-century 
criticism with Coleridgean organicism. But in light of deconstructionist efforts to claim Shelley for their own — 
most notably in Harold Bloom et al., Deconstruction and Criticism (1979) — it also seems possible to regard this 
emphasis on Coleridgean organicism as a kind of strategic diversion or, at least, as an easier target. This approach, 
for instance, distinctly encourages reading mid-century critics like Wasserman and Abrams backwards rather than 
forwards – tying them, for instance, to a discredited New Criticism at the expense of exploring their affinities with 
post-structuralist via Shelleyan poetics. 
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dithyrambic parts of Pindar, as in the ___ of Aristotle — the remark is a valuable 
one / 
 
Poetic Feelings, like the flexuous Boughs 
Of mighty Oaks, yield homage to the Gale, 
Toss in the strong winds, drive before the Gust, 
Themselves one giddy storm of fluttering Leaves; 
Yet all the while, self-limited, remain 
Equally near the fix’d and parent Trunk 
Of Truth & Nature, in the howling Blast 
As in the Calm that stills the Aspen Grove. —  
That this is deep in our Nature, I felt when I was on Sca’ fell… (2:864) 
 
The poetic simile is Coleridge’s own; the poem from which it is drawn, “To Matilda Betham 
from a Stranger,” was by most critical accounts drafted September 9th, 1802, just the day before 
he postmarked his letter to Sotheby.148 ⁠ The simile occupies an ambiguous position between what 
we have been describing as neoclassical and Romantic poetics. There are evident conflations 
between tenor and vehicle, for instance, that for a mid-century critic would signal an organic 
unity: “Feelings” replaces “Boughs” as the subject of “yield,” “drive,” and “remain;” the oak’s 
trunk, as a possession of “Truth” and “Nature,” is equally part of the moral and the natural 
order.  On the other hand, the simile is highly symmetrical, its argumentative content neatly 
reproduced in two four-line groups in the manner that aligns it with the neoclassical model. The 
comparison between feeling and oak does not afford any moralizing interpretation of nature. But 
its argument does appear to endorse the characteristic commitments of neoclassical poetics: 
systematic interpretation of moral order through natural order  (“Poetic Feelings, like the 
flexuous Boughs/Of mighty Oaks”), affective response (“giddy storm of fluttering Leaves”) 
tempered by judgment (“self-limited”) and equanimity (“equally…in howling Blast/As in the 
Calm”), and finally “poetic truth” supported by “truth to Nature” (“remain/Equally near the fix’d 
and parent Trunk/Of Truth & Nature”).   
 The presence of this simile in the same letter as Coleridge’s critique should be enough to 
suggest that the relation between Coleridge’s organicism and its neoclassical predecessor is more 
complicated than Wimsatt’s analysis would suggest. It also complicates the standard 
developmental narrative that claims that Coleridge, though “under the influence of Bowles” in 
his earlier Descriptive Sketches, had renounced that influence by 1802. Citing Coleridge’s 
                                                            
148For the date of composition, see Feldman 91. 
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playful, self-reflexive mockery of his own analogizing tendencies in earlier poems like “Frost at 
Midnight,” Wolfson suggests that Coleridge’s criticism of Bowles may in fact be a form of “self-
discipline” (66). But the newly minted simile should dissuade us from relying exclusively on 
these developmental scenarios. Rather, it recommends that we take Coleridge’s explicit 
qualification of his critique of formal Simile (e.g. “I do not mean to exclude these formal Similes 
— there are moods of mind, in which they are natural”) not as pro forma but as meaningful 
critical exception and as an attempt to temper the hierarchy of these forms almost as soon as he 
constructs it. 
 A third approach to analogy occurring later in the letter presents other more difficult 
challenges to the aesthetic principles neo-Kantian critics have extracted from it. Coleridge’s 
thoughts turn from a critical distinction between Greek and Hebrew poetry, to the writings of 
Plato and, finally, to the poetry of John Milton. Coleridge then mulls over what he takes to be an 
allegorical moment within Milton’s masque, Comus (1634): 
Amongst the rest a small unsightly root,  
But of divine effect, he cull’d me out; 
The leaf was darkish, and had prickles on it, 
But in another country, as he said, 
Bore a bright golden flow’r, but not in this soil: 
Unknown, and like esteem’d, and the dull swain 
Treads on it daily with his clouted shoon: 
And yet more med’cinal it is than that moly 
That Hermes once to wise Ulysses gave; 
He call’d it haemony, and gave it me, 
And bad me keep it as of sovereign use 
‘Gainst all inchantments, mildew, blast, or damp, 
Or ghastly furies’ apparition (629-41) 
 
Coleridge’s interpretation of the passage as allegory centers on the figure of the “small unsightly 
root.” It is prompted by a recognition of an inconsistency in the poet’s (or, more precisely, the 
guide’s) description of a plant. The inconsistency is so obvious, Coleridge argues, Milton must 
have introduced it intentionally. He writes, by way of introduction,  
What an unthinking & ignorant man we must have supposed Milton to be, if 
without any hidden meaning, he had described [the root] as growing in such 
abundance that the dull Swain treads on it daily — & yet as never flowering — 
Such blunders Milton, of all others, was least likely to commit (866). 
 
Coleridge then offers a line-by-line exegesis of the passage as an “Allegory of Christianity”:  
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Do look at the passage — apply it as an Allegory of Christianity, or to speak more 
precisely of the Redemption by the Cross — every syllable is full of Light! — A 
small unsightly Root — to the Greeks Folly, to the Jews a stumbling Block — 
[‘]The leaf was darkish & had prickles on it[‘] — If in this Life only we have 
hope, we are of all men the most miserable / & [a] score of other Texts — [‘]But 
in another country, as he said, Bore a bright golden Flower[‘] — the exceeding 
weight of Glory prepared for us hereafter / — [‘]but [not] in this soil, unknown, & 
like esteem’d & the dull Swain treads on it daily with his clouted shoon[’] / The 
Promises of Redemption offered daily & hourly & to all, but accepted scarcely by 
any — [‘] He called it Haemony[’] —Now what is Haemony? — Αἷµα-οἶνος—
Blood-wine. —And he took the wine & blessed it, & said — This is my Blood — 
/ the great Symbol of the Death on the Cross (866). 
 
Without pursuing the precise Biblical coordinates and “score of other Texts” informing 
Coleridge’s allegorical reading of Milton, we should be able to draw out at least two difficulties 
it presents to Coleridge’s assumed organicist aesthetic. For Coleridge to accept Milton’s 
allegorical meaning, he must not only allow for Milton’s appropriation of natural scenery for 
moral purposes; he must also allow that such an appropriation necessitates Milton’s departure 
from an accurate description of Nature. Milton’s allegorical intention only becomes visible once 
we notice the contradictory presentation of natural fact. Even more surprising, however, is that 
Coleridge’s rendering of the Haemony plant as a displaced Christological symbol implies that 
these departures from his descriptive imperative in fact realize his aesthetics of organic unity.149  
 Because of the tendency to extract Coleridge’s critique from its context, critics rarely note 
either the neoclassical simile or the Christian allegory that follow it in the letter, much less the 
ways these other figures discourage or at least complicate such an extrapolation. In one of the 
few pieces that address Coleridge’s reading of Milton’s Comus, Lucy Newlyn suggests that 
Coleridge maintains “an implicit distinction between the Bowlesian ‘trick of moralizing 
everything’, and the power Milton has to perceive and create through symbols” (125), but her 
evidence for this claim is somewhat thin.150 Even if Coleridge did imply such a distinction, it 
offers no insight into the evident conflict between Coleridge’s moral reading of Milton’s nature 
imagery and his descriptive imperative. A more viable explanation might be that Coleridge here, 
                                                            
149Though the argumentative transition is not entirely clear in the letter, Coleridge presumably presents the passage 
from Comus (and its interpretation) to illustrate the commonality of Hebrew poetry, English poetry, and the writings 
of Plato as expressions of “imagination, or the modifying, and co-adunating Faculty” where “each Thing has a Life 
of it’s own, & yet they are all one Life” (866). 
150For Newlyn, the distinction is sustained and transferred through Coleridge’s earlier comparison of Greek and 
Hebrew poetry which implicitly maps to the poetry of Bowles and Milton, respectively.  But, while Milton, as the 
representative of English poetic tradition, is correlated explicitly with Hebrew poetry, Bowles is not mentioned.   
 238 
as in other places, amends his general critical preferences to make room for Milton’s 
poetry. ⁠151 But this explanation would still support what the presence of these three approaches to 
analogy seems to imply: despite the prestige that Coleridge’s critique of Bowles has enjoyed 
within twentieth-century criticism, Coleridge in his letter to Bowles fails to endorse any single 
categorical approach to analogy. One might argue that Coleridge does arrive at a trans-historical 
account of poetry as a product of the imagination, but his reading of Milton demonstrates that he 
is able to see the imagination at work in both moral and descriptive approaches to nature. 
 In addition to raising questions about Coleridge’s unilateral commitment to organicism, 
Coleridge’s allegorical reading of Milton — and its absence within the criticism — should also 
direct us to another major difficulty with the break-with-analogy narrative: namely, its 
problematic interpretation of Coleridge’s descriptive imperative. Within the mid-century account, 
there is a distinct tendency to convert Coleridge’s emphasis on description over moral 
interpretation into a claim about the increasingly secular quality of Romantic approaches to 
Nature. We can observe this secularizing tendency in Wimsatt’s foundational close reading. 
Neither Bowles’ nor Coleridge’s sonnet offers any explicit religious content, but, in his final 
analysis of Romantic poetry, Wimsatt declares that 
[t]he common feat of the romantic nature poets was to read meanings into the 
landscape...that meaning especially was summoned out of the very surface of 
nature itself.  It was embodied imaginatively and without the explicit religious or 
philosophic statements which one will find in classical or Christian instances…or 
in the teleological divines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or in Paley 
during the same era as the romantics (110, my emphasis). 
 
Wasserman likewise emphasizes the Romantic interest in “perception as an act of self-
knowledge,” which he frames as the Romantic poet’s active engagement with the 
epistemological questions raised in the eighteenth-century. This emphasis allows him to bracket 
ontological and theological concerns in Romantic poetry: “Of course epistemologies involve 
ontologies and can, and did, interconnect with theologies; but the epistemological problem is 
radical to [Romantic] poetry as poetry” (“Grounds” 22). Both Wasserman and Wimsatt are eager 
to demonstrate the irrelevance of traditional religious ontology or theology to Romantic poetry, 
                                                            
151Theresa Kelley has recently noted how Milton’s allegorical treatment of Sin in Paradise Lost also presents 
challenges to Coleridge’s more-or-less categorical dismissal of allegory in his literary critical lectures (Kelley 219). 
This point about critique of allegory should be made more explicitly re-Coleridge’s reading of Comus. As things 
stand, a reader might think you see a consistency between allegory and organicism. 
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while also framing the Romantic attention to epistemology as a necessary consequence of the 
supposed collapse of that ontology. 
 From a modern, secular perspective, it may be tempting to read Coleridge’s preference 
for “natural” over “moral” types of description or his witty gloss of the Horatian phrase Sermoni 
propiora (typically translated as “more proper for conversation”) as “Properer for a Sermon” as 
early Romantic arguments for the separation of moral and aesthetic interest. Yet, Coleridge’s 
reading of Milton suggests the limits of Coleridge’s critique of Bowles’ moralizing tendencies 
and raises questions about his interpretation of “Nature’s proper interest.” As Newlyn observes, 
Coleridge’s ecstatic and idiosyncratic interpretation may say little about Milton’s Comus. But it 
does uniquely demonstrate “how strongly Coleridge believes that poetry is ‘consecrated by being 
emblematic of some Truth’” and “reveals, moreover, what sort of ‘Truth’ he has in 
mind…Coleridge values symbolic vision, in its sacramental sense, more highly than any other 
mode of perception or creation” (Newlyn 125). Coleridge may balk at the manner in which 
Bowles evades a fuller, more thorough engagement with Nature. But in his reading of Milton, 
what matters is explicitly how Milton’s description departs from an engagement with Nature as it 
is. Coleridge reads this departure as not only meaningful but profound and prophetic, a gesture 
towards the world to come and a license to elaborate his allegorical interpretation. Here, 
Coleridge’s allegorical reading seems guided by his theologically-inflected understanding of 
“analogous” language as language in which “a thing, power, or principle in a higher dignity is 
expressed by the same thing, power, or principle in a lower but more known form” (Aids to 
Reflection 35). Coleridge, in other words, shows a decidedly weak, theological orientation 
towards analogy. As a whole, these considerations support Jager’s remarks about the distortions 
introduced by the secularizing tendencies of neo-Kantian Romanticism and Tomko’s more 
specific objections to representing Coleridge as “enabl[ing] a secularized literary studies” 
(Tomko 2) at the expense of neglecting the interplay of his theological and poetic investments. 
 
5.2 Wordsworth’s Visual Analogies 
 In “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” Paul de Man puzzles over the ease with which Wimsatt 
claims that, in Romantic poetry, “closer attention to surface engenders greater depth” (“Rhetoric” 
194). In “Form and Intent in American New Criticism,” de Man asks, “can we take [a] continuity 
between depth and surface…for granted? Is it not rather the most problematic issue with which 
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the theory of poetry will have to deal?” (“Form and Intent” 23). I would agree with de Man here, 
and I would say that Wimsatt’s elision of this difficult problem — especially as it is 
foregrounded in Romantic poetry — seems encouraged by Wimsatt’s preoccupation with 
secularizing Romantic ways of seeing: that is, with distinguishing Romantic interpretations of 
Nature from those offered by Christian apologetics and, more generally, with establishing a 
ground for Romantic meaning in the absence of theological traditions. With this imperative, 
Romantic attention to surface might easily register an implicit rejection of those traditions. 
 In her reading of this debate, Wolfson concurs with de Man against Wimsatt regarding the 
persistence and difficulty of this problematic of surface and depth. She proposes, in turn, that 
“the Romantics’ poetics of simile, in theory and in practice, had already posed the question” (71). 
For Wolfson, Coleridge “not only thought about the problem, but experienced it as a condition of 
his intellectual pleasures” (71). It is a specifically “intellectual” pleasure since, in Wolfson’s 
formalist analysis, the structure of simile itself —  a structure “negotiated by likeness and 
difference” — “spells out the contrary impulses” of the “mind’s analytic impulses” (71). On this 
view, Romantic invocations of simile uniquely interrogate the “opposition” of these impulses, 
which gives simile “its figurative capacity to set the power of language to construct, connect, and 
refer against its potential exposure of absence, supplement, and difference.” In this way, Wolfson 
takes Romantic uses of simile to “tap[] a latency in the classical conception of representation as 
verisimile” (71).  
 Wolfson’s formal analysis of simile is insightful, but, with the intellectual history I have 
been sketching in view, one need not turn to the classical conception of versimile as a means of 
articulating either the nature or significance of Coleridge’s intellectual interest in simile. From 
my perspective, Common Sense philosophy would have thoroughly elevated this problematic of 
verisimilitude. It would not have been latent, but salient and even ubiquitous.152 More 
                                                            
152 Consider the following entry from Coleridge’s Notebooks:  
Nay, but (pops in my Man of Edinburgh or Aberdeen) we see a great number of figures more or less like 
each other/and then form arrange them, putting that first which all the others may follow, each according to 
its degree of similitude…Yet what is Likeness? How come we by this power of arranging things by a Law 
of Likeness? Surely, before I can perceive the likeness of some 50 or a 100 different things to each other 
(shades of Green, for instance) I must have some general Idea of that, in which they resemble.  (Notebooks 
4047). 
What is striking is how thoroughly this appeal to the “law of likeness” is associated with Scottish philosophy. “My 
Man of Edinburgh or Aberdeen” seems to be not directed at any particular thinker (say, Hume) but a broadly painted 
caricature. Of course, if Coleridge registers a familiarity with this discourse, he also registers a clear dissatisfaction 
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importantly, associationist aesthetics (especially as interpreted by Jeffrey) would have articulated 
its relation to the more general poetic problematic of “surface and depth” in an original and 
robust manner, as a problem of private and public associations and, in turn, a problem of 
analogical perception. It is better to see a Romantic poetics of simile drawing on and 
interrogating this associationist framework rather than establishing a new one.153 
 As many critics have noted, in his poetic theory, Wordsworth tends to elevate the 
perception of “similitude in dissimilitude” as a central — if not constitutive — poetic act.154 In 
the 1802 preface to Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth describes the “pleasure which the mind derives 
from the perception of similitude in dissimilitude” as the “great spring of the activity of our 
minds, and their chief feeder” (610). For Wordsworth, even the structure and quality of “our taste 
and our moral feeling” depend themselves “upon the accuracy with which similitude in 
dissimilitude, and dissimilitude are perceived” (610). I want to link Wordsworth’s normative 
                                                            
with its overconfident (“pops”) and, from his perspective, impoverished appeal to analogy. And it leads Coleridge to 
posit something like a Platonic idea that exists prior to these analogical comparisons to arrange and integrate them. 
Coleridge’s dissatisfaction seems to be the exception in most philosophical circles — where, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, analogy was embraced as a fairly parsimonious (if also mysterious) psychological 
mechanism. In Zoonomia (1794), we find Erasmus Darwin mulling over analogy’s strange integrative function: 
…[I]n our waking hours, whenever an idea occurs, which is incongruous to our former experience, we 
instantly dissever the train of imagination by the power of volition, and compare the incongruous idea 
with our previous knowledge of nature, and reject it.  This operation of the mind has not yet acquired a 
specific name, though it is exerted every minute of our waking hours; unless it may be termed 
INTUITIVE ANALOGY. It is an act of reasoning of which we are unconscious except from its effects 
in preserving the congruity of our ideas, and bears the same relation to the sensorial power of volition, 
that irritative ideas, of which we are unconscious except by their effects, do to the sensorial power of 
irritation; as the former is produced by volition without our attention to it, and the latter by irritation 
without our attention to them. (Darwin 196). 
The concept of this involuntary or automatic operation appears so novel to Darwin (“not yet acquired a specific 
name”) that he appears to run in some conceptual confusion. Darwin qualifies intuitive analogy as an “act of 
reasoning” which disrupts an incongruous train is by an exertion of the “power of volition,” but he also asserts that 
we are “unconscious” of this activity of intuitive analogy except from its “effects” of “preserving the congruity of 
our ideas” (196). Finally, Darwin must figure it through another, more familiar analogy an analogy between this 
unconscious, involuntary process and that of “irritation” or reflexive response to outside stimulation. It is unclearly 
how something might be “produced by volition without our attention to it” (196). It is also unclear how one would 
even be able to observe these “effects” since those effects ultimately manifest as a perceived congruity of ideas over 
time, that is, a perceived indistinguishability and resemblance between past and present thought. Nevertheless, 
Darwin’s speculation marks out what may be considered the limit of the epistemological account of analogy holding 
that, while we may consciously employ analogy in some context, in some way analogical reasoning must be 
operating in some sense outside rationality or conscious reflexion, constituting the very conditions of rationality or 
logic itself. 
153 With this claim about the robustness of associationist aesthetics, I follow Craigs Cairn’s call to “dispose 
immediately of those versions of literary and intellectual history that assume that associationism is necessarily both 
materialistic and mechanical” (46). 
154 Wolfson, for instance, describes Wordsworth as “more deeply devoted to this principle than to any other” (71). 
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concept of “accuracy” with his broader associationist “intention” to “illustrate the manner in 
which our feelings and ideas are associated in a state of excitement” (my emphasis, 598). We get 
a sense of what Wordsworth means by “accuracy” through another associationist passage:  
I am sensible that my associations must have sometimes been particular instead of 
general, and that, consequently, giving things a false importance, sometimes from 
diseased impulses I may have written upon unworthy subjects; but I am less 
apprehensive on this account, than that my language may frequently have suffered 
from those arbitrary connections of feelings and ideas with particular words and 
phrases, from which no man can altogether protect himself. (612) 
 
Wordsworth’s deference to the communal and general here offers an important correction to the 
frequent (neo-Kantian) identification of Romantic poetic practice specifically with a kind of 
unapologetic pursuit of an idiosyncratic or private mythology.155 Here, Wordsworth identifies 
idiosyncrasy as a form of error, and he describes that error in the recognizably associationist 
terms we saw Jeffrey employ: as a matter of presenting “particular” rather than “general” 
associations — or, alternatively, as a matter of “arbitrary” rather than natural connections. 
Admittedly, I can only speculate whether or not analogical perception — again, for Wordsworth, 
the “great spring of the activity of our minds” — in fact generates these associations. Yet, 
Wordsworth seems to acknowledge, with Jeffrey, that the validity of any perception of 
“similitude in dissimilitude” cannot be confirmed individually (or even immediately) but by a 
broader community. This is already evident in Wordsworth’s frequent and consistent use of the 
first-person plural: “our feelings,” “our taste,” and “our moral feeling.”  The right perception of 
similitude in dissimilitude might shape “our taste,” but it also must be confirmed as our taste.  
 I am less interested in how Wordsworth’s associationism frames his understanding of 
what poetic error looks like — that is, as particular against the universal — than I am in how this 
associationist framework (as developed by Alison’s descriptive interpretation) allows him to 
conceive of this error — that is, the risk of idiosyncrasy — as itself a universal psychological 
aspect “from which no man can protect himself” (612). As Wordsworth goes on to claim, the 
“Reader” like the “Poet” is “exposed to the same errors” of idiosyncratic association and 
“perhaps in a much greater degree:” for Wordsworth, “…there can be no presumption in saying, 
                                                            
155 In the Mirror and the Lamp, for instance, Abrams argues that, whereas earlier neo-classical poets’ use of 
figuration was bound by a kind of decorum, in Wordsworth’s poetic theory and practice, “the generic reference to 
the poet’s own affective state, together with that to the creative operations of the poet’s mind, are now the sole 
warrant for all valid poetic figures of speech” (290) 
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that it is not probable [the Reader] will be so well acquainted with the various stages of meaning 
through which words have passed, or with the fickleness or stability of the relations of particular 
ideas to each other” as the poet. After all, continues Wordsworth, since reader is “much less 
interested in the subject” he may be more prone to judge such associations “lightly and 
carelessly” (612).  
 Wordsworth thematizes this kind of error of associationism in his poetic practice as a 
means of viewing the imagination at work, as a means of achieving depth through surface.156 
Here I draw on Wolfson’s observations that Wordsworth often employs simile to figure “extreme 
aberration,” “illusion and error,” and, more generally, the “self-generating energies of 
imagination” (79). These affiliations lead Wolfson to propose that simile functions as “a rhetoric 
of uncertainty…underwriting the process by which a chance event gets read into significance” 
(74). Wolfson has Coleridge’s Rime specifically in view with this comment about the “rhetoric of 
uncertainty,” but I want to explore the role of such a rhetoric in two poems from Wordsworth, 
“Resolution and Independence” and “The Thorn.” My interest here will be how this rhetoric of 
simile is used to mark and interrogate a more general risk which Common Sense philosophy 
identifies as the presumptuous character of analogical reasoning: the way analogy reads or 
projects depth into and onto surface, or alternatively, draws together the surface of experience to 
generate a depth. In the last chapter, we saw Stewart grapple with problem of analogy as it 
“imperiously command[s]…assent” (241), but Hume is the first to identify analogy as a problem 
of presumption, as a kind of circularity inherent to probabilistic reasoning. For Hume, 
“probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we 
have experience, and those, of which we have had none” (Treatise 63). But, if this is the case, 
“’tis impossible this presumption can arise from probability” since “the same principle cannot be 
both the cause and effect of another” (63). This is why, for Hume, belief must be “more 
properly” an act of the “sensitive” not the “cogitative” part of our nature, more imaginative and 
affective than rational construction. From my perspective, associationist aesthetics translates this 
psychological problem to an aesthetic one. The poet too must always read “general associations” 
through “particular ones,” depth through surface: with the poet’s pursuit of assent comes the risk 
of presumption. Alternatively, in associationist aesthetics the work of imagination is most salient 
                                                            
156 It’s also worth noting in passing how thorough a probabilistic framework — e.g. presumption, probable — 
organizes Wordsworth’s rhetoric. 
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at its most presumptuous and erroneous. I take this to be Coleridge’s central charge that Bowles 
has “no native Passion, because he is not a Thinker — & has probably weakened his Intellect by 
the haunting Fear of becoming extravagant” (2:864). Thought and passion are not only linked, as 
they are in Hume. Thought is marked by its presumptuousness. 
I have specified that Wordsworth explores error in his “poetic practice” because we will 
have to depart, in some sense, from Wordsworth’s theoretical descriptions of his poetics, largely 
because in these Wordsworth is more inclined to privilege the “stability” over the “fickleness” of 
the “relations of particular idea” and, in turn, to align this privileged term of “stability” with a 
privileged term of generality. In the preface to Poems (1815), for instance, Wordsworth figures 
the difference between comparisons drawn by the fancy and imagination as concerned, 
respectively, with “stable” and “fickle” features — or, alternatively, as superficial and deep 
features. Comparisons of the fancy are as “capricious as the accidents of things;” they center on 
“form and feature;” they offer an “unstable and transitory” effect and are “given to quicken and 
to beguile the temporal part of our nature” (636). In contrast, a comparison of the imagination 
does not necessarily “strike on the first presentation;” rather, “a sense of the likeness, from the 
moment that it is perceived, grows — and continues to grow — upon the mind” (636). A 
comparison of the imagination speaks to “inherent and internal” properties, it “incite[s]” and 
“support[s] the eternal” and remains conscious of an “indestructible dominion” (636).  
 This theoretical preference for depth over surface, stability over instability, is perhaps to 
be expected. And yet, in the 1815 Preface, when Wordsworth goes on to discuss specific 
examples of the imagination, his analysis of comparisons formed by the Imagination takes for 
granted the importance of surface similarity as the occasion for imaginative comparison: 
imaginative comparisons “take[] advantage of the appearances of the senses” (631) – that is, they 
capitalize for their cognitive effect on the contingency of sense, viewed as an entry point for 
encountering deeper structural relations; they “endow” objects “with properties that do not inhere 
in them upon an incitement from properties and qualities the existence of which is inherent and 
obvious” (632). The power of the analogical comparison is its ability to impose outside qualities: 
to disrupt these “inherent and internal properties” with images that “invariably modify each 
other” (636). Wordsworth’s major example is the train of association gathering around the leech 
gatherer in “Resolution and Independence:” 
As a huge Stone is sometimes seen to lie 
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Couched on the bald top of an eminence, 
Wonder to all who do the same espy 
By what means it could thither come, and whence; 
So that it seems a thing endued with sense, 
Like a Sea-beast crawled forth, which on a shelf 
Of rock or sand reposeth, there to sun himself. 
 
Such seemed this Man; not all alive or dead, 
Nor all asleep, in his extreme old age. 
Motionless as a cloud the old Man stood, 
That heareth not the loud winds when they call, 
And moveth altogether if it move at all. 
 
Here is Wordsworth’s commentary in the Preface to Poems (1815): 
In these images, the conferring, the abstracting, and the modifying powers of the 
Imagination, immediately and mediately acting, are all brought into conjunction. 
The Stone is endowed with something of the power of life to approximate it to the 
Sea-beast; and the Sea-beast stripped of some of its vital qualities to assimilate it 
to the stone; which intermediate image is thus treated for the purpose of bringing 
the original image, that of the stone, to a nearer resemblance to the figure and 
condition of the aged Man; who is divested of so much of the indications of life 
and motion as to bring him to the point where the two objects unite and coalesce 
in just comparison. (633). 
 
In the example prior, Wordsworth discusses an earlier line from the same poem — “Over his own 
sweet voice the Stock-dove broods” (5) — and draws out the “intervention of the metaphor 
broods” which “mark[s] the manner in which the Bird reiterates and prolongs her soft note, as if 
herself delighting to listen to it, and participating in a still and quiet satisfaction, like that which 
may be supposed inseparable from the continuous process of incubation” (633). The account is 
not a bad description for the kind of meditative practice that the narrator of the poem performs 
on the old man’s image, or that Wordsworth performs in his critical commentary. Indeed, the 
poem seems to foreground this meditative act itself (“a minute’s space I guess/I watched him…” 
(60-61)). 
 The interplay I want to describe between surface and depth here can be accessed along 
two avenues. First, we can access it by focusing on Wordsworth’s description of the stone and 
the man “unit[ing] and coalesc[ing] in just comparison” (633). Here, Wordsworth presumably 
intends just in one of its many normative senses. With Wordsworth’s invocation of “accuracy” in 
the Preface, we can see just as a kind of aesthetic measure of proper agreement or proportion. On 
this reading, the claim might be that the comparison conforms to prior expectations about the 
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activity of imagination: the comparison in this manner is just because it unites and coalesces in 
the way Imagination should. Or, alternatively, we can see just as an estimation of the 
achievement of the comparison, its suitability for a certain end. Taken with the first interpretation 
of just (and the critical context in which Wordsworth invokes this passage as exemplification), 
that end would seem to be the illustration of imagination.  
 The difficulty with these readings of just as normative is that they would appear to 
emphasize the accuracy or precision of this comparison, whereas what is foregrounded in 
Wordsworth’s description is its imprecision as an act of steady approximation along degrees of 
gradation. That imprecision is foregrounded in the open-ended phrasing “something of the power 
of life” and “some of its vital qualities.” There are no specific aspects of comparison treated: the 
stone, the sea-beast, man, and cloud are taken as integrated wholes: indeed, the cloud image 
seems to align their immobility with their integrity. From another angle, while Wordsworth 
wants to emphasize the completeness of this comparison (the full “unity” of stone and man), 
what is consistently foregrounded in the poem is the transitional aspect of both the old man and 
the stone his figure invokes. The stone’s perched status makes it seem “endued with sense,” 
while the old man is “not all” dead or alive, asleep or awake. Finally, while the critical context 
fixes the intentionality of this comparison as a kind of illustration, this does not resolve the 
question of what function, if any, the comparison serves within the poem. Indeed, the critical 
context of the Preface abstracts the comparison in such a manner that seems to emphasize its 
sheer superficiality and visuality: its limited interest in “figure” and signifier (“indication”) and, 
more generally, on “seeming” primarily as a bare kind of “seeing.” With the mid-century claims 
that, in Romantic poetry, “meaning especially was summoned out of the very surface of nature 
itself” or that “perception” functions itself “as an act of self-knowledge,” one gets the sense that 
a “just comparison” is somehow just — that is, simply — comparison.  
 This line of interpretation is one way to generate depth from surface, and this reading 
would seem to depend on the assumption that the poet’s act of comparison (much like its critical 
commentary) has no explicit moral function, but rather has something of an ostensive function: it 
is comparison for comparison’s sake. Taken in isolation in this manner, one might be able to 
forward such a claim about the non-moral or even anti-moral aspect of the comparison. The 
comparison takes a man and, through a visual analogy, “reduces” him to a stone or a sea-beast. It 
is hard to see how this amounts to an elevating act of comparison.  
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 But the moralizing impulse of the poet-narrator elsewhere in the poem complicates this 
reading. If the leech gatherer seems like a stone or a sea-beast in this passage, the leech gatherer 
also did seem “like a Man from some far region sent; To give me human strength, and strong 
admonishment” (118-9). It is here, in other words, that we see simile arise to negotiate, as 
Wolfson notes, “a chance event” which is “read into significance” (118-9). The young poet-
narrator has his own trick of moralizing his encounter with the leech gatherer. He consistently 
attempts to elevate the leech gatherer as a kind of individual moral lesson, as a “stately” figure 
(103, 143) who has arrived providentially to chastise the narrator. The poet-narrator surmises that 
the leech gatherer has arrived by some “peculiar grace” to draw him out of his own preoccupied 
isolation in which “up and down my fancy thus was driven” (53). In this context, de Man’s 
concession to Wimsatt’s reading that in Romantic poetry “…[t]he relationship with nature has 
been superseded by an intersubjective, interpersonal relationship that, in that last analysis, is a 
relationship of the subject towards itself” (195-6) seems relevant, but differently so. The question 
turns on how privileged or problematic this self-reflexive turn should be regarded. As we have 
seen, the mid-century neo-Kantian critique finds it worth celebrating. But is this the unqualified 
conclusion the poetry offers up? To put this in the terms I have developed: is this self-reflexive 
turn more heroic or idiotic?   
 Indeed, “Resolution and Independence” seems to recapitulate this entire progression that 
de Man describes, as ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. The poet-narrator’s mediation on nature 
morphs into his melancholic general meditation on the occupational hazard of poetry before 
being interrupted by his enigmatic intersubjective, inter-personal encounter with the otherness of 
the leech gatherer. But, through that encounter, the narrator is also so preoccupied, so self-
absorbed, that his encounter with the leech gatherer is finally an encounter with himself. He is 
inclined to treat the leech gatherer as his own psychological construction: “the whole Body of the 
man did seem/Like one whom I had met with in a dream” (117). Here again, simile occurs to 
mark the poet-narrator’s attempt to elevate his encounter. In this context, the narrator’s 
analogizing is associated with his pre-occupation. So how seriously should we take the poet-
narrator’s analogizing? Is it more a sign of truth or error?   
 We can address the question along a second avenue by considering the figuration of 
stability and instability throughout the poem. Once again, it is worth moving out from the central 
image Wordsworth extracts in the commentary to see how the patterns there can and cannot be 
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extracted meaningfully from the broader progression. From within the figure, the stability and 
continuity of the old man’s form and of the poet’s “watching” generate the instability of the poet-
narrator’s analogical perception. It is the man’s “continuing motionless” that generates the 
comparison with the stone. The fixity of form incites the poet-narrator to what Wordsworth calls 
elsewhere a “play with simile,” which runs through “loose types of things.” The visual play 
generates in turn a conceptual instability, in which the contraries of inanimate and animate — 
stone and man — are gradually (even mediately) brought together in “just comparison” (633). It 
is through this activity that the oppositions of animation and in-animation seems to be fruitfully 
destabilized: not only “endowed with properties that do not inhere with them” but somehow set 
into an open-ended relation that defies their difference. Here Schey’s insight that analogy “both 
opens and leaves open the question of relation” (184) seems particularly apt. The entire structure 
is destabilizing in a generative way: just comparison is indeed just comparison.  
 Moving out from the image, however, we see that the sight of the motionless man itself 
temporarily arrests the narrator’s instability. The poet-narrator’s instability is figured by “driven” 
and “striven,” which both suggest a kind of ambitious energy or thirst. This mental unrest is 
linked to his physical motion, which is also arrested upon seeing the man: “my course I stopped 
as soon as I espied/That Old Man in that naked wilderness.” From this perspective, the poet-
narrator’s analogical comparison of the man and the stone marks the return of his mental unrest, 
his “[over]driven” fancy. And, simile appears to resurface each time the poet-narrator makes his 
inward turn: “now his voice to me was like a stream/Scarce heard…” (114-5). Later, the narrator-
poet drifts off again “while he was talking thus” to his “mind’s eye” in which the poet-narrator 
“seemed to see him pace/About the weary moors continually/Wandering about alone and 
silently” (137-39). In this reverie, the poet-narrator envisions the leech-gatherer’s dissatisfaction 
as a kind of physical unrest and instability. The central interpretive instability for the narrator 
seems to be how to interpret the man’s unique isolation: in short, the narrator-poet cannot decide 
whether the old man is a “stately” model to be emulated or a thing merely “endued with sense” 
to be pitied. The poet-narrator’s preoccupation with this question not only inhibits his encounter 
with the leech gatherer. It seems to distort his relation of the leech gatherer’s story. Is the line 
“Employment hazardous and wearisome!” (108) a faithful reiteration of the leech gatherer’s 
remarks (as it appears) or the poet-narrator’s translation and commentary of the leech gatherer’s 
tale?  
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 The crux of this somewhat suspicious interpretation of the poet-narrator turns on the 
leech gatherer’s calm, consistent, and bemused reaction to the poet-narrator’s excessive mental 
instability. The leech gatherer’s stability is figured in his calm repetition of his answer to the 
poet’s repeated question (127, 140): it is “with a smile” that the leech gatherer repeats his tale. 
The smile here registers the poet-narrator’s unrest as a form of idiocy, one that, as the poet-
narrator relates, seems to arise from his dissatisfaction with the ease and stability that marked his 
“whole life,” which was “lived in pleasant thought” and “as if life’s business were a summer 
mood” (37). The poet-narrator is conjuring a mistaken image of “solitude, pain of heart, distress, 
and poverty” that clarifies the poet-narrator’s inexperience of these hardships, his lack of mature 
integration into the social world, figured by his inability to sustain a mutual encounter with the 
leech gatherer. Indeed, it is even the narrator’s own sense that these affective states are 
problematically Idiotic — and thus his inclination to interpret his encounter with the leech 
gatherer as corrective — that finally inhibits and narrows his encounter. 
 If the narrator of “Resolution and Independence” is marked by his false perception of 
integration with the social world, then the narrator of “The Thorn” is marked by a false 
perception of his distinction from the highland community he inhabits. But, like the narrator in 
“Resolution and Independence,” the narrator’s error is marked by his tendency to lean on 
analogy in the face of the uncertainty surrounding the mysterious scene he encounters. Whereas I 
have certainly read the error of idiocy into “Resolution and Independence” against the grain, the 
substantial amount of extra-textual material suggests that Wordsworth’s depiction of the 
narrator’s error is intentional and critical. In the oft-cited 1800 Note to “The Thorn,” Wordsworth 
works to distance himself from the poem’s narrator. He provides the narrator with a thorough 
backstory and characterizes him not only as “prone to superstition” but as a paradigmatic 
instance for “exhibit[ing] some of the general laws by which superstition acts on the mind” 
(593). Here we see Wordsworth announcing poetry’s claim as “the history or science of feelings” 
(594). Some critics have generatively contested Wordsworth’s post facto attempt at distancing 
himself, but here I’ll accept it because, as many critics have observed, the appeal of this effort is 
the way Wordsworth’s description of the narrator as “credulous” and “common” cuts against the 
narrator’s own evident attempts to establish critical distance himself from the unsubstantiated — 
and often supernatural — speculation that circulates through the poem. As W.J.B. Owen 
observes, the “narrator continually casts doubt” (10) on the townspeople’s interpretations of the 
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mystery at the poem’s center. Similarly, the narrator foregrounds his skeptical and procedural 
discipline of his own investigation (and narration) of the mystery. And the question has long been 
how to square Wordsworth’s affirmation of the narrator’s superstition against the narrator’s 
implicit rejection of that claim. Is the narrator really superstitious? And, if so, how does the 
narrator’s superstition emerge in relation to or against his perception of the villagers, and how 
might seeing the narrator as superstitious modify a conception of what superstition entails?  
 In Chapter Two,  I discussed the rise of a privileged concept of “internal evidence,” 
which was increasingly valued over problematic “external evidence” or human testimony. I 
considered that one of the contradictory aspects of this new discourse around this new 
privileging of “facts” is that it never quite relinquishes its dependence on narrative as it shapes 
and constructs these facts. Here I want to suggest “The Thorn” thematizes this specific issue of 
empiricism. As Paul Sheats has noted, despite Wordsworth’s description of the narrator as a 
commoner, he “behaves very much like a sceptical philosopher” who “discriminates between 
various degrees to which propositions can be objects of authentic knowledge” and who 
privileges “personal experience” over “second hand report” (97). Indeed, the narrator 
presumably favors a kind of circumstantial evidence over the village hearsay, and not only 
returns to the spot repeatedly himself but frequently enjoins the reader to do so. But the limited 
interpretive economy of the scene — its three elements — causes him to lean heavily on these 
descriptions. Moreover, his skeptical commitment to first-hand evidence blinds him to his 
susceptibility to the village hearsay. He may repeatedly and explicitly reject the rumors 
concerning Martha Ray’s potential infanticide, but his uncritical absorption of these rumors 
comes through at the periphery of his procedural examination of the scene — most evidently, in 
the kinds of comparative practices he uses to describe and interpret its objects.  
 In line 5, for instance, the narrator describes the thorn as “Not higher than a two-years’ 
child” (5), and this strange but as-yet-meaningful reference to a child returns with the narrator’s 
description of the formation covered in moss next to the thorn: the heap is “Is like an infant’s 
grave in size/As like as like can be” (52-53). Both descriptions come well before the narrator 
introduces Martha Ray or even explains the relevance of the scene as a potential site of 
matricide. What ostensibly licenses the narrator’s use of these comparisons is his limited 
attention to measurement. But, with the second comparison, the important qualification — 
“like…in size” — is dispensed with in the following line, collapsing the similarity between the 
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heap and a grave into an identity. As Wolfson writes, the collapse “betrays the explanatory 
protocol of simile” (80). We see the narrator’s desire for an explanation to this mystery lead him 
unwittingly beyond the limitations he attempts to impose on his investigative procedure, and to 
color the scene with the speculative and narrative content generated by the communal rumors. It 
is only the similarity in size that selects out the comparison, or makes it salient. At the same time, 
the similarity is clearly more superficial than substantial, its relevance context-driven. One would 
expect an infant’s grave to be buried, not visible. And in this manner, the heap nicely figures the 
narrator’s inability to resist reading surface as depth. The repetition of like in turn registers this 
desire, what Wordsworth describes as a “craving in the mind” which causes a speaker to “cling to 
the same words, or words of the same character” (594). The formal quality of sameness aligns 
with the semantic content of like to exacerbate the effect of that desire, as repetition of sameness 
reproduces identity. 
 The emphasis on measurement in these passages links them with what have historically 
been the most contentious two lines of the poem. Speaking of the third and final feature of the 
scene — the muddy pond — the narrator writes, “I’ve measured it from side to side: ’Tis three 
feet long, and two feet wide” (32-3). Most critics — Coleridge especially — found the line 
appallingly because distinctly unpoetic. But Wordsworth resisted removing it despite a good deal 
of ridicule. In his sympathetic and extensive reading of the line, Sheats suggests that the line’s 
bathetic character amounts to a programmatic “provocation:” it attempts to “satirize the taste it 
offends:” on this view, the lines intentionally depart from a prior constricted definition of the 
poetic to redefine it: to reinforce the “essential unity of prose and poetry” (94). However, while 
concurring with Sheats about the line’s “unpoetic” and “bathetic” quality, I would prefer to see 
the line’s artlessness as an extension of the narrator’s claim to the artless — that is, unmediated, 
unconstructed — nature of his investigation. The narrator’s performance is more generally 
marked by a strange mixture of artlessness and artfulness, as well as his tendency to misassign 
each.  
This is really the thrust of Coleridge’s extensive critique of the poem: where the narrator 
is psychologically accurate, he is not poetic, and vice versa. But this tension between artfulness 
and artlessness seems to be thematized. As we have seen, the narrator believes his interpretation 
of the scene to be artless while the reader recognizes it to be artful. This is best captured in the 
poem’s opening description of thorn. The poem opens with an existential clause, “There is a 
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Thorn,” whose neutrality and impoverishment may be interpreted in divergent ways: either as an 
untutored lack of poetic capacity; or, alternatively, as a studied suspension of rhetorical 
adornment and stylistic interference. Whereas Wordsworth’s characterization of the narrator 
works to recommend the first interpretation, the skeptical procedures of the narrator firmly 
recommend the second. In this way, the reader arrives at a prior linguistic construction whose 
history – as depth – is obscured and can only be read negatively, through its effacement. This is 
the problem the narrator himself encounters with the thorn, whose bare visual presence intimates 
a history as depth while also emphasizing its inaccessibility through its surface: The thorn “… 
looks so old/In truth, you’d find it hard to say/How it could have ever been young” (1-3).157 It is 
only with “Not higher than a two-years’ child” (5) – and with the other more meticulous acts of 
measurement – that we glimpse the (un)imaginative work behind the narrator’s construction. 
Returning to Wordsworth’s remarks on “accuracy” of comparison, we see the narrator’s attempt 
to reduce his comparison to a matter of accurate measurements to be a distinctly inaccurate and 
distorted estimation of “similitude in dissimilitude.” 
It should be evident that neither “Resolution and Independence” or “The Thorn” conform 
neatly (or at all) to the poetic program of associationist aesthetics as either Jeffrey or 
Wordsworth articulates it. Both, on the other hand, would seem to involve the kind of surface 
reading that a mid-century neo-Kantian Romantic critic like Wimsatt or Wasserman would 
observe. The narrator of the “The Thorn” – and thus the poem itself – even foregrounds the 
                                                            
157The lines present a kind of riddle of inference. The narrator’s observation that the thorn is old seems impossible 
without a prior assumption of the thorn’s development through time. The thorn’s aged appearance makes its youth 
conceptually self-evident. To be old presupposes to be young, first, in a logical sense (youth is logically prior) and in 
a probable sense (trees don’t emerge fully formed, but must undergo ontogenesis). Consider the difference between 
aged and ageless. The thorn’s agedness emerges as a kind of agelessness. But ageless implies the absence of 
expected signs of age, not its overriding presence. The concept of old, on the other hand, implies the prior presence 
and subsequent loss or negation of youth. The absence of signs of youth is possible in one sense, but the utter 
inaccessibility of youth seems conceptually paradoxical. And yet somehow the thorn’s youth emerges as 
inaccessible in this way, something merely posited as a supposition on the basis of inference – whether that 
inference is logical in the sense that old necessarily presupposes youth or as probable inference. The thorn is, rather, 
a being that obscures its own becoming even as it is a being that signifies most directly and prominently as having-
already-become. This state is posited somehow a result of the intensification of the thorn’s embodiment of oldness: 
because the thorn is so old — so evidently the product or effect of its history, it manages this paradoxical obstruction 
(perhaps parallel to the way agelessness resists or defies the appearance of oldness even as it meets its conceptual 
qualifications). From the perspective of probable inference, the thorn’s presence testifies to its passage-through-time 
without yielding any positive knowledge of its own past. That knowledge is only a reasonable surmising that, rather 
than achieving any positive knowledge of the past, simply exacerbates the inaccessibility of this knowledge: it 
produces the palpable sense of available knowledge met by a palpable lack of knowledge, a conviction of a prior 
past marked by the inaccessibility of that past, affording no clear sense of how the thorn’s becoming has contributed 
to its being. 
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question of epistemology in a way the neo-Kantians observe. But, as many critics have since 
noted, in “The Thorn,” the narrator’s epistemological preoccupation is clearly marked as 
problematic, a kind of moral error, a misguided response to Martha Ray’s suffering – not to 
mention a self-defeating procedure which, as Sheats notes, “does not further knowledge but 
impedes it” (98). The same can be said of the narrator’s effort to either aestheticize or moralize 
the presence of the leech gatherer in “Resolution and Independence:” it inhibits and distorts the 
social encounter. In both cases, it is the pursuit of depth against surface that is thematized. Here, 
I would argue, is where associationist aesthetics does emerge as relevant, since it describes the 
act of poetic interpretation as risking the similar kind of presumption. That risk is integral to 
transaction between the particularity of the poet’s vision and the general, stable, and communal 
vision that the poet aspires to access. The associationist poet presents its associations as public at 
the risk of it being private, its analogies as deep at the risk of them being superficial. In this way, 
whereas associationist aesthetics fails to provide an account of Wordsworth’s poetic practice, it 
does provide a way to describe the way Wordsworth’s narrators misread, how they misread depth 






Disciplines of Doubt: Wordsworth’s The Borderers, 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, and Godwin’s Caleb Williams 
 
 
 In the Introduction, I claimed that neo-Kantian intellectual history – and more importantly 
the Skeptical perspective that defines it – ultimately commits two mistaken assessments of the 
modern history of skepticism. First, I proposed that neo-Kantian intellectual history tends to 
overestimate the broader historical significance of radical epistemological skepticism. Second, I 
claimed this overestimation leads neo-Kantian intellectual history to underestimate the continued 
significance of the traditions of moral, practical skepticism that a neo-Kantian, Skeptical 
perspective attempts to diminish or displace. Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour, Michael Polanyi, 
Michel Serres, and others have examined these distortions as they relate to the theory and 
practice of the natural sciences, where the meta-language of epistemology has tended to distort 
rather than faithfully reflect scientific practice. But the same general pattern can be nicely 
observed within modern Anglophone legal epistemology. The skeptical techniques endorsed 
within Anglophone legal epistemology are distinctly indebted to the constructive skeptical 
tradition I have tried to recover in the preceding chapters. And this fact recommends law and 
literature as an important initial site to reimagining the Romantic literary response to 
Enlightenment skepticism as more explicitly a reaction to this constructive skeptical tradition.  
 The impact of constructive skepticism within Anglophone legal epistemology can be seen 
in that tradition’s progressive adoption and formalization of a rational, procedural skepticism as a 
means for disinterested legal judgment over the long eighteenth century. The “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard — regarded in the American legal system as the strongest 
instruction given by a trial judge to a jury concerning both (1) the presumption of the innocence 
of a defendant and (2) the burden of proof faced by the prosecution in any criminal trial – 
amounts to a crystallization of the constructive skeptical ethos embraced by Enlightenment 
thinkers. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is now regarded as an affirmation of the 
value of radical doubt in legal practice, an injunction to jurors to adopt an actively skeptical 
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posture that the prosecution must labor against to establish the plausibility of its case. The US 
Supreme Court has cited the instruction as the “prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error” and for providing “concrete substance for the presumption 
of innocence” (re: Winship, 397 US 363). But, as I will explore in at length below in my reading 
of William Godwin’s Caleb Williams, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard has a 
distinctively conservative and practical orientation that is often occluded in modern treatments.  
The “reasonable doubt” instruction aims in some sense to restrict the legitimate role of doubt 
within common law practice, to establish reasonable parameters an individual jury member’s 
right to doubt or withhold assent in the face of uncertainty. The phrase’s endorsement of doubt is 
not unqualified; on the contrary, the adjective reasonable marks out the limits of the legitimacy 
of doubt, carving out a critical conceptual space between “merely possible” doubt and 
“plausible” doubt — between “any doubt at all” and those doubts which qualify as “reasonable.” 
In this sense, this specific formulation could be said to lower the prosecution’s burden of proof 
and, moreover, to guarantee conditions for the possibility of legal judgment in the absence of 
“absolute certainty” and against certain “unreasonable” evidentiary demands.158 The standard 
formulation generally and explicitly cautions against entertaining more radical or implausible 
forms of skepticism. Consider, for instance, the following instruction from a 1990 case Cage v. 
Louisiana: 
If you entertain a reasonable doubt as to any fact or element necessary to 
constitute the defendant's guilt, it is your duty to give him the benefit of that doubt 
and return a verdict of not guilty. Even where the evidence demonstrates a 
probability of guilt, if it does not establish such guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 
you must acquit the accused. This doubt, however, must be a reasonable one; that 
is one that is founded upon a real tangible substantial basis and not upon mere 
caprice and conjecture...A reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an 
actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man can seriously 
entertain. What is required is not an absolute or mathematical certainty, but a 
moral certainty. (my emphasis, 498 U.S. 39) 
 
This formulation of the reasonable doubt can be regarded as more or less typical. Indeed, the 
language – which legal scholars have traced to the 1790s — has remained standardized since at 
                                                            
158I will consider a recent legal argument along these lines at length in Section 6.3. For earlier arguments along these 
lines in legal scholarship, see Morano, “A Reexamination of the Reasonable Doubt Rule” (1975) and Steve 
Sheppard, “The Metamorphosis of Reasonable Doubt” (2003), both of which argue that the “reasonable doubt” 
standard replaced a more general “any doubt” standard to favor the prosecution. 
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least the mid-nineteenth century. Several states explicitly forbid judges from altering or 
elaborating the definition of reasonable doubt for fear that any attempt to explain the term 
effectively violates the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. From this 
perspective, supplementing a formalized definition of reasonable doubt is more likely to 
compromise the burden of the proof the standard aims to instill than to clarify it.159  
 I have introduced Cage v. Louisiana (1990) here not only for its typicality but its 
exceptionality in the legal history of reasonable doubt. In this case, the defendant Cage did in 
fact make a successful appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds of due process, and the court 
ultimately reversed the guilty verdict on the basis of a few extraneous qualifiers presented in the 
standard. In their decision, the Supreme Court judges write: 
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and "grave," as they are commonly 
understood, suggest a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under 
the reasonable doubt standard. When those statements are then considered with 
the reference to "moral certainty," rather than evidentiary certainty, it becomes 
clear that a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction to allow a 
finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process 
Clause (498 U.S. 39, 6). 
 
Here it seems possible to read the real – if relatively minor – impact of epistemological 
Skepticism in the semantic distance the court imagines between moral and evidentiary certainty.  
As we have already seen, in eighteenth-century epistemology the category of “moral certainty” 
would have functioned in a largely epistemological and technical sense. But in Cage vs. 
Louisiana, the judges take the qualifier moral to be opposed to the bare epistemological sense of 
evidentiary certainty. The injunction to “moral certainty” is taken to be more distorting than 
clarifying, to effectively lower the otherwise high standard of proof by suggesting that jurors 
might apply a personal (if also normative) sense of morality to bear on the evidence. As I have 
argued, the Skeptical tradition has effectively helped to establish this semantic distance, 
according to which judgment emerges as somehow preoccupied or compromised by moral 
commitment. On this view, moral commitments must be set aside or suspended to achieve the 
appropriate orientation for legal judgment.160 
                                                            
159 See Miller Shealy, “A Reasonable Doubt about ‘Reasonable Doubt’” (2013): 260, 266 for a discussion of these 
actual historical examples.  
160 It is notable that in a later case, Victor v. Nebraska (1994), the US Supreme Court, leaning largely on the work of 
the legal historian Barbara Shapiro, acknowledges the currency of this technical if “archaic” sense of “moral 
certainty.” In her ruling, Justice O’Connor clarifies that while the judges “do not countenance its use” in the 
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 This sense of the impositions or distortions introduced of “moral certainty” arguably 
explains why the courts have not only preferred the negative formulation “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” – which would have been essentially synonymous and even appositional with moral 
certainty – but why they have preferred to keep the definition of “reasonable doubt” minimal or 
even in some sense implicit. “Reasonable doubt” functions as what Robert Mitchell calls a 
“variable regulative standard...read blindly and negatively through the actions of others” 
(keynote, North American Society for the Study of Romanticism, 2017). This negative, implicit 
status depends in turn on the assumption that legal rationality and practical rationality are more 
continuous than discontinuous, but that both are readily accessible. In this way, the judge’s legal 
expertise, for instance, is not taken to ensure the precision or justness of his interpretation of 
reasonable doubt. Rather, any elaboration or improvisation is taken to be a distortion or, at the 
least, a form of mediation: the juror has more immediate and thus reliable access to a standard of 
reasonable doubt through her own private estimation. By departing from the minimal definition, 
a judge is taken to cross over from the legal to the rhetorical and the political. 
 If the Anglophone legal theory has generally favored the variable, implicit, and minimal 
character of the reasonable doubt standard to be more dependable over a fixed, explicit, or 
maximal definition, then the works of literature I examine in the remainder of the chapter dwell 
upon the obvious risks of this variable standard: how one might exploit or manipulate an implicit 
confidence in the intellectual and moral probity of skeptical procedures to goad someone into 
immoral action; how a community or institution might distort or circumscribe a definition of 
reasonableness to encourage certain, more convenient kinds of judgment and discourage others; 
how individual desires condition and shape the form and intensity of doubt.  In my reading of 
The Borderers, “Staging Risk in the Borderers,” I propose a new way of thinking about what 
William Jewett has described as the drama’s “master plot of ‘strange repetition’” as a kind of 
procedural and experimental rationalism. In “Victor’s Reasonable Doubt,” I focus on 
Frankenstein’s engagement with the concept of circumstantial evidence in the early trial scene 
and consider the difficult relation between Victor Frankenstein’s cold, constructive skepticism 
and his hotter but suppressed psychological turmoil. And in “Caleb’s Unreasonable Doubt,” I 
                                                            
evidentiary standard, they rule that the phrase “did not render the instruction given in Victor’s case unconstitutional” 
(511 U.S.1 (1994)). Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred that “while not in itself so misleading as to render the 
instructions unconstitutional, [the term moral certainty] should be avoided as an unhelpful way of explaining what 
reasonable doubt means” (ibid.).  
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focus on the relation of doubt and desire in Caleb Williams. I consider how the novel insists on 
the ways desire conditions doubt and how that insistence subverts the claims to 
“disinterestedness” and “reasonableness” that recommend “reasonable doubt” as a legitimate and 
adequate response to the risks posed by judgment under uncertainty. Collectively, these works 
appear to raise questions about the Enlightenment’s confidence embrace of constructive 
skepticism and gesture towards a theory of Romantic doubt, which I develop in the chapter’s 
Coda, that tries to imagine the radical possibility of doubt against skepticism’s often overlooked 
conservatism.  
 
6.1 Staging Risk in Wordsworth’s The Borderers 
 In his influential study, Wordsworth’s Poetry, 1787-1814, Geoffrey Hartman characterizes 
Wordsworth’s early, difficult play The Borderers as a “philosophical drama” (129). With this 
characterization, Hartman intends to emphasize the play’s highly stylized form and setting, 
which Hartman contends are designed not to be performed live or to gesture towards any specific 
historical content but rather to probe a central philosophical question: “[C]an the intellect yield 
true moral judgments?” This arguably remains the most compelling way to think about the 
drama’s form and even the best way to frame the play’s subtle interrogation of judgment under 
uncertainty. This is especially true if we take “moral” in the more technical, epistemological 
sense it held prior to neo-Kantian epistemology, and if we absorb Hartman’s elegant observation 
that the “poet’s question” is “a tragic one” which can only be “deepened, not answered” (129). 
The play’s tragic question deepens as its complexion and direction shifts over the course of the 
drama. The moral judgment at the center of the play is ostensibly Mortimer’s decision to murder 
the blind, aged Herbert on the basis of Rivers’ salacious accusations against him. The play 
follows Rivers’ persistent seduction and manipulation of Mortimer. The tragedy, in one sense, 
centers on Mortimer’s intellectual failure to detect and overcome Rivers’ deftly orchestrated 
ploy. The play heightens this tragedy by staging this failure in alternating terms of sympathy and 
skepticism. Mortimer’s love for Herbert’s daughter, Miranda, occasionally promises to thwart 
Rivers’ plot but finally fails to expose or prevent it. Likewise, Mortimer is incapable of 
conducting a cooler, skeptical examination of Rivers’ false accusations against Herbert, largely 
because Rivers so thoroughly directs and manipulates Mortimer’s procedural inquiry. The plot’s 
shape is distended by the incomplete development of Mortimer’s sympathetic and skeptical 
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urges, even as it is also prolonged by Mortimer’s utter lack of interest in murdering Herbert. 
Rivers drags an unfocused Mortimer through his ploy, and Mortimer only murders Herbert after 
much vacillation and largely by accident. The tragic question at the play’s center is finally 
“deepened” not “answered” in large part because Mortimer’s reservations and sins of omission 
make any judgment about the nature of Mortimer’s moral or intellectual failure perplexing. 
Mortimer’s failure emerges as the compound effect of events which seem, at turns, to mitigate 
and exacerbate Mortimer’s responsibility.  
 The overall effect is to confuse the role the intellect plays in Mortimer’s judgment: does 
Mortimer’s intellect primarily work to resist or facilitate Mortimer’s tragic error, or both at 
turns? Yet, the question of judging Mortimer is only pertinent because the intellect of interest in 
the play is not Mortimer’s but Rivers’. In this sense, Hartman’s assertion that the drama’s central 
question belongs to “the poet” seems somewhat misleading. It is more accurate to say that the 
“poet’s question” — or some perversion of it — is posed from within the play by its villain, 
Rivers. Rivers’ seduction of Mortimer amounts to a kind of moral experiment itself, one meant 
to confirm Rivers’ own conviction that the question somehow traffics in an illusion. Rivers is at 
once defiant and anxious about the singularity of his critical insight. That insight seems to open 
up a new moral plain that is unapologetically heroic, beyond both intellect and morality as the 
intellect falsely conceives them. His experiment with Mortimer is an effort to confirm the 
validity of his insight through an approximate reproduction of the conditions he takes to have 
precipitated his new intuition. Rivers’ problem is that the experiment seems either woefully 
inconclusive or compromised for reasons he cannot determine and in ways that suggest his own 
thinking to be not clear but perverse, not essence but excess. Indeed, the problem is finally that 
Rivers’ still finds himself in the habit of experimenting, still anxious that a singularity cannot be 
known to speak beyond itself until it is reproduced, in ways that reveal him to be confined to the 
same kind of sympathetic thinking he understood himself to have overcome. The tragedy 
therefore ultimately shifts to center on Rivers’ moral and intellectual perversion. 
 If the symbolic structure of the play does a great deal to make this philosophical drama 
salient, it also arguably obscures the play’s more specific historical and contextual engagements. 
Many critics have been inclined to follow Hartman and read The Borderers as a kind of literary 
sublimation of the personal intellectual crisis Wordsworth recounts in Books X and XI in the 
Prelude. For Hartman, if the central problem of Wordsworth’s crisis of judgment is the “need for 
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judgments of an immediate and absolute nature” — or for what Othello calls “ocular proof” 
(247) — then The Borderers “expos[es] the difficulty of such proof” in the context of uncertain 
moral judgment. For Hartman, the play’s “locale, the border region” in turn represents “the 
absence of the ‘blind restraints of general laws’” (X.826). Here Hartman references the kind of 
immutable law that Wordsworth’s “young ingenuous mind/Pleased with extremes” (X.815-6) 
once aspired to overcoming when “enflamed/With a thirst of a secure intelligence” (X.832-3). 
For Hartman, the play transpires in the “absence” of these general laws not only because they fail 
to intervene and restrain Mortimer’s tragic action, but because Rivers represents an embodiment 
of Wordsworth’s earlier, perverse idea of the “freedom of the individual mind:” 
Which, to the blind restraint of general laws 
Superior, magisterially adopts 
One guide, the light of circumstances, flashed 
Upon an independent intellect. (X.826-9).   
 
Hartman suggests that the “one guide, the light of circumstances” is “the only law [Rivers] 
respects” (128), and indeed Rivers repeats a version of the line in his confession to Mortimer 
(III.v.22-37). Hartman understands the play’s pre-modern context as an attempt to achieve a 
meaningful distance from any sort of formal, procedural trial. This interpretation of Rivers — 
and the play — both as somehow “lawless” would explain the play’s projection into a distant 
past that appears to precede even informal assizes. Rivers is conducting his experiment in an 
environment distinctly amenable to its success, where his lawless machinations, however finally 
misguided, may proceed without much communal restraint. And, in this sense, Rivers’ 
experimental failure becomes all the more tragic.  
 In a recent reading of the play, Victoria Myers departs from this kind of decontextualized 
interpretation to pursue its more direct engagement with British legal institutionality. Myers 
argues that the play should be read not as “an avoidance of a formal trial” but as what she calls as 
“emplaced trial:” the modern trial structure as it is abstracted from institutional context to reveal 
the purely formal structure of its procedural inquiry. For Myers, the play is shot through with the 
language and content of contemporary trials, and the play’s dramatic action attempts to 
“recreate[] the experience of epistemological shock” that comes with the “process of proving the 
guilt of a suspect in conditions which close him off from institutional procedural assurances” 
(439). By “institutional procedural assurances,” Myers means the comfort and authority of the 
modern courtroom itself. The play amplifies this shock because it “represents the essential 
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elements of the court-room trial without either the confinement or the confidence of the 
institutional setting” (439). Removing these formal and procedural elements out into the 
borderlands bares them to generate a “skepticism about the procedures of the institution.” From 
this perspective, the absence of the “blind restraint of general laws” at the borderland is only 
apparent: the setting of the borderland works to clarify the superficiality of the institutional 
comforts that prop up these formal procedures. On this view, Rivers’ machinations are 
themselves deeply procedural. Rivers’ masterful means of staging of Herbert’s guilt 
“culminate[s]” in a “fundamental assault upon the literal truth of appearances” (446). Thus, 
Myers’ reads the play back into the Prelude for the different conclusion that the play 
“dramatize[s] not only the effect which the perversion of approbatory procedure has exerted 
upon [Wordsworth], but also the deep effect of that perversion upon modes of belief within 
British society” (451-52). 
 These competing readings of the play seem to follow from different interpretations how 
Rivers finally deceives Mortimer. From Hartman’s perspective, Rivers lures Mortimer with his 
heroic vision, exploiting “the vestiges of the old ‘nature’ morality” (129). While this morality has 
the “positive” effect of occasionally encouraging Mortimer to resist Rivers, Rivers exploits this 
nature morality by “accus[ing] Herbert of the most unnatural of crimes: steading someone else’s 
daughter, keeping her in ignorant captivity, and conspiring to seal her to a debauched lord” (129). 
And these unnatural accusations are what finally propel Mortimer. From Myers’s perspective, it 
is rather Rivers’ systematic orchestration of false inferences that deceives Mortimer. Rivers’ felt 
“superiority” over the “blind restraint of general laws” has not so much caused him to abandon 
them for the “light of circumstances” as it has enticed him to toy with and turn both to his ends. 
From this perspective, if Rivers wants to deceive Mortimer, he does it as much through 
Mortimer’s faith in procedure as he does against it. If we accept Hartman’s reading, we might 
say that Rivers has to direct this faith so that it aligns with the nature morality he seeks to exploit. 
This is simply to say that Rivers sees Mortimer at the border between a nature morality and a 
more rational universalism. Rivers sees himself at the border of a rational universalism and a 
new heroic morality. And he recognizes this transition not as his estrangement from rational 
universalism but with a new kind of mastery over it, in which the logic of nature morality 
appears predictable and reproducible enough to be manipulated. As we will see, this mastery also 
amounts to a form of enslavement. 
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 I find the procedural reading of Rivers that Myers offers as more advantageous than 
Hartman’s in two ways. First, while it is true that Rivers tries to warm Mortimer up to his heroic 
vision — to prepare him for the communal backlash he will experience and to condition him to 
see it as a misunderstanding — by exploiting its affinities with the older nature morality Hartman 
discovers, Rivers’ deception also exploits a distinctly rationalist angle. More generally, Rivers’ 
deception effortlessly crosses the border between nature morality and universal rationalism, 
playing them against one another. The more striking moments of the play are when Rivers seems 
to exploit Mortimer’s or his clansmen’s faith in the “blind restraint” of colder, disinterested 
procedure: when River asks Mortimer to calmly reflect on his degree of certainty and disinterest. 
Early on, for instance, Rivers encourages Mortimer to circumspection and caution. Mortimer’s 
act of vengeance must also be an “act of reason" (II.i.81). At one point, sensing (or rather 
projecting) Mortimer’s reservations, Rivers feigns his regret for the absence of an institutional 
structure: 
Now on my soul I grieve for you. The misery 
Of doubt is insupportable. Pity the facts 
Did not admit of stronger evidence. Twelve neighbours 
Plain honest men, might set us right. Their verdict 
Would fortify your spirit — end this weakness. (II.iii.188-90). 
 
These gestures towards rather than against rationalism appeal to Mortimer’s own desire for 
disinterest. Indeed, Mortimer says that he “should loathe the light” if he “could think one weak 
or partial feeling” (II.i.83-86) influenced his decision. From this perspective, Hartman’s turn to 
the Prelude encourages an unhelpful opposition between “the restraint of general laws” and the 
“light of circumstances” which Myers’ attention to the procedural logic of legal institutionality 
helps correct. Indeed, Rivers takes his new heroic insight to be a tragic (but also empowering) 
realization that the “light of circumstances” only appears to reflect the “blind restraint of general 
laws.” Rivers now realizes that appearances can be far too readily and easily co-opted in the 
service of conspiracy. On Rivers’ own account, Rivers was deceived into killing his former 
captain by a conspiracy orchestrated by his shipmates. They persuade Rivers that his act of 
mutiny would be justified – that it would be rightly interpreted as just — only to reveal their 
performance to have been a “…plot/To rid them of a master whom they hated” (IV.ii.73). By his 
account, it is upon reflecting on his strange role in this plot — at once its agent and yet also its 
victim — that Rivers gains his heroic insight. His victimhood somehow reveals that morality has 
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no universal grounding: it is instead merely a manner of social control. It is also an innervating 
kind of control: it constricts a more natural impulse to heroic action.  
 It is of interest that we gain much of this backstory during Rivers’ attempts to persuade 
Mortimer to adopt a similar set of insights. Rivers tells Mortimer that, in resolving to murder 
Herbert (long before Mortimer even has resolved to do so), Mortimer has “burst through” the 
“flimsy superstition” of universal rationalism (III.v.106). Throughout the play, it is strongly 
insinuated that River constructs a similar cloud of deceit around Mortimer — a total situation 
which Mortimer must read as distinct from Rivers’ testimony and which must function as a self-
sustaining system of false inference – merely to confirm his own heroic insight by constructing a 
similar set of events around Mortimer. Rivers wants to propel Mortimer to the same insight, to 
dislodge him in the same manner, to have his heroic observations corroborated. Rivers uses 
Mortimer’s dependence on and respect for procedural inquiry to frame the light of circumstances 
so that they have the appearance of general laws: to massage the “ocular proof,” so to speak. As 
Myers nicely puts it, Rivers encourages Mortimer to “speculate on a more tangled web of 
deception than the mere evidence would bear” and to extract evidence from “appearances and 
suspect witness[nes]” which are then “constructed by inference into conspiracy” (446). Rivers 
amplifies the light of circumstance so that it is powerful enough to blind. He aims to generate 
“…a flash/Of truth enough to dazzle and to blind/And he is mine for ever" (II.i.10-12). The 
clearest evidence of Rivers’ dual strategy occurs in a monologue in act III, scene 2:  
This last device must end my work — methinks 
It were a pleasant pastime to construct 
A scale and table of belief — as thus —  
Two columns, one for passion, one for proof, 
Each rising as the other falls: and, first, 
Passion a unit, and against us. —Proof! 
Nay, we must travel in another path 
Or we’re stuck fast for ever — passion, then, 
Shall be a unit for us — proof, oh no, 
We’ll not insult her majesty by time 
And place — the where, the when, the how, and all 
The dull particulars whose intrusion mars 
The dignity of demonstration. (III.ii.4-16). 
 
The passage feels distinctly anachronistic in its rationalism. The “scale” of belief should be 
familiar from the preceding discussions of moral evidence. The “table” of belief arguably alludes 
to the more extensive rationalizations of the period epitomized, for instance, in Jeremy 
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Bentham’s “Table of the Springs of Action” or Edward Tatham’s massive “Chart and Scale of 
Truth, by which to Find the Cause of Error” (1790). But more important here is Rivers sense of 
confident ease and familiarity with the two “units” of belief, the dexterity with which he 
imagines himself to play one against the other. 
 The second advantage of Myers’ procedural interpretation is that it highlights the 
procedural, analogical bent with which Rivers’ approaches his conspiracy, what I have called its 
experimental character. In his interpretation, Hartman observes that Rivers instigates a crime 
“practically identical to his own” (130). But, perhaps leaning too heavily on the comparison of 
River with Iago, Hartman reads Rivers’ pursuit of identity in psychoanalytic terms, as “deeply 
compulsive” (130). This leads Hartman (and many other critics following him) to read Rivers’ 
character as a study in “repetition compulsion” (130).161 Against this psychoanalytic emphasis, 
Myers argues that Rivers’ thinking is largely an effect of the “perversion of probatory procedure” 
(452). I take this to be slightly more nuanced than the typical association of Rivers with a 
perverse Godwinian rationalism and, finally, a more promising approach to what William Jewett 
calls the drama’s “master plot of ‘strange repetition’” (Jewett 82) than Hartman. With Myers’ 
interpretation in view, I want to interpret Rivers’ compulsive interest in repetition as more 
properly a sign of his rationalist or empiricist conditioning. Again, I take Rivers to be conducting 
a kind of experiment with Mortimer. Rivers perceives his transgressive murder as 
transformational, but he needs to confirm that his transformation is more natural than 
idiosyncratic via a reproducible experiment. And his objective seems to create such an 
overwhelmingly strong analogy between the circumstances of his case and those of Mortimer’s 
that it will produce the same psychological effect in Mortimer. In this way, his strange repetitions 
are more calculated than compulsive.  
 There seem to be two unknowns that complicate Rivers’ experiment, both which Rivers 
uses analogical constructions to address. First, Rivers is not quite sure of the best means to 
persuade Mortimer to commit the crime itself. Rivers’ solution this first problem, as Myers notes, 
is to construct, through his testimony and other means, a broad situation which Mortimer can 
interpret as independent “circumstances.” And, from my perspective, what is notable about this 
strategy is the way Rivers’ constructs a series of analogical relations to stage Matilda’s potential 
                                                            
161 Readers often support this by drawing out a proto-articulation of this Freudian concept from Wordsworth’s 
“Essay on the Character of Rivers.” See, for instance, David Bromwich, Disowned by Memory: Wordsworth’s 
Poetry of the 1790’s. 
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risk were Mortimer not to kill Herbert. The “flash/Of Truth enough to dazzle and blind” come 
from two major sites: a beggar Rivers’ has paid to pose as a Matilda’s birth mother and a “poor 
tenant” Clifford claims that the “villain Clifford” (II.i.16-7) once abducted and drove to madness. 
Meeting the beggar, Mortimer cries “when I looked upon that woman/I thought I saw a skeleton 
of Matilda” (II.i.32-3). And Rivers consistently stages an analogical comparison between the 
poor tenant’s fate and the potential of Matilda. And, afterword, Rivers works to establish a 
speculative timeline: "The savage debauchee/Would there perhaps have gathered the first 
fruits/Of this foul monster's guilt" (II.i.120-22). This construction is notably counteracted (but 
not overcome) in the play by a crosscurrent of resemblances centered on Matilda and Herbert’s 
physical likeness. Mortimer observes,” There was something in [Herbert’s] face the very 
counterpart of Matilda" (II.iii.272). And, again, later: “There is a vein of her voice that runs 
through his” (III.iii.65). These resemblances threaten (but ultimately fail) to expose Rivers’ 
claim that Matilda is not Herbert’s daughter but rather than Herbert has abducted her for the 
purposes of selling her to Clifford.162  
 Second, while Rivers anticipates that his new heroic consciousness is the final effect of his 
earlier manipulation, Rivers is not sure which conditions of his own case amounts to the efficient 
cause. This problem recommends Rivers’ elaborate reproduction of the entire set of conditions 
surrounding the event. Once Rivers’ believes Mortimer has killed Herbert, he tells Mortimer his 
tale and implores, “[T]hink of my story — / Herbert is innocent” (IV.iii.211-12). Rivers’ intent is 
to dislodge Mortimer in the same manner that Rivers believes his earlier realization to have 
dislodged him. The problem is that, at the moment of revelation, Mortimer believes Herbert is 
still alive, so he fails to see the relation (in any case, Mortimer is not a very astute reader). The 
effect of circumstances is squandered, and it forces Rivers to dictate Mortimer’s insight to him in 
a different pattern of repetition: Rivers tells Mortimer that “You have taught mankind to seek the 
measure of justice/By diving for it in their own bosons” (III.v.24-25), you have “…seen deeper” 
(III.v.95). But this dictation lacks the effect of circumstance. Mortimer simply asks, “Wherefore 
press this on me?” (III.v.22). Later, Mortimer again asks, “Wherefore this repetition?” 
(III.v.43).163 This here seems to gesture to both Rivers’ verbal repetition and his elaborate 
replication. 
                                                            
162 Although, as Schey observes in his reading, the play never confirms whether Herbert is Matilda’s father. 
163 In his recent reading of this play (and largely in response to the psychoanalytic readings), Schey has called into 
question whether or not we should take Rivers’ story at face value, “as though it were a truthful and transparently 
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 Many scholars have read this turn to repetition as Rivers seeking to “bind” Mortimer as a 
double. Some have explored the homosocial and homosexual implications of this act. These 
seem like viable readings, but I believe it is better to regard Mortimer as Rivers’ experiment and 
to take this experiment to have failed on two accounts. In the first sense, we can take it as 
inconclusive because Mortimer does not experience the kind of transformation that Rivers 
hypothesizes. And this suggests that Rivers’ own heroic vision is more perverse than natural. 
But, as I suggested at the beginning of this section, the deeper problem is revealed by Rivers’ 
need to confirm his heroism through the reproduction of experiment itself. Had Rivers overcome 
his rationalist impulses, he would not need to replicate his condition to confirm it.164 He could 
“magisterially adopt[]/One guide, the light of circumstances, flashed/Upon an independent 
intellect (X.826-9).”  
 
6.2. Victor’s Reasonable Doubt 
Much like Wordsworth’s The Borderers, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818, 1831) lends 
itself to critical readings that bypass the novel’s engagements with its historically specific 
contexts in order to focus on the novel’s more philosophical engagements with themes of justice, 
technology, ethics, and epistemology. Indeed, Frankenstein has in many ways been privileged as 
the most philosophical gothic novel in addition to being the most famous one, and it has served 
as the principal justification for pursuing a strongly “philosophical” approach to the Gothic as a 
genre itself. The novel’s unique ability not only to speak to these persistent philosophical themes 
but to speak to them at their difficult intersection points has played an important role in elevating 
the Gothic novel as a literary form and recovering it from its longstanding and often pejorative 
associations with erotic sensibility and material excess or its diminished reputation as a historical 
fad.  
                                                            
literal account of his personal history?:” “Is it not possible — indeed more than possible — that the arch-
storyteller’s confession is simply another one of what he calls his ‘daring fictions?’” (“Limited Analogies” 195) For 
Schey, Rivers’ autobiography could amount to “the drama’s ultimate trick of manipulation” (195). I am willing to 
accept this reading, because it merely reinforces my account of Rivers’ attempt to stage risk: we simply see that his 
process of staging was more elaborate and thoroughly orchestrated than critics have assumed. 
164 Hartman notes a similar irony, but reads it through Rivers’ continued desire for sympathetic identification, which 
is also a satanic one. His reading is worth revisiting: “Oswald seeks an accomplice because he is too weak to suffer 
the liberty into which he was betrayed and needs Marmaduke to solace his loneliness…he cannot live without 
enslaving others…[T]he motive, therefore, is satanic and points to the mystery in all seduction” (130). 
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As necessary as this philosophical turn has been, it has often encouraged a kind of 
overcorrection that abstracts Frankenstein’s philosophical engagements too far from the 
historical specificity that gives them their purchase, gravity, and complexity. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a distinct taste for Kantian epistemology has often facilitated this purely 
philosophical approach. In his 1987 essay, “A Philosophical View of the Romantic Novel,” for 
instance, Marshall Brown makes an early, important case for “revers[ing] the priorities of gothic 
criticism” from the material to the philosophical. Brown frames this intervention schematically 
as approaching “Frankenstein's monster as a thought, not a thing” (Brown 276) and, more 
generally, as theorizing “gothic substance” not in terms of its saturated materiality but as “a thing 
whose materiality has been sublimated into a freedom from all conditioning factors, making it at 
once madness, dream, and play” (280). Brown’s deft use of “substance” points not only to his 
attempted reversal of gothic criticism but as a relocation and reappraisal of the gothic novel’s 
philosophical heft. For Brown, the gothic’s substance is substantially (read: significantly) 
insubstantial (read: philosophical). On this view, gothic novels are more generatively viewed as 
“pure speculative instruments that investigate the origins of experience” (280) rather than, say, 
literary instruments for representing or even practical instruments for experiencing a certain kind 
of erotic or emotional excess. For Brown, the gothic novel is fundamentally about a lack of 
conditioning, a stripping away of familiarity of habit and society. The gothic novel pursues 
knowledge at its impossible limits: 
What would be left of a man, these novels ask, if all human society were stripped 
away, all customary perception, all the expected regularity of cause and effect? They 
ask, in other words, what man is in himself, when deprived of all the external 
supports that channel ordinary experience. What resources, if any, does the mind 
retain in isolation? What is the nature of pure consciousness? And this, in turn, is the 
fundamental question of Kant's epistemology. (281).  
 
I agree with Brown’s claim to the philosophical potency of the gothic novel, and the special 
potency of Frankenstein. But it should be clear that Brown’s justification for this new 
philosophical orientation towards the gothic is explicitly neo-Kantian. These purer philosophical 
questions are not only made visible by Kantian epistemology; they are recommended because 
they have been singled out for special consideration within Kantian epistemology. Brown’s 
orientation towards this act of purification is likewise distinctly Skeptical. Here the gothic’s 
pursuit of the “remainder” amounts to a pursuit for a kind of essence, an attempt to access “what 
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man is in himself” (281) through a kind of productive distortion and subtraction. Brown’s 
constellation of Kantian aesthetic terms — “freedom,” “play,” and “pure” — anticipate the 
potential rather than the limitation of this kind of philosophical purification, and assume its 
clarifying rather than its distorting role. 
From my perspective, this taste for Kant leads Brown down an idealist line which is 
distinctly unhelpful and unjustified for approaching the philosophical import of Frankenstein. 
Indeed, it seems impossible to appreciate the novel’s philosophical engagements at this level of 
abstraction. For Frankenstein seems to be a novel about not the lack of conditioning of 
“customary perception” and “expected regularities,” but the necessity and inescapability of such 
conditioning. Frankenstein examines the horrors that emerge as a result of such conditioning 
and, more specifically, of the hubris which posits the possibility of escaping this kind of 
conditioning through the act of speculation. Indeed, there seems to be no “pure” speculation in 
Frankenstein: the Creature is surely first a thought, but it is a thought that Victor’s scientific 
mind feels compelled to realize — to turn into a thing — in order to confirm the “cause of life” 
through this “effect” of realization. Once realized, Creature is a thing that pursues a life neither 
Victor’s thought nor the “external supports that channel ordinary experience” can successfully 
predict or contain. The creature represents something like the horrific issue of Victor’s own 
mistaken belief that his speculations on life might reproduce a life that somehow remain apart 
from living, that these speculations can come to fruition without answering to the fundamentally 
unpredictability of life as it is lived. For Victor, the creature becomes a “living monument of 
presumption and rash ignorance” (Shelley 1818 78) that pursues philosophical speculation 
without an appreciation for its practical consequences. The Creature is a figure for the kinds of 
uncertainty that consistently defy and frustrate any conditioning. Victor’s hubris is an unholy 
marriage of the technocratic expertise and philosophical idiocy.165 
There is no doubt that the novel is an intense examination of the singularity of 
Frankenstein’s creature. But that singularity emerges as distinctly problematic in the novel, and 
only against the kind of stabilizing or conditioning institutional structures that cannot contain or 
                                                            
165 There have been countless readings of Frankenstein as a parable of the perils of technocracy. See Kim 
Hammond, “Monsters of Modernity: Frankenstein and Modern Environmentalism.” Cultural Geographies 11 
(2004):181-198; K. Back, “Frankenstein and Brave New World: Two Cautionary Myths on the Boundaries of 
Science,” History of European Ideas 20 (1995): 327-32; M. Warner, Managing Monsters: Six Myths of Our Time: 
The Reith Lectures 1994. London: Vintage, 1994; L. Winner, “Frankenstein’s Problem.” Autonomous Technology: 
Technics-out-of-control as a Theme in Political Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977. 
 269 
even see the Creature’s singularity, in large part, because of their reliance on and confidence in 
“expected regularity” as it organizes and conditions experience. Indeed, Frankenstein 
foregrounds scientific and legal institutionality so thoroughly that it is hard to justify the sort of 
ahistorical philosophical approach possible (but, as we have seen, also somewhat constricting) 
with The Borderers. Indeed, many scholars, following Marilyn Butler’s important introduction to 
the 1818 edition, have illuminated the novel’s engagement with the contentious Romantic-era 
scientific debates regarding the nature of life.166 And this is true even as Butler has persuasively 
demonstrated that Mary Shelley worked to sublimate or even efface the novel’s suggestive 
materialism in subsequent editions and reframe Victor’s work as more alchemic than chemical. 
Here I want to focus on Shelley’s evident investments in legal institutionality inspired, in large 
part, by her father’s philosophical and literary work and to help clarify the novel’s complicated 
engagement with contemporary legal debates. I intend to show that Shelley increasingly worked 
to foreground and complicate these engagements with legal institutionality in later editions, and 
to fold them in to Victor’s horror as dissonant and difficult counter note. And I want to argue that 
this counter note is culled from increasing anxieties the reliability of “circumstantial evidence” 
— or, as it was more sympathetically called at the time, “presumptive proof.”  Put schematically, 
I want to examine how the novel sets Victor’s hubristic “presumption” against this form of 
“presumptive” proof, which Victor seems variously critical of and complicit with: blinded by his 
own confidence in his ability to understand its nature or assess its reliability. 
With this strong emphasis on contemporary legal contexts, I am following Bridget 
Marshall’s recent suggestion that the “legal preoccupations of the Gothic novel” should not be 
treated as broad response to “nature of justice” but should rather “be traced to contemporary 
anxieties about the nature of justice and to specific legal challenges in the evolving Common 
Law system” (Marshall 2).167 I am also following to some extent Marshall’s stronger suggestion 
the Gothic novel may be fruitfully approached as “kind of legal framework” (1) itself whose 
various stories, “embedded letters, documents, and diaries become ‘evidence’ in a trial presided 
                                                            
166 See Butler, “Introduction” in Frankenstein: The 1818 Text. London: William Pickering, 1993: ix-li. For other 
treatments of the scientific contexts of the novel, see Anne Mellor’s “Frankenstein, Racial Science, and the Yellow 
Peril” and Liggins, “The Medical Gaze and the Female Corpse: Looking at Bodies in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein.” 
167For Marshall’s reading of Frankenstein in this context, see “Questioning the Evidence of Bodies and Texts in 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein” in The Transatlantic Gothic Novel and the Law, 1790-1860: 65-90. Of Frankenstein, 
Marshall suggests that the “most compelling horror portrayed in the novel is the monster of the legal system, which 
is very much a real entity” (66). 
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over by the reader” (2). Here I will be concerned less with how this legal framework structures 
Frankenstein as a whole, but how such a framework does appear to shape the events surrounding 
Justine’s trial to give that episode the feel of a self-contained, pointed, but also finally 
complicated critique of legal institutionality. Self-contained not only because Justine’s trial 
seems to be in some sense preliminary and collateral to the novel’s plot but because the name 
“Justine” seems to announce the episode’s status as a stand-alone examination of the failure of 
legal justice — and, more specifically, the evils of wrongful conviction, of forced confession, 
and of circumstantial evidence. Pointed because the polemical and negative character of this 
critique seems, from one perspective, unmistakable and unqualified. But finally complicated 
because the critique is narrated through Victor’s compromised voice, and the cool, constructive 
confidence and sense of intellectual probity with which Victor offers this critique is marked as 
problematic, set in relief to the hotter registers of both Victor’s suppressed psychological turmoil 
and Elizabeth’s hotter anxiety. 
The best way to observe the attention the novel devotes to this critique is to consider how 
Justine’s trial draws from and elaborates on an early trial scene from William Godwin’s Caleb 
Williams. As many critics have noted, Godwin’s novel works as a kind of architectonic informing 
Frankenstein; Shelley even dedicates Frankenstein not to her father by name but to the “author 
of Caleb Williams.” Caleb Williams similarly centers on the wrongful conviction of working 
poor, the Hawkinses, for murdering a member of the leisure class, the malicious Tyrrel. Both 
trials turn on the damning presence of circumstantial evidence. Both scenes function formally as 
preliminary to the novel’s plot: they represent instance of collateral damage whose injustice is 
summarily discarded for the elaborate and amplifying drama, left painfully and even frustrating 
unresolved (especially. But, whereas Caleb Williams does not clarify the Hawkinses’ innocence 
until well into the second volume, Frankenstein immediately affords Victor and the reader.  In 
Frankenstein, however, the reader is afforded omniscience fairly early — with access to Justine 
and information about her confession, with Victor’s premonitions. The wrongful verdict comes 
after and not before the reader gains this knowledge about Justine, as a pessimistic rejoinder not 
only to Victor’s professed confidence in the reliability of the legal system but also to Victor’s 
more thorough, passionate procedure of rational doubt (which discovered Justine’s false 
confession). The reader in this way occupies a critical passivity that mirrors Victor’s: the readers 
observe and, with Victor, ruminates philosophically on the tragic miscarriage of judgment, 
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without an ability to intervene significantly. Similarly, in Caleb Williams, the mysterious 
appearance of the murder weapon near the Hawkinses’ farm is never completely addressed or 
explained, whereas in Frankenstein the creature presently and thoroughly explains how he 
planted William’s locket on Justine in his first tête-à-tête with Victor. Finally, Frankenstein 
representation of the maliciousness of institutional structures is more pronounced than Caleb 
Williams. Rather than simply revolve around the false confidence and tragic complacency of 
judges, Frankenstein also introduces a conniving nun to force Justine’s confession.  
The overall effect of these formal changes is Frankenstein’s critique of legal 
institutionality a more concentrated character than Caleb. Even as the episode points up multiple 
sites of failure — the nun, the judges, but also Victor himself, these failures have a more 
meaningful coherence than the more dispersed, ambiguous — or at least, unarticulated — 
failures in Caleb Williams. Its distributed network of failures is traced thoroughly and 
convincingly by Victor’s acute intellect; and this gives the critique a more complete or total 
character: it aims it at legal system it traces at large more than any particular actor. Even the 
nun’s more salient maliciousness seems to be different only in degree and not in kind from the 
judges’ complacency and oversight. All seem inspired by the same desire to bring the case to a 
confident resolution. This systematic critique of is not left implicit but voiced explicitly by Victor 
following Justine’s conviction and execution. Upon returning home, Victor cynically relates to 
Elizabeth that “it is decided as you may have expected; all judges had rather that ten innocent 
should suffer, than that one guilty should escape” (1818 66). The line is an ironic inversion of the 
conservative common law dictum, often attributed to William Blackstone, that it is better for ten 
guilty to escape rather than one innocent should suffer. Here, Victor appears to mock the kind of 
logic of organic immunization that we have already seen espoused in Paley’s political treatise 
and hijacked and perverted by Rivers to win the confidence of Mortimer’s borderers.  
The additional structure and direction of Frankenstein’s critique seems intended to clarify 
and reinforce the critique of legal institutionality implicit in Godwin’s Caleb Williams, but in 
some sense these gestures towards formal closure rob the critique of its energy. Where 
Frankenstein resolves the indeterminacies and ambiguities in Caleb Williams to put a finer point 
on its critique, Caleb Williams seems to retain and redirect them to suspenseful, narrative ends in 
a way that makes its critique more probing and difficult. Complicating indeterminacies are not 
simply left unresolved in Caleb Williams: they are more widely and unevenly distributed in a 
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way that muddies what emerge as clear moral distinctions in Frankenstein. In Frankenstein, for 
instance, the victim of the murder, William, as well as Justine, appear wholly and unquestionably 
innocent, and the nun palpably evil. Yet, in Caleb Williams, it is the victim of the murder, Tyrrel, 
who is palpably disgusting, and from the beginning the reader’s loyalties lie with Tyrrel’s 
murderer, Falkland. Indeed, Caleb’s loyalties remain with Falkland not only after Caleb 
discovers Falkland’s guilt, but even after Falkland systemically destroys Caleb’s wider character 
and credibility. As a result of these crossed signals, Caleb Williams generates a more difficult and 
inconclusive interrogation. And, in some sense, Frankenstein’s efforts to make its critique more 
immediately and definitively legible for its reader rob its critique of these more negative 
energies, extinguishing them by shaping them so that they arrive at a clear moral conclusion. 
Then again, we can disrupt the apparent closure and legibility of the Justine episode fairly 
easy by interrogating Victor’s problematic role as critique. We can begin this by considering the 
disparity between Victor’s final pessimism and the initial (and misplaced) optimism in the legal 
institution it displaces. Upon returning to Switzerland and conducting his own conclusive review 
of the case, Victor conveys that he “no fear, therefore, that any circumstantial evidence could be 
brought forward strong enough to convict her” (78). This line remains in both editions, but what 
follows changes in a way that seems designed to emphasize this disparity. In the 1818 edition, his 
investigation gives Victor a more general peace of mind: “[I]n this assurance,” he writes, “I 
calmed myself, expecting the trial with eagerness, but without prognosticating an evil result” 
(60) But, in the 1831 edition, Shelley replaces these lines with others that bring the convenience 
and self-interest of Victor’s optimism into focus. Victor instead reads the lack of evidence against 
Justine to relieve him of his responsibility to relate what he knows or suspects of the case. The 
1831 reads:  
My tale was not one to announce publicly; its astounding horror would be looked 
upon as madness by the vulgar. Did any one exist, except I, the creator, who would 
believe, unless his senses convinced him, in the existence of the living monument of 
presumption and rash ignorance which I had let loose upon the world? (78). 
 
The text cleverly elides the logical connection between this observation and the previous one 
concerning circumstantial evidence, but the implication is that Victor is preoccupied with the 
question of whether he has a responsibility to relate what he knows. The difference between 
these two version is difficult to assess. The 1831 edition surely registers Victor’s sense of his 
own responsibility the 1818 edition does not. But it is unclear if this recognition finally works to 
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increase or decrease Victor’s credibility. In either context, Victor’s optimism looks not only 
misplaced but suspiciously convenient. Victor justifies his silence and inaction simultaneously on 
the basis of the incomprehensible singularity of his story and his confidence that legal procedure 
will discover and account for this singularity. But, if Victor accepts that no one could possibly 
believe his story, how could he also anticipate the judges to detect its irregularities? Victor’s 
knowledge of Justine’s innocence seems to come from the thoroughness of his own constructive 
skeptical investigation: but it could just as easily come from his special knowledge of the case 
which is just as singular as the Creature’s existence or as idiosyncratic as his testimony about the 
Creature’s existence would appear. During the trial, Victor notes that “several strange facts 
combined against her, which might have staggered any one who had not such proof of her 
innocence as I had” (62). These suspicions seem more justified once we learn that Victor was 
never all that confident in the judges’ ability.  
 This is one, suspicious way to square Victor’s early optimism about the law with his final 
pessimism. A second, more sympathetic reading comes from considering the novel’s explicit 
interest in circumstantial evidence. The skepticism about circumstantial evidence that the novel 
projects — ironically within the narrative and tragically without — seems to be slightly 
anachronistic, if we take the novel to be set well within the eighteenth-century past. As 
Alexander Welsh notes in Strong Representations, though by the early nineteenth century 
“circumstances were no longer so readily identified with conviction” (18), in the mid-eighteenth 
century (and beyond) circumstantial evidence enjoyed a privileged evidentiary status: “a 
concurrence of well authenticated circumstances” — also known as a “violent presumption” — 
was seen to “compose[] a stronger ground of assurance than positive [i.e. external] testimony, 
unconfirmed by circumstances, usually affords” (16). Of course, the novel seems interested in 
dramatizing the inability of this skepticism to actually counteract or correct the risks of 
circumstantial evidence. But the novel seems to want to portray any confidence in the efficacy of 
this skepticism against these risks as itself an egregious form of presumption, one that tends to 
lay blame on its failure on individual actors rather than on the uncertainty of the procedure more 
broadly. 
 To see this logic, consider the critical thrust of the anonymous tract, “Theory of 
Presumptive Proof” (1815), which remarks on the “general prejudice, which at present prevails 
for circumstantial evidence” (48), in which “doctrine of circumstantial evidence [has been] 
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hastily applied, by loose analogies and incidents, foreign to the intrinsic conditions of the 
subject” (45). What is notable here is that the author does not relinquish a faith in the practice of 
circumstantial evidence itself or the value of the “intrinsic conditions of the subject” (45). 
Rather, he is confident enough in the reliability of these procedures to discipline the “hasty” 
individual application. And this is true even as the author traces this haste to a general 
psychological disposition which “readily supposes a greater order and conformity in things than 
it finds” even as “many things in nature are singular, and extremely dissimilar” (48). For the 
author, while this psychological disposition maybe universal, succumbing to it is only 
characteristic of “weak men” who are always “the first to assent and to admit of loose analogies, 
imperfect resemblances, and inferences without proof” (48). More disciplined minds know how 
to “search for discriminations in subjects nearly similar, and are slow in yielding their assent to 
first impressions” (48).  
 Victor would seem to have a disciplined enough mind to resist circumstantial evidence. 
And yet the effectiveness of Victor’s own constructive skeptical procedure — his own reasonable 
doubt — somehow causes him to overestimate the capability of others’ reasonable doubt. In this 
way, his confidence emerges as a different kind of “presumption and rash ignorance,” one that is 
mirrored in the judge’s own overconfidence in their constructive skeptical abilities. An officer of 
the court tells Victor that Justine’s confession was “hardly required in so glaring a case, but I am 
glad of it…none of our judges like to condemn a criminal upon circumstantial evidence, be it 
ever so decisive” (65). The officer’s unease with circumstantial evidence is ironic, for in this 
context Justine’s confession itself — as well as her confusion throughout the proceedings — 
emerges as a form of circumstantial evidence. When these precautions against circumstantial 
evidence fail, Victor’s own confidence makes him inclined to see the failure of justice as finally 
not systemic deficiency of the legal system itself or the constructive skeptical procedures it 
promotes, but rather the moral and intellectual failures of individual judges.  
In World at Risk, Ulrich Beck argues that Frankenstein exists at the cusp of a new literary 
vision of “risk” in which risk is “no longer…the existential hazardous of a precarious human 
condition forsaken by God” but in which “modern social institutions” such as the law and 
scientific practice take “centre stage” (6). For Beck, this literary history of risk works in “parallel 
though contrasting ways” with the history of risk in the “social sciences” (6). Where the social 
scientific places increasing confidence in the description and rationalization of the risks these 
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institutions present, the literary considers how this rationalization merely foists the 
“impenetrability, omnipresence, and undecidedability of risk” generated by these institutions “on 
the individual” (6). In one sense, Beck’s observation clarifies Victor’s tendency to blame the 
judges rather than the institution itself. But, more interestingly, it comments on Victor’s own 
psychological turmoil — which seems compounded in some sense by his faith in rationalization. 
For Victor’s overconfidence is not different in kind than the judges. They prove too confident in 
its own procedural practices — not to mention to committed to a broader imperative regulate and 
arbitrate experience through the rule of law and the distribution of justice — to detect or manage 
singularity — in this case, not only the Creature’s being but Justine’s individuality (something 
that the 1818 version takes pain to develop with a historical sketch). Instead, the judges believe 
Justine’s motivation to be petty theft, an impulsiveness that cuts against any sympathetic 
attachments she may have with William or which discredits that sympathetic attachment 
suspiciously as only ostensible, conspiratorial. Her individuality is effaced by a more sinister 
stereotype. 
The effect of the novel’s critique is not simply to dismiss the value of circumstantial 
evidence, but to interrogate any overconfidence in the ability to manage its risks. What 
differentiates Elizabeth’s response from Victor’s is, for instance, where Victor seems to have 
successfully internalized a healthy suspicion of circumstantial evidence, Elizabeth struggles to 
resist its force. In this way, Elizabeth is aligned with Victor’s father, who initially doubts 
Justine’s guilt until “several circumstances came out, that have almost forced conviction upon 
us” (59). Victor’s father and Elizabeth are responding to a different constructive skeptical 
imperative than Victor. These different orientations towards circumstantial evidence inform 
Victor and Elizabeth’s different reactions to Justine’s wrongful conviction. We can measure 
Victor’s constructive skeptical investments by contrasting his cooler response to Elizabeth’s 
more thorough anxiety about the case. While Victor’s critique reaches for indignation, 
Elizabeth’s skepticism reaches an existential intensity: 
When I reflect…on the miserable death of Justine Moritz, I no longer see the 
world and its works as they before appeared to me…Alas! Victor, when falsehood 
can look so like the truth, who can assure themselves of certain happiness? I feel 
as if I were walking on the edge of a precipice, towards which thousands are 
crowding, and endeavoring to plunge me into the abyss. (74)  
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Elizabeth’s cry moves well beyond doubts about the legal actors but ascends to doubts about the 
possibility of obtaining any assurance in an uncertain world “when falsehood can look so like the 
truth” (74). the novel’s critique would be more accurately ethical, not epistemic: less a comment 
about the problem of uncertainty itself but more about the problematic ways institutions attempt 
to minimize the risks uncertainty poses to the ends it wants to pursue in an effort to attain those 
ends. As Elizabeth’s quote suggests, the problem is not of epistemic but moral assurance: not 
how to obtain “certain” knowledge with which to make judgments — which would be 
impossible — but how to “assure certain happiness” that the actions we take in a fundamentally 
uncertain world are ethically sound. Victor, as a constructive skeptic, seems unable to raise (or at 
least perform) these more existential questions.  
This is not to say that Victor does not experience psychological turmoil. But it’s nature 
seems more compromised than Justine’s and, in any case, it is exacerbated through 
misrecognition. Victor’s father thinks Victor is immaturely lingering over the horror of William 
and Justine’s deaths. He implores Victor to move on: “[I]is it not a duty to the survivors, that we 
should refrain from augmenting their unhappiness by an appearance of immoderate grief? It is 
also a duty owed to yourself; for excessive sorrow prevents improvement or enjoyment, or even 
the discharge of daily usefulness, without which no man is fit for society” (72). Victor’s father 
offers another version of constructive skeptical indignation. For Victor, the advice was “good” 
but “totally inapplicable to my case” (72). Again Victor’s knowledge of the monster’s singularity 
isolates him, and Victor’s father’s misrecognition of Victor’s emotional state reinforces Victor’s 
isolation. Elizabeth too notes that “I am not so wretched as you are” (74), her misrecognition of 
Victor’s “wretchedness” also marking it as a kind of deviancy. Victor’s constructive skepticism, 
once comforting, increasingly looks more problematic. Victor’s existential horror up is somehow 
compounded by his institutional faith in constructive skepticism. We see Shelley’s novel raise the 
question of how the unfamiliar and the emergent, figured in the ranging of the Creature, 
undermines the legitimacy of verisimilitude as a response to uncertainty and, in turn, makes any 
assurance of “certain happiness” not only uncertain but largely contingent on an adequate 





6.3 Caleb’s Unreasonable Doubt 
 William Godwin’s novel Caleb Williams (1794) offers a compelling interrogation of the 
relation of doubt and desire, by which I mean not only how doubt could be said to produce or be 
attended by different forms of desire (for instance, the desire to resolve doubt into certainty), but 
also how different forms of desire condition different forms of doubt, and, even more strikingly, 
how doubt itself constitutes a form of desire in the novel. Since the novel’s exploration of doubt 
also focuses on how doubt organizes legal inquiry (for example, into Tyrrel’s murder or 
Falkland’s guilt), I also want to consider how the novel’s treatment of doubt is in conversation 
with a form of legal doubt that, by the late eighteenth century, had emerged as a central strategy 
within legal epistemology for addressing the problem of legal judgment in the face of imperfect 
evidence. Indeed, that rational, procedural form of doubt remains crystallized in the familiar 
“beyond reasonable doubt” evidentiary standard, which first emerged in common law practice in 
the late eighteenth-century and which continues to organize legal proof in American criminal 
law. Much has already been written about the novel’s explicit thematization of legal judgment as 
well as its incorporation of various legal frameworks—for instance, the frameworks of testimony 
and trial—within its narrative form.168 Given the central role of doubt in the legal theory of the 
period, the novel’s emphasis on the role of doubt in assessing Falkland’s case could be regarded 
as part and parcel of its appropriation of this broader legal framework. However, in this essay I 
intend to concentrate on how the novel’s insistence on the relation of doubt and desire ultimately 
works to subvert this form of legal doubt by exposing the desires that condition it and thus 
upending assumptions regarding its disinterested and reasonable character. 
To begin to develop these claims, we might turn to Godwin’s suggestive remark in his 
1831 advertisement to St. Leon that it was, in part, “the state of doubt in which the reader might 
for a time be as to the truth of [Caleb’s] charges” against Falkland that made Caleb Williams “a 
narrative of no uncommon interest” (St. Leon v). It is a remark that testifies as much to the 
centrality of the trial framework to the novel’s form as it does to the centrality of procedural 
doubt within that legal framework. And yet Godwin does not assume the reader’s state of doubt 
to reflect the kind of disinterestedness we might expect or even demand from a judge or jury 
member reviewing Falkland’s case. Rather, it is a sign of the reader’s “uncommon”—that is, 
                                                            
168For recent treatments of Caleb Williams in relation to eighteenth-century legal theory and practice, see Marshall 
27–64, Grossman 37–38, and Hoeveler and Jenkins 327. 
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extraordinary or even excessive—interest in Falkland’s case. This is doubt as suspense, not 
suspension. It heats up rather than cools down judgment. In this sense, the character of the 
reader’s doubt could be said to have a closer affinity with Caleb’s doubts and suspicions about 
Falkland; it reproduces Caleb’s doubt-as-suspense.169 At the same time, however, the reader’s 
doubt also appears to constitute a negative recoil from Caleb’s suspicions. Here again Godwin’s 
retrospective remark is suggestive since Godwin assumes the reader’s doubt to center on the 
“truth of [the] charges” put forward by Caleb rather than directly on the facts of Falkland’s 
case—or, in Godwin’s terms from the same advertisement, not on Falkland’s “atrocious crime” 
itself but on the “annoyance [Falkland] suffers from the immeasurable and ever-wakeful 
curiosity of a raw youth” (v). In other words, it is a question of the merit or grounds of Caleb’s 
suspicion, a question that includes but also exceeds the question of Falkland’s actual guilt. 
Although Godwin seems to assume that the reader’s doubts only exist “for a time” (presumably 
until Falkland confesses), the novel’s ethical difficulty and sophistication would seem to hinge 
on the fact that the reader’s doubts about the “truth” of Caleb’s charges – again, in this sense of 
their warrant, of the legitimacy of Caleb’s grounds for making them – remain long after the 
factual certainty of Falkland’s guilt is established. The reader’s doubt does not ultimately register 
a dispute about the facts of Falkland’s case but rather a dissatisfaction with the moral 
ambivalence of Caleb’s doubt. On one hand, it seems evident that Caleb’s doubt about 
Falkland’s innocence is hardly grounded in a disinterested desire for legal justice. Instead, his 
doubt seems grounded in an excessive, indeterminate form of desire. On the other hand, Caleb’s 
doubt, however compromised by desire, somehow succeeds in discovering Falkland’s guilt 
where the supposedly disinterested procedural doubt of the legal system fails. In this sense, the 
reader’s dissatisfaction with Caleb’s doubt is compounded by an equal dissatisfaction with the 
legal system, whose form of legal doubt appears no less compromised. To complicate matters 
even further, the affinities between the reader’s and Caleb’s doubt make it so that any 
dissatisfaction the reader may have with Caleb’s doubt also amounts to a negative recoil from 
her own doubt-as-suspense, a recognition of how this affective excess similarly compromises 
any claim the reader has to disinterested judgment. This compounding dissatisfaction should be 
seen as an emergent effect and instrument of the novel’s negativity, one which turns doubt upon 
                                                            
169Uphaus similarly observes that Caleb’s curiosity “excites” and “expresses the desires of the reader’s curiosity” 
(281) and functions as “a psychological attribute by which the reader is lured into reenacting Caleb’s processes of 
mind” (282).  
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itself to interrogate a certain faith in doubt’s reliability as a disinterested ground for judgment 
under uncertainty. 
 
6.3.1 Constructive Skepticism and “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” 
While the novel’s pursuit of doubt as desire engages most directly with the legal form of 
“reasonable doubt” I have described above, it should also be seen as engaging with and 
commenting on a more widespread embrace of rational skeptical procedures as a viable response 
to the problem of judgment under uncertainty in the period. As Barbara Shapiro notes in her 
discussion of eighteenth-century legal theory, because legal theorists assumed a fundamental 
similarity between legal and everyday reasoning, eighteenth-century legal epistemology should 
not be understood as distinct from the general epistemology of the period. Rather it should be 
viewed largely as an attempt to apply the most current epistemological theory to specific legal 
problems (Shapiro, Beyond Reasonable Doubt 19, 38). As Shapiro observes, long before the 
phrase “reasonable doubt” emerged in the common law court, it formed the cornerstone of a 
broad epistemological program that united philosophers and divines of various stripes around the 
premise that, despite epistemological uncertainty, “reasonable men, employing their senses and 
rational faculties, could derive truths that they would have no reason to doubt” (Beyond 
Reasonable Doubt 7).  
It is specifically this conservative character of constructive skepticism and how it 
conditions the character of legal doubt adopted within eighteenth-century legal theory that I want 
to examine in this section as a necessary philosophical background for understanding the novel’s 
approach to doubt. This conservatism is inscribed in the demand that legal doubt must be 
“reasonable” doubt. It is a qualification that reflects constructive skepticism’s organizing 
assumption regarding the qualified value of rational skepticism as a response to judgment under 
uncertainty. On one hand, the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard reflects the recognition that 
an actively skeptical posture helps reduce the risks of factual error and wrongful conviction in 
legal judgment. On the other hand, the standard reflects the recognition that, since legal facts are 
always subject to some degree of uncertainty, at a certain point doubt must lose its instrumental 
value and become an impediment to legal judgment. Allowing some doubt helps reduce the risk 
of wrongful conviction; allowing any doubt makes it impossible to convict at all. As such, the 
“beyond reasonable doubt” standard attempts to strike a balance between, on the one hand, a 
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desire to reduce the risks of uncertainty and, on the other, a desire to preserve the possibility of 
legal judgment despite the risks that inevitably attend uncertainty. It achieves this balance by 
positing a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of doubt, between “reasonable” 
doubts that are recognized within the legal process and “unreasonable” doubts that, for various 
reasons, fail to qualify. The distinction aims to separate “plausible” from “merely possible” 
doubt, “reasonable” doubt from “any doubt at all,” and, most importantly for our purposes, 
“private” or “interested” forms of doubt from “public” or “disinterested” forms of doubt. 
Though these distinctions appear largely normative in retrospect, they were regarded as 
descriptive in the period and, along with constructive skeptical arguments for the sufficiency for 
“moral certainty,” depended more fundamentally on a descriptive epistemological distinction 
between two kinds of knowledge, “probable” and “demonstrative.” “Demonstrative knowledge” 
entailed propositions that could be proved by logical demonstration and, thus, produced an 
“absolute” or “demonstrative” certainty that necessitated assent. Since probable knowledge could 
never admit of this level of demonstrative certainty, the evidentiary standards for proof in 
probable knowledge had to be adjusted to reflect the intuition that one could gain sufficient, if 
incomplete, degrees of certainty to justify practical action by ascending a graduated scale of 
belief based on degrees of “moral evidence.” In this sense, degrees of evidence could be 
correlated to relative degrees of belief ranging from absolute doubt or disbelief up to opinion 
and, finally, to full confidence and conviction. “Moral certainty” existed at the top of this 
evidentiary hierarchy and was assumed to provide a functional equivalent to demonstrative 
certainty in the realm of contingent fact. It was reserved for propositions that would be 
“unreasonable” to doubt despite any theoretical level of uncertainty. 
 Intuitions about the sufficiency of moral certainty were developed with reference to 
widely-observed and fairly uncontroversial natural regularities (e.g., the rising and setting of the 
sun or the ebb and flow of the tides) or to widely attested historical or geographical facts (e.g., 
that there was a historical figure named Julius Caesar or that a city called Rome existed). But the 
eighteenth-century legal theorist had little reservations about applying the label of moral 
certainty to less regular, more controversial legal facts. Eighteenth-century legal treatises readily 
adopted the basic epistemological distinction between moral and demonstrative knowledge to 
develop a normative account of evidentiary standards. Treatise writers approached the 
epistemological distinctions as if addressing an audience that would be either unfamiliar with the 
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nature of moral evidence or somehow reluctant to accept the sufficiency of moral certainty 
relative to demonstrative certainty. Similarly, treatise writers tended to treat orientations towards 
uncertainty that challenged the sufficiency of moral certainty as irrational and pathological. Such 
orientations reflected an excessive and unreasonable desire for certainty that failed to grasp the 
very nature of probable knowledge, much less the exigency and necessity of practical action 
under uncertainty. They fixated on doubts that were theoretical instead of practical, scrupulous 
instead of significant, matters of private rather than public concern.  
To enjoin readers to accept the sufficiency of moral certainty, treatise writers could depict 
the relation between demonstrative and moral certainty in various ways and to various effects. In 
Essay Upon the Law of Evidence (1789), for instance, the jurist John Morgan stresses the 
functional equivalence of moral and demonstrative certainty to the point of identity, asking 
readers to accept the truth of legal testimony under oath with the same confidence as if it had 
been demonstratively proven. For Morgan, even though “human testimony, i.e. evidence given 
by one man to another, can never produce certainty,” nonetheless, in matters where a witness is 
under oath “[a mind] must acquiesce [to a witness’s testimony] therein as from a knowledge by 
demonstration, because, according to the nature of things, it ought not any longer to doubt, but to 
be nearly, if not as perfectly well satisfied, as if we of ourselves knew the fact” (5). Treatise 
writers could also stress the categorical difference of demonstrative and moral certainty in an 
effort to reinforce the concept of sufficient though incomplete evidence. This latter strategy 
generally necessitated pathologizing the inability to perceive this difference as unreasonable and 
irrational. As we have seen with Gambier in Chapter 2, the desire to attain degrees of certainty 
thought to exceed “reasonable doubt” was generally treated in this manner as an epistemic 
category error, a refusal to accept the basic epistemic conditions governing the evaluation of 
matters of fact—what Gambier refers to as the “nature of the thing”—rather than, say, a 
legitimate concern or anxiety about the limits of practical judgment established by uncertainty. 
Indeed, it would be possible to show that similar epistemological distinctions continue to 
organize the concept of “reasonable doubt” in legal theory. For instance, in the 1850 case 
Commonwealth v. Webster still regarded by many legal theorists as the most lucid attempt to 
define the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, Massachusetts Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Lemuel Shaw characterizes reasonable doubt as “. . . not mere possible doubt; because every 
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thing [sic] relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible 
or imaginary doubt” (qtd. in Shealy 234 n. 40). 
If Gambier’s account reflects a pathology of doubt developed in response to the threat 
posed to legal judgment within rational skepticism itself, then William Paley’s reflections on 
legal doubt in The Principles of Political and Moral Philosophy (1785) present an alternative 
skeptical pathology developed in response to a separate tradition of theological skepticism which 
perceived doubt as a sign of uneasy conscience and, as such, recommended withholding 
judgment in the face of any uncertainty. Unlike the rationalist pathology sketched above, which 
focuses on reasonable expectations of certainty as informed by epistemology, this alternative 
pathology focuses on how private concerns of conscience unreasonably interfere with public and 
civic duties to uphold and execute the law. This pathology was characterized as the “scrupulous 
conscience” which, as Shapiro explains, was regarded as “a troubled or diseased condition” of an 
individual “reluctant to act even after doubts had been resolved” (“Changing Language” 267). 
Thus, Paley laments the civil disservice performed by a jury member paralyzed by “an over-
strained scrupulousness, or weak timidity” which “holds it the part of a safe conscience not to 
condemn any man, whilst there exists the minutest possibility of his innocence” (391). For Paley, 
such private reservations threatened the very efficacy of the legal system itself, where that 
efficacy was conceived largely in terms of its ability to root out and convict criminals despite 
uncertainty: “[W]hen certain rules of adjudication must be persued [sic], when certain degrees of 
credibility must be accepted, in order to reach the crimes with which the public are infested; 
courts of justice should not be deterred from the application of these rules, by every suspicion or 
danger, or by the mere possibility of confounding the innocent with the guilty” (393). Indeed, in 
his 2008 study of the origins of the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard, James Q. Whitman 
draws on this figure of the “scrupulous conscience” to support his revisionist argument that the 
standard was developed—at least at first—not to promote sound evidentiary proof practices but 
rather to provide “moral comfort” for jury members anxious about the eternal consequences of 
an error in uncertain, temporal judgment. For Whitman, the reasonable doubt standard was 
“originally a theological doctrine” which responded to “religiously motivated reluctance to 
convict” (4) by “reassur[ing] jurors that they could convict the defendant without risking their 
own salvation, so long as their doubts about guilt were not ‘reasonable’” (3). In this sense, 
 283 
Whitman argues, the standard was “not originally designed to make it more difficult for jurors to 
convict”—as we assume it to be today—but “to make conviction easier” (4). 
 These alternative pathologies should sufficiently demonstrate how the concept of 
“reasonable doubt”—though ostensibly formulated as a means of alleviating the problems of 
uncertainty—is also informed more fundamentally by a conservative desire to preserve the 
possibility of legal judgment under uncertainty against the threats posed by more radical forms of 
skepticism, whether those threats are perceived as coming from within the rational tradition itself 
or from outside that tradition in the form of theologically-inflected skepticism. These pathologies 
should also illustrate how the concept of “reasonable doubt” responds to this threat by 
normalizing a circumscribed form of “reasonable” doubt that reflects these conservative 
assumptions and, in turn, pathologizing other orientations towards uncertainty that do not reflect 
these conservative assumptions as excessive and illegitimate. With these observations, we are 
now in a position to consider how the novel’s exploration of doubt and desire—and, more 
precisely, doubt-as-desire –responds to this conservatism informing “reasonable doubt.” 
 
6.3.2 Before Skepticism: Caleb Williams and Unreasonable Doubt 
The novel’s insistence on the relation of doubt and desire can be read as an attempt to 
expose how the desire to preserve the possibility of legal judgment against uncertainty conditions 
the form of procedural, rational doubt adopted by the legal system and, ultimately, circumscribes 
the kinds of inquiry it can perform. The novel’s pessimistic depiction of the inability of the legal 
process to, if not convict Falkland for Tyrrel’s murder, at least save the Hawkinses from 
wrongful conviction seems constructed to raise doubts about the ability of procedural doubt to 
identify and assess risks associated with factual uncertainty or, more provocatively, to achieve 
anything more than preserve the appearance of the legitimacy of the legal process itself. In this 
sense, the novel asks whether legal doubt is grounded, as it professes, in a desire to assess and 
respond to the risks of uncertainty or, instead, grounded in a more basic desire to preserve the 
possibility of legal judgment under uncertainty itself. Further, the novel seems particularly 
invested in exposing how the normative distinction between “reasonable” and “unreasonable” 
forms of doubt does not necessarily reflect a legitimate response to the risks of uncertainty but 
rather functions as a technique for rationalizing the legal status quo. It is as if the novel’s 
subversive treatment of the distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” doubt aims to 
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recast that distinction as one between “legitimating” and “delegitimating” forms of doubt. 
“Legitimate” doubts are “legitimating” in the sense that they operate within the legal system to 
strengthen and legitimize the claim that it is not only possible but reasonable to perform legal 
judgments despite uncertainty, whereas “illegitimate” doubts are “delegitimating” in that they 
threaten to undermine this claim. In this context, the desire of the legal system to represent such 
doubts as illegitimate “in themselves” rather than in relation to the organizing assumptions of the 
legal system becomes an essential strategy for preserving and reinforcing the authority of the 
legal system itself. The normative distinction between reasonable and unreasonable forms of 
doubt relies, primarily, on the assumption that “unreasonable” doubts threaten the legal system 
on account of their origins in illegitimate forms of desire. But while the distinction purports to 
preserve the legal process from the pernicious influence of desire, the novel explores the chilling 
possibility that this distinction not only effectively inscribes such unreasonable desires in the 
legal process but also surreptitiously obscures or conceals this fact by directing critical attention 
towards a specter of unreasonable doubt.170 
 We can draw out these interests in the novel by considering the brief and seemingly 
irrelevant appearance of a group of skeptics in the midst of Collins’s narrative: 
. . . Hawkins and his son were tried, condemned, and afterwards executed. In the 
interval between the sentence and execution Hawkins confessed his guilt with 
many marks of compunction; though there are persons by whom this is denied; 
but I have taken some pains to enquire into the fact, and am persuaded that their 
disbelief is precipitate and groundless. (Godwin Caleb Williams 174) 
 
The passage is one of the few times Collins breaks from his task of narrating the events 
surrounding Tyrrel’s murder to perform the task of validating his narrative. It is significant that 
this task of validation takes the specific form of a procedural skeptical inquiry. Collins doubles 
back to review and confirm the evidence for Hawkins’s confession in the face of skeptical 
objections, in a manner that, though technically extralegal, seems intended to mirror and extend 
                                                            
170I should register my distance from the novel’s position here. I concur with Gregg Crane’s assessment that “[t]he 
impossibility of absolute certainty does not mean that all judgments are merely arbitrary exercises of power. In 
terms of their truth content, all narratives are not equal. Some are more plausible than others” (802). What I do 
intend to draw out, however, is what I take to be the novel’s deep moral ambiguity which, as I have suggested, arises 
in large part from its formal indeterminacies. And here I follow Tilottama Rajan’s important readings of these 
indeterminacies as characteristic features of “Romantic narratives,” which contrary to the common perception of the 
Victorian Novel, are not disciplinary but exploratory, disruptive in character. See Rajan, “Wollstonecraft and 
Godwin: Reading the Secrets of the Political Novel.” Studies in Romanticism 27.2 (1988): 221-51 and Romantic 
Narratives (Johns Hopkins, 2010).  
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the careful legal procedures performed to absolve Falkland of any involvement in Tyrrel’s 
murder. Despite their minor presence, these skeptics function as an essential feature of Collins’s 
skeptical investigation. They enable Collins to demonstrate what Caleb calls the “uncommonly 
judicious” (166) nature of Collins’s investigation by situating his procedural application of 
reasonable doubt in productive contrast with a doubt that is marked, explicitly by Collins and 
implicitly in other respects, as unreasonable. The episode illustrates Collins’s willingness to 
entertain doubt as well as his willingness to assess and dismiss it on rational grounds: Collins 
does not dismiss the disbelievers reflexively but only after he has “taken some pains to enquire 
into the fact” and is “persuaded” that their doubts are “precipitate and groundless.” The figure 
capitalizes further on the suggestive contrast established between Collins’s dynamic performance 
of a procedural doubt and the skeptics’ static doubt and, likewise, between Collins’s singularity 
and the skeptics’ collectivity. It is not just Collins’s independent inquiry but his very 
independence of mind that is set in relief with the mob-like collective judgment of the skeptics. 
This is true even as Collins’s performance of intellectual autonomy manages to disable the 
reader’s own critical capacities by omitting any specific content that readers might use to 
perform their own assessments of these skeptical doubts. The skeptics, along with the nature of 
their reservations, remain unnamed (do they deny that Hawkins ever confessed or that he was 
ever guilty, or both?). They are a stage prop in Collins’s performance of reasonableness, a 
rhetorical aporia that allows Collins to acknowledge and then authoritatively dismiss any doubt 
about the legitimacy of Hawkins’s execution. 
The episode should sufficiently illustrate the novel’s explicit interest in what I will refer 
to as the “rhetoric of reasonableness” deployed by constructive skepticism. And, similarly, 
observing the interpretive instability of this episode as the novel progresses should illustrate how 
the novel wields irony to undermine the authority of this rhetoric. Of course, whatever authority 
the reader grants Collins will be largely undermined by his later revelation that his judgment of 
the case had been influenced by his fear of retribution from Falkland and, more to the point, his 
desire to preserve the moral distinctions that the uncertainties of the case threaten to disrupt. “If 
you could change all my ideas, and show me that there was no criterion by which vice might be 
prevented from being mistaken for virtue,” he asks Caleb, “what benefit would arise from that?” 
(Godwin Caleb Williams 416). The question could be taken as the novel’s most concentrated 
expression of the conservative impulse I have been examining, and it affords a suggestive 
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glimpse into how the desire to preserve the possibility of legal judgment under uncertainty is 
suffused with an anxiety about the consequences of its impossibility. In this light, legal doubt 
emerges as a form of suspense that anxiously anticipates its ability not to account for uncertainty 
but to overcome it.  
But, Collins’s revelation aside, it is also true that his rhetorical deployment of the skeptics 
never quite behaves the way he intends. And the unruliness of the rhetorical figure itself suggests 
how, in the final analysis, the real instabilities and risks that attend uncertainty defy the efforts of 
constructive skepticism to contain them. Collins’s effort to validate his narrative raises 
suspicions about why it must be validated in the first place. Collins introduces the skeptics as a 
way of closing down the question of Hawkins’s confession, but they eventually mark the very 
rupture in Collins’s narrative Caleb will fixate on when formulating his own doubts about 
Hawkins’s guilt and Falkland’s innocence. Collins presumably omits the skeptics’ specific 
objections from his narrative because he believes they have no rational basis. Yet, in the light of 
Hawkins’s innocence, this omission seems to demand that readers acknowledge the ethical merit 
of the skeptics’ doubts prior to and even despite any consideration of their rational basis. 
Similarly, the skeptics’ plurality, which at first appeared to be a sign of their intellectual 
slavishness, becomes a sign of their intellectual and moral resolve—especially once we take into 
account that they are essentially the only collective body figured in the novel not under the 
absolute sway of some social superior. All told, by the novel’s end, the figure’s rhetorical 
function seems to shift from aporia to exempla, in what amounts to an ironic inversion of that 
religious genre’s tendency to introduce skeptics as counterexamples whose disbelief and its 
miserable consequences are meant to redouble the faith of both reader and author. In this 
inversion, “unreasonable” doubt as it is defined by constructive skepticism stands out as the only 
reasonable and ethical response to the risks of uncertainty. 
The critique I have developed from Collins’s episode with the skeptics should clarify the 
novel’s deep skepticism regarding the legal concept of reasonable doubt, the rhetoric of 
reasonableness it deploys, and the conservative desires that inform it. Yet, as much as Collins’s 
episode with the skeptics clarifies about the novel’s interest in “unreasonable” doubt as a 
negative response to “reasonable doubt,” it risks giving the false impression that this response 
can be neatly, clearly, or completely articulated by this critique. On the contrary, this critique 
seems to be only a side effect of a much more disruptive form of negativity pursued by the novel, 
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one which ultimately muddies whatever critical or moral clarity I have drawn from the ironies 
above. In fact, it is arguably even misleading to characterize the effects of the novel’s negativity 
as “critique,” since the procedure of rational critique we have inherited from the eighteenth 
century is animated by the very same spirit of constructive skepticism the novel calls into 
question. To see this, simply consider that Kant’s critical project, although typically framed as an 
idealist response to Hume’s skeptical empiricism, is no less a variety of skepticism itself, one 
that is distinctively conservative and therapeutic.171 This is an observation I will return to in the 
coda when I consider how the negativity Caleb Williams pursues suggests a much different 
understanding of Romanticism’s relation to skepticism than the one proposed by Stanley Cavell 
in his well-known account of Romanticism as a “response” to Kant’s settlement with 
epistemological skepticism. 
If it is misleading to characterize the novel’s negativity as critique, it is similarly 
misleading to characterize it as a form of skepticism itself, even as the novel’s negativity takes 
doubt both as its central instrument and object of inquiry. This is because the force of novel’s 
negativity seems to originate in its exploration of doubt as it exists before it hardens or stabilizes 
into skepticism. Indeed, the novel seems to resist any conflation of skepticism and doubt in an 
effort to preserve the unruly aspects of doubt that get lost once doubt is disciplined by 
skepticism. That is, if skepticism can be characterized as a directed, instrumental application of 
doubt to specific intellectual or epistemic problems, then I would argue that the novel pursues a 
form of doubt that lacks this instrumentality or directedness: a form of doubt that is inchoate, 
marked by affective excess rather than intellectual restraint, hot rather than cold.172 In the 
                                                            
171After all, Kant’s aim is to reassure us that we can remain confident in our ability to employ our rational faculties 
to attain reliable knowledge about the phenomenal world of appearances as long as we accept our inability to know 
the world beyond appearances, in itself, as noumena. 
172In  his essayistic treatments of belief and doubt, Godwin does attempt to inject desire into rational skepticism, and 
briefly surveying the problems he encounters should illustrate how rational skepticism cannot accommodate the 
examination of doubt and desire the novel pursues. In “Essay of Skepticism,” for instance, Godwin works against 
the common assumption that skepticism must be “necessarily allied to coldness of character” and insists instead that 
skeptical inquiry must be imbued with an “ardour and animation” located between cold “indifference” and 
overheated “enthusiasm” (308). Even as the skeptic must be “careful not to suffer a predilection for one side of a 
question” (302) he is nonetheless “by no means inclined to hold himself in a state of equal indifference to all 
opinions” (304). Yet, Godwin seems well aware of problems of asserting the influence of interest or passion into 
rational skepticism in this way, a fact which comes through in his more downbeat essay, “On Belief.” There, the 
disinterested procedure posed as an ideal by skepticism seems to be inevitably thwarted by an insidious will to 
believe. For while Godwin insists that “we must be, at all times, and to the last hour of our existence, accessible to 
conviction built upon new evidence” (247) he also admits that when considering any consequential issue there 
appears to be “ever a secret influence urging me earnestly to desire to find one side of the question right and the 
other wrong” (249) and that “[t]hat which we wish to believe, we are already greatly in progress to embrace” (249). 
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episode above, Collins refers to the skeptics’ doubt as “groundless” in the sense of lacking 
rational grounds, but it is better to characterize the doubt I am describing as the affective ground 
from which skeptical doubt draws its critical energies, the raw doubt-as-desire that skepticism 
refines and harnesses. Here it should be clear that I have effectively described the character of 
Caleb’s doubt. It should also be evident that the destabilizing effects achieved by the novel will 
emanate from the unreasonableness of Caleb’s doubt-as-desire. In any case, these effects seem 
too ambivalent to constitute anything like a skeptical program. They faithfully reproduce the 
doubt and uncertainty from which they originate. 
These negative definitions of the novel’s negativity should provide a sense of just how far 
the novel must depart from our usual understanding of the forms negativity can take so that it 
may arrive in uncharted waters or, as Godwin famously declared, “launch [readers] upon a sea of 
moral and political inquiry” (Caleb Williams 451). However, we can begin to sketch out a 
positive account of the novel’s negativity by first identifying the ways that Caleb’s doubt does 
appear to accord with the critique of “reasonable doubt” I have developed from the passage 
above. Once we have pursued this accord to its limit, we can then consider how the 
unreasonableness of Caleb’s doubt necessarily points beyond this critique.  
In light of the legal epistemology I have sketched, we might argue that Caleb’s tendency 
to understand his doubt primarily as a form of curiosity—one that is excessive, unproductive, 
and idiosyncratic or, in Caleb’s terms, “ungoverned,” “infantine,” and “unreasonable” (Godwin, 
Caleb Williams 212, 224)—reflects the extent to which Caleb has internalized the normative 
distinction between reasonable and unreasonable doubt as means for assessing the ethical merit 
(or lack thereof) of his doubt. Indeed, Caleb consistently weighs his skeptical disposition against 
an internalized sense of what a reasonable person would or would not doubt. He continually 
seeks—and fails—to find what he would consider to be rational grounds to justify his 
dissatisfaction with Collins’s narrative. Caleb doubts Hawkins’s guilt even as Hawkins’s alleged 
confession makes him feel “there was no longer a possibility of doubting” (180); he pursues his 
suspicions about Falkland even as “could find nothing that [he] could consider as justifying 
[him] in persisting in the shadow of a doubt” (198) about Falkland’s innocence. In this way, 
Caleb anxiously observes the distance between his doubt as it is and his sense of what it should 
be. 
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Moreover, Caleb’s internalization of these norms helps explain, to some extent, his 
inability to attribute any ethical value to his doubt, despite the many opportunities he has to 
reassess or qualify its value in light of new evidence. Falkland confesses his guilt, Collins reveals 
his narrative to have been compromised by political and practical concerns, but Caleb only 
grows more certain of the unethical and pathological nature of his own doubt. In his retrospective 
attempt to “divid[e] . . . the offensive [and] defensive” (212) parts of his actions, he ends up 
condemning all his behavior leading up to Falkland’s confession. By the novel’s conclusion, 
Caleb has even rejected this division and remains saddled with a sense of guilt many critics have 
found to be, like his curiosity, excessive and inexplicable. Yet, on this reading, any 
dissatisfaction a reader might have with Caleb’s inability to recover any ethical merit in his 
actions or with the excessive sense of guilt that results from this inability should ultimately 
resolve into a dissatisfaction with the normative assumptions that enable Caleb to misread his 
doubt in this way. Caleb’s conversations later in the novel with Collins and Laura—both of 
whom reinforce this misreading—seem designed in part to exacerbate this sense of 
dissatisfaction. And, in this way, the novel recovers the ethical potential of Caleb’s doubt while 
also sowing discontent with institutional efforts to obscure or discredit that ethical potential.  
 Approaching Caleb’s doubt in this recuperative manner illustrates how the novel’s 
negativity carries forward the deconstructive project Godwin pursues against political institutions 
in An Enquiry to Political Justice (1793). In that work we find Godwin similarly invested in 
exposing the various techniques political institutions deploy to condition private acts of judgment 
so they reflect and reinforce the organizing assumptions of the institutions themselves. Caleb’s 
mistaken dismissal of his doubt as idiosyncratic and his consequent inability to perceive its 
ethical and political potential exemplifies the pernicious effects of what Godwin attacks in the 
Enquiry as the attempt to distinguish between public and private spheres of judgment, or, in 
Godwin’s terms, between “conduct in civil concerns” in which positive institutions “may 
properly interfere” and “matters of conscience” in which “positive institutions ought to leave me 
personally free” (Political Justice 75). For Godwin, while such distinctions might appear to 
establish an autonomous sphere where ethical considerations preside independently from 
political interests, their ultimate effect is to consolidate institutional power against the disruptive 
ethical and political potential of conscience. And it is notable that, for Godwin, the tension an 
individual feels between the responsibilities dictated by private judgment and those dictated by 
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institutions often manifests as doubt: an individual’s desire to “believe what is dictated to them” 
by institutions is frustrated by the absence of “that in which belief consists, evidence and 
conviction” (368), resulting in “a perpetual dissatisfaction” (368) which speaks to the “execrable 
tyranny” (368) of any attempt to coerce private judgment.173 Caleb’s doubt thus has the effect of 
both exemplifying this dissatisfaction for and generating this dissatisfaction within the reader. 
Although the novel’s negative project aligns with the deconstructive project of the 
Enquiry in this general sense, the novel’s insistence that the procedural skepticism adopted 
within rational inquiry itself constitutes a form of institutionality that compromises private 
judgment illustrates how the novel manages to extend the Enquiry’s project beyond the limits 
imposed by its own commitment to rationalism. To be sure, throughout the Enquiry Godwin is 
concerned with preserving the autonomy of private judgment against the impositions of 
institutional norms. Yet Godwin also places great faith in the assumption that reason always 
functions in accord with individual conscience, as an instrument and not an impediment to the 
unbiased exercise of private judgment. It is a faith that originates in Godwin’s appreciation for 
the dynamic and progressive nature of rational inquiry, which he characteristically contrasts to 
the stagnancy of custom and dogma. “Refer [people] to reading, to conversation, to meditation,” 
Godwin writes, “but teach them neither creeds nor catechisms, either moral or political” (352). 
Indeed, it is in this spirit that Godwin deploys a rhetoric of reasonableness throughout the 
Enquiry to punctuate his own exercises in private, rational judgment. But this assumption 
regarding the natural alignment of reason and conscience also blinds the Enquiry to how a 
rhetoric of reasonableness might be deployed against conscience as it manifests in “private” 
doubt or how such a rhetoric might be wielded to close down, rather than open up, rational 
inquiry. Yet, this is precisely how Collins (or Paley) deploys such rhetoric. Likewise, these are 
the rhetorical and ideological effects that Caleb must resist to pursue his own unreasonable 
doubt. In this respect, Caleb Williams could be said to turn the Enquiry’s deconstructive project 
on the latent threat of dogmatism posed by the rhetoric of reasonableness that treatise employs. 
 So far, I have approached Caleb’s unreasonable doubt with the assumption that it aligns 
with and reinforces the critique of reasonable doubt I have teased out of the novel’s ironic 
                                                            
173 Moreover, Godwin’s specific critique of legal institutions in the Enquiry involves recovering and elaborating the 
radical ethical implications of the “imperfection” or “uncertainty” of evidence (Godwin Political Justice 381, 401). 
For Godwin, since “[n]o principles of evidence have yet been laid down that are infallible” (78), the “veracity” and 
“competence” of witnesses as accurate and just observers must be subject to “continual doubt” (381).  
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treatment of Collins’s rhetoric of reasonableness. On this assumption, the novel would appear to 
stage a coordinated critique of the legal system that mobilizes doubt and irony to undermine the 
legitimacy of the circumscribed form of doubt that system normalizes in an effort to preserve its 
own legitimacy. From this perspective, the novel’s critique of reasonable doubt also appears to 
align with—and extend in striking and productive ways—the deconstructive project pursued in 
Godwin’s Enquiry. This is a satisfying and neat interpretation of the novel’s interest in 
unreasonable doubt. But it also helps clarify why Caleb’s doubt cannot be perceived as ethically 
viable and must instead be regarded as “unreasonable” in ways that exceed the ideological 
distortions created by the normative account of reasonable doubt. For, on this reading, Caleb’s 
doubt, although wrongly dismissed by the legal system and even by Caleb itself on the basis of 
its private and pathological nature, nonetheless appears to emerge as a viable ethical orientation 
to the problem of judgment under uncertainty. Yet, the novel’s interest in unreasonable doubt 
does not seem to be how unreasonable doubt might replace the circumscribed form of 
“reasonable doubt” adopted within legal theory as, say, a more adequate response to the risks of 
judgment under uncertainty. Rather, the novel’s interest lies in how Caleb’s unreasonable doubt 
reveals the fundamental interestedness of all doubt—that is, how all doubt is grounded in 
desire—in a way that calls into question the viability of doubt as a disinterested ground for legal 
judgment. This point is succinctly captured in a central ethical paradox that frustrates any 
recuperative reading of Caleb’s doubt: as readers, we have no way of knowing that Caleb’s 
doubts about Falkland are justified until he confirms this fact through evidently unjustifiable 
means. Any attempt to assert the ethical viability of Caleb’s doubt requires condoning the 
perverse psychological torture he performs on Falkland to confirm his suspicions. Caleb may not 
be as guilty as he believes, but he is hardly innocent. Further, this ambivalence gestures towards 
the insufficiency of the categories of guilt and innocence to capture Caleb’s moral predicament.  
While many critics have been puzzled by Caleb’s excessive sense of guilt at the novel’s 
end, there has been little debate that Caleb’s suspicions towards Falkland at the beginning of the 
novel are ethically problematic in ways that the reading of Caleb’s doubt I have pursued above 
cannot adequately address. For where I have read Caleb’s tendency to understand his doubt as 
curiosity to be, in some respect, an ideological mechanism that misrepresents an ethical response 
as a pathological one, other critics have persuasively interpreted Caleb’s curiosity to be a 
symptom of other inchoate forms of desire. Some critics, for instance, have argued that Caleb’s 
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curiosity masks a political desire to wield the knowledge of Falkland’s secret crimes against him 
as a means to achieve political power and equality.174 Others have seen Caleb’s compulsive 
curiosity as a symptom of his unspeakable homosocial desire for Falkland.175 Caleb himself at 
one point proposes the compelling explanation that his excessive, suspicious reading of 
Falkland’s behavior amounts to a symptom of his early habit of reading romances, in what 
amounts to a suggestive gesture towards the relation between paranoia and the experience of 
politeness that several critics have since explored in other contexts (Caleb Williams 60).176 On 
one hand, the viability and mutual compatibility of these different interpretations should attest to 
the overdetermined nature of Caleb’s doubt; this interpretive excess could be said to simply 
reproduce the affective excesses that condition Caleb’s doubt. On the other hand, although this 
interpretive excess appears to present several competing or complementary desires “motivating” 
Caleb’s doubt, it also attests more fundamentally to the indeterminate nature of Caleb’s doubt —
that is, its lack of clear motive, interest, or aim. It is as if Caleb’s doubt radiates interestedness 
even as it does not display interestedness in any of its recognizable forms. The fact that no single 
interpretation of his curiosity feels any more viable than the other confirms this indeterminacy. 
And this observation lends some credence to Caleb’s tendency to characterize his curiosity as 
immature and inexplicable instead of sinister or malicious. Indeed, even as critics have perceived 
something much more sinister behind his treatment of Falkland than “curiosity” can address, 
they have rarely suggested that Caleb is conscious of or consciously concealing the desires that 
motivate his curiosity. Instead, it is much more common to read Caleb as a victim of his 
repressed desires or other ideological mechanisms.177  
Rather than attempting to ascribe some specific motive or desire to Caleb’s doubt, it 
seems more productive to consider how the indeterminate nature of Caleb’s desire itself 
generates an irresistible but problematic urge in the reader to doubt his motivations even as 
                                                            
174See, for instance, Handwerk 951–53, which also persuasively argues that Caleb’s guilt reflects Caleb’s inability to 
recontextualize, and thus rationalize, his own actions within an ideological framework in the same way he can 
Falkland’s at the end of the published version of the novel. 
175 See Gold, “It’s Only Love;” Corber, “Representing the ‘Unspeakable;’” and Sedgwick 116–17.  
176 For instance, see Jesse Molesworth’s recent discussion in Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel of the novel 
as a “weapon against Enlightenment” that fosters the illogical and excessive expectations about the causal and 
teleological shape of everyday experience (Molesworth 6–7). 
177 For instance, Gold and Handwerk pursue their ideological readings explicitly against the assumption that Caleb’s 
behavior can be attributed to personal idiosyncrasy or pathology. Even Uphaus, who objects to reading Caleb’s 
behavior in terms of the “corrupting influences of social and political institutions” (279), nonetheless mitigates 
Caleb’s agency by asserting that “Caleb’s curiosity is not entirely governed by conscious control: his instincts 
exceed his control and always drive him forward” (282).  
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Caleb’s desires remain inaccessible. Of course, as I have already suggested, this lingering 
dissatisfaction with Caleb’s doubt is important in itself for the way that it disrupts any moral or 
ethical certainties that might potentially be inferred from Caleb’s act of discovering Falkland’s 
guilt. Even though, against the background of the ineffective and compromised procedural doubt 
of the legal institution, Caleb’s doubt somehow emerges as a more ethical response to judgment 
under uncertainty, the reader’s sense that Caleb’s doubt is grounded in illegitimate desire—
which remains even after Falkland confesses—makes it difficult to attribute any ethical or legal 
value to his discovery. The ethical dilemma manages to exceed the mutually exclusive logic of 
ethical judgment in a way that evacuates it of its meaning. In this context it seems possible to say 
that Caleb’s doubt is somehow unethical yet ethical, but to say this is to say nothing at all about 
Caleb’s doubt. Instead, it is to demonstrate the insufficiency of these categories themselves to 
respond to the complexity introduced by uncertainty. But it seems equally important that this 
dissatisfaction—that is, the reader’s conviction that Caleb’s doubt is somehow motivated by 
illegitimate desire—remains even as the reader has no means of resolving the indeterminacy 
surrounding Caleb’s doubt-as-desire, no means of confirming this suspicion. It reflects the extent 
to which the reader’s doubt is itself unreasonable, propelled but also compromised by the desire 
to judge Caleb’s actions finally as ethical or unethical, interested or disinterested. In this way, the 
novel embraces the ethical dilemma presented by Caleb’s doubt as a productive site of negativity 
and exploits it to sow a more fundamental doubt about the legitimacy of ethical judgments, one 
captured in Caleb’s own progressive dissatisfaction with his former belief that innocence and 
guilt were “things in the whole world most opposite to each other” (243) as he discovers that 
such a belief is “impossible . . . to hold” once one is “conversant with the passions and 
institutions of men” (404). 
 
Coda: Romantic Doubt 
 While the striking deconstruction of eighteenth-century constructive skepticism Caleb 
Williams performs seems to be only a by-product of the novel’s more ambitious pursuit of the 
destabilizing excesses of negativity, the presence and precision of that critique suggest the 
potential for reading the form of doubt the novel recovers—what I have characterized as doubt 
“before skepticism”—as a specifically “Romantic” form of doubt that constitutes, to some 
extent, a Romantic reaction to the conservative and constructive character of eighteenth-century 
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rational skepticism. By characterizing this Romantic doubt as a “reaction” to skepticism in this 
way, I expect readers to hear echoes of Stanley Cavell’s interpretation of Romanticism as a 
response to Kant’s “settlement” with skepticism. But, by recalling Cavell, my aim is also to 
demonstrate how this form of Romantic doubt offers a significant challenge to Cavell’s thesis 
and, further, reveals the more conservative aspect of Cavell’s account of Romanticism.  
 To draw out this challenge, I want to focus on the way that Cavell constricts or limits the 
possible forms that any Romantic “reaction” to—and, particularly, against—Kant’s settlement 
with skepticism might take. Cavell imagines the Romantic response to Kant’s settlement to have 
two faces. One face, which Cavell calls “avoidance,” registers a fundamental dissatisfaction with 
the limits Kant places on our ability to access the thing-in-itself, while the other, which Cavell 
calls “acknowledgment,” accepts the validity of and stability afforded by Kant’s limits on 
knowledge. In one sense, Cavell sees these twin reactions as dynamically constructed and 
mutually reinforcing: the Romantic “simultaneously craves [the] comfort [of Kant’s idea of 
limitation] and crave[s] escape from its comfort . . . as if the one stance produced the wish for the 
other” (Quest for the Ordinary 32). But, in another, Cavell sees them as a two-phase progression 
that amounts to a maturation. While Cavell empathizes with the Romantic response of 
“avoidance” (“You don’t—do you? —have to be a romantic to feel sometimes about that 
settlement: Thanks for nothing” [31]), it is evident that Cavell regards “acknowledgement” as the 
more productive, mature, and theoretically interesting response. For whereas the strategy of 
avoidance entails for Cavell pursuing the idle Romantic fantasies of animism and solitude, the 
strategy of acknowledgement sets to the responsible tasks of accepting and adjusting to the hard 
limits established by language as a social form and, further, of working within these confines to 
remake and contribute to (ordinary) language so that it reflects common interests and desires.  
 Cavell’s preferred project of acknowledgement and adjustment continues to influence 
approaches to Romanticism in ways that testify to its critical sophistication and potential.178 But 
one issue with Cavell’s interpretation is that, because he ultimately accepts the philosophical 
authority of Kant’s settlement—he refers to it as “the most stable philosophical settlement in the 
modern period” (31)—Cavell has a fairly limited conception of what rejecting Kant’s settlement 
                                                            
178For two recent studies informed by Cavell’s project of acknowledgment and adjustment, see Nersessian, Utopia, 
Limited: Romanticism and Adjustment and Duffy, The Constitution of Shelley’s Poetry: The Argument of Language 
in Prometheus Unbound. For another important critical engagement with Cavell’s approach to Romanticism, see 
Roberts, Chaos of History, esp. 19-24.   
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might entail. And he assumes, ultimately, that Kant’s settlement sets the conditions for any 
response to it. Cavell’s strategy of avoidance may have the Romantic reject the terms of Kant’s 
settlement, but only after she has accepted Kant’s characterization of the problem of knowledge 
as valid and authoritative (if only to overcome it on his terms). Yet, the negativity I have 
explored in this essay points us to an alternative form the Romantic rejection of Kant’s 
settlement might take. In this form, the Romantic’s dissatisfaction with Kant lies not with the 
ways Kant’s limit cordons off certain knowledge or denies transcendence but in the way that 
Kant’s settlement misrepresents the nature or extent of the threat to judgment posed by 
uncertainty. Romantic doubt, as informed by negativity, does not reject Kant’s limits themselves 
but rather rejects the false comfort with uncertainty and false confidence in our ability to 
overcome its threat that those limits promote. Instead, Romantic doubt would cultivate a 
discomfort with the risks uncertainty poses and sow doubt about our ability to overcome or even 
know them. Romantic doubt is the “awful doubt” (Shelley 77) of Shelley’s “Mont Blanc” that an 
unflinching view of Nature as mystery recommends: a sense of doubt that is informed by an awe 
of uncertainty, that stands in opposition to the mild “faith” in our ability to reconcile ourselves 
with uncertainty through positive means, and that “but for such faith” would achieve this 
(negative) reconciliation and likewise “. . . repeal / Large codes of fraud and woe” (80–81). The 
discontent with “moral certainty” Romantic doubt names clarifies the political and ethical charge 
of Keats’s formulation of negative capability as “being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, 
without any irritable reaching after fact and reason” (492). From the perspective of Romantic 
doubt, Keats’s negative capability does not recommend relinquishing our desire for absolute 
certainty or cultivating an ease with uncertainty. Rather, it cautions against the “irritable,” false 
comfort that follows from believing that we can conquer uncertainty through constructions of 
fact and reason. It is a reminder that even to reach for fact or reason is to underestimate the threat 








Thinking Beyond Neo-Kantian Romanticism 
 
My approach throughout the dissertation has been predominantly negative and polemic, 
focused on directly engaging and contesting the neo-Kantian picture of Romanticism and the 
neo-Kantian approach to intellectual history that informs it. In this conclusion, therefore, I want 
to gesture towards a more constructive account of what Romanticism might look were we 
abandon this foundational neo-Kantian approach with its instrumental topos of crisis.  
In some sense, it seems impossible to think beyond neo-Kantian Romanticism without 
fundamentally altering a foundational picture of British Romanticism. By this, I do not only 
mean that neo-Kantian intellectual history was the indispensable ground on which a modern 
theory of Romanticism was constructed. I also mean that the theoretical concept of Romanticism 
itself seems to be a distinctly intellectual-historical formation. Neo-Kantian intellectual history – 
with its emphasis on a break into modernity -- encourages a certain revolutionary image of 
Romanticism, which in turn provides the sharp dramatic contours that make neo-Kantian 
intellectual history compelling.  Moreover, as Clifford Siskin and William Warner have 
suggested in their recent search for a new model of Romanticism, it is possible to approach 
intellectual history as a Romantic mode of historical inquiry, one premised on distinctly 
Romantic assumptions about the role individual ideas and individuals play as agents of historical 
change. For Warner and Siskin, the history of ideas is “deeply implicated in Romanticism itself” 
(287), and intellectual history is finally more a manner of “being Romantic” than a means of 
“put[ting] Romanticism into history” (283). Thinking beyond neo-Kantian Romanticism would 
arguably then require abandoning precisely the style of intellectual-historical reading that has 
encouraged the construction and elaboration of the theory of Romanticism. Indeed, with Siskin 
and Warner in view, it seems possible to argue that the neo-Kantian topos of crisis I have 
explored is itself a legacy of Romanticism, a style and critical sensibility importantly embraced 
and cultivated within Romantic literature. 
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To be sure, the theory of Romanticism is so thoroughly bound up with modern 
intellectual history that, although I do think we should ultimately distance ourselves from a neo-
Kantian approach to Romanticism, I do not believe we should abandon a critical and historical 
interest in the mutual imbrication between the theory of Romanticism and the practice of (neo-
Kantian) intellectual history. Indeed, in this dissertation I have attempted to demonstrate the 
necessity and critical payoff of such an interest. Yet, as Siskin and Warner observe, the 
intractable problem with approaching Romanticism through the history of ideas – one that my 
study confirms – is that such an intellectual-historical approach tends to overestimate the 
revolutionary or radically different character of Romanticism. In the terms I have developed in 
this dissertation, we might say that neo-Kantian intellectual history encourages a view of 
Romanticism as a site of a critical inflection point: nothing sort of the beginning of modernity.  
Instead of approach Romanticism as such critical or revolutionary event in the “history of 
ideas,” Siskin and Warner propose that we should approach the Romantic period as an 
“eventuality” in a “history of mediations.” Here “mediation” functions as a “shorthand for the 
work done by tools, by what we would now call ‘media’ of every kind – everything that 
intervenes, enables, supplements, or is simply in-between” (282). For Siskin and Warner, this 
broader concept of mediations allows us to study not only the abstract “ideas” operative in 
traditional intellectual history but also the mediated networks which enable, circulate, and 
reproduce these abstractions. Within a history of mediations, Siskin and Warner argue, 
Romanticism would name an “eventuality” rather than an “event” (283) since Romanticism 
amounts to contingent effect of a prior, more significant event in the history of mediation, the 
Enlightenment. And attending to this new set of objects means “not all periods have the same 
purchase on change” (290). For Siskin and Warner, Romanticism is “the condition of begin after 
the event” (288) of the Enlightenment, of encountering and responding to the elaboration and 
saturation of the different historically-specific forms of mediation developed during the 
Enlightenment. In another formulation, Romanticism occurs on the “operational platform” 
provided by Enlightenment forms of mediation (285). On this view, the Victorian period would 
entail an even narrower set of contingencies on top of the platform of Romanticism. For Siskin 
and Warner, if the Enlightenment is “an event,” then “Romanticism is an eventuality, and the 
Victorian is a variation” (289): each successive period is built on a “platform” of mediations 
established by the previous period. 
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Siskin and Warner’s picture of Romanticism as “eventuality” provides a welcome 
alternative to the longstanding emphasis on crisis and discontinuity within Romantic studies. But 
their turn to mediation likewise promises to provide solid theoretical ground for the revised 
history of the relation of Romanticism to Enlightenment skepticism I have pursued in this 
dissertation. This is because, in the history of mediations, what becomes significant are not 
individual ideas but widely adopted “protocols:” which Siskin and Warner gloss as “enabling 
constraints: the rules, codes, and habitual practices that help secure the channels, spaces, and 
means of production and communication” (284). Indeed, in this dissertation, I have tried to re-
imagine skepticism as a “protocol” in this sense, a habitual practice widely, if also cautiously, 
endorsed as a means of knowledge verification and error reduction since the seventeenth century. 
In a history of ideas, the most momentous events of the history of modern skepticism might 
appear to be Hume’s Treatise or even Kant’s critical project. But, in a history of mediations, the 
more important events would have been the more diffuse and progressive embrace of 
constructive skeptical protocols, an emerging appreciation for rational skepticism as a form of 
intellectual rigor and probity rather than pathological perversity. Warner and Siskin describe 
Romanticism as an “eventuality” that took place on the “operational platform” established by 
Enlightenment protocols (285). Humean epistemological skepticism might be viewed in similar 
terms: an eventuality or variation upon the more foundational event of constructive skepticism. 
From a neo-Kantian perspective, literary Romanticism has always appeared to engage 
this more exotic – and distinctively “modern” – mode of Humean epistemological skepticism. 
But, when we approach Romanticism as responding to the broader “platform” of constructive 
skepticism – in this sense, the constructive skeptical ethos widely promoted by intellectuals of all 
stripes — the relation of Romanticism and skepticism takes on a much different character. 
Indeed, the Romantics appear equally ambivalent about skepticism as they always have in neo-
Kantian intellectual history, but the nature and character of this anxiety is different. For whereas 
a neo-Kantian perspective proposes that Romantics worried over the radical implications of 
skepticism, my account suggests that Romantics were instead ambivalent about the confident and 
conservative character of instrumental or procedural skepticism. And this perspective reveals a 
more precise Romantic attention to the rhetorical or social character of skepticism, one that neo-
Kantian history has routinely overlooked because of its uncritical embrace of skepticism as an 
intellectual procedure. In my readings, I have tried to suggest that Romantic writers approach 
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skepticism with a characteristic reflexivity trained on the blindspot that accrues around the 
practice of skepticism itself, one that can only be registered by attending to skepticism, on one 
hand, as a tacit, almost reflexive or instinctive modern protocol and, on the other, as a social and 
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